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Abstract 
Although the Eritrean-Ethiopian war (1998-2000) has been analysed by a large number of 
researchers, the impact of organisational culture on the war has been neglected. This thesis 
employs the constructivist theories of Elizabeth Kier in order to examine the impact of 
organisational culture on Ethiopian decision-making before and during the war and uses the 
findings to produce policy advice for this and other conflicts. 
The thesis' main contribution to the study of the specific Eritrean-Ethiopian war is the 
revelation that organisational culture in a variety of organisations had serious effects on the 
bilateral relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, effects that can not be explained by 
ethnically, economically or geographically defined factors. The thesis' main contribution to 
the field of peace research is a strong warning: calling for caution when policy makers want to 
apply some of the more generally prescribed policy guidelines within the field, and 
controversially suggesting that some of the most common advice, as for example the advice to 
support the oppositional press in order to promote peace, might, if not planned properly, lead 
to more conflict rather than promote peace. 
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Acronyms and Glossary 
ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement): ANDM, the second most important organisation 
within the ruling party of Ethiopia, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 
originated in a splinter group from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), called Ethiopian 
People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). The organisation was established in 1981. It was reorganised 
along ethnical lines and changed its name to ANDM in 1991. Oromo members then left for the OPDO. 
AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation): Oppositional party organised by Amhara intellectuals after 
EPRDF's takeover in 1991. The organisation has close links with the newspaper ANDINET. Today AAPO 
has changed its name to All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) in order to reflect a broader ethnic basis. It is 
also a member of the largest oppositional umbrella party in Ethiopia, the Coalition for Unity and 
Development (CUD). 
Bado Shewate (The 7th Unit): The security unit of the TPLF, in charge of internal and external security. 
Derg: Amharic for `committee'. It became the popular name for the post-imperial and supposedly 
Marxist Ethiopian regime which lasted from 1974, when Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed, until 1991. 
Dimitse Weyane Bitew (The Voice of Weyane): TPLF's Radio Station 
EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union): Originating from the organisation Teranafit, organised around 
nobility struggling to re-impose the monarchy after the revolution in 1974. In the 1970's EDU was 
supported by the United States. Today the organisation is a political party in Ethiopia, within the UEDP- 
Medhin coalition that in turn is a member of the largest oppositional umbrella party in Ethiopia, the 
Coalition for Unity and Development (CUD). 
EFFORT (Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray): Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front 
(EPRDF)-controlled NGO promoting development in Tigray 
EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front): Formed by an amalgamation of disenchanted members of 
the older Ethiopian Liberation Front (ELF) in the early 1970's, the EPLF was predominantly led by, and 
composed of, Tigrinya-speaking highland Christians but it also sought to recruit beyond the highland 
provinces of Eritrea. Purportedly secular, it adopted Marxist rhetoric (and a number of apparently Marxist 
policies) in its early years. 
EPRDF (The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front): The umbrella organisation 
currently governing Ethiopia. EPRDF consists of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), which are the two oldest organisations, as well as the 
newer Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic 
Front (SEPDF) and a large number of smaller ethnically based organisations. 
EPRP (The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party): EPRP emerged in the mid-1970s as one of the 
main opposition organisations working against the Derg. It also exists today as a component of the largest 
oppositional alliance. 
ESM (Ethiopian Student Movement): Name used for the student activists politically active in Ethiopian 
universities during the late 60's, early 70's. These students later led all of the powerful Ethiopian political 
organisations. Arguably, ESM also influenced the political direction of the Derg. These students are also 
often called the Generation or the Generation that shook the mountains. 
Kebele: The smallest geographically defined administrative unit in Ethiopia 
MLLT (Marxist Leninist League of Tigray): Marxist cadre organisation within the TPLF containing 
more or less all of TPLF's leaders. MLLT has never been officially abandoned. 
Nakfa: Eritrean currency from 1998 and onwards 
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OLF (Oromo Liberation Front): An organisation fighting for the rights of the Oromo ethnic group. OLF 
fought the Derg from 1973 until the Derg's fall in 1991. From 1991 until 1992 OLF was in alliance with 
the EPRDF. The organisation clashed with the EPRDF during the 1992 elections, and it is today banned in 
Ethiopia. 
OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic Organisation): Established in 1989 as an organisation for Oromos 
within the EPRDF. Originally it consisted of many officers from the Derg that had changed sides. 
However, former Oromo EPRP members joined OPDO from 1991 and onwards. Other OPDO leaders 
came from the EPDM when this organisation became an Amhara based organisation in 1991. 
Palace Group: Nickname for Meles Zenawi's supporters during the showdown between the two fractions 
within the TPLF in Mekele 2001. The nickname indicates the supporters' supposed lack of contact with 
Tigray. 
PFDJ (Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice): The new name of the EPLF, and also, in effect, the 
only legal party in Eritrea today. 
Shemek: Special force units of the Derg specialising in counter insurgency operations (COIN), anti - 
guerrilla warfare. 
SEPDF (Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front): The weakest of the larger EPRDF 
organisations. It is in itself an umbrella organisation consisting of many smaller ethnically defined 
organisations representing ethnic minorities in the South Western Ethiopia. 
Tigray: The northernmost province of Ethiopia which is inhabited by predominantly Tigrinya (see below) 
speaking people, and therefore sharing much in the way of culture, language and history with adjacent 
highland Eritrea. 
Tigrinya: The dominant language of highland Eritrea and much of Tigray, and therefore shared by the 
EPLF and the TPLF. The term can also be used to refer to culture and custom in the same areas. 
TNO (Tigrayan National Organisation): Originally named Mahber Gesgesti Bihere Tigray (MAGEBT), 
it is the predecessor of TPLF. 
TPLF (The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front): The organisation emerged in 1974-5 from the TNO. 
By the late 1970's it was the dominant movement in Tigrayan nationalist politics, having largely cleared 
the field of both local and pan-Ethiopian rivals. A primarily guerrilla movement, generally eschewing 
conventional warfare until the late 1980's, it was deeply rooted in the Tigrayan peasantry although its 
leaders were mostly middle class and educated and, like the EPLF, inspired by Marxism in thought. TPLF 
is the most important party within the EPRDF. 
TUSA (Tigrayan University Student Organisation): Organisation for Tigrayan Students at the Addis 
Ababa University during the early 1970's; many of the future TPLF leaders were members of the 
organisation. 
UNMEE (United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia): The United Nation Peace Keepers stationed 
at the Eritrean-Ethiopian border to oversee the implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement 
Weyane: Popular Tigrayan rebellion against the Emperor in 1943, crushed by Ethiopian and British forces. 
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NOTE: 
REGARDING THE SPELLING OF PROPER NAMES: Proper names in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea tend to be spelled in various ways. In this thesis one version has been chosen for each 
person/place. However, in direct quotations, the spelling has been kept as in the original. 
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Introduction 
On 6th May 1998 patrols of the Eritrean army clashed with Ethiopian militia. Seemingly 
surprising both of the belligerents, the initial small-scale clash developed into a full-scale war, 
involving around half a million soldiers. I It was a war fought between two of the poorest 
countries in the world and diverted money from healthcare and development projects. 140 000 
Eritreans and Ethiopians lost their lives before the war ended, and over one million refugees 
fled their homes. 2 Moreover, the belligerents involved their local allies in Somalia, leading to 
conflict in yet another poor country. The war thus had large consequences for a substantial 
number of people and was a tragedy for the millions living in these areas of the Horn. 
Foreign observers were puzzled by the outbreak of the armed conflict. The two 
belligerents had previously been seen as good friends and their leaders had been regarded as 
members of a new generation of African leaders, supposedly promoting democratisation, 
peace and development. 3 The war was also puzzling given many of the theories exploring the 
general causes of war. One could not, as the researcher Samuel Huntington does, speak of a 
clash of civilisations. Members of the "Muslim civilization" were killing each other, as were 
members of the "Christian civilization". Both countries were internally divided by religion, 
nevertheless they also easily managed to keep a united front outwards. 4 Similarly, 
explanations centred on ethnicity and tribalism, which are often viewed as Africa's great 
plague, seem to be unable to explain the war. Ethnic groups were divided and fought internal 
wars, members of ethnic groups in Ethiopia fought their ethnic kinsmen with Eritrean 
citizenship. Faced with this seemingly unexplainable war, some western observers resorted to 
the terminology of madness. 5 
This thesis enquires into the causes of this so-called madness, as well as the factors 
that hindered the various attempts to end the war after it had started. The main objective of 
the thesis is to reveal new aspects of the process that led to the armed conflict. 6 It will do this 
1 This estimate includes the Aideed Somali National Army (SNA) fraction in Somalia, the Rahanwhein Resistance Army 
(RRA), The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and the Ogadeen National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), guerrilla groups involved in the fighting at various stages. The two belligerents themselves fielded 440 000 soldiers 2 Human Rights Watch, "Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 
1998 - April 2002), " (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 3. 3 See for example Marina Ottoway, "Africa's New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem?, " Current History 97, no. 
5 (1998), "Old Comrades Spurn Peace in Horn of Africa., " The London Times 9 June 1998. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996). 
s "Intervju Med Torbjern Jagland, " Verdens Gang 1 October 1998. 
6 Wallensteen and Sollenberg define major armed conflict as a prolonged combat between two or more governments or of 
one government and at least one organised armed group, with at least 1000 deaths in the duration of conflict. Their definition 
in order to create policy guidelines that can be employed to avoid war or to ease tension 
between the two belligerents. Given the many questions left open even five years since the 
war ended, and the still tense situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the purpose of the thesis 
holds a grim actuality. 
In order to attain its objective, the thesis draws upon constructivist-based 
organisational theory, never previously employed to study the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. The 
thesis examines some of the most important organisations in Ethiopian society: the 
newspapers and the various member organisations of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), their organisational culture and its impact on the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian relationship. Importantly, the thesis explores factors preventing the restoration of 
peace after the war had broken out as well as factors leading up to the war. 
Addressing Problems within Peace Research 
The scope of the thesis goes beyond providing new insights with regards to the factors 
causing the war. The thesis is situated within the field of peace research, and by providing 
policy guidelines it attempts to deal with some of the problems facing the discipline. 
Present-day European peace research was essentially shaped by the East-West 
conflict. Much of the research conducted during the Cold War focused on the Cold-War 
frontlines in Europe. Researchers had been studying the rest of the world, but most commonly 
analyzed it in the light of the Cold War. ' When the East-West relationship changed, peace 
research in many ways lost its foundation. As the peace researcher Christian Scherrer argues, 
researchers now had to confront cases like Rwanda and Somalia, not the well known bipolar 
world of the Cold War. Notably, the peace researchers failed to have an impact on these new 
wars, and often failed to have influence on strategies chosen by decision-makers. 8 Christian 
Scherrer gives the causes for the many failures: 
They had to do, firstly, with the way in which most peace-research facilities 
were concentrated in and on Europe and North America (and not on the major 
will be used in this thesis. Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg, "Major Armed Conflicts, " in Sipri Yearbook 1997, 
ed. Margareta Sollenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 17. 
Christian P Scherrer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001), 1-10. 
8 Ibid., 8. 
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areas of conflict), secondly, with the fact that in many countries peace and 
conflict research was still subsumed under military sociology, and thirdly, with 
the sad state of empirical research and the almost total lack of on-the-spot 
knowledge of violent conflict. The latter had and still has probably the most 
serious impact on the outcomes of established peace and conflict research. The 
balance between the theoretical and empirical work is missing, hence there is 
little corrective against speculative research outcomes. 9 
Although there are many exceptions to this trend Christian P. Scherrer rightly argues that 
there are enormous gaps in peace research. I° He argues that there are massive lacks in in- 
depth local knowledge, as well as in knowledge of the practical implementation of ideas and 
strategies of preventive and constructive conflict resolution. By exploring the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian war, some shortcomings of the general theories within peace research, hampering 
the construction of good policy guidelines, are addressed. Additionally, new policy advice, 
based on local knowledge, is designed. In this way the thesis contributes to the general field 
of peace research, by re-evaluating some of the standard advice given by peace researchers, as 
well as by providing new policy advice. 
Because of the current tense situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, such advice might 
still be needed to address this particular conflict. Policy advice deduced from the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian case might also be useful in order to address other wars as well. 
Utilising Constructivism in Order to Explore New Aspects of the Conflict 
The Eritrean-Ethiopian war has been studied in detail by area specialists. " Most of the 
researchers studying the war focus on three different factors. The first is a focus on states, the 
second is a focus on the historical and cultural factors influencing ethnic groups and the third 
is a focus on individual self- interest. This thesis takes a different approach. Focusing on 
9 Ibid., 9. 
10lbid., 5. 
" Kinfe Abraham, Ethio-Eritrean History, Liberation Struggle, Statehood and Bilateral Political Economic Social and 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean War (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
Development, 2004), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 
5, no. 25 (2000), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea and Ethiopia Are at War, " Briefing 
paper, New Series, no. 6 (1999), Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean 
Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 2000), Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics 
of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 (forthcoming). 
3 
organisational culture, it argues that organisational culture and organisational interaction also 
had a negative impact on Eritrean-Ethiopian relations. Studying a level of decision-making 
seldom studied in the case of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, it thus opens up new grounds for 
future research. Similarly, it goes beyond the most common general approaches to the study 
of war. While statistical and more holistic approaches to war might disclose important facts 
about conflicts, they often compare states and/or ethnic groups and view them as homogenous 
entities. The constructivist theorist used in this thesis, Elizabeth Kier, warns explicitly against 
this focus. Her claim is that sub-groups within a society, such as for example organisations, 
can have distinct cultures, and that the interaction between these sub-groups will influence the 
decision making of a state. 12 A Kirean approach will thus put focus on more or less neglected 
elements of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, so in this sense the thesis also contributes to the 
specific study of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. 
The theories of Elizabeth Kier are widely regarded as a part of the wider constructivist 
research approach. Constructivism focuses on how actors or groups form their understanding 
of the world through social interaction, an understanding that eventually influences their 
actions and defines goals and the available means to achieve them. Such an understanding 
might in turn influence new actions that contribute to armed conflict. Moreover, the 
constructivist approach has seldom been employed in order to understand war, and this thesis 
thus focuses on social processes that previously have been almost entirely left out of the study 
of most other wars. 13 
This thesis has three central research questions. These questions are designed to identify 
relevant information, and subsequently to use such information to produce policy advice. 
The questions are: 
1) Did the organisational culture of key actors influence Ethiopian decision-making 
before and during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in ways that promoted war or prevented 
peace? 
2) If so, where did such negative traits of organisational culture originate? 
12 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
13 Erik Rigmar's study of the Swedish intervention in the thirty years war is perhaps the exception. Erik Rigmar, Identity, 
Interest and Action. A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
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3) Given the answers to questions one and two, what kind of policy advice can be given 
in order to promote peace? 
These questions will form the basis of the analysis conducted in this thesis. 
Importantly, the aim of the thesis is not to falsify other theories, but to contribute to the 
formation of policy advice. This means that the results can be complementary to several of the 
previous theories exploring the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, as well as theories exploring other 
wars. 
Chapter Outline 
In order to analyse the role of organisational culture in the Eritrean-Ethiopian war and to 
deduce policy advices based on such an analysis, it is first necessary to establish an 
appropriate theoretical and methodological framework, then to proceed by using this 
framework to examine the organisational culture of influential organisations and then 
subsequently use the findings of such an analysis to explore policy advice. Correspondingly, 
this thesis is divided into three parts: the first part deals with methodology and theory, the 
second part with the analysis of the organisations and the third part with the exploration of 
policy advice. 
Chapter one, part one, provides a short introduction to peace research and discusses its 
normative foundations situating this thesis within an activist/ problem-solving tradition of 
peace research. Moreover, the chapter presents an introduction to constructivism, and presents 
Elizabeth Kier's version of constructivism in more detail. It demonstrates how a focus on 
organisational culture highlights aspects of decision-making procedures seldom studied in 
relation to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Chapter two details the research methods used in this 
thesis: process tracing, interviews, interview techniques and the study of written sources. 
Methodology and methods are a way to ensure that the information gathered holds high 
quality, and subsequently ensures that the policy advice given has a solid foundation. 
Part two of the thesis, consisting of chapters three, four, five, six and seven, explores the 
various organisational cultures with influence on the process leading up to the war. This part 
also explores how organisational culture influenced the peace process after the war had 
started. The main argument is that elements of the organisational culture of several 
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organisations had a negative impact on the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. Chapter three 
argues that previous approaches have neglected the elements of the organisational culture that 
influenced the process leading to the war. Moreover, the chapter argues that previous 
approaches almost entirely neglected sub-group interaction within important organisations, a 
level of analysis that can be examined by employing Elizabeth Kier's theories. In chapters 
four, five, six and seven Kier's theories are used to analyse various organisations in Ethiopian 
society, organisations that play a big role in Ethiopia's public life. The first of these chapters 
examines the organisational culture of the Ethiopian newspapers. It explores how the rhetoric 
from the previous regime, the Derg, remained important amongst several newspapers, even 
after the regime fell, and argues that this was partly because of organisational culture. 
Subsequently it argues that this influenced the general coverage of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
relationship, resulting in a newspaper coverage pushing for a more hawkish policy towards 
Eritrea. 
The next chapter moves from the newspapers influencing the public discourses in Ethiopia 
to the umbrella organisation governing in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front 
(EPRDF). Chapter five argues that the EPRDF's past ideology, Marxism, influenced their 
decision making even after it had been officially rejected. Based on primary interviews with 
persons who have not previously spoken about the war, the chapter argues that remaining 
Marxist elements in the organisational culture hindered peace/ border negotiations when 
mediators associated with their old ideological enemies tried to facilitate this/were engaged in 
parallel negotiations. Remaining old ideological assumptions made groups within the EPRDF 
perceive third parties as linked to Eritrea. Chapter six narrows the focus, focusing on the two 
most important organisations within the EPRDF, namely the Tigray People's Liberation Front 
(TPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). The chapter explores the 
guerrilla traditions of these organisations, and, drawing upon interviews with key EPRDF 
party officials never interviewed on these topics before, demonstrates that these traditions 
produced a habitual tendency to focus on secrecy and security that subsequently created 
problems for the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. Chapter seven makes a detailed analysis of 
the most powerful organisation within the EPRDF, the TPLF. It argues that the TPLF's 
almost obsessive worship of Tigrayan farmers, which was entrenched in their organisational 
culture, allowed the tension to increase in Tigray, as local authorities failed to deal with 
locally initiated actions targeting Eritreans. 
The third and last part of the thesis deduces policy guidelines. Chapter eight presents 
the new insights that can be gained from the analysis, thus contributing to the specific study of 
6 
the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. The chapter uses these new insights in order to re-examine and 
change some of the traditional policy advice given by peace researchers as well as to stipulate 
new policy guidelines. In this way it contributes to the general field of peace research. 
The main contribution to the field of peace research is a strong warning, a call for 
caution when policy makers want to apply some of the more generally prescribed policy 
guidelines within the field: the thesis controversially suggests that some of the most common 
advice, such as for example the advice to support the oppositional press in order to promote 
peace, might, if not planned properly, lead to more conflict rather than promote peace. The 
main contribution to the study of the specific Eritrean Ethiopian war is the revelation that 
organisational culture in a variety of organisations had serious effects on the bilateral 
relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, effects that can not be explained by ethnically, 
economically or geographically defined factors. 14 In this sense the thesis contains a second 
warning, addressed to the analyst studying this war: it warns against examining the 
belligerents as more homogeneous than they really were and the belief that ethnic or national 
groups are the only form of groups that can have a distinct culture. 
" Importantly, this thesis does not argue that the cultural elements identified here are the only ones that influenced the war, 
but the research conducted indicates that these specific elements of the organisational culture of various EPRDF 
organisations and newspapers were of vital significance. 
7 
Part I: Theory and Methodology 
Chapter 1: A Constructivist Approach to Problem-Solving Peace 
Research 
This thesis studies some of the factors that led to the recent Eritrean- Ethiopian war, drawing 
upon theories within peace research and constructivism. The purpose of this chapter is to 
situate the thesis theoretically within the field of peace research. In addition, the chapter 
presents the constructivist theories underlying the analysis and shows how this theoretical 
approach can lead to new insights on how to contribute to ending armed conflicts. The thesis 
is thus located within a specific activist peace research tradition that sees the researcher as an 
activist, an active participant in political processes, offering suggestions for policies to 
promote peace. While descriptive peace research, satisfied with describing the causes of peace 
and conflict rather than offering advice, is now quite common, the tradition focusing on 
giving advice contains notable founding fathers and mothers of peace research such as Johan 
Galtung, John Burton and Kenneth and Elise Boulding. Moreover, the ideal of giving advice 
in order to create peace in many ways led to the foundation of peace research itself. ' 
This thesis uses constructivism as a tool to produce policy advice. Although 
constructivists have attempted to explain the outbreak of war or proclaimed the employability 
of constructivism within peace research, none has so far used constructivism in order to make 
policy guidelines. 2 In order to perform such a task, the constructivist theories of Elizabeth 
Kier are employed. 
Section one of the chapter presents the problem-solving peace research tradition this 
thesis is situated within, and also discusses some of the critiques of this tradition. Section 
two starts with a general presentation of constructivism and considers some of the theoretical 
connections between constructivism and peace research. Section three concentrates on 
explaining the main ideas of Elizabeth Kier, the constructivist theorist employed in the thesis. 
1 Elise Boulding, New Agendas for Peace Research; Conflict and Security Re-Examined (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 
Kenneth Boulding, "The War Trap, " in Towards a Just World Order, ed. Richard Falk (Boulder: Westview, 1998), John 
Burton, Conflict and Communication (London: Macmillan, 1969), Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: 
Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Building, " in Peace, War and Defence - Essays in Peace Research (Oslo: Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), 1975), Johan Galtung, "The Next Twenty Five Years of Peace Research: Tasks and 
Prospects, " Oxford Projects for Peace Studies 26, no. 6 (1988), Johan Galtung, "Commentary" (paper presented at the Prion 
Seminar: Fredsbevegelsen, hvor gär den (The Peace movement, where is it heading? ), Oslo, 3 September 2002), Johan 
Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage Publications, 1996), Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defense 
(Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), Johan Galtung, Interview, 28 October 2002. 
2 For a constructivist attempt to explain war : Erik Rigmar, Identity, Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's 
Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a presentation of benefits gained 
by the use of constructivism for Peace Researchers: Heikki Patomäki, "The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at 
the Start of the New Century, " Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 6 (2001). 
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Section four provides the reasons for why her theory employed in this thesis. The chapter 
concludes that constructivism employed as a tool for peace researchers seeking to actively 
prevent or transform armed conflicts. Moreover, the chapter opens up for the study of 
previously neglected factors that are important to understand the processes that lead to war 
and prevent peace. 
Some Principles of Problem- Solving Peace Research 
The proper focus of peace research has been widely discussed amongst peace researchers and 
amongst outsiders commenting upon it. Peace research has traditionally been seen as 
inquiring into the causes of war; however, this applies to most work within the broad field of 
international relations. To argue that peace research is the research into the causes of war 
becomes too simple. As Johan Galtung argues, it is instead an inquiry into the causes of 
peace, often studying war in order to find these causes. 3 
Nevertheless, there is more to peace research than an inquiry into the causes of peace. 
Another central difference between the original agenda of peace research and international 
relations is expressed in Peter Wallensteen's definition of peace research: "The aim of peace 
research is to understand the causes of violence and find ways to reduce and remove 
violence". 4 According to Wallensteen, peace research not only tries to understand violence, 
but it also tries to reduce it by actively working to promote peace. Indeed, one of the most 
notable identifying traits of early peace research was this strong normative component based 
on the ethical axiom that violence is to be reduced. All of the prominent early researchers in 
the field, the founders of the discipline itself, including Johan Galtung, Elise Boulding, 
Kenneth Boulding and John Burton, were activist peace researchers and wanted to end war. 5 
They were not satisfied by just describing the causes of conflict. The aim of peace research is 
for them strongly normative; certain values are taken for granted, and these values, as the 
need to put end to all wars and to minimise human suffering, are to be promoted actively. 
Johan Galtung goes so far as to state "nothing short of the abolition of war as a social 
` Johan Galtung, Interview, 28 October 2002. 
4 Peter Wallensteen, "The Growing Peace Research Agenda, " Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, no. 21 (2001). 
5 Elise Boulding, New Agendas for Peace Research; Conflict and Security Re-Examined (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 
Kenneth Boulding, "The War Trap, " in Towards a Just World Order, ed. Richard Falk (Boulder: Westview, 1998), John 
Burton, Conflict and Communication (London: Macmillan, 1969), Johan Galtung, "The Next Twenty Five Years of Peace 
Research: Tasks and Prospects, " Oxford Projects for Peace Studies 26, no. 6 (1988). 
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institution should be our goal". 6 Early peace research was defined as an applied science and 
the peace researcher was viewed as a kind of physician, dealing with the problems of fellow 
beings. 7 These researchers were not only motivated by the desire to know, they were 
motivated by a desire to change, and this became a crucial principle for the early peace 
researchers. It is also one of the underlying principles of this thesis. For Burton and Galtung, 
peace researchers were to use a multitude of different disciplines such as psychology, 
economics, international relations, political science and sociology to map conflicts and 
subsequently try to provide policy guidelines. 
Such activist peace researchers, as for example Johan Galtung, always kept close 
contact with both the peace movement and decision makers. Understanding the disagreements 
between Galtung and the activists within the peace movement is important in order to 
understand fully the approach of the activist peace researchers. While appreciating the 
initiatives and the enthusiasm of the peace movement, Galtung criticised their negativity. 
Galtung felt that the peace movement should come up with practical alternatives to the 
policies that they were opposing and the wars they protested against, and should give policy 
advice and promote principles for policy making. 8 The task of the researcher was not to 
describe; it was to create change, and to create change one needed to be aware of what to 
change, not only know that change was needed. 
Not surprisingly, peace researchers soon discovered that this was a hard task. Peace 
researchers had arguably little impact on the Cold War. Although contested by some peace 
researchers, historians specialising in the Cold War in general agree that their effect was 
minimal. 9 After the Cold War, cases like Rwanda and Somalia showed the irrelevance of 
much peace research. In a case like Somalia, political scientists like Ken Menkhaus and 
anthropologists like loan Lewis had real influence. 10 Peace researchers in highly regarded 
institutions, such as the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIG), on the other hand, failed to 
have any influence. The failure of peace research in the cases of Rwanda and Somalia made 
peace researchers such as Christian Scherrer explore the process of policy advice making 
6 Johan Galtung, "The Next Twenty Five Years of Peace Research: Tasks and Prospects, " Oxford Projects for Peace Studies 
26, no. 6 (1988): 8. 
7 Heikki Patomäki, "The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century, " Journal of Peace 
Research 38, no. 6 (2001): 226. 
'Johan Galtung, "Commentary" (paper presented at the Prion Seminar: Fredsbevegelsen, hvor gär den (The Peace movement, 
where is it heading? ), Oslo, 3 September 2002). 
9 Geir Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers, Peace Stability and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
10 loan Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1985), Ken 
Menkhaus, Somalia, a Situational Analysis and Trend Assessment (New York: The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UN H CR)/Wri tenet, 2003), Boutros Boutros-Gahli, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, 
Proposing the Expansion of Unosom and the Creation of Four Operational Zones, " (New York: United Nations, 1992). Ioan 
Lewis also writes his name Ian. 
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itself. 11 At the same time, Johan Galtung also increased his focus on this side of peace 
research. 12 Both Scherrer and Galtung agreed that the policy guidelines peace researchers 
suggested had to be practically feasible in order to receive any attention from potential 
implementers. In addition Scherrer stressed that the researcher had to have local knowledge; 
in his opinion the lack of such knowledge had made peace researchers suggest solutions that it 
was impossible to implement. 13 If policy advice failed to take the attitudes and capacities of 
the parties and/or implementing agencies into account, the result of policy advice produced by 
peace researchers would be a form of utopism. Stanley Hoffmann in many ways summed up 
this point. The problem with utopian visions, he argued, was how to get from here to there. 
He claimed the main advantage of such theories was that it made the researchers' work easy; 
the latter only needed to define practical problems away in their theory, but in this way they 
also remained isolated from the world. 14 
The problem was twofold. Firstly, some policy advice might contradict organisational 
values to the extent that it became impossible to implement them. Other recommendations 
might suggest measures beyond the available capacity of the potential implementers. Galtung 
tried to address this point and move peace research away from utopism by developing theories 
specifically constructed for the different channels of influence available to peace researchers; 
he also formulated principles for the deduction of policy advice. These principles were made 
to help the peace researcher form advice according to the background and the capacity of the 
institutions and organisations for which they were intended. 15 
Secondly, local knowledge becomes important in order to understand the complex 
dynamic of a specific conflict. Scherrer addressed this problem and suggest that local, "on the 
spot" knowledge is essential if one wants to contribute to the understanding and end of wars. 16 
An additional and equally important principle for early peace researchers was an 
adherence to pacifism. War and violence must be avoided, even when political change was 
necessary. Alternative non-violent resistance strategies were examined in order to provide 
11 Christian P Schemer, Peace Research for the 21st Century. A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001). 
12 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage Publications, 1996), Christian P Schemer, Peace Research for the 
21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict 
Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001). 
13 Christian P Schemer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001), 13. The Peace Researcher Häkan Wiberg pushes 
this point even further, stressing that one ought to know at least one local language before engaging in solving a 
conflict. Häkan Wiberg, Interview 2004. 
14 Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 194. 
15 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 27. 
16 Christian P Schemer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001), 13. 
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states exposed to aggression with strategies to counter such aggression. 17 Thus military 
intervention in order to stop a malignant government was not deemed a viable option; peace 
had to be achieved through peaceful means. 18 These major axioms of peace research, as 
articulated by the founders of peace research, are also the normative axioms that underlie this 
thesis. To the early peace researchers, the peace researcher was supposed to shun violence, 
even if violence seemed to be a viable tool to achieve positive change. 
However, this principle came to be challenged at an early stage of peace research. A 
new generation of peace researchers started to emerge at the end of the 1960's. Wars such as 
the Vietnam War contributed to the development of this new group. These researchers were 
still activists and believed in working to change the world for the better. 19 Their criticism of 
earlier "advice-driven" peace research was severe, and must be taken seriously. Two major 
forms of criticism can be identified: first a critique that claims that problem-solving 
approaches focus too much on local variables, in order to make the envisaged solution easier 
to implement. The argument is that such approaches overlook the global dimension and 
indirectly thus legitimise the current global system, a system that is regarded as unfair and in 
need of change. Second, another critique argues that such problem-solving, focused peace 
research is too accommodating and does not distinguish between aggressor and victim. The 
first critique is especially strongly articulated by the Swedish peace researcher Herman 
Schmid, while the second type of critique is often articulated by his compatriot Lars Dencik, 
who argues that activists have to take sides in conflicts. 20 Both arguments merit careful 
consideration. 
Herman Schmid sees problem-solving theory as a legitimising research that neglects 
the current international structure and that legitimises international relationships of power. 21 
In 1968 he wrote an article entitled "Peace Research and Politics", in which he argued that 
peace research aims to achieve a form of social control. He claimed that even though the 
original peace researchers were supposed to be critical of the global system, their views were 
based on the belief that all individuals and groups in the world shared a common interest in 
survival and peace. He was critical of this project, arguing that problem-solving peace 
17 As Adam Roberts, "The Case for Civilian Defense, " in Civil Defense, ed. Gene Sharp (London: Peace News, 1964). 
'8Johan Gattung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage Publications, 1996). 
19 They were in this aspect far from today's mainstream researchers in institutes such as the Peace Research Institute in Oslo 
(PRIO) and the Swedish Institute of Peace Research (SIPRI). 
20 Schmid in many ways echoes Robert Cox' critique of problem-solving research. However, as this thesis is situated within 
Peace Research, the discussion will focus on Schmid. Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders, " Millennium 10, 
no. 2 (1981), Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Herman Schmid, 
"Politics and Peace Research, " Journal of Peace Research 3, no. 5 (1968). 
`' Herman Schmid, "Politics and Peace Research, " Journal of Peace Research 3, no. 5 (1968): 217-32. 
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research was escapism from a social reality created by hegemonic interests, and thus 
indirectly working to hide the latter. Hegemonic interests had created the so-called peace, and 
this peace had to be sustained so that a hegemonic group could remain in power and continue 
their exploitation of poorer groups in the social and economic structure. The so-called critical 
aspect of peace research thus became a mere excuse for naivety. To strive to uphold world 
peace in a situation where the north was taking advantage of the south, or to uphold a peace 
where the upper class was taking advantage of the lower class, was seen as immoral. By doing 
so, the peace researcher contributed to the maintenance of the current situation. 22 Peace 
researchers thus often indirectly had a conservative agenda and helped preserve existing 
patterns of power. According to Schmid, the peace-researchers often believed they were 
doing the right thing, without seeing that what was right was defined by an ideology that was 
conservative in nature because it contributed to preserving existing exploitive power 
structures. 
Problem-solving peace research, with approaches that try to address local conflicts in 
order to make a quick fix while failing to see that they were created by the global structure, is 
seen by Schmid as maintaining the interests of those who have power, protecting them against 
the weak, by failing to address adequately the problems of the power structure. They protect 
the ideology of the rulers. He argues that the "quick-fix" approach fails to focus on the real 
differences between interests, making the victims unaware of the hidden exploitation in the 
world structure. Conflict solving is seen as a form of brainwashing, which makes the parties 
accept the "quick-fix" solution which maintains the status quo. Peace researchers, according 
Schmid, should enhance conflicts and sharpen them, break the system down and build new 
structures. Schmid's critique thus seems to contain two main elements, the most important 
being that problem-solving techniques legitimise the existing world structures and enhance 
the position of a dominant class. 
The second element in Schmid's critique is the accusation of being too particularistic, 
and thus losing much information in the process. According to Schmid, by focusing on the 
small details of a conflict the researchers lose the big picture. By examining a war as being 
between directly involved belligerents, a researcher might fail to explore how international 
alliances have promoted the war, and how the international capitalist system makes it possible 
for individuals to benefit economically from war thus giving them incentives to start a war 
rather than create peace. By being too particularistic, the international structures and historical 
22 Ibid.: 226. 
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sociology are largely overlooked and ignored. Moreover, Schmid also argues that the 
researcher has a hidden agenda. Perhaps without knowing it, peace researchers work for a 
class or a party by implementing their ideas of world order, and thus help to maintain their 
hegemony. By fixing the conflict rather than the world structure, the symptom rather than the 
cause is addressed. The external actors with a vested interest in war remain and will be ready 
to promote conflict in other parts of the world. Problematic international structures will also 
remain. By fixing the symptom, peace researchers contribute to hiding the real cause of the 
problem. The problem-solving approach could for example be seen to rationalise Russian or 
American arms sales that make the various wars in the world possible, by studying the 
directly involved belligerents only. By addressing the local issues in a conflict, how resources 
and political disagreement create a specific conflict, peace researchers often fail to see the 
structure of how the supply of weapons and foreign support enabled the belligerents to fight. 
Focus on internal causes may be viewed as directing the focus away from external factors, 
and such guidelines may take the focus away from western policies that promote conflict. 
Schmid desires major and holistic change. Behind this lies a wish to change 
development into a positive direction. However, as Heikki Patomäki argues, more historic- 
specific and/or case specific studies are needed within peace research. A general focus on 
holistic universalism, focusing on the international structures only, could be regarded as one 
of the major problems of peace research. 23 During the Cold War, many researchers focused on 
systemic change and global structure, but the results were meagre. As described previously, 
after the Cold War peace research, with all its universalistic theories, also had little effect. The 
more globally focused efforts to create change might be important and can have a long term 
effect, but measures to deal with present day conflicts also have to be developed, these 
conflicts can not be neglected. As argued both by Scherrer and Patomäki, an over strong focus 
on global structures might also leave out a lot of information, as local issues of grievance, 
local cultural factors, are neglected. 24 
Importantly, and fortunately, this is not an either/or situation, and both strategies might 
be followed simultaneously. A problem-solving approach might develop strategies for global 
change. "Quick-fix" approaches can also be critical of the ruling order and in this case 
critically expose the organisational culture of the local elite; exposure of local elites might in 
turn lead to exposure of global elites. Local changes might also give indications of possible 
23Heikki Patomäki, "The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century, " Journal of Peace 
Research 38, no. 6 (2001): 11. 
24 Ibid, Christian P Scherrer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: 
Institute for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001). 
15 
side effects of the global changes that peace researchers strive for and perhaps even suggest 
slight alterations in their global agenda. System-focused theories and problem-solving 
theories are not mutually exclusive. Peace research, as shown by Johan Galtung, is about 
system change as well, and both approaches might provide important information; they can 
and should co-exist and interact. In this sense Schmid's critique may serve as a reminder of 
the need to see local conflicts in a global frame, recognising that some conflicts might need to 
be addressed at both local and global levels. 
Peace researchers such as Lars Dencik raise an additional type of critique against 
mainstream peace research. Dencik argues that peace researchers should "show active 
solidarity with the people struggling against imperialism and super power supremacy", and 
they should be prepared to take sides in a conflict. 25 Normatively, he maintains that a peace 
researcher should support violence if it serves a just cause. Dencik also argues that that too 
strong a focus on neutral peace making could reward aggression by giving the aggressors 
legitimacy in the negotiation process. Such argumentation was used in a major attack on 
mainstream peace research during the 1960's. Peace researchers like Lars Dencik had 
watched the neutrality of many peace researchers towards the Vietnam War with contempt. In 
the late 1960's Dencik accused the majority of peace researchers for hiding the asymmetry of 
the conflict and the final goals of the parties. One of these belligerents, the USA, was deemed 
to fight an unjust and aggressive war, while the goals of the second, North Vietnam, was 
deemed as being just. Dencik characterised the founding fathers of peace research as 
"Physicists suffering from a bad conscience". 26 He implied that this "bad conscience" was 
because they took no notice of justice, of right and wrong. Dencik argued that peace 
researchers should support the oppressed, to the extent that certain forms of violence would be 
legitimate. The need to eradicate unjust situations, situations where one party abused another 
party in the conflict, was pressing. Such unjust situations were defined as latent conflicts. 
Addressing an overt conflict situation without addressing the latent conflict does not provide a 
viable solution; it would be like a sleeping volcano that could erupt in the future. The Vietnam 
War was again employed as the main example: American support for the Saigon regime was 
seen as support for an unjust and corrupt regime that exploited its own population. Any 
negotiations between north and south could perhaps create short-term peace, but the 
oppressed people of the south would inevitably rise again, they would not accept the unjust 
situation. 
25 Lars Dencik, Scientific Research and Politics (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1969), 23. 
26 Peter Lawler, A Question of Values: Johan Galtung's Peace Research (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 77. 
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Dencik argues that the peace researcher has to support the side which is morally right. 
However, Johan Galtung argues that even an aggressor should have protection: "The 
judgment of an enemy should distinguish between the status action of an enemy and the status 
holder". 27 Perhaps international law can be used as an example, distinguishing between Jus in 
Bello, the legal protection of combatants in war, and Jus ad Bellum, the legality of the war 
itself. International law thus ensures that the individual has protection even if he fights an 
aggressive war, in part because the individual in question often thinks he is fighting a just 
war. Perceptions of right and wrong will exist amongst both parties in a war. The perceptions 
of the individual belligerents on this issue will often contradict each other. 
Importantly, this also involves the peace researcher: the peace researcher's perception 
of who is right and who is wrong might in itself be a misperception. This leads to serious 
problems for Dencik's argument. If the peace researcher involves herself in violent action and 
kills, as Dencik actually argues a peace researcher should if necessary, then the effect is 
irreversible; the individual killed can not be raised from the dead. Subsequently the peace 
researcher might discover that he/she has killed based on wrong assumptions. 
An over strong focus on right and wrong might also prevent reconciliation in the sense 
that it recycles hate and leads to a search for vengeance for old injustices. As peace researcher 
and activist Andrew Rigby claims: 
Hatred and the search for vengeance can consume people turning them into 
mirror images of those that they hate. Unless people manage to forsake their 
determination to get even, there can be no new beginning, no transformation of 
relationships. Everyone will remain imprisoned in a particular history or 
28 mythology recycling old crimes and hatreds. 
Vengeance because of old injustice thus may take the place of a new and better future, 
by entrenching old conflicts it might lead to even more killing. As Michael Ignatieff claims, 
peace making must go beyond this 
Reconciliation must reach into the shared democracy of death to teach the 
drastic nullity of all struggles that end in killing, the unending futility of all 
27 Ibid., 82. 
28 Andrew Rigby, "Forgiving the Past: Paths Towards a Culture of Reconciliation" (paper presented at the International Peace 
Research Association (IPRA), Tampere, 3 August 2000). 
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attempts to avenge those who are no more. For it is an elementary certainty that 
killing will not bring the dead back to life. 29 
In this sense a too strong will to take sides might recycle old hatred and prolong the conflict 
itself Dencik's argument that one should support the oppressed also requires that one clearly 
can identify who the oppressed are. It should also be kept in mind that in real life both parties 
in a conflict might at some stage have been oppressive. In Rwanda the Hutu and Tutsi regimes 
have taken turns as oppressors of their ethnical counterparts. 30 Moreover, a weak oppressed 
group might ally with new oppressors in order to deal with old oppressors. For example 
Finland allied with Nazi Germany, the latter a clearly oppressive regime, in order to prevent 
Soviet rule of Finnish Karelia, previously conquered militarily by the equally oppressive 
Soviet Union. 31 Subsequently, the separation between the oppressor and the oppressed in a 
conflict becomes blurred. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the party that is deemed to 
be oppressed, or normatively right, might be oppressive in itself The regime Dencik 
supported, North Vietnam, for example suppressed its own citizens during the Vietnam War 
and continues to do so even today, perhaps being harsher towards its own citizens than 
Dencik's enemy, South Vietnam ever was. 32 
A focus on strategies that shun violence seems more viable than focusing purely on a 
dichotomy between oppressed/oppressor and a too strong emphasis on such a dichotomy 
might even prevent a solution to the conflict, emphasising old animosity rather than a hope of 
a better relationship in the future. The consequences of violence may become irreversible, a 
dead person can not be healed, even though the belief that one side had justice on its side 
turns out to be wrong. In this way the consequences of violence are often irreversible, and 
hence a strategy to support violent action. Non-violent strategies trying to address the 
grievances of both parties as well as addressing recent injustice seem to be the only alternative 
for an activist peace researcher. 
29 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998), 190. 
30 Sometimes this was because of the manipulation of a third power, the colonial government of Belgium, that used the Tutsi 
elite to govern their colony. Jackson Nyamuya Magoto, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, " African Journal 
On Conflict Resolution 3, no. 1 (2003). 
31 John Robert Elting, Battles for Scandinavia, ed. Jerry Korn, World War 2 (Chicago: Time-Life books inc, 1981), 116-19. 
32See for example: Amnesty International, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Renewed Concern for the Montagnard Minority 
(Amnesty International, 2004 [cited 1 May 2005]); available from 
www. amnestyusa. org/countries/vietnam/document. do? id=9DO75D101 B9E6562802569A600601 F67, Amnesty International, 
Viet-Nam: Annual Report 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995 [cited 25 October 2003]); available from 
www. amnestyusa. org/countries/vietnam/document. do? id=9DO75D101B9E6562802569A60060IF67, Amnesty International, 
Viet-Nani:. innual Report (1999 [cited 1 January 2002]); available from 
www. amnestyusa. org/countries/vietnam/document. do? id=9D075D 101 B9E6562802569A600601 F67. 
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Constructivism and Peace Research 
Constructivism is a broad school of thought that cannot easily be characterised as one uniform 
body of literature. Within the field of International Relations, the word constructivism was 
first used in 1989 in Nicholas Onuf's World of our Making. 33 Today many researchers define 
themselves as constructivists, and the focus of the school has become very varied. However, 
there have been several attempts to sum up the common focus. Michael Desch characterises 
constructivists as being united in the belief that "... cultural theories, which look to ideational 
factors, do a much better job of explaining how the world works. , 34 Jeff Checkel, a self- 
proclaimed constructivist, argues that constructivism is: 
... not a theory 
but an approach to social inquiry based on two assumptions: (1) 
the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; 
and (2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their interests 
35 (it can "constitute" them). 
Thus constructivism often tends to focus on social factors, as for example norms or culture. 
Moreover, it studies the way social factors constitute the interests and understanding of the 
agents/states, and how they are constructed through social interaction. 
The focus of constructivists has several parallels within peace research. During the late 
1980's, the prominence of cultural and discursive analysis grew as researchers such as 
Hayward Alker became disillusioned with the failures of previous projects launched in order 
to understand war. 36 Today there are many examples of peace researchers that focus on 
cultural factors, how they are changeable and on the social construction process. The peace 
researcher Mohammed Abu-Nimer uses the word culture to name the process that creates 
mental frames, a cognitive process where individuals emphasise the variety of settings that 
33 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
34 Michael Desch, "Culture Clash : Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies, " International Security 23, no. 1 
(1998): 141. 
35 Jeffery Checkel, "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, " World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 
325-26. 
36 Heikki Patomäki, "Hayward Alker: Peace Research to Globalism, " in The Future of International Relations. Masters in the 
Making?, ed. Iver B. Neuman and Ole Waver (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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they encounter. 37 Johan Galtung states that culture is changeable and thus could be changed 
into a more positive agenda. 38 Raimo Väyrynen explains how rule transformation changes the 
norms of the parties' interactions, and thus can change a conflict in a positive direction. 39 
Hayward Alker is interested in the transformation of conflicts through moral discourse and the 
social reconstruction of relationships. 4° Such concepts seem close to constructivism; indeed 
the last researcher is commonly referred to as a constructivist. Thus many peace researchers 
developed a conceptualisation bearing similarities to present-day constructivism. 
Constructivism with its defining concern with the notion of constituted social facts, 
and a shared interest in the constitutive role of ideational factors, focuses on many interesting 
elements for a peace researcher, amongst other things how interests are defined and redefined 
and how a cultural environment can influence behaviour. 41 This thesis makes use of 
constructivist insights and thus aims to contribute to peace research by generating new 
insights for understanding and ending conflicts. 
Elizabeth Kier's Approach to International Relations 
This thesis draws mainly upon the theories of Elizabeth Kier. Elizabeth Kier can clearly be 
grouped amongst the social constructivists within the field of international relations. Kier 
starts her analysis with three major claims, the first clearly indicating her constructivist 
position: 
1) There are no definitive meanings attached to an objective reality. As important as 
material factors might be, they can be interpreted in numerous ways. Furthermore, 
making sense of which incentives structures/organisations provide for individual 
action often requires an understanding of the meanings that actors attach to their 
material world. We should not presume that actors from the same socio-economic 
groups prefer the same policies across national boundaries. 
37 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution, Culture and Religion: Towards a Training Model of Interreligious Peace 
Building, " Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 6 (2001). 
38 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 56. 
39 Raimo Väyrynen, "To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts, " in 
New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1991), 1-25. 
40 Hayward Alker, Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
41 Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue, " International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 3. 
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2) Domestic balance of power will influence decision-making; military policy should not 
be regarded exclusively as the strategic interest of a state. 
3) Culture is not simply a derivative of functional demands or strategic imperatives; it 
has an independent causal role. 42 
As the third tenet indicates, culture is central in Kier's analysis. She draws upon Ann 
Swindler for an explicit definition of culture, defining it as "the set of assumptions so 
unselfconscious as to seem a natural transparent, undeniable part of the structure of the 
world. 9943 However, the use of the term culture within constructivism is severely criticised, 
even by the constructivists themselves. Prominent constructivists, including Jeffery Checkel, 
warn about the use of the term culture in international relations. To Checkel, the term culture 
became a fashion within international relations, an abstract buzzword that few have defined 
clearly but that many people use. 44 Kier uses organisational theory in order to address this 
criticism and narrow the concept of culture. Consequently, the focus in her study is not on 
culture per se but on a special type of culture, organisational culture, defined as the set of 
basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs and formal knowledge that shapes collective 
understanding within a bounded entity - the organisation. 
45 
When it comes to estimating the effects of culture, Kier employs the work of the 
American sociologist Ann Swindler. To Swindler, culture provides toolkits of behaviour; it 
provides strategies of action and persistent ways of ordering action over longer periods of 
time, rather than goals. Moreover, elements of culture are repeatedly used to construct 
strategies for action. 46 Certain elements of a culture thus promote certain actions. Such 
cultural elements make specific strategies seem to be amongst a few restricted viable options, 
as they are unconsciously defined as correct, and alternatives are not properly discussed or 
considered. In the most extreme cases, certain strategies and interpretations become habitual. 
They become almost organisational reflexes. 
Culture becomes very important for the organisation itself, as it creates esprit de corps, 
and also provides specific responses to specific situations, giving help to organisational 
members that lack information. As claimed by Kier: "Organizational life would be 
42 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-10. 
a' Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action, Symbols and Strategies, " American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273. 
44 Jeffery Checkel, Interview, 15 May 2002. 
as Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 28. 
46Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action, Symbols and Strategies, " American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273. 
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unmanageable if specific actions did not call for specific responses, if members had no 
expectations about others' actions, or if they had no understanding of the effects of their own 
actions on others. "47 Organisational culture thus provides relevance and standards and 
determines which external events are to be defined as important and which not. Moreover, it 
also influences how these events have to be interpreted. Such a culture provides collective 
assumptions and formal knowledge, the latter referring to knowledge defined as relevant 
according to organisational standards. It focuses on specific external events and makes some 
solutions for solving problems more prominent. Organisational culture has a Janus-faced 
effect on the organisation itself: it creates standards and role expectations that make 
organisational life easier, but it also inhibits innovation because it hides potential new 
strategies and makes certain old ones more prominent. Kier argues that a too strong 
organisational culture leads to a rigid and conservative organisation that fails to respond to 
external pressure in a proper way. 
Kier and Swindler thus stress that culture not only provides goals, it also defines 
strategies. Cultural assumptions are seen as building a repertoire from which organisations 
plan their actions, sometimes resulting in a nearly reflexive pattern of behaviour where certain 
organisational responses become almost automatic. Kier's main finding, namely that 
organisational decision-making is influenced by culture, is the theoretical starting point of this 
thesis. 
The way Kier employs culture and the factors she stresses as influencing the formation 
of organisational culture can be studied in her major work, Imagining War: French and 
British Military Doctrine between the Wars. 48 This book produced a meticulous analysis of 
how organisational culture influences the choice of military doctrines, constraining the 
choices of the decision makers, preventing them from choosing certain strategies while 
making other strategies more cognitively visible. In Imagining War, Kier's main argument is 
that different organisational cultures within various armed forces created different responses 
to exogenous impulses. She studies the case of the British and French armed forces in World 
War Two. The French armed forces felt under constant threat from their own left-wing 
politicians, which led to a homogenisation and dogmatisation of the organisational culture of 
the French military. The military felt threatened by conscription, which was seen as a way of 
getting left-wing agitators into the units. Consequently, this led to a notable antipathy towards 
4' Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 34. 
48 The book won the 1998 Edgar S. Furniss Award for exceptional contribution to the study of national and international 
security. Ibid. 
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conscription amongst the military. Military leaders believed the conscripts unable to handle 
the advanced technical equipment of mechanised forces, thus they chose a static military 
doctrine. This conclusion was reached despite contradictory information from Germany. The 
French doctrine was thus a result of organisational culture rather than logical decision- 
making or organisational self-interest. Conscription had at this stage been accepted for 
decades; however the pressure for conscription, together with other civilian decisions, created 
an organisational shock that led to dogmatisation, which in interaction with organisational 
socialisation caused a specific outcome. Kier also analyses the politics of the armed forces of 
the United Kingdom, starting with the cavalry. Here she examines an element which was part 
of the organisational culture. She names this element "An Officer and a Gentleman", an ideal 
where officers were supposed to be focused on style and attitude rather than technological 
competence. In this culture, technical knowledge was looked down upon and war was seen as 
a sport; this culture inhibited mechanisation, and made the organisation postpone a necessary 
change of doctrine. 
Importantly, she stresses that there were deviant subcultures. For example certain 
branches of the armed forces adopted mechanisation faster. Because of the segregation of 
regiments in British services, the British regiments had slightly deviant cultures. She thus 
acknowledges the existence of subgroups within an organisation, and that such subgroups 
may have separate competing cultures that lead to differences both in perception and action. 
In addition, she addresses the question of how organisational culture was formed. In 
Imagining war she puts emphasis on organisational shocks as well as recruitment patterns as 
forming organisational culture, but also argues that several other factors influenced or might 
influence such formation. In order to examine how a specific culture has developed Kier 
firstly again draws on the theories of Ann Swindler. As Ann Swindler argues, culture consists 
of many elements of different origins that still influence planning, decisions, organisational 
structure and partly determine the interpretation of events. 49 One element with a large 
influence is previously held ideology. This relationship provides an explanation for how some 
of the elements of an organisational culture are initially created. To Swindler, ideology, is a 
type of culture, she defines ideology as: 
49 Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action, Symbols and Strategies, " American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273. 
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"A highly articulated self-conscious belief and ritual system inspiring to offer a 
unified answer to problems of social action. Ideology might be thought of as a 
phase in the development of a system of cultural meaning. "50 
This type of culture is highly influential on action, but it is also very conscious. The 
individual organisational members know that the ideology and its assumptions can be 
discussed; their actions are not habitual but based on a choice to adhere to a certain religious 
or political system . 
51 However, ideology transforms into a culture based on institutionalised 
traditions and a shared definition of common sense. Ideology forms organisational culture 
even after its assumptions are forgotten, as its rites and habits are institutionalised into the 
organisation. 
In order to explain the transformation from ideology to a more habitual culture, 
Swindler introduces two concepts: settled and unsettled periods. In a settled period, culture 
independently influences action by making certain strategies more cognitively prominent. In 
an unsettled period, culture influence politics directly, but this form of culture, ideology, is 
both more coherent and more explicit than the culture during the settled period. As Ann 
Swindler maintains: 
In settled lives culture is ultimately integrated with action. It is here that we are 
most tempted to see values as organising and anchoring patterns of action; and 
here it is most difficult to disentangle what is uniquely cultural since culture and 
structural circumstances seem to reinforce each other... Cultural symbols 
reinforce ethos, making it a plausible world view which in turn justifies ethos. 52 
The unsettled phase is a culturally offensive stage where culture influences new action 
instead of preserving old reaction patterns. The organisational members feel strongly about 
their ideological or religious agenda, fighting for good or world revolution, willing to 
sacrifice themselves for the greater good of their ideology. The ideological form of culture in 
such a stage seems to be more explicit and conscious than the more habitual form of culture 
in the settled stage. Swindler argues: 
so Ibid.: 279. 
"Ibid.: 278. 
52 Ibid. 
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In such periods [unsettled], ideology, explicit, articulated highly organized 
meaning systems (both political and religious) establish new styles or strategies of 
action. When people are learning new ways of organizing individual and 
collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until they become familiar, then 
doctrine, symbol and ritual directly shape action. 53 
A struggling organisation needs ideology. The ideology keeps the organisation 
together by creating cohesion; ideology reinforces the organisation during struggle, but is 
also reinforced by the struggle itself. The works of Swindler and Barry Turner, the latter one 
of the organisational theorists Kier draws upon, make similar statements. All argue that 
organisational struggle reinforces the ideology during the unsettled phase, in itself a phase 
filled with struggle. However, even during this phase ideology adjusts to the needs of the 
organisation; the two will interact and form the future organisational culture. 54 
But ideology transforms. There is a continuum from ideology through tradition to a 
type of "common sense" as defined by organisational standards. Ideology often transforms 
into traditions; subsequently traditions become habitual standards and practices and are no 
longer as explicit as in an ideology. They seem to be inevitable parts of the lives of 
organisational members. "Common sense" then becomes the common set of assumptions, a 
natural transparent and undeniable part of the structure of the world for the organisational 
members that share them. 55 When the unsettled period changes into a settled period, some of 
the actions prescribed by ideology become habitual rather than products of conscious 
decision making. Even though ideology has gone underground, perhaps even been officially 
rejected, it nevertheless still contributes to a definition of right and wrong actions, of 
appropriate strategies and habitual ways of interpreting the world and it continues to 
influence actions. It then becomes harder to trace a causal link between culture and action, 
because the link between the two is no longer conscious. Nevertheless, organisational 
assumptions based on old and forgotten ideology remain a way to facilitate collective action, 
as they create a common frame of reference and are especially important when people need 
to act in concert. These standards and habits also prescribe action under unfamiliar 
circumstances. In this sense, they provide safety within organisational life as organisational 
53 Ibid. 
sa Ibid, Barry Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters, " Administrative Science 
Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1976). 
ss Swindler borrows this definition from Clifford Getz. Clifford Geertz, "Common Sense as a Cultural Sense, " Antioch 
Review 33, no. 5 (1975). 
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members form expectations and perceptions based on the previous ideology. Expectations 
and perceptions based on organisational culture in turn prescribe certain interpretations of 
external and internal actors, and suggest appropriate strategies to deal with new problems. 
In sum, first, the argument is that ideology influences the actions of an organisation 
long after it officially ceases to be important. An organisational ethos has been created; an 
ethos that often remains even after the original ideology has been rejected. 56 Secondly, Kier 
and Swindler also argue that culture based on such ethos influences action by restricting the 
possible strategies applicable for problem solving, sometimes narrowing the options down to 
only a few or even one type of strategy. As Kier stresses, during settled periods it shapes 
behaviour by establishing what is natural and making other patterns of behaviour 
inconceivable. 57 Culture provides a finite set of strategies and, as Kier argues, often only 
one. 58 Strategies of action thus last longer than the ideological aim that originally motivated 
them. 
In addition to the works of Swindler, Kier draws upon traditional organisational theory 
in order to understand how organisational culture forms. To Kier organisations have special 
traits that influence them, just because they are organisations. They have limited contact with 
the outside world and a hierarchal order that defines the status of the organisation. New 
candidates are often selected by applying a standardised procedure and standardised criteria 
are used to evaluate new candidates. Organisational members have sometimes to go through 
a rigid training system. They have to learn the standardised operational procedures in order to 
function within organisational and personal life. In order to fit in, new recruits need to adapt 
to the organisational culture; this may subsequently lead to active participation in the cultural 
patterns of the organisation. New members are exposed to a massive socialisation process. 
The socialisation process tends to produce role beliefs where individuals perceive their 
position and their role as stable with certain meanings attached to it. They are also exposed to 
organisational assumptions that define conventional wisdom. 59 Standards are important to 
create cohesion. Kier argues that this is especially true in military organisations, also in the 
type of guerrilla organisations analysed in chapter five of this thesis. 
Kier argues that the research conducted on organisational culture in private firms is 
suitable for her study, and addresses many of the issues discussed by organisational 
56 Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action, Symbols and Strategies, " American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986). 
57Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 26. 
58Ibid., 144. In the case of ideology Kier keeps the point at a fairly general level and does not go into its connections with the 
doctrinal processes within the French and British armies 
59 Ibid., 27. 
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theorists. 60 One of these issues is the role of the charismatic individual in forming 
organisational culture. Kier cites the organisational theorist Burton Clark, who argues that 
charismatic leaders might have a strong role in an early phase of organisational 
development. 61 Individuals are viewed as playing a role in designing organisational culture in 
its early phases, but their role is drastically limited as the organisation's institutions age and 
62 become ritualised. 
Importantly, she explicitly states that the organisation is more than the sum of the 
values of a few individuals. Individuals may create some of the cultural elements, but the 
totality of organisational culture is formed by the totality of social interaction within the 
organisation. As Kier argues: "Organisational cultures are features of organisations, not of 
individuals. A culture is a property of a collectivity. "63 
Some parts of organisational culture may stem from organisational needs, in that an 
organisation might institutionalise standard operational procedures in order to achieve 
organisational goals. However, these standard operational procedures will always be 
constrained and influenced by other cultural elements within the organisation. 64 Such standard 
operational procedures may continue to be employed long after the needs of the organisation 
have changed and after the procedures themselves lose their rationale. 65 
Arguments used for propaganda or political purposes also become institutionalised and 
maintain their importance long after their initial rationale has disappeared. Official 
programmes, campaigns and day-to-day use of slogans also affect organisational culture. By 
continuous repetition they persuade external and internal actors of the correctness of certain 
cultural assumptions. The use of propaganda will also often lead to the organisation adopting 
certain measures which reinforce the believability of the propaganda; these measures may 
subsequently influence organisational culture. Kier claims that public commitment and 
repeated argumentation will have an impact on organisational culture. 66 
Kier admits that conscious efforts to form organisational culture often do not have the 
intended effect. Such efforts often have "dysfunctional results" in the sense that they fail to 
fulfil the purpose of the leadership when they interact with other components of 
60 Ibid., 28. 
61 Burton Clark, The Distinctive College. Antioch, Reed and Swarthmore (Luton: Aldine, 1970), Elizabeth Kier, Imagining 
War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152. 
62 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152. 
63 Ibid. 
64Ibid., 153. 
15Ibid., 154. 
66 Ibid., 156. 
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organisational culture. 67 The new cultural elements that are introduced will always interact 
with the previous culture. Transforming all sub-groups in the organisation is difficult, because 
each contains slightly different sub-cultures, and some might actively resist transformation. 
Attempts at social engineering might also have unintended influence long after they are 
applied. 
Another factor influencing organisational culture is organisational defence 
mechanisms formed in a period when the organisation faced external dangers. 68 
Organizational theorists argue that hostility in the external environment 
strengthens the organisational culture. Managers who encounter a hazardous 
business environment react by pulling the reins in hopes of gaining some control 
over the situation; midlevel employees become more willing to rely on managers 
and executives. These responses strengthen the organizational culture at the same 
time that they reduce the organizational adaptability... In short, the greater the 
hostility in the organizational environment, the greater the potential for 
organisational dogmatism. 69 
Arguments promoting the organisation become viewed as a defence of the organisational 
identity and the identity of the organisational participants. Thus the arguments promoted by 
the organisation to defend itself might in this way become institutionalised. The organisation 
becomes more closed, in extreme cases almost like a religious sect. In such extreme cases, 
only the most ardent believers stay. In addition, arguments justifying the struggle are 
circulated more rapidly, an obvious consequence of the shrinking size of the organisation: it 
becomes easier for arguments to circulate rapidly when the group they are circulated within 
consists of fewer individuals. The argument of self-justification thus becomes a vital part of 
the self. The belief in victory and in the correctness of organisational goals becomes 
entrenched into organisational culture as members with doubts about these factors leave the 
organisation because of the external pressure and only the most fanatical remain. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Charles Hermann, another organisation theorist that Kier draws 
upon, the amount of communication within the organisation becomes limited: "The increase 
67 Ibid., 161. 
68 Kier here borrows from Charles Hermann and Barry Turner. Charles Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which 
Limit Viability of Organizations, " Administrative Science Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1963), Barry Turner, "The Organizational and 
Interorganizational Development of Disasters, " Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1976). 
69Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 32. 
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in stress on authority units will reduce the number of channels used for the distribution and 
collection of information. "70 Fewer channels lead to less new information being circulated, 
limiting the discussions of policies, and even ideological discussions. Old perceptions become 
cemented, as they become less questioned. 
External threats put stress on members of the organisation with several possible 
results. Those who are not strongly committed leave. Those who are highly motivated, 
believing in the organisation, will stay. This group, inspired by the organisational ethos and 
highly influenced by the values of the organisation, will be committed to enduring any 
hardship. The organisation undergoes a process of self-selection. Elizabeth Kier argues that: 
Organizational theory predicts that, when faced with a threatening external 
environment, organizations respond dysfunctionally by strengthening the 
organization's culture; the righteousness of the chosen policy is magnified and the 
71 value of the alternative dismissed. 
This often happens if the organisation encounters an organisational crisis, a relatively 
unexpected critical event that threatens the high-priority values of the organisation and 
presents a limited amount of time in which to response. 72 The argumentation used to sustain 
the organisation during the crisis often becomes a part of the identity. It becomes a cultural 
assumption attached to the organisation and is taken for granted, perceived as truth long after 
the original crisis has passed. Long periods of struggle for survival in a harsh environment 
may have similar effects on an organisation. 73 
To sum up, Kier draws upon certain tenets of organisational theory about how 
organisations behave. For her, charismatic individuals will influence the organisational 
culture at an early stage of organisational life. However, they will have less and less 
importance as the organisation develops. Furthermore, repeated slogans and functional needs 
will have influence, but always in interaction with other elements. However, these repeated 
slogans will entrench the values of the propaganda in the organisation. While the 
organisational needs that justify certain operational procedures disappear, the organisational 
rituals remain. The resulting cultural elements are thus no longer products of functional 
70Hermann defines authority units as the units that distribute information Charles Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis 
Which Limit Viability of Organizations, " Administrative Science Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1963): 75. 
71 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 145. 
72 Charles Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit Viability of Organizations, " Administrative Science 
Quarterle, 8, no. 1 (1963): 64. 
73 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 135. 
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needs. Last, but not least, Kier shares Turner and Hermann's view that organisational crisis 
will dogmatise its culture. 74 Cultural assumptions become entrenched in order to justify the 
organisation's struggle. Ideologies will influence policy even after they are officially 
abandoned or taken for granted. Slogans and standard operational procedures might also have 
effects long after their rationale has disappeared. In addition, organisational crises might 
homogenise an organisation's culture. 
All in all Kier claims that organisational culture often creates reflexive thinking, that 
it prevents decision makers from choosing strategies that do not fit into organisational 
culture, while it makes certain strategies more viable. Such a culture is created by old 
ideology that has become habitual, by recruitment patterns, organisational crises, by 
charismatic individuals in the early phase of the organisation's history, by propaganda that 
has been continuously repeated, and by old drills and standard operational procedures that 
have ceased to be functional but nevertheless have been kept as a habit. 
To Kier organisational culture has a clear causal effect, changing certain decisions by 
governing the focus of decision makers towards certain options. Kier argues that 
organisational culture may be a cause of action, and constructivists might deal with causes 
and explaining. She claims that if a change in culture inevitably leads to a change in 
behaviour, then organisational culture has a clear causal effect. Moreover, if differences in 
culture have led two or more different organisations to adopt different strategies under 
otherwise very similar conditions, then organisational culture has a clearly causal effect, as 
after all it determined the outcome. In this way the factors described as influencing the 
formation of culture within an organisation, also, through organisational culture, indirectly 
influence decision making. 
Applying Kier 
Elizabeth Kier's theories offer many advantages when applied to peace research. Firstly, the 
school of thought she is located in, constructivism, has never been applied to the study of a 
war in order to deduce policy guidelines. An application of a constructivist approach thus 
provide a new focus, which in turn might reveal new factors in processes that leads to war. 
74Charles Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit Viability of Organizations, " Administrative Science 
Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1963), Barry Turner, "The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters, " 
Administrative Science Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1976). 
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Secondly, Kier stresses the situational specific: it is not given that organisations, 
including states, in a similar situation in the world hold the same interests. To understand the 
difference one has to examine the various organisations, their history and the social 
interactions taking place within them. According to her it is a mistake to believe a state to be 
homogeneous. A state will usually contain many groups with different interests, different 
powers and different cultures. The product of interaction between these groups creates the 
resulting decisions. In this way Kier avoids taking a unitary national culture, even a unitary 
organisational culture for granted. Instead she stresses that there will be several competing 
cultures even within a state or an organisation. Indirectly she warns about simplistic studies 
without the local knowledge needed to uncover these different cultures. She thus claims that 
on the spot knowledge is important, making her theories more suitable for peace researchers 
wishing to take Scherrer's critique of peace research into account. Her focus takes into 
account the "on the spot knowledge" that Christian Scherrer claims is so important for 
successful peace research. 75 
Thirdly, the focus of her theories, specifically acknowledging the existence of several 
cultures within a society, and even sub-cultures within an organisation, allows for the study of 
interaction between various political and non-political actors and their cultures. A researcher 
applying the theories of Kier will thus examine how one culture interacts with another culture 
and how they reform each other, moving beyond ethnic and national stereotypes describing a 
homogenous culture. 
Fourthly, her focus on military organisations offers new insights in societies governed 
by former military organisations, such as for example Ethiopia. 76 In addition, the hostile 
environment facing the military organisations are similar to the environment civil 
organisations may face when their environment is hostile and they share certain traits. 
Examples of such civil organisations are for example newspapers in conflict with a repressive 
government. 
Lastly, her theories acknowledge that organisational culture interacts with other 
factors; her theories are process-oriented and study such interactions, thus acknowledging that 
organisational culture is influenced by other factors, factors that might be of vital importance 
if one wants to develop policy alternatives. 
's Christian P Scherrer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001), 13. 
76 Many of the governing parties around the world, and especially in Africa started out as military organisations. South 
African is for example ruled by members of the African Nationalist Council (ANC), Zimbabwe is ruled by Robert Mugabe 
and his former guerrilla organisation Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Importantly, two of 
the most powerful organisations within the ruling coalition in Ethiopia have a similar past. 
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All in all, Kier's theories supply very important theoretical tools when studying a 
setting where former military organisations hold political power, and where organisations 
experience continuous crises and a hostile environment. As it examines the causes of action, it 
may examine the causes of actions leading to war as well. Her theories set focus on topics 
seldom addressed within peace research, namely organisational culture; this might also lead to 
new insights. Moreover, she puts focus on the interaction within organisations and on how the 
organisational sub-cultures influence outcomes, again a focus seldom applied to peace 
research, again with the potential to uncover new insights. Indirectly Kier also takes on some 
of the points of Scherrer's criticism of peace research, as she takes local details into account. 
She opens up the possibility for the study of how organisational culture was formed, thus 
allowing the study of factors that are important for peace researchers trying to transform/ 
accommodate such organisational culture into a more peaceful version, or to accommodate 
the organisational culture in ways that prevent war. In this way the theories of Elizabeth Kier 
provides a valuable tool to study war, both the decision-making that leads to it, as well as to 
study the decisions preventing a reestablishment of peace. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia remains tense even five years after the 1998- 
2000 Eritrean - Ethiopian war formally ended. Both sides are still engaged in a war of words 
and the border remains closed. Ethiopian as well as Eritrean politicians, journalists and 
political scientists retain vested interests when discussing the causes and the handling of the 
war. The Ethiopian side wants to show that the Eritreans caused the war, while the Eritreans 
want to show that Ethiopia was to blame. Moreover, the Ethiopian opposition actively 
criticises the government's handling of the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship and use the 
Eritrean issue as a strategy in order to gain voters and supporters. The relationship between 
the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian press continues to be problematic; there are 
frequent attempts by the government to harass independent journalists and to manipulate the 
press. Lies and misinformation are often strategies used to protect the interests of the various 
parties, as well as to damage political opponents, also when describing the events of the past. 
This situation poses a number of challenges for research and the collection of 
information. It influences the quality of most of the regional sources of information that this 
thesis has to draw upon, namely interviews, oral and written statements made by involved 
individuals, as well as Ethiopian newspaper articles. Perhaps more than in other situations, 
both oral and written sources must be treated with caution and with keen appreciation of their 
potential bias, or authenticity, as forgery of documents remains a frequent occurrence. It 
might also imply that some of the original documents from the involved organisations that 
have been studied are forgeries. 
This thesis employs a number of different strategies in order to deal with research 
under the challenging circumstances of the Eritrean - Ethiopian war, and this chapter outlines 
these various approaches and methods. No methodology can fully overcome the possibility of 
misinformation and misrepresentation, however, specific research methods might enhance the 
analysis conducted through the thesis. 
A general introduction to the type of process tracing employed in the thesis is 
presented in section one and a justification of the chosen narrowly focused case study 
approach is also provided. Section two presents the interview techniques. Section three 
presents how written sources were used and how the study of the press was conducted. 
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Employing Process Tracing in a Case Study 
In order to examine how organisational culture was formed, entrenched and in the end had 
effects on decision making, this thesis employs a form of process tracing. Process tracing is a 
research strategy that looks closely at the way decisions are made and the factors that 
influence the participants. It involves reconstructing actors' motivations, as well as their 
definitions and evaluations of situations. Thick process tracing is close to an historical 
explanation and traces the sequences of events in detail over a longer period of time. ' As 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennet claim, process tracing examines in detail the 
processes, events, actions and expectations that link a cause to its effect. 2 Such an approach 
gives several advantages: the development of organisational culture might be traced over 
time and the process of how the culture was enhanced, even changed, by external forces, can 
be studied, as well as its final effects on decision making. The thesis will thus be able to trace 
specific elements within the organisational culture of the involved organisations, show their 
origins, how they developed and how they influenced decision-making in the period leading 
up to the war. 
Process tracing is here employed in a case study of Ethiopian decision-making. While 
statistical approaches comparing different wars commonly applied by peace research might 
disclose important facts about conflicts, they tend to compare states and use states as units. 3 
This thesis is based on the constructivist theories employed by Kier, theories that warn 
explicitly against perceiving a state, or any party to a conflict, as more homogenous than it 
really is. 4 She maintains that a state-centric approach often describes a religion and a 
simplified culture as norms that influence a state's behaviour. To Kier, there is no such thing 
as a unified state culture; different groups and different organisations operating within a state 
will always have different cultures. If there are intra-state conflicts, the different rebel fronts 
will seem more coherent than they really are, whereas they actually consist of smaller groups 
1 Andrew Bennet and Alexander George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research" (paper presented at the Mac Arthur 
Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Harvard University, October 17-19 1997), 3. 
2Ibid., 2. 
3 The classical works of David Singer and Melvin Small for example compare the characteristics of states when exploring 
inter-state wars. They focus on the GNP of states, their resource situation, and their status in the international system, number 
of deaths per participant and so on. If additional actors originating in one of the participating states are to be counted, they 
have to take up arms. Non-violent policy influence is not examined. David Singer, and Melvin Small, Correlates of War 
Project. International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (Icpsr 9905) (ICPSR 9905) [Internet] (Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research, 2000 [cited 1 June 2005]); available from 
http: //webapp-icpsr. umich. edu/cocoon/DDI/SAMPLES/09905. xml. 
4 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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with different cultures. Moreover, even within the various segments and organisations 
influencing the decision making in a state, there will be complex interaction between different 
groups. A case-study approach is one way of avoiding the theoretical superimposition of 
homogeneity. This kind of study affords possibilities for an in-depth examination of local 
conditions, local cultures, sub-group interaction and the history and culture of the many 
groups and institutions inevitably involved in the process leading to war. 
However, such a case study is demanding. It is of vital importance to interview people 
who participated in relevant organisational decision-making. In the Ethiopian case, people 
that held influential positions are parts of organisations that have a tradition of secrecy, so it 
inevitably becomes both time- and resource-intensive. Due to the lack of time and resources, 
the field study phase had to focus on Ethiopia only. While this decreases the information 
available on Eritrea, it has the advantage of increasing the possibility for an in-depth study of 
conditions in Ethiopia. This thesis does not look for the cause, the most important cause of the 
war. It rather examines many of the small causes, causes that nevertheless had crucial impact 
on decision-making at various stages in the process that led to war. It acknowledges that many 
of the small causes were probably rooted in Eritrean actions, but also clearly identifies such 
causes on the Ethiopian side. It is impossible to examine innumerable causes that might lead 
to a specific war and all peace researchers must limit their focus. The focus on Ethiopia 
functions as a way to narrow down the focal point. It is important to understand the Ethiopian 
case. This is not to appropriate blame but to be able to go in depth. Similar studies of 
organisational culture might be conducted in Eritrea, but this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The Fieldwork Phase 
This thesis is based on ten months of fieldwork in Ethiopia conducted from August 2002 to 
June 2003, as well as a second short fieldwork phase in December 2004. A vital part of this 
fieldwork was the conducting of interviews. A total of twenty four persons were interviewed. 
Twenty of the interviews were recorded. Interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa and 
Mekele. The largest single group that was interviewed consisted of members or former 
members of the ruling party in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front 
(EPRDF). The EPRDF is a complex organisation. It is an umbrella organisation consisting of 
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four important ethnically defined structures: the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation 
(OPDO), the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic 
Party (ANDM) and Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Front (SEPDF). 
5 All these 
organisations have their separate leaders and separate central committees. However, the TPLF 
is clearly the oldest and most influential of these organisations. It dominates policy making, 
and is the oldest association within the EPRDF umbrella. 6 Focus was therefore set on TPLF, 
its leadership and its central committee, of which five members were interviewed.? The 
central committee of the EPRDF was also deemed to be important. As the highest ruling body 
of the party it has a large and direct influence on Ethiopian decision-making. A total of seven 
central committee members were interviewed. Some of these respondents had double roles: 
they were also interviewed because of their parallel roles as members in the TPLF central 
committee, as well as their OPDO and AAPO central committee memberships. 8 One central 
committee member in the OPDO and three members in AAPO (of which one at the time had 
been sacked for corruption) were interviewed. 9 
The second main group consisted of high ranking parliamentarians and civil servants, 
also originating in the EPRDF structure, but interviewed because of their supposed proximity 
to the formal decision-making processes. 10 Two of the participants of the Ethio-Eritrean 
border commission, each from separate sides in the conflict that broke out within the TPLF, 
were interviewed. " Six members of the Defence and Security Affairs Standing Committee 
and the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs (committees in the Parliament) were 
interviewed. 12 In addition the vice minister of foreign affairs was interviewed. 13 
An interviewer encounters many methodological dilemmas. The respondent might be 
provoked by the question or be tempted to give answers that suit her/his own purposes. 
5ANDM used to be known as Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), and was at the start not ethnically defined. 
6 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 116. 
Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Kiddusan 
Nega, Interview, 17 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003, Netsanet Asefaw Nigus, Interview, 1 January 
2002. 
8 All in all this was the case for three of the TPLF central committee members, two of the ANDM central committee leaders 
as well as one of OPDO members 
9 Simon Bereket, Interview, 25 December 2002, Mesmor Fante, Interview, 2 February 2003, Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 
December 2002, Hassan Shiffa, Interview, 21 December 2003. 
10 As will be elaborated in later chapters, in the case of the Parliament the MPs were not close to the decision-making 
although theoretically supposed to be so 
11 They were not formal members, but these informal participants mixed with the formal members and participated in the 
debate. Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
12 The two committees in the Parliament are now joined together and exist as one committee. Aserat Adaro, Interview, 6 
December 2002, Zeray Askedom, Interview, 3 December 2002, Hailekiros Gesesse, Interview, 1 December 2002, Fentaye 
Legesse, Interview, 2 December 2002, Tesfaye Tsegaye, interview, 25 October 2002, Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 
2002. 
13 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
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Interview triangulation, cross checking with other interviews, is employed in order to explore 
self-interests, using other interviews in order to disclose hidden motives amongst other 
respondents. Although not perfect, it creates a possibility to detect false information. Political 
adversaries will usually have a great interest in disclosing the selfish motivations of their 
opponents, and the thesis employed such adversaries to check the information of the EPRDF 
respondents. In this thesis, three leaders of oppositional parties, namely Beyene Petros of the 
Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), Beranu Nega, now vice-leader 
of the oppositional party Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), and Merara Gudina of 
the Oromo National Congress (ONC) were interviewed in order to explore the influence of 
self -interests in the replies of the EPRDF leaders. 14 A representative of the Eritrean side was 
also interviewed. 15 In addition dissidents from the ruling party itself were interviewed. 16 
Self-evidently, the claims of the respondents in opposition to the EPRDF respondents 
might also be motivated by selfish reasons, and cannot be taken as valid without being 
checked with other sources of information. However, they can be used as indicators showing 
that some answers need to be double checked. Comments from these respondents were used 
as a foundation for further research rather than as an outright dismissal of the EPRDF 
members' claims. 17 
Several members of the press and the civil society were interviewed, as were members 
of the international diplomatic community. 18 The researcher's day to day interaction with the 
students and staff of the Addis Ababa University, as well as the press and the diplomatic 
community in Ababa also provided additional information. All information from interviews 
was compared and checked with the information from the 49 Ethiopian newspapers studied in 
connection with the research for this thesis. 19 Previous documents made by and about the 
respondents, were also employed to study the respondents' background and make 
comparisons with their more recent statements, to examine changes in opinion over time. 20 
14 Merara Gudina, Interview, 1 April 2003, Berhanu Nega, Interview, 1 March 2003, Beyene Petros, Interview, 3 December 
2002. ONC and SEPDC has now joined in the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) party 
15 Yonas Manna Bairu, Interview, 1 September 2004. 
16 Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Mesmor Fante, Interview, 2 February 2003. 
" Surprisingly often the various groups actually agreed on relatively controversial issues 
18 Amhare Aregowi, Interview 2002, Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003, Anthony Lake, Interview, 22 
March 2005. 
19 They will be dealt with more in-depth later in the chapter 
20 Closely following the research methodologies of Checkel; Jeffery Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration, " Journal 
of European Public Policy(Special Issue) 6, no. 4 (1999), Jeffery Checkel, "Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and 
the Study of International Institutions, " Arena working paper, no. 24 (1999), Jeffery Checkel, "Taking Deliberation 
Seriously" (paper presented at the workshop on Ideas, Discourse and European Integration, European Union Center, Harvard 
University, 11-12 May 2001), Jeffery Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, " 
International Organization 55, no. 3 (2001), Jeffery Checkel, Interview, 15 May 2002. 
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When structuring the interview itself, several other questions had to be dealt with. 
According to Egil Fivelsdal, politicians have a tendency to have answers prepared in advance, 
and also to force the interviewer to speak about certain issues. It is easy to lose control over 
the direction of the interview; some questions become impossible to ask and valuable 
information is often not obtained. 21 Ottar Hellevik argues that the use of memory questions 
often influences the respondents, who tend to believe that their individual preferences are 
more consistent over time than they are. 22 Tove Mordal suggests that researchers also might 
encounter a telescope effect where the respondent tends to include events and developments 
outside the focus period, and backdate them, believing that they are within the time span they 
are being asked about. 23 
The previously described source triangulation is used as a technique to counter the 
telescope effect described by Mordal, as important events will be dated in other sources and 
statements in the interview may be compared to such sources and a telescope effect could be 
discovered. A cognitive interview technique is employed in order to deal with the challenge of 
memory questions. In its original form, the cognitive interview format comprised several 
memory retrieval techniques together with some supplementary techniques for recalling 
specific details. 24 Recent studies have shown that by using these strategies to improve the 
results, the respondents remember more. 25 When conducting interviews with high profile- 
politicians, such a technique might also have its disadvantages; first and foremost it is time 
consuming. As many of the respondents were working in positions with relatively heavy 
working burdens and tight time schedules they had little time for conducting interviews, two- 
hour sessions were too long, and the interviews usually lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour. 
Thus, in some cases the technique had to be modified to save time, but in general the 
cognitive interview technique was used. 
`1 Egil Fivelsdal, Nogle Problemer Ved Interviewing Af Personer I Ledende Stillinger (Kobenhavn: Samfundlitratur, 1990). 
22Ottar Hellevik, Forskningsmetode I Sosiologi Og Statsvitenskap (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1991), 381, Elizabeth F Loftus, 
"Creating False Memories, " Scientific American 277, no. 3 (1997). 
23Tove L. Mordal, Som Man Spor Fär Man Svar (Spydberg: Tano, 1989. ), 155. 
24 One of the main cognitive interview techniques is mentally to reconstruct the physical and personal contexts that existed at 
the time of the event or situation in which the researcher is interested in. This is based upon the assumption that context 
reinstatement increases the accessibility of stored information. The respondent is also asked to report everything. 
Respondents also have to report in full without screening out anything they consider being irrelevant or which they only 
partially remember. Another strategy is to ask the respondent to remember from different perspectives, both from the 
perspective of another person, but in addition from the perspective of another location. A last, but very important technique is 
to give the respondent self-confidence. The interviewer has to indicate to the respondent that he/she has little previous 
knowledge on the subject. The respondent must be allowed to govern the timetable of the interview, thus making him/her feel 
in control of the situation. Edward R. Geiselman, "On the Use and Efficacy of the Cognitive Interview, " Psycoloquy, 7, no. 11 
(1996), Endel Tulving, "Cue-Dependent Forgetting, " American Scientist 62, no. 3 (1974). 
25Edward R. Geiselman, On the Use and Efficaci of the Cognitive Interview (1996 [cited 11 7]). 
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The way interviews were conducted was structured after an interview guide. An 
interview guide makes it possible to put systematic focus on important events, cultural themes 
and expected processes of cognitive evolution without having a structured interview where all 
questions are prepared in advance. 26 The first interviews used as a point of departure an 
interview guide prepared before the eleven-month long field study in Ethiopia. The interview 
guide contained a number of events, decisions and themes that were to be researched as well 
as techniques for conducting the interview itself, and was used as a reminder during 
interviews to ensure that no themes were forgotten. It is important to stress that this was only 
a point of departure; responses provided during the interviews were used to add new questions 
and themes to the interview guide. This process was inspired partly by theories behind the 
cognitive interview, which is based on the reflection of the respondent; it was also inspired by 
theories on qualitative interviews. Qualitative interviews are an unstructured form of 
interviewing that resembles a conversation in the sense that the respondent interacts with the 
researcher, both mutually learning from the process. 27 Steinar Kvale argues that a qualitative 
interview might lead to increased understanding both for respondent and the person 
conducting the interview. 28 By adding themes suggested by the respondents, the researcher 
will take advantage of both his/her previous knowledge and the increased understanding of 
interviewer and respondent. 
An additional problem that emerged during the interview rounds in Ethiopia was fear. 
Respondents feared for their positions within their parties, and feared that the disclosure of 
facts would hurt their party organisation or themselves. This made anonymity essential, and 
respondents asking for such anonymity were granted it. Most interviews were recorded and 
transcribed later, in order to make the information available for future research on Ethiopian- 
Eritrean relations. This made the interviews more formal, but by putting emphasis on creating 
a good atmosphere, by encouraging the respondent to speak about his/her life experience and 
interests, this effect was countered as much as possible. In some cases the respondents wanted 
the tape to be turned off when making certain comments, and in such cases only notes were 
taken. 
Interviews will always have an element of interpretation, and there will always be 
problems, but the above mentioned techniques are a way to minimise these challenges. 
26 The first version of the interview guide is enclosed as an appendix; although later modified this was the basis of all 
interviews 
27 Anna Svabo, Adel Bergland and Jorun Haereid,, Sosiologi Og Sosialantropologi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1993), 220. 
28 Steinar Kvale, "Det Kvalitative Interview, " in Valg Af Organisations- Sociologisk Metoder, ed. lb Andersen (Kobenhavn: 
Samfundslitratur, 1990), 227. 
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Written Sources 
The written sources used in this thesis can be divided into four categories: they are literature 
written by researchers specialising in Ethiopia, ideological documents/ party programmes 
from the government and various political parties, interviews given to the press and Ethiopian 
newspaper articles. These sources were used to check the responses given in interviews 
conducted in conjunction with this thesis, and the interviews were also used to check the 
written sources in a cross-checking process. The use of such triangulation helps the 
interviewer improve the interviewing techniques and avoid influencing the respondents' 
answers. 
Books and articles written by researchers are secondary sources as the authors have 
most commonly not directly witnessed the events they analyse and have to draw upon 
additional sources. Such books and articles have to be used with caution as it becomes harder 
to establish the quality of their primary sources. Emphasis is here put on sources directly 
written by participants in the studied organisations, or on interviews with these various 
participants, published both in the Ethiopian and the international press. 
There are some general traps researchers can fall into when using written sources. 
Written sources might have other origins than they claim to have. Public claims made by the 
individual respondents and organisational protocols might be products of efforts to de- 
legitimise actors, due to the tense relationship between the governing party and the opposition 
in Ethiopia. If the individuals involved are controversial and have fallen from grace with the 
government, researchers have to examine the source of relevant documents and their context 
in more depth in order to disclose all potentially problematic aspects of the source. 
Triangulation will also in this case be a potential method to enhance quality of the research. 
The Study of the Press 
Peace researchers such as Wilhelm Kempf, Heikki Luostarnen and Rune Ottosen have 
suggested that newspapers and media coverage are important for the general discussion of war 
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and peace in society and have the power to promote peace, but also more warlike strategies. 
29 
Similarly, in the Ethiopian case the Ethiopian press influenced the public discussion of the 
war. Much of it actually took place in their articles, and it thus becomes important to study its 
role in relations to the war. 
It is important to remember that the different newspapers are organisations themselves, 
and have to be studied as having organisational cultures that influence their writing styles and 
their conclusions. Newspapers might print articles strongly influenced by their own 
organisational background. 
However, newspapers might also be accurate sources for information about ongoing 
events, and this is the way newspaper sources will be used in chapters five, six and seven of 
this thesis. Such use demands the triangulation of the newspaper articles. If the content of an 
article runs contrary to previous editorial attitudes and against the ideology of the paper, and 
when statements of the newspaper are corroborated by other sources, this might indicate a 
weak role of organisational culture. Importantly, erroneous reporting in itself does not 
necessarily mean that organisational culture have blurred the reporting; papers make mistakes 
and many individuals have reached wrong conclusions based on good information. The 
presence of systematic traits and the repetition of certain phrases will be needed to indicate 
the existence of a specific organisational culture. If such systematic traits seem to be 
explainable by referring to organisational culture, this indicates that organisational culture has 
systematically influenced the interpretations of the paper. 
Repeated conclusions that systematically contradict the available information on 
external events might be explained by the organisational history of the papers in question. 
Nevertheless, this may also be explained by vested interests and the thesis will examine this 
by analysing which interests papers might have in reporting in a particular way. Interviews 
with critics of the paper indicate such interests, and triangulation and examination of more 
neutral sources might be able to confirm such suspicions. 
The thesis examined systematically the 49 most important newspapers from 1994 to 
1998, looking for common themes and the influence of potential cultural elements. 
30 It then 
inquired into the organisational background of the most popular of the Ethiopian papers. As 
illustrated by the table on page 43(Table 2.1), the media covered in this thesis can be 
29 Wilhelm Kempf, "Gulf War Revisited: A Comparative Study of the Gulf War Coverage in American and European Media" 
(paper presented at the Projektgruppe Friedensforschung's Conference on Peace Journalism, Konstanz, 13-15 June 1997), 
Heikki Luostarnen, and Rune Ottosen, "Challenges for Journalism in Restricted Conflicts after the Second World War" 
(paper presented at the Projektgruppe Friedensforschung's Conference on Peace Journalism, Konstanz, 13-15 June 1997). 
30 Most papers are in Amharic (the most important language in Ethiopia). 
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categorised into eight groups. The first category comprises the major opposition papers 
directly associated with political organisations, the second category consists of large and well- 
known opposition papers without a direct connection to political organisations, and the third 
category includes smaller opposition papers. A fourth group consists of big papers usually 
viewed as government-friendly, with the fifth category consisting of papers that are directly 
attached to the government. The sixth is a group of small papers with obscure and unknown 
attachments. I also chose to include a seventh category for subversive papers, those that 
pretend to be oppositional but are by some viewed as subversive tools of the government. The 
eighth and last category is national TV, controlled directly by the government. The different 
categories are important for methodological reasons, as the control the government held over 
them varied, as well as the relationship with the government. Thus the more tactical 
motivations for criticising the government may have varied as well. The articles in the 
newspapers were analysed while keeping their affiliations in mind. 
The study of the newspapers was mainly conducted in Ethiopia in 2002-2003 by the 
researcher and one Ethiopian project assistant, both participating in the translation of the 
articles studied in this thesis. In addition the English language Ethiopian Press Digest was 
studied in Norway 2005, as well as the Ethiopian Herald, the main English newspaper of the 
Derg. Newspaper issues from 1994 until August 1998 were studied systematically. The 
Ethiopian Herald was studied from 1974 to 1989. Selected post-1998 issues of the Reporter, 
the Addis Zemen and the Addis Tribune were studied because they were suggested as sources 
by respondents. 
A study of the organisational culture of the Ethiopian press and its influence on the 
process that lead to war might raise at least two objections. First, the press might be seen as 
controlled by the government, a pawn in their media strategy controlled by reprisals and harsh 
prison sentences given to critical journalists. It might be argued that this has led to the death 
of several newspapers. From a peak of 128 publications registered in 1994, there are now 
fewer than several dozen. 31 As Human Rights Watch argues, "government repression is being 
used as a means of tightening the state's grip. , 32 
31 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 72. 
32 Human Rights Watch, "The Ethiopian Government Is Trying to Muffle the Independent Press, " (London: Human Rights 
Watch, 2004). 
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Table 2.1: The studied papers and their circulation (In the year 2000). 33 
Cat 1. Cat 2. Cat 3. Cat 3. Cat 4. Cat 5. Cat 6. Cat 7. Cat 
8. 
Andinet Tobiya Genawi Dannew Addis Yerezarethu Madda Adwa? ETV 
(6500) Zemen Etiopia Welaabu 
(15.000) 
Niqa Mogad Dowol Tarik Weekly Abiotawi Roha Fiametta? 
(2000) Report Demokrasi 
Tariq Tomar Amiro Dagmawi Addis IFIYOTA Tazzabi 
(2000) Tribune (Circulated 
(2000) amongst 
Eprdf 
Members, 
numbers 
unknown). 
Amiro Mudai Tenager The KITAB 
Reporter 
(11.000) 
URJI WAQT Mebreq The Lubar 
(4000) Monitor 
(1000) 
Gomorra Zog Agere The Andebet 
Ethiopian 
Herald 
(7000) 
Beza Addis Habasha Beza Tequamin 
lissan 
Etiop Zenai Wolafen The Sun Anbet 
(5500) Admas (1000) 
Seife - Zena Morech 
Nebelbal Ethiopia 
(4000) 
33 The circulation numbers for some newspapers are not available. The first category comprises the major opposition papers 
associated with political organisations, the second category consists of large and well-known opposition papers without a 
direct connection to political organisations, the third category includes smaller opposition papers. A fourth group consists of 
big papers usually viewed as government-friendly, with the fifth category consisting of papers that are directly attached to the 
government. The sixth is a group of small papers unknown attachments. A seventh category covers subversive papers, papers 
claiming to be oppositional but are accused by competing newspapers to act as subversive tools of the government. The 
eighth category is national TV, controlled directly by the government. 
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Indeed, the Press Law of 1992 had many shortcomings constraining the press. 
34 This 
law was based on the Press Proclamation 34/1992, which in turn was partly, not fully, written 
on the basis of articles stipulated in the Penal Code of 1957 and the Civil Code of 1959.35 
Some of these older articles are not fully identical to the new press law, but still have legal 
force. Journalists and their lawyers also had to pay attention to the Constitution of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Criminal Procedure Code, and, of course, the 
International Conventions Ethiopia has signed. 36 This confusion has been actively used by 
the government to prosecute newspapers and their journalists. 37 As Mulat says: 
Ethiopia's Press Law (Proclamation 34/1992) could be taken as an achievement of 
great significance in the process of political liberalization. Typical gestures in this 
direction are the measures taken to free the press from the captivity of pre-print 
censorship. In practice, however, rather than regulating the activities of the private 
press, the law imposed prohibitive articles. 38 
Additionally, the press law contains paragraphs allowing the imprisonment of journalists for 
example of spreading false accusation against the government, and paragraphs so vague that 
they are open to interpretation. 
The second question becomes how can the Ethiopian press with its low distribution 
numbers have any influence? After all, only three of them have full coverage of Ethiopia. As 
the Norwegian press researcher Oyvind Aadeland asserts, Ethiopian papers are circulated 
amongst relatively few individuals, around 20,000 all in all. 39 Even a large paper will only 
have a circulation of 11,000 to 15,000 issues. 
With regards to the first issue: the Ethiopian press can clearly not be said to be 
controlled by the government. On the contrary, most papers are highly critical of the 
government. Of the four largest papers, the Addis Zemen, the Reporter, the Abitawi 
34 A new press law is in the process of being created, this law is still relatively restrictive prohibiting foreign investment in 
the press and preventing former criminals, including some former journalists convicted under the 1992 law, from owning 
newspapers. 
35 1949 Ethiopian calendar and 1952 Ethiopian calendar. 
36Kifle Mulat, "Presentation" (paper presented at the Workshop for Journalist associations, Media Politicies and Investigative 
Journalism on HIV/AIDS, Nairobi, Kenya, 5-8 June 2002). 
37 There is a problem of incompatibility both in time and outlook (for example the conceptual outlook with regard to the press 
between these laws) due to the fact that the Press Proclamation is nine years old. The Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure 
code are both 42 years old. The youngest of the laws pertaining to the press in the Constitution, 
is only four years old. 
38 Kifle Mulat, "Presentation" (paper presented at the Workshop for Journalist associations, Media Politicies and Investigative 
Journalism on HIV/AIDS, Nairobi, Kenya, 5-8 June 2002). 
39 (yvind Aadland, "Contextualization of Communications, the Role of the Media in Bringing Democracy and Protecting 
Human Rights and in Development" (paper presented at the Freedom of the Press and Social Development Seminar, Imperial 
Hotel, Addis Ababa, 10-11 October 2003). 
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Demokrasi and the Tobiya, one, the Tobiya, was highly critical of the government from its 
conception. The Reporter was initially friendly towards the government but became highly 
critical in 1997. The Addis Zemen, although owned by the government, contained many 
critical articles and only one, the Abitawi Demokrasi, an official EPRDF paper, was an 
uncritical supporter of the government. 40 Most of the smaller papers had articles that were 
unfavourable to the government. Moreover, even given the prohibitive articles of the Press 
Law, the press actually had very strong guarantees compared to previous regimes: the 
opposition was allowed to found newspapers and had some freedom of operations within the 
somewhat confusing constraints set by the Press Law and the various reprisals from the 
government. The reduction in the amount of papers was, as Kjetil Tronvoll and Sarah 
Vaughan claim, also a result of the limited market for newspapers in Ethiopia, and the over- 
investment in the media sector following its first opening in 1992.41 
From time to time the oppositional press accuses some of its members of being 
planted, of being created by the government to publish false rumours so as to discredit the rest 
of the oppositional papers. Nevertheless, the accusations are directed at few newspapers. 
During the period studied here such accusations were directed at the newspapers Adwa and 
Fiametta only. 42 The critical views of the majority of the papers and the fact that accusations 
of subversion are so limited make it reasonable to view most of the newspapers in Ethiopia as 
independent organisations with the ability to write articles with a critical attitude towards the 
government. 
With regards to the second issue, as f yvind Aadeland, a well known expert on the 
Ethiopian press, points out, although the circulation numbers of the Ethiopian papers are low 
and mainly restricted to Addis Ababa and other large cities, they are circulated among a very 
important elite. 43 The papers are circulated amongst the political leadership of all the major 
ethnic groups, the government, the opposition, the leaders within the army and the financial 
sector. In addition, the official circulation numbers might be misleading. Ethiopia might be 
40A quick look through archived issues of these papers in the institute of Ethiopian Studies library at the University of Addis 
Ababa will confirm such a view; one might also access the Reporter online at www. Ethiopianreporter, com. For examples 
see: "The Arrest of Taimarat Layne, Tplf Systematizes Corruption, " Tobiya 10 April 1997, "Ato Sileshi Woubneh Leaves as a 
Protest against the Eprdf, " The Reporter 17. February 1997, "Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, " Tenager 8 September 1994. 
41 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 72. 
42 "Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, " Tenager 8 September 1994, Issaias Afwerki, "Appendix 3: Letters Exchanged between 
Afwerki & Zenawi, July-August 1997, Second Letter from President Issaias Afwerki to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Dated 
25/08/1997, " in Brothers at War, Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, ed. Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1997). 
430yvind Aadland, "Contextualization of Communications, the Role of the Media in Bringing Democracy and Protecting 
Human Rights and in Development" (paper presented at the Freedom of the Press and Social Development Seminar, Imperial 
Hotel, Addis Ababa, 10-11 October 2003). 
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similar to neighbouring Somaliland in the sense that one issue is resold after its use, 
circulating amongst more than one reader. 44 One copy of a newspaper is often shared by many 
individuals, and literate family members often tend to read to other, illiterate family members 
and friends. The circulation is thus larger than official numbers indicated. The newspapers 
thus were important and most newspapers acted independently of the government. 
Methodology, a Summary 
All in all, this thesis uses a variety of methodological techniques in order to deal with the 
problems encountered when doing research on the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. First, it narrows its 
focus to organisational culture and Ethiopian organisations in order to go more in depth into 
these factors. All studies of war have to be narrowed down in some way or another and the 
focus of this thesis allows the researcher to conduct an in-depth exploration of a topic seldom 
researched into. 
Second, it uses several techniques to ensure the quality of the information gathered. It 
compares information gathered in interviews with information from other sources, both 
written and other interviews. This triangulation allows the researcher to discover more easily 
answers that are given out of self-interest or answers that are wrong because of the weakness 
of memory. It also uses the cognitive interview technique in order to deal with these 
problems. Similarly, triangulation is used to examine information from written sources: they 
are compared to other sources and the backgrounds of the writers are checked. 
No methodology can fully overcame the possibility of misinformation and 
misrepresentation; however, these specific research methods enhance the foundation for the 
analysis conducted through the thesis. 
44 The writer observed this practice in Addis Ababa on several occasions. 
Newspaper sellers would go to restaurants to pick 
up leftover papers and sell them again. Berit Linderman and 
Stig Jarle Hansen,, Somaliland, Electoral Report (Oslo: Center 
for Human Rights, 2003). 
46 
Part II: Empirical Analysis 
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Chapter 3: Explaining the Eritrean-Ethiopian War 
On 6 May 1998, a small group of Eritrean soldiers entered a disputed territorial zone on the 
Badme plains, an area along the western borders of Eritrea and the northernmost part of 
Ethiopia. The exact details of the clashes that followed are hard to establish. Over a period 
of six days smaller contingents of Eritreans and Ethiopians became engaged in small scale 
battles. Eritrea then subsequently launched a major offensive to retake what they claimed to 
be Eritrean territories controlled by Ethiopia. In response, the Ethiopian government swiftly 
assembled its lower chamber of Parliament, the Council of People's Representatives. This 
chamber subsequently issued a resolution condemning the acts of aggression by the Eritreans 
and demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Suddenly Africa had a full-scale 
bilateral war, the first in decades. ' The war lasted for two years and involved half a million 
soldiers from three countries. Hundreds of thousands had to flee their homes. 140,000 
Eritreans and Ethiopians lost their lives. 2 
Many observers were surprised by the start of the war. 3 The alliance between the 
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 
had been perceived as having been one of the more stable alliances during the 1970's and 
1980's. 4 The two organisations were often viewed as recruiting from related ethnic groups, 
the Tigray and the Tigrinya. Moreover, these groups also shared the Christian Coptic 
religion. The close ethnic and religious bonds between the groups were seen as central to 
strengthening their alliance. 5 The seemingly mutual friendship between the two ruling parties 
seemed to be so close that the scholar Amare Tekle referred to it as a special relationship in 
line with the Anglo-American one. 6 Similarly, in early 1997, the area specialist Roy Pateman 
optimistically stressed that there would be no military danger as long as the leadership in the 
two countries remained the same. 7 
Many observers attempted to explain why the war broke out. The explanations ranged 
from pure conspiracy theory to well-founded theories based on meticulous historical analyses 
' Walta Information Center, Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information Center, 2001). 
2 Human Rights Watch, "Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 
1998 - April 2002), " (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 3. 3 See for example: "Old Comrades Spurn Peace in Horn of Africa., " The London Times 9 June 1998. 
4 Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 12. 
5 See for example "Old Comrades Spurn Peace in Horn of Africa., " The London Times 9 June 1998. 
6 Amare Tekle, "The Basis of Eritrean-Ethiopian Cooperation, " in Eritrea and Ethiopia from Conflict to Cooperation 
(Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1994), 2. 
7 Roy Pateman, Even the Stones Are Burning (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1998), 264. 
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and in-depth study of source materials, some drawing on general theories of war, some 
highlighting specific factors. It is important to examine these approaches in order to provide 
an overview of the literature presenting explanations for the outbreak of the war. In addition, 
a review of the previous attempts to explain the war is necessary because some of these 
explanations bring to light factors that interacted with the organisational culture studied in 
chapters four, five, six and seven of this thesis, and also to show that most of the explanations 
failed to include organisational cultural factors and inter-organisational interaction when 
attempting to explain the war, leaving important information unexamined. 
Many interacting elements, including the conceptions and strategies of a multitude of 
actors, drove the developments that led to the war. Many of the previous attempts to explain 
the Eritrean-Ethiopian war point to different factors that at different stages impelled the 
process in the direction of war and this chapter highlights their various strengths and 
weaknesses. The chapter will first show how many of the present day theories of conflict 
studies fail to explain adequately the causes of the conflict. Subsequently, it will move on to 
an analysis of more case specific explanations of the war and describe their connections to 
more general conflict theories when necessary. It will show that both case specific 
explanations and general explanations leave questions open and almost totally neglect 
organisational culture. 
General Theories on the Causes of War 
There are many theories claiming to be valid for most conflicts, and thus also to have the 
potential to yield new insights when applied to the Eritrean- Ethiopian war. 
One set of theories strongly asserts that differences in language, ethnicity or religion 
can form the basis for psychological distrust or enmity. 
8 Most prominent amongst the 
proponents for these theories are Samuel Huntington and Donald Horowitz. Huntington, who 
also touches directly upon the first Eritrean-Ethiopian war in his main book, "The Clash of 
Civilizations", claims that different standards, communication problems and lack of 
familiarity with the assumptions, motivations, social relationships and social practices of other 
$Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Samuel P. Huntington, 
"The Clash of Civilizations?, " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not 
Civilizations, What? 
Paradigms of the Post- Cold War World, " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (1993). 
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people will create large differences between members of the different world religions. 
9 
Different world religions are in turn a defining factor of what Huntington calls civilisations: 
broad cultural entities. 1° Feelings of superiority, fear and distrust of members of other 
civilisations and difficulties in communication because of different languages and different 
standards of civic behaviour will all lead to conflicts between such broad cultural entities. 
Consequently, Huntington claims that war will most often start at the borders between 
civilisations. " 
Horowitz, not commenting upon the Eritrean-Ethiopian war specifically but on war in 
general, asserts that ethnicity can induce dangerous calculative and passionate behaviour. 12 He 
claims that humans in general prefer humans that are similar to them, and also have a 
tendency to form groups. Humans wish to socialise with other humans that are perceived as 
having many similarities with themselves, like a common ethnic heritage or common 
language. 13 Such socialisation will lead to individual group members overemphasising 
similarities, and make them neglect the differences within a group. Socialisation will also 
create a desire to belong. Such a desire makes it easier to view other ethnic groups as inferior 
and justify attacks on them. ' 4 
The Ethiopian-Eritrean war is clearly not a clash of civilisations, nor do the two 
countries have substantially bilateral problems because of different religions. Indeed some of 
Huntington's claims become strange when examining this conflict. He claims that conflicts 
between Muslims and non-Muslims are especially violent. 15 A conflict between Muslims and 
Christians, found both within Ethiopia and Eritrea, exists, but it is small, if not insignificant, 
compared to the carnage of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. In this war Muslims from Eritrea 
killed Muslims from Ethiopia and Muslims from Ethiopia killed Eritrean Muslims, members 
of the Christian civilisation acted likewise. Huntington also claims that Eritrea is a Muslim 
country while Ethiopia is Christian. 
16 This is also clearly wrong, both of the two countries 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996), 129. 
10 Ibid., 27. 
" Ibid., 129. 
12 Donald L. Horowitz, "Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict" (paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference 
on Development Economics, Washington DC, 20 April 1998), 5. 
13Ibid., 16. 
14 Ibid., 20. 
15 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996), 183. 
16Ibid., 27. 
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being divided into roughly a 50/50 balance between their Christian and Muslim populations. 
'7 
Huntington's theories seem largely irrelevant for the Eritrean-Ethiopian case. 
In the case of Ethiopia-Eritrea, Donald L. Horowitz' claims fare no better. He claims 
that humans often tend to bond according to similarities into ethnic groups, and that they tend 
to attack ethnically defined groups perceived as less similar. 18 Two of the most important 
ethnic groups that stood almost fully united backing the Ethiopian and Eritrean side 
respectively, the Tigrayans and the Tigrinyas, had a very similar culture and shared the same 
language. Thus the potential communication problems due to language and traditional cultural 
differences seem to have been small. The Eritrean-Ethiopian case could be a deviant one, but 
the above argumentation illustrates that Horowitz' theories have little to offer in explaining 
this particular war. 
Balance of power theories are also commonly used to explain war or the absence of 
war within the field of International Relations. Scholars such as Stanley Hoffman, 
commenting on war in general, view changes in the balance of power between countries as 
vital in order to explain the outbreak of war. 19 It is important to point out that, as indicated by 
figure 3.1 and 3.2, the balance of power between the two had not been changed by arms 
import, and no larger arms purchase project had been initiated by any of the two. 
In the Eritrean-Ethiopian case the military balance of power between the two states 
remained virtually unchanged for the five years leading up to the conflict. 20 There was no 
arms race between the two countries. 21 Admittedly, (as shown in Figure 3.3) there had been a 
very minor increase in defence spending on the Eritrean side, but this was barely enough to 
keep track with inflation. 
The Soviet Union had earlier exported large amounts of weapons to the previous 
Ethiopian regime, weapons that were used by both parties in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. 
17 Thomas P Ofcansky, and Berry LaVerle, Ethiopia, a Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress, 1991), 1-20. 
18 Donald L. Horowitz, "Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict" (paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference 
on Development Economics, Washington DC, 20 April 1998), 5-22. 
19 Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981). 
20 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998), 248-50, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 131-32, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-96 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 241-42, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1996-97 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 250-51, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military Balance 1994-95 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 227-28. 
21 During the autumn of 1997, there was an Eritrean mobilisation of several units that was to participate officially in public 
construction. These soldiers/workers might 
have been mobilised because of military purposes. However, this was after 
tension already had increased, so it 
did not create the initial tension but might have been a consequence of it. 
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Figure 3-1: A Comparison Between the Eritrean and Ethiopian Air Forces. 22 
140 .... ... 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
SP FbIl` SO so ýlb 
Noy N°i N°i N°i ý°ý "S 
Combat aircrafts: 
Ethiopia 
Combat aircrafts: 
Eritrea 
Combat 
helicopters: 
Ethiopia 
Combat 
helicopters: 
Eritrea 
Figure 3-2: A Comparison of the Manpower of the Eritrean and the Ethiopian Army. 23 
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22 The serviceability of the Ethiopian fighters was very low; the airplanes that remained in service in 1997 were mostly of the 
Derg vintage. However, the Ethiopian air force had scored some notable successes in increasing the serviceability of their 
airplanes, this by "cannibalising" parts and by hiring Russian maintenance. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 248-50, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 131-32, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-96 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1996), 241-42, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996-97 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 250-51, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994-95 
(London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 227-28. 
23 The real Eritrean army was probably significantly smaller than indicated by these numbers; a significant proportion of its 
manpower is allocated to the running of business enterprises. However, Eritrea mobilised a large number of youths during the 
autumn of 1997. It was claimed that this was for construction purposes, but it could have been a preparation for war. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998), 248-50, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 131-32, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-96 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 241-42, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1996-97 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 250-51, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military Balance 1994-95 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 227-28. 
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Figure 3-3: The Development of the Defence Budgets of the Belligerents24 
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As Wolbert Smidt points out, whilst this meant that the two sides had access to relatively 
modern weapons, it does not in itself explain why the war broke out. 25 The large quantities of 
ex-Soviet arms could have remained in storerooms if other factors had not influenced the 
parties to use them. Moreover, these stores had been depleted by wear and tear, and kept 
depleting until the time the war broke out. In this sense the parties were, albeit probably 
involuntarily, disarming, as more and more of their arms became worthless because of 
deterioration through wear and tear. 
Theorists like Kenneth Waltz argue that defensively motivated efforts by states to 
provide for their own security through armaments, alliances and deterrent threats are often 
perceived as threatening and so lead to counteractions and conflict spirals that are difficult to 
reverse. 26 The effects of defensively motivated efforts create the security dilemma, the 
possibility that a state's actions to provide for its security may result in a decrease in the 
security of all states, including itself. 27 
24 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998), 248-50, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 131-32, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-96 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 241-42, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1996-97 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 250-51, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, The Military Balance 1994-95 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 227-28. 
25 Wolbert Smidt, "Gibt Es Fur Den Krieg Zwischen Eritrea Und Athiopien Uberhaupt Grunde?, " Streitblatt. Zeitung der 
Gegenuniversität, no. 9 (2000): 1. 
26 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
27 Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, " in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 175. 
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Yet the security dilemma seemed remote from the characteristics of the Ethiopian- 
Eritrean relationship. The two states seemed to have a deep and warm relationship. At one 
point the Eritreans suggested creating a federation between the two countries. 
28 While 
perhaps offering valuable insights when exploring other conflicts, a focus on the security 
dilemma seems misplaced when studying the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. The leaders of the two 
countries, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Eritrean President Issaias Afworki, 
were viewed as members of a new and dynamic generation of African leaders able to 
transcend the previous security dilemmas of the African continent. Martin Plaut and Patrick 
Gilkes describe their images as: "Hard-working, uncorrupted and determined to break with 
the continent's sleazy past, both men were promoted as role models for Africa". 29 Marina 
Ottaway mentioned their names together with Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Paul Kagame 
of Rwanda, and hailed them as the new generation of leaders that gave hope to the 
continent. 30 
Other theoretical approaches apparently touch upon vital characteristics of the parties, 
but nevertheless seem to leave several questions open. Basing their ideas on Immanuel Kant, 
peace researchers like Rudolph J. Rummel, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Havard Hegre claim that 
democracy in general prevents war. 31 In a democracy power is claimed to be checked by cross 
pressures; citizens apply pressure to avoid losing their sons and daughters in war and traders 
apply pressure to maintain trade; this is claimed to prevent conflict. 32 In the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian case, none of the belligerents were democratic, and the conflict thus fitted with the 
pattern one would have expected given that Rummel's and Gleditsch's theories work. 33 
However, the belligerents had been undemocratic and at peace for several years before the 
war started. In Ethiopia elections had been held, but observers regarded them as mere shows 
34 for donors. The Eritrean ruling party had changed its name, that was all. In other words, 
28 "Interview with Meles Zenawi, " Die Welt 26 April 1993. 
29 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea and Ethiopia Are at War, " Briefing paper, New Series, 
no. 6 (1999): 13-14. 
30 Marina Ottaway, "Africa's New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem?, " Current History 97, no. 5 (1998): 4. 
31 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Hävard Hegre, "Peace and Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis, " Journal of Conflict Resolution 
41, no. 2 (1997), Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Essay (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992), Immanuel Kant, 
"To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, " in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, ed. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), Rudolph J. Rummel, Power Kills. Democracy as a Method of Non-Violence 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997). 
32 Rudolph J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Non-Violence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 150-60. 
33 Christopher Clapham, "Preface, " in Ethiopia since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance, ed. 
Kjetil Tronvoll Sigfried Pausewang, Lovise Aalen (London: Zed Books, 2002), xvi, Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From 
Friends to Foes, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut 
(Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 14. 
34 Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 14. 
54 
there had been no changes in the emphasised explanatory variable of Rummel and Gleditsch 
that could explain why the war broke out just in 1998 and not previously. The approach of 
Gleditsch and Rummel thus fails to illuminate why the war broke out when it did. 
The members of the so-called Toronto group, led by Thomas Homer Dixon, focus 
their work on scarcities of renewable resources and have defined a special notion, 
environmental scarcity. They have explicitly concentrated on finding the links between 
environmental scarcity and conflicts. Thomas Homer Dixon, Daniel M. Schwartz and Tom 
Deligiannis, commenting upon conflict in general, claim that: 
What we should investigate, rather, is the resource's supply relative to, first, 
demand on the resource, and, second, the social distribution of the resource. The 
relationships between supply and demand and between supply and distribution 
determine people's actual experience of scarcity, and under any practical 
hypothesis, it is these relationships that influence the probability of violence. 35 
The Toronto group claims that environmentally induced conflicts are likely to arise first in the 
developing world, which for them includes Eritrea and Ethiopia. In these countries, a range of 
atmospheric, terrestrial and aquatic environmental pressures is claimed to produce, either 
singly or in combination, four main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural 
production, economic decline, population displacement and disruption of regular and 
legitimised social relations. These social effects, in turn, may cause several specific types of 
acute conflict, including scarcity disputes between countries, clashes between ethnic groups 
and civil strife and insurgency, each with potentially serious repercussions for the security 
interests of the developed world. 
Their approach seems to be very relevant for the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. The 
contested areas between the belligerents in the Eritrean-Ethiopian war had few resources; the 
area had been plagued by droughts and rain was scarce, and clashes between ethnic groups 
and civil strife were often induced by the quarrel over resources. 
36 However, these scarcity 
problems were also relatively common on the border with Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan, but 
here the government managed to quell clashes over local resources. 
37 The approach does not 
35 Thomas F Homer-Dixon, and Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, "The Environment and Violent Conflict: A Response 
to Gleditsch's Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research, " Environmental Change & Security Project Report 6, no. 
2 (2000): 79. 
36 Kiros Gebre Egziabher, and Solomon Tegegne, "Ethiopian Village Studies: Geblen Subhsaesie Woreda, Tigray, " (Oxford: 
UK Overseas Development Administration, 1996), 4. 
37 "Kenya Attacks, " Seife Nebelbal 9 May 1997. 
55 
adequately explain what made the Eritrean-Ethiopian border different from the other borders; 
why, if this was so, resource scarcity created a larger armed conflict only between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, although being equally present in the border areas facing the other neighbours of the 
belligerents. While it seems to provide relevant information on the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the 
environmental scarcity approach nevertheless leaves important questions unanswered. 
To sum up: several of the more general theories attempting to explain war are found 
inadequate when applied to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. An approach focusing on a supposed 
clash of civilisation misses out on the dynamics of the conflict as both countries were equally 
divided when it came to religion: the conflict transcended religion. Furthermore, some of the 
ethnic groups fighting each other were so close linguistically and culturally that it becomes 
meaningless to talk about communication problems due to ethnic differences. The armament/ 
disarmament situation strongly contradicts theories emphasising armament as a source of 
armed conflicts. Other general theoretical approaches leave questions unanswered. An 
approach focusing on democratisation/ the lack of democratisation and its connection with 
war, says little about the timing of the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, as there 
was simply no change in their democratisation variable. Lastly, an approach focusing on 
environmental scarcity may explain several small scale conflicts at the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
border. It does not however explain why the war broke out just on this border and not the 
other borders of Ethiopia or Eritrea, borders where the locals were facing similar scarcity 
problems. 
Importantly, none of the previously presented researchers have a mono-causal 
approach to war, acknowledging that other factors also create warfare. However, the factors 
they emphasise as most important fail to provide the insight needed to understand the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian war. As Christian Scherrer suggests, the problems of such general theories 
might be that they fail to take local factors adequately into consideration. 
38 Several regional 
analysts examined such local factors in detail. Although sometimes drawing on more general 
theories, they developed explanations focusing on issues like the confused demarcation of 
borders, the economic interests of the belligerents, their historical relationship, their identities 
and the personal interests of their leaders. Regional analysts suggested that it was the 
interaction between these factors that had led to the war. Again, none of them had a mono- 
causal approach to the war. Nonetheless, in order to follow more clearly the arguments they 
38 Christian P Scherrer, Peace Research for the 21st Century: A Call for Reorientation and New Priorities (Moers: Institute 
for Research on Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution (IFEK-IRECOR), 2001), 3. 
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used to support their claims and the varied emphasis various researchers put on the different 
factors, it becomes necessary to analyse these factors in separate sections. 
A Confusing Border 
Both parties in the conflict and many academics stress the confusing border disagreement 
between the belligerents as one of the major causes of the war. 39 Such explanations come in 
many different versions. One of the researchers supporting Eritrea, Tekie Fessehazion, 
invokes a narrative of how Ethiopia aggressively handled border demarcation long before the 
war started and thus created a pattern of hostility. 40 The occupation of Adi Murug on 16 
August 1997, one year before the war started, was often claimed to be an example of such 
hostility. 
There are various versions of this 1997 event. Gabriele Ciampi, for example, writes 
that Adi Murug was peacefully returned to Eritrea after what was an Ethiopian operation to 
destroy Afar rebels from the Ougugume rebel group. 41 Ciampi's view is not shared by 
Ethiopian decision makers, who would seem to have incentives to support her as her version 
puts more blame on the Eritreans. The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yemane Kidane 
admits that Ethiopia entered into the area with the intention of re-establishing Ethiopian 
sovereignty there. 42 Other researchers are also critical of Ciampi's claims, Jean-Louis Peninou 
explicitly stating that the village was occupied by Ethiopians. Elias Habte Selassie even 
claims that the Ethiopians dismantled an existing Eritrean administration in the area and 
replaced it with their own, a claim that Ethiopian authorities also contested. 43 Nevertheless, 
all of the above researchers argue that this incident led to a downward spiral that ended in the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian war. 
39 See for example: Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, 
no. 25 (2000), Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: 
James Curry, 2000). 
ao Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. con-i/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
41 Gabrielle Ciampi does not point to any sources for this information. Gabriele Ciampi, "Componenti Cartografiche Della 
Controversia Di Confine Eritreo-Etiopica, " Bolletino della Societa Geografica Italiana 12, no. 3 (1998). 
42 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
43Gabriele Ciampi, "Componenti Cartografiche Della Controversia Di Confine Eritreo-Etiopica, " Bolletino della Societa 
Geografica Italiana 12, no. 3 (1998): 508, Jean Louis Peninou, "Guerre Absurde Entre L'Ethiopie Et L'Erythree, " Review of 
African Political Economy 25, no. 77 (1998): 508. Elias H. Selassie, The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict: Its Causes and 
Consequences (CISP, 2001 [cited 20 November 2001]); available from http: //www. cisp- 
ngo. org/CorsoConflitti/Confl 
itto%20Etiopia-Eritrea/ConflictSelassie. htm#7. 
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They also stress the importance of the clashes between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces 
in the vicinity of the small village of Badme, some ten months after the Adi Murug incident. 
Badme was contested by both Ethiopia and Eritrea. An agreement made between Italy and 
Ethiopia, signed on 10 July 1900, seemed to support Eritrea's claim to the area. This 
agreement states that the area called Badme, and also the Sittona and Meetebe tributaries of 
the Setit River, were Italian and fell within what was then the Italian colony of Eritrea (Map 
3.1). The Italian geographers Federica Guazzini and Gabriele Ciampi contest this view. 44 
According to them, the map that the Eritrean government claims to be the product of the 1900 
treaty is a map produced by Italian cartographers in 1906. 
Map 3.1: Ethiopian and Eritrean Claims: Western Sector (Including the Badme area) 
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44 Gabi fiele Ciampi, "Componenti Cartografiche Della Controversia Di Confine Eritreo-Etiopica, " Bolletino della Societa 
Geografica Italiana 12, no. 3 (1998): 530, Federica Guazzini, La Regione Di Un Confine Coloniale: Eritrea, 1898-1908 
(Torino: L'Hattman Italia, 1999), Bereket H. Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1980). 
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Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll agree and claim that: "Italy resorted to what geographers 
describe as the persuasive functions of maps" and that they: "chose to manipulate the colonial 
map so as to incorporate the larger part of the Badme plains". 45 Ethiopia protested to this 
alteration many times during the early part of the 20th century. However, the Ethiopian 
protests were in general weak, and the issue was not felt to be important, mainly because the 
Italians lacked practical control over the borders. 
Tekie Fessehazion argues that disagreements concerning another contested area, the 
area around Irob, east of Badme (Map 3.2), created conflict as well. Moreover, he claims that 
the area was Eritrean, and most maps clearly agree. 46 
Map 3.2: Ethiopian and Eritrean Claims: Central Sector 
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Nevertheless, Irob had been administered by Ethiopia during the period Eritrea was ruled 
from Italy. After the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1936, Tigray was united with Eritrea, 
thus sidelining the border issue until the Eritreans started their struggle for independence. 
During the early part of the conflict Ethiopian writers such as for example Getahun Gebre 
Amlak stressed that the contested areas in Tigray (Map 3.1 and Map 3.2 as far east as Irob) as 
as Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 24. 
46 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
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well as outside Tigray (Map 3.3), had been under de-facto Ethiopian control for many 
decades. 47 As an oddity it could be mentioned that the Ethiopians until 1997 used maps that 
accorded with the Eritrean version of the story on their birr notes. It became necessary for the 
Ethiopian government to explain their predecessors' use of these maps. Running parallel with 
these arguments, another line of argumentation developed. Many Ethiopians claim that the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 nullified all treaties between Eritrea and Ethiopia prior to 
that date, as can be seen in an article by an anonymous contributor to the well-known book 
"Dispatches from the Electronic Front" containing Internet articles written by Ethiopians 
defending the Ethiopian views. Argumentation like this had the advantage of presenting 
Ethiopia as a champion against former colonial injustice, suggesting parallels between the 
Eritrean government and the government of Benito Mussolini. 48 
Professor John Abbink claims that the wishes of the local population should have been 
the most important factor in deciding between the claims to the Badme triangle. 49 Moreover, 
he claims that the neglect of the wishes of the locals and the disrespect of the principle of uti 
possedetis facto (lands actually held being the basis for continued possession), enabled the 
Eritreans to go to war and thus this neglect in itself became a factor leading to conflict. To 
him, the locals clearly wanted to remain Ethiopian. However, in order to establish who lives 
in an area, one has to establish the location of the area itself, and in the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
case even this was problematic. As for the town Badme itself, its location was confused by the 
varied usage of the term Badme. Abbink argues that: 
On most maps there is a place called Yirga, which seems to coincide with the 
location of Badme. Yirga's geographic location is 14° 37' 60N latitude - 37° 55' 
OE longitude. In a news dispatch of 12 July 1999, an AFP reporter noted that local 
people spoke of `Badme' when they meant the village formally named `Yirga'. In 
official Ethiopian documents, however, Badme is the name of a place in the 
4' Getahun Gebre Almak, "We Do Know Where Badme Is and to Whom It Belongs, " in Dispatches from the Electronic 
Front, ed. Walta Information Center (Addis Ababa: Walta Information Center, 2000), 209-10. This conclusion is supported 
by the OAU high level delegation examining the issue, which claims: " With regard to the authority which was administering 
Badme before 12 May 1998 and on the basis of the information at our disposal, we have reached the conclusion that Badme 
Town and its environs were administered by the Ethiopian authorities before 12 May, 1998. This conclusion does not 
obviously prejudge the final status of that area which will be determined at the end of the delimitation and demarcation 
process and, if necessary, through arbitration"; 4th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, "Report on the Efforts Made by the Oau High Level Delegation on the Dispute between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, " (Ouagadougou: Organisation of African Unity, 1998). 
48 Anonymous, "Issayas' Deeds Are Similar to Those of Mussolini in Many Ways, but Ten Reasons Stand out the Most, " in 
Dispatches from the Electronic Front, ed. Walta Information Center (Addis Ababa: Walta Information Center, 1999), 52-53. 
41) Jon Abbink, "Badme and the Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Back to Square One?, " Perihelion Working Papers, no. 2 (2003): 
4. 
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woreda (or district) of Tahtay-Adiabo. In the Ethiopian census report of 1994 
there is no mention of a town called Yirga, which confirms the idea that Badme 
and Yirga are one and the same. 50 
Abbink situates Yirga well inside the Ethiopian border. On the other hand, the writer 
Margarethe Fielding claims she visited a village called Badme 5 km to the west - for example 
on the Eritrean side - of the "internationally recognized border", by which she means the 
straight line of the 1902 treaty. 51 The journalist Dan Connell, admittedly a well-known friend 
of Eritrea, claims that: 
I was in Badme in early 1985 with guerrillas of the Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front, who then administered the area. Badme had just been obliterated by 
Ethiopian jet fighters, and most people had fled. A week later, I was on the other 
side of the border in Ethiopia's Tigray People's Liberation Front. When I 
mentioned where I had been, one TPLF fighter commented, `you were not in 
Eritrea - Badme is Tigray. 
52 
The demographic composition of the area makes the situation bewildering. The 
triangle is inhabited by the Kunama, a group that lives mostly inside Eritrea but was against 
Eritrean independence in 1993. The Kunamas in the area were hostile towards the EPLF, and 
the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam frequently used them to fight both the EPLF and the 
TPLF. 53 The problems are made even more confusing by the fact that Eritreans from 
Hamasien and Tigrayans from central Tigray resettled in the area. 54 The area had an 
Ethiopian administration, some of the population had voted in Ethiopian elections and the 
Ethiopian birr was the currency in use. 55 Nevertheless, the area clearly also had many Eritrean 
farmers. 56 Thus few clear conclusions can be drawn, and this indicates that the border issue 
50 Ibid. 
51 Margarethe Fielding, Bad Times in Badme (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 
1999), 3. 
52 Dan Connell, "Against More Odds, the Second Siege of Eritrea, " Eritrean studies review 3, no. 2 (1999): 97. 
53 Patrick Gilkes, "Conference Proceedings" (paper presented at the Eritrea- Ethiopia conference, Institute of African 
Alternatives, London, 1 July 1998), 1. 
54 Jon Abbink, "Badme and the Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Back to Square One? " Perihelion Working Papers, no. 2 (2003): 
55International Crisis Group, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace, " (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 7. 
56 Alexander Last, "A Very Personal War: Eritrea Ethiopia, 1998-2000, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 60. 
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indeed had the potential to create hostilities between the two belligerents, each of them 
choosing a version of the history of the areas that fitted their own interests. 
If an ambiguous border was the main cause of the 1998 - 2000 war, the border issue 
would have been likely to figure prominently in the previous talks between the TPLF and the 
EPLF. Indeed, Richard Reid claims that this was one of the issues that sparked the conflict 
between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the rivals of the present day rulers 
of Eritrea, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), during the 1970's. This was one of the reasons 
that the TPLF came to prefer the EPLF as an alliance partner, as they were more lenient on 
57 this issue. 
During the 1980's the ambiguous border created tense relations even between TPLF 
and EPLF parties. According to one of the founding fathers of the TPLF, Gidey Zeratsion, the 
question surfaced in November 1984. The EPLF raised the issue and wanted to demarcate the 
Badme (on map 3.1), Tsorena-Zalambessa (on map 3.2) and Bada (on map 3.3) areas. 58 
Map 3.3: Ethiopian and Eritrean Claims: Bada and the Afar regions 
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57 Richard Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, " Africa. Journal of the International African Institute 73, no. 3 (2003): 387. The 
conflict was mainly about the Sheraro area. He claims that the argument tied the TPLF to the Eritrean People's Liberation 
Front (EPLF), as the former saw the latter as more reasonable with regards to the border questions. 
58 Richard Reid claims that the issue was raised at the Khartoum meeting in 1983, Ibid.: 386. 
62 
They wanted to ensure that they could recruit in these regions and sought to stop Eritrean 
deserters fleeing to Badme. The TPLF used very harsh language when they commented upon 
the EPLF's request. They thus threatened the EPLF with war even before they won the war 
against Mengistu. At an MLLT (Marxist Leninist League of Tigray)/ TPLF leadership 
meeting in September 1985 they declared: 
If EPLF trespasses the present borders, even if we are not sure it belongs to 
Tigray, we will consider the EPLF as an aggressor and we will go to war. If the 
documents for demarcating the border areas, which now are under the Tigrian 
administration prove the contrary we will consider them as Tigrayan territory 
because they have been under effective administration of Tigray. The identity of a 
people is determined by the unity and common history created under the same 
administration. This type of areas, which are under Tigrean administration (areas 
in Belesa-Muna and in Erob, which in the maps are shown within the borders of 
Eritrea), will be under common administration of TPLF and EPLF. If the EPLF 
rejects this and tries to administer it alone, we will consider the EPLF as an 
aggressor. 59 
As Zeratsion claims, this shows that the border was important from an early stage. It is 
significant to note that he also argues that it was not important enough to create war. The 
TPLF at the time again adopted a `wait and see' policy. They did not have enough knowledge, 
and they could not sign an agreement for the whole of Ethiopia. 60 It is vital to underline that 
the TPLF did not threaten with war to protect its final hold of the provinces, only its interim 
rights to them. The TPLF at the time wanted to wait. The issue was postponed by both parties 
in mutual agreement and was not one of the issues that later created the rupture between the 
two. 61 
After Eritrean de-facto independence in 1991, the borders between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
had to be drawn, and the border question again gained prominence. Many local border 
59 Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999), 4-5. 
60 Ibid., 4. Negash and Tronvoll claim that the issue was raised in January 1984, basing this on an interview with Zeratsion. 
Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 25. 
61 This rupture will be described later in this chapter. 
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disputes now emerged. 62 According to Kjetil Tronvoll and Tekeste Negash, the local 
Ethiopian authorities in Adi Abo, the area adjoining Badme, now began to claim that Eritrean 
farmers illegally crossed into the Badme triangle. 63 Eritrean researchers such as Tekie 
Fessehazion claim that these farmers had been long established in the region. 64 Moreover, 
they argue that the farmers were unfairly penalised when the Ethiopian authorities confiscated 
their property to punish them for illegal entry. 65 
These early cases created some local tension. The local Eritrean administration felt 
somewhat offended by the fact that the Ethiopians only sent junior regional officials to deal 
with the problems. 66 The Adi Murug incident in 1997 was one of the larger incidents. Eritrean 
President Issaias Afworki then subsequently wrote to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
on 25 August, proposing that a Joint Border Commission be set up at governmental level. 
Prime Minister Zenawi replied in a cordial manner, saying that: 
We did not imagine that what happened in Bada could create problems. Because 
the areas our comrades are controlling were not controversial before and [we] 
believed that prior consultation was only needed for the disputed areas. 67 
A Joint Border Commission was consequently established, and the first meeting of the 
commission took place in Asmara on 13 November 1997. This achieved little, and there was 
no further meeting until 8 May 1998, on the eve of the war itself. Meetings between the 
parties involved much socialisation, but little negotiation. A lot of the time of the last meeting 
was for example spent in the bar of the Addis Ababa golf club. 68 It seems safe to claim that 
the commission did not function properly. 
Nevertheless, the problem had been there since 1984 and did not create war before 
1997. When it had previously created hot discussions and even threats of war, like in 1984, 
the two sides managed to cool things down and to postpone a settlement. Nor was the issue 
62 Formally, Eritrea seceded in 1993 after a popular referendum, but in practice Eritrea functioned as an independent entity 
from 1991 and onwards. Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "War in the Horn, the Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, " 
Royal Institute for International Affairs Discussion Paper, no. 82 (1999): 10. 
63 Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 40. 
64 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
65 Ibid. ([cited). 
66 Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 40. 
67 Metes Zenawi, "Appendix 3: Letters Exchanged between Afwerki & Zenawi, July-August 1997: Response of Prime 
Minister Metes to the Letter of President Issaias Afwerki of 16th August 1997, " in Brothers at War. Making Sense of the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian IVar, ed. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll (Oxford: James Curry, 1997), 116. 
68 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
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regarded as the most important issue remaining to be settled between the two organisations. 
Not one of the previous serious crises between the two organisations had been caused by the 
border issue. While important, it seems as if other issues must have been involved, issues that 
could have made the border a more serious question in 1998 than before. As Aregawi Berhe, 
the former military leader of the TPLF, claims - echoing most of the scholars commenting 
upon the conflict - "It is worth observing that the border issue was just one ordinary element 
and by no means the only driving cause of the conflict". 69 
Economic Interaction Between the Belligerents 
The history of Eritrean - Ethiopian relations gives rich empirical support to scholars focusing 
on the importance of economic factors. The Ethiopian market was very important for Eritrea 
and vice versa, but Ethiopia's and Eritrea's economic perspectives were different. As Jean- 
Louis Peninou points out, the governments of the two countries had different "dreams". 70 
Eritrean leaders dreamed of Singapore with its financial liberalism, production for export and 
distrust of uncontrolled aid. Ethiopian leaders dreamed of South Korea with its control over 
trade, extensive investments and maximum foreign aid. Relations between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia were formalised in the Asmara Pact of 1993. It was decided to harmonise exchange 
rate policies and interest rates. The two governments also decided to work out common 
economic tools to deal with inflation and to harmonise their economic policies in general. One 
of the reasons for the strong Eritrean will to achieve cooperation could have been that Eritrean 
leaders wanted a free trade area to benefit the Eritrean investors in Ethiopia, of which there 
were many. Another reason could be the Eritrean focus on autonomy from the west. 7' 
Kjetil Tronvoll and Tekeste Negash correctly claim that the agreement created a huge 
Eritrean trade surplus. This surplus became the main theme in the trade negotiations between 
the two countries after 1993 and was to cause the Ethiopians irritation. 72 Ethiopia also tried to 
combat the surplus unilaterally by applying stricter and stricter rules regulating investment. 
69 Aregawi Berhe, "The Ethio-Eritrean Crisis: Why? " (Paper presented at the International conference on the Ethio-Eritrean 
conflict, Amsterdam, 11 July 1998), 4. 
70 Jean Louis Peninou, "Guerre Absurde Entre L'ethiopie Et L'erythree, " Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 77 
(1998): 505. 
7' Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 32. 
72 Ibid. 
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The Ethiopian trade policies subsequently became less and less friendly to the dream of 
Singapore. 
Eritrea and Ethiopia had also been in a practical currency union since 1991. This was 
not the long-term solution the Eritreans wanted, primarily because it allowed extensive 
Ethiopian control over monetary policy as the Ethiopian national bank controlled the 
production of currency. Moreover the fact that Eritreans had to use notes with the old Derg 
slogan Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First) was seen as an insult. In 1997 they announced that 
they planned to introduce their own national currency, the Nakfa, which was expected to be in 
circulation before the end of 1997. They asked Ethiopia for a 1: 1 exchange rate and to let both 
currencies circulate on either side of the border. 73 Ethiopia refused to accept this, thus creating 
obstacles for the trans-border trade. Furthermore, Ethiopia unilaterally decided that border 
trade should be conducted via hard currency and letters of credit. 74 This meant that the border 
itself became more important, as it now needed to be patrolled more frequently to catch 
smugglers taking advantage of the new regulations, and new border posts had to be erected . 
75 
The demand for the use of letters of credit provoked Eritrean accusations of 
discriminatory politics; according to them such policies were not imposed on the trade with 
Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya. 76 Nevertheless, it is essential to underline that this is the most 
common standard of trade relations between sovereign states. 
Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut stress the importance of the economic negotiations, as 
well as the timing of the negotiations. The decision to demand letters of credit in cross-border 
trade was announced by the Ethiopians in late October 1997. This was just before the first 
meeting of the Joint Border Commission thus making the issue of borders more important for 
both Ethiopian and Eritreans. 77 The relationship between the belligerents also became 
damaged by the new birr note made by the Ethiopian Government to prevent an influx of the 
birr changed into Nakfa in Eritrea, a note showing an expansive map of Ethiopia containing 
the contested areas. 
Other economic factors may have soured the climate even more. Gebru Asrat, the 
previous Ethiopian governor in Tigray, claimed that Eritrea provoked the war because of the 
threat to its hegemonic economic position in Ethiopia, especially due to the rapidly worsening 
73 The details were disclosed in July 1997; Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " 
Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 14. 
74The only exception was for petty cross-border trade with goods valued less than 2000 birr (285 US 1999 dollars). A 
licensing system and especially designated border posts were opened to handle this type of trade. Ibid. 
75 "Stepped up Border Vigilance, " Beza 21 October 1997. 
76 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 37. 
77 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 14. 
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terms of bilateral trade. 78 Tigray received more investments after 1993 and thus, seen from 
this view, had the potential to increase its share of Ethiopian trade. Negash and Tronvoll argue 
that this could have made Tigrayan leaders believe that they could replace Eritrea's place in 
the Ethiopian economy. War might have made bilateral trade impossible, and in practice this 
could have been viewed as a type of protection for industry in Tigray. Alternatively, as Gebru 
Asrat promulgates, war could be seen as an Eritrean strategy to force Ethiopia to relax their 
trade barriers. 79 
However, as Negash and Tronvoll claim, such arguments are close to conspiracy 
theories. A rupture in relations between the two was perceived as potentially extremely 
expensive, offsetting any gains that both nations could have hoped for through such policies. 
Both countries were extremely dependent on each other and a conflict had the potential to 
decrease their income. Nonetheless, given its prominence in the media and amongst political 
commentators, such a conspiracy theory may have influenced the Eritrean and Ethiopian 
governments and subsequently the process leading to conflict. Explanations of this sort also 
became ideal propaganda tools in the hands of the belligerents, making them able to label 
their opponents as greedy. 
A moderate focus on economic factors, as held by Gilkes, Plaut, Tronvoll and Negash, 
probably highlights important elements in the process that led to war but also raises some very 
important questions. During the 1980's there had been fierce economic competition between 
the EPLF and the TPLF. The competition was about securing humanitarian aid. The rivalry 
between the two organisations over western humanitarian aid was vicious; indeed it had to be 
since such aid was crucial for the continued existence of the organisations. The limited 
amount of money available to the organisations must have made such aid money 
exceptionally vital for their operations and indeed 80% of the TPLF's non-armament budget 
came from humanitarian aid. Regardless of such economic competition, the two organisations 
managed to remain at peace with each other. At the time, the competing economic interests of 
the organisations must have been of equal importance with the contradicting interests that rose 
to prominence in 1997 and 1998.80 After all, during the guerrilla years of the two 
organisations, they needed all the money they could get in order to insure their own survival. 
78 Gebru Asrat, "War, " The Reporter: Magazine 1998. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999), 6. 
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Nevertheless, the situation never developed into war. This could be one reason why observers 
such as Chester Crocker choose to focus on an additional element, namely ethnic conflict. 
81 
Ancient Hatred and Ethnic Expansionism 
Many observers including Kidane Mengisteab and Chester Crocker stress the animosity 
between one ethnic group, the dominant Tigray group in Ethiopia, and Eritrea as the main 
factor causing the war. 82 This approach has similarities with the more general approach of 
Donald Horowitz presented earlier, but focuses on one ethnic group only, the Tigrayans. The 
opponents, the Eritreans, are seen as united despite the existence of various ethnic groups in 
Eritrea. 
Statements from the Eritrean government argue that Tigrayan irredentism was a reason 
for the war. According to their claims, the Tigrayans wanted to include the contested areas in 
Tigray. A map, published early in 1997 at Mekele in Tigray, is central to their argumentation. 
The map was not used in any legal discussions about the border but was intended to be 
distributed to primary schools and was funded by the German government aid agency, 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Several contested areas were 
incorporated into Tigray. For the Eritreans this was positive proof of the hostile intentions of 
the Tigrayans. The Eritrean scholar Kidane Mengisteab interprets the map as the realisation of 
the long-held TPLF dream of a Greater Tigray, a Tigray supposed to include parts of Eritrea 
as well as other regions in Ethiopia, expanded in order to include all Tigrayan speakers. 
83 
Such argumentation is enforced by the fact that similar views had been outlined previously in 
the famous TPLF manifesto of 1976 outlining the policy of the then young movement. 84 It is 
said to contain claims to 50% of the Eritrean land mass and thus to have started a trend and 
culture of Tigray expansionism. The TPLF manifesto was repudiated in the next TPLF 
congress but it was not publicly disowned until some time later. 
85 Kidane Mengisteab sees 
81 Chester Crocker, From Comrades to Adversaries (British Broadcasting Cooperation World: Africa, Monday, June 8, 
12: 27 GMT 1998 [cited 30 January 2002]); available from http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/africa/107332. stm. 
82 Ibid. ([cited), Kidane Mengisteab, "Some Latent Factors in the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, " Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 2 
(1999). 
8; Kidane Mengisteab, "Some Latent Factors in the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, " Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 2 (1999): 91. 
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the war as a product of greater Tigrayan expansionism developed by a militant wing of the 
TPLF that gained power during the years before the war. 86 
There is also a primordial version of this argumentation. In his article "Eritrea (Mereb- 
Melash) and Yohannes IV of Abyssinia, " Jordan Gebre-Medhin takes a historical approach 
when identifying the source of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute: the revival of Tigrayan 
hegemonic ambition. Gebre-Medhin sees a direct link between Emperor Yohannes IV's 
repeated invasions of Eritrea (then known as Mereb-Melash) during the last century and the 
TPLF's intermittent forays into Eritrea since May 1998.87 He describes how expansionist 
attitudes towards the Eritreans on behalf of Tigrayans evolved under the Tigrayan Emperor 
Yohannes and survived until the present day. 
Not only Eritreans stress ethnic rivalry as a possible factor. The US Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, focuses directly on the rivalries 
between Tigray and the Eritreans. Crocker points to the historic rivalry between the Tigrayan 
Ethiopians and the Eritreans, claiming that: "The people who are fighting each other should 
not be viewed as all of Ethiopia against all of Eritrea. It's really Tigrayans and Eritreans going 
at each other". 88 
However, when evaluating such argumentation its flaws easily become visible. The 
TPLF was always nationalist, yet nevertheless it managed to cooperate with the Eritreans 
from 1991 until 1998. The TPLF allowed Eritrea to gain independence before they had gained 
the areas they wanted, hardly the act of an expansionist regime. Moreover, the events taking 
place at the end of the war totally discredit proponents of a theory focusing on Tigrayan 
expansion. When the Eritrean military was almost destroyed during the final battles of the war 
in 2000, the Ethiopians abstained from advancing claims beyond the contested areas. Thirdly, 
the military armaments situation between the two countries contradicts the existence of 
systematic expansionist plans; as shown previously the two countries simply did not arm for 
war. Larger quantities of additional armaments were only bought after the relationship had 
soured. 
The ethnic expansionist factor seems more important as a narrative in the Eritrean 
press, than as a factor leading to the outbreak of war. The Eritrean press might in turn have 
influenced many observers into believing in such factors. 
86 Kidane Mengisteab, "Some Latent Factors in the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, " Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 2 (1999): 92. 
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Superiority and Inferiority Complexes 
The areas making up the nucleus of the Abyssinian state have a long history of warfare. 
Several scholars, including Patrick Gilkes, Gidey Zeratsion, Tekie Fessehazion and Wolbert 
Smidt, indicate that this may have had some influence on the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. 89 In 
order to understand their argument one has to go back in Ethiopian history. 
Emperor Menelik (1844-1913) is by many viewed as the founding father of modern 
Ethiopia. 90 Thanks to Italian support Menelik was able to conquer forcibly the rich regions of 
present day Ethiopia. On 2 May 1889, Menelik and Italy signed a treaty at the Ethiopian 
village of Wuchale. The treaty was craftily written in both Amharic and Italian. The Italian 
version implied that Italy had sovereignty over all Ethiopia. This was unacceptable to 
Menelik and he sent an envoy to Rome to reissue the treaty in its original form. Italy did so 
but on 11 October 1889 reasserted to the other European powers its claim to a protectorate 
over Ethiopia. Italy subsequently occupied the town of Adowa in January 1890 and informed 
Menelik that they would not withdraw until he recognised the Italian version of the Wuchale 
treaty. The Abyssinian Empire rejected the Italian ultimatum. The Italians lost the subsequent 
battle, known as the battle of Adowa. On 26 October 1896, the Italians capitulated and agreed 
to the Peace Treaty of Addis Ababa. This treaty nullified the Wuchale Agreement and 
recognized the complete independence of Ethiopia. 
Italy had 17,000 troops fighting in the battle, one third of which were Eritrean 
conscripts. Many Eritreans had been eager to join the ranks of the Italian forces, and this was 
noted amongst the Ethiopians. Eritreans were still seen as Ethiopians (Abyssinians), from the 
old Abyssinian region of Hamasien. 91 This meant that Eritreans joining the Italians were seen 
as traitors. While the Italian prisoners-of-war avoided punishment, the Eritreans were 
punished severely. Chris Prouty writes: 
89 Tekie Fessehazion, "Explaining the Unexplainable: The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border War, " The Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 
2 (1999), Patrick Gilkes, "Conference Proceedings" (paper presented at the Eritrea- Ethiopia conference, Institute of African 
Alternatives, London, 1 July 1998), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "War in the Horn, the Conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, " Royal Institute for international Affairs Discussion Paper, no. 82 (1999), Wolbert Smidt, "Gibt Es Fur Den Krieg 
Zwischen Eritrea Und Athiopien Uberhaupt Grunde?, " Streitblatt. Zeitung der Gegenuniversität, no. 9 (2000), Gidey 
Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International Conference 
on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999). 
90 Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa, a Political Biography: Ethiopia and Eritrea 1875-1897 
(Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1996), 11. 
91 Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 
(forthcoming), 138. 
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When the captured Askaris [Eritrean soldiers] were paraded before Emperor 
Menelik, he, as usual, did not make the decision but looked up at Abune Matewos 
[The Bishop], while all the soldiers were shouting "slice them up". The Bishop 
ruled that since they had been treacherous their left hand and right foot should be 
cut off. 92 
Despite the Italian failure, Eritrea remained an Italian colony, received investments from the 
latter and developed a monetised economy. Tigray, in spite of its proud warrior traditions, 
grew poorer and poorer. Many Tigrayans had to go to Eritrea to get work; they were regarded 
by many Eritreans as backward and uncivilised. During these years, the term Agame became 
used by Eritreans to denote the backward Tigrayans. Agame was initially a village in Tigray, 
which was regarded by the Eritreans as dirty and undeveloped and became a derogatory term. 
As one of the founding fathers of the TPLF, Gidey Zeratsion, put it: 
Since there are better cosmopolitan areas in Eritrea than in Tigray, many Tigreans 
and especially from Agame, usually travel to work in Eritrea. Most of them take 
the type of job despised and considered inferior by the Eritreans. The Tigreans are 
hence seen as inferior in Eritrea. The Eritreans use the derogatory "Agame" to 
describe many things that are socially or physically ugly. 93 
The Eritrean role in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was to create even more 
animosity. As Kjetil Tronvoll puts it: "The fact that Italy used about 50,000 Eritrean colonial 
troops to help pacify the Ethiopian resistance was viewed as treachery by Ethiopians". 94 
Moreover, after the Italians won, they in a way institutionalised Agame. The Italians started to 
distinguish between the two groups, with Eritreans being defined as more civilised. 95 
The Eritreans had to pay a price for this; to a certain extent they became associated 
with Fascism, treason and Italy, although Eritreans participated heavily in the resistance 
against the Italians. 96 The price the Tigrayans had to pay was that the term Agame became 
entrenched in everyday use in Eritrea. Poor Tigrayans became to a certain extent despised. 
92 Chriss Prouty, Empress Taytu and Menelik 2. Ethiopia 1883 -1910 (London: Ravens, 1986), 158. 
93 Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999), 6. 
94 Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 
(forthcoming), 377. 
95 Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Federal Experience (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika insitutet, 1997), 16. 
96 Two Eritreans were behind the most famous terrorist attack on Italian officials, in 1937 they tried to kill Governor Rudolfo 
Graziani. 
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This development reflected itself in various Tigrinya (one of the most common languages in 
Eritrea) proverbs such as "shih entekone hyaway, ayt'meno ntgraway", which means: "never 
trust even the most innocent and harmless Tigrayan". An inferiority/ superiority complex 
seems to have developed, enhanced by a rather militaristic culture and a myth treating the 
Eritreans as traitors. 
Several researchers claim that the Agame complex was an important factor influencing 
the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. Gidey Zeratsion claims that the use of the derogatory 
word Agame created tensions between the TPLF and the EPLF during the 1980's, but he 
allocates little space to the subject in his writings on the history of the former organisation. 97 
The Eritrean scholar Tekie Fessehazion also puts some emphasis on the Agame complex, 
claiming that he heard Tigrayan generals visiting Eritrea talking about rectifying Tigrayan 
inferiority and claiming that their inferiority complex influenced the outbreak of war. 98 
Richard Reid describes how such perceptions were entrenched long before the war broke out, 
and how he encountered EPLF veterans in 1991 who warned against trusting Tigrayans and 
Ethiopians. 99 
References to the connections between Eritrea and Fascist Italy became common after 
the war broke out, referring to the treason of the Eritreans when they allied themselves with 
Italy in 1896 and in 1935 to go to war against Ethiopia. A line in a popular poem in Tigray 
stated that: "Do you Issaias Afworki [Eritrea's president] like to be called Hitler or 
Mussolini? Whom do you want to be named after you small Graziani? "loo Similarly, Eritrean 
soldiers stuck notices on Ethiopian corpses, with texts like: "who would like to live with an 
Agame? " Moreover, these habits produced severe reprisals from the Tigrayan soldiers, and 
indeed also from soldiers of the other Ethiopian nationalities. 
The research of Kjetil Tronvoll clearly indicates that such popular myths had some 
importance, but he conducted this research only after the war had started. 101 Importantly, as 
Alessandro Triulzi argues when criticising the focus on old cleavages between the two 
belligerents, the ancient conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia were actively promoted by the 
two belligerents and the press after the war broke out, selectively highlighting some events, 
97 Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999), 7. 
98 Tekie Fessehazion, "Explaining the Unexplainable: The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border War, " The Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 
2 (1999): 77. 
99 Richard Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, " Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 73, no. 3 (2003): 377. 
'°° his poem became popular in Mekele during the summer 1998., Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of 
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while forgetting others. 102 It is true as Tronvoll claims: "contemporary conflicts draw heavily 
on heroic myths, national and ethno-national symbols, and enemy images in order to inspire 
the Tigrayan population to sacrifice their lives in yet another war to protect their 
homelands". 103 Inferiority/superiority argumentation could thus have been employed by the 
belligerents to inspire their soldiers after the war had started, thus making it more important 
than it was before the war, making it harder to say something about their pre-war strength 
without referring to pre-war fieldwork. 
Surprisingly, the research of Alemseged Abbay indicates that the animosity between 
Ethiopians was much larger than the Tigrayan animosity towards Eritreans. 104 These 
animosities did not lead to large scale war. Tronvoll also suggests that different conceptions 
of the relationship existed side by side, some stipulating brotherhood between the two people, 
some stipulating conflict. 105 Accordingly, it seems fair to claim that while animosities 
between the population of Tigray and the Eritreans existed, equally important animosities 
existed between Tigrayans and other Ethiopians, yet these animosities did not cause war. 
As the works of Patrick Gilkes and Wolbert Smidt suggest, an inferiority/ superiority 
complex played a role. 106 However, the role of the inferiority complex increased after the 
war had started and this theme was pushed in the propaganda of the parties. This does not 
explain why the conflict erupted when it erupted, nor does it explain the many years of 
peaceful cooperation between the two countries, and previously between the two 
organisations. Indeed neither Patrick Gilkes, Gidey Zeratsion, Tekie Fessehazion nor Wolbert 
Smidt suggests such mono-causality; to them an inferiority/superiority complex becomes one 
factor amongst many. 107 
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Identity as a Process 
Approaches focusing on ancient hatred, ethnic expansionism and inferiority/superiority 
complexes in general view the identities of the belligerents as relatively homogeneous and 
stable. The war is seen as being between two or more well defined ethnic groups or two 
countries. However, ethnic and national identity might be under construction or in need of 
definition, and some approaches to the conflict stress that this process in itself was a cause of 
the conflict. 
The claim that identities are in a continuous construction process is indeed a well- 
known claim within international relations theory. International relations theorists such as Iver 
B. Neuman claim that collective identity should be treated as "always in a state of formation, 
as ever-lasting negotiations about who is who, how that who comes about, how individuals 
become a party to it and how it is reproduced over time. "108 Ruth Iyob, Patrick Gilkes and 
Martin Plaut indirectly adopt such an understanding of identity when they examine the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian war. They argue that active policies designed to influence the identity 
formation processes, as well as uncontrolled aspects of this identity formation process, were 
important factors influencing the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship in a negative way. 1 09 
One might identify three different case specific approaches that stress attempts at 
identity construction or unconscious identity construction as a cause of the war. A first 
approach stresses the incommensurability between the Eritrean notion of civic identity and the 
Ethiopian notion of ethnic identity. A second approach focuses on the changing identities of 
the parties and stresses the strains that the transformation from rebel organisations to ruling 
parties created in the relationship between the TPLF, the EPRDF and the EPLF. A third 
approach emphasises the need for Eritreans to create a coherent national identity by finding 
enemies. 
To understand the first approach, an approach that focuses on the incommensurability 
between the Eritrean notion of civic identity and the Ethiopian notion of ethnic identity, a 
short exploration of the history of the organisations that formed the foundations of the two 
governments is in order. The Eritrean state apparatus had its origin in the Eritrean People's 
Revolution Force (EPLF), an organisation that included many different ethnic and religious 
108 Iver B. Neuman, "Identity and the Outbreak of War, " The International Journal of Peace Studies 3, no. 1 (1998): 1. 
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Eritrea, " Foreign Policv, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea 
and Ethiopia Are at War, " Briefing paper, New Series, no. 6 (1999), Ruth Iyob, "Re-Configuring Identities: A Clash of 
Vision(S) in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000" (paper presented at the Early warning in practice: the case of Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), London, 5 March 1999). 
74 
groups. This group's identity and ideology were in turn formed by its struggle with the first 
large Eritrean opposition group, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 110 Some of the ELF's 
field commanders, most notably Eritrea's present President Issaias Afworki, had formed the 
Tripartite Union. They did this to reform the ELF in order to alter what they perceived to be 
the prevailing influence of regionalism and the ethnic dominance of the Beni Amer. III 
However, the old leaders of the ELF started to hunt down actively the Tripartite Union's 
leaders. 112 This development created widespread dissatisfaction within the ranks of the ELF. 
The organisation splintered. Two of the splinter groups, the Ala group and Popular Liberation 
Forces (PLF), were to become the foundation of the EPLF. These two groups subsequently 
laid the foundations for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) as an alternative to 
what they perceived as an ethnocentric ELF. In February 1972 the EPLF was formally 
established as a rival of the ELF. 113 
Thus the EPLF was initially formed as a reaction against regionalism and a reaction 
against ethnocentrism. From its foundation, the EPLF stressed unity between religions and 
between ethnic groups. Moreover, EPLF promoted a single Eritrean identity that transcended 
the ethnic and religious identities; unity was an important goal for the movement. A clear pan- 
ethnic identity had been formed by the struggle against the ELF, a view stressing Eritreanness 
as superior to the ethnic focus of the ELF. Such a pan-Eritrean view resulted in draconic 
measures against all tendencies towards ethnicist ideology and/or federalised organisational 
structures. 114 As Haggai Erlich observes, the EPLF became an extremely hierarchical 
organisation with a focus on unity, and this focus increased during the organisation's 
history. 115 
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Institution, 1983), 22-23, Bereket H. Selassie, Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa (London: Monthly Review 
Press, 1980), 64. 
112 Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962 -1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983), 27. 
13The PLF was established on a meeting from 2 to 24 June 1970; The strongly pro Arab Uthman Sabi were quite prominent 
at the meeting and it is claimed that the organisation sent fighters to fight with PLO against the Jordanese during September 
1970.; Ibid., 28, David Pool, "The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, " in African Guerrillas, ed. Christopher Clapham 
(Oxford: James Curry, 1998), 24. 
"4Both Seliassie and Erlich describe the organisation as consisting of Christian fighters and a diplomatic mission that was 
Muslim and Arab Nationalist. Haggai Erlich, The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962 -1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983), 22, 
Elias H. Selassie, The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict: Its Causes and Consequences (CISP, 2001 [cited 20 November 2001]); 
available from http: //www. cisp-ngo. org/CorsoConflitti/Conflitto%2OEtiopia-Eritrea/ConflictSelassie. htm#7. 
15He suggests that this was demonstrated indirectly when they changed their name from Eritrean People's Liberation Forces 
to Eritrean People's Liberation Front. While there could be many forces there could be only one front. Haggai Erlich, The 
Struggle over Eritrea, 1962 -1978 (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983), 70. 
75 
The EPLF's emphasis on unity within the organisation and indeed within the future 
Eritrean state also showed itself in the criticism of the Tigray People's Liberation Front's 
(TPLF) call for liberation of the nationalities. ' 16 The TPLF had a different perception of 
ideology and of the nationality issue, nationality to them being an ethnically defined concept. 
The TPLF, which later supplied Ethiopia with its present prime minister, was officially 
formed on 18 February 1975 in Dedebit. It had roots in the student-based Tigray National 
Organisation (TNO). The students later tried to harness support from their native regions and 
successfully managed to mobilise many peasants. 117 One way of mobilising peasants was to 
promote Tigrayan nationalism. Indeed, important elements within the TPLF promulgated full 
independence from Ethiopia based on ethnic lines. 118 The principle of the right to 
independence for ethnically defined groups was a key principle for the movement, thus 
contradicting the EPLF's view focusing on unity between ethnic groups in Eritrea. 119 The two 
groups were at odds from the start with regards to their suggested strategies for solving the 
ethnic questions facing the two countries and had a different ideology with regards to the 
nationality question. The TPLF wanted independence on ethnic grounds, while the EPLF had 
a unitary territorial definition of Eritrea. The EPLF definition included all the nine large 
groups in Eritrea, all of them represented in central posts, but still with a strong emphasis on 
unity in the decision making process. 120 Argumentation for ethnic self-determination was not 
accepted and the nominal rights of the ethnic groups were limited. The two organisations 
again had different dreams for the future. The EPLF dreamed about lus soli, citizenship based 
on a common geographic background; they dreamed of an identity forged by the common 
experiences during the colonial period and during the struggle against Ethiopia. The TPLF 
dreamed a dream about lus sanguinis, citizenship based on common bloodlines and thus based 
on the bonds of ethnicity. 
The differences kept resurfacing. In June 1985, at the height of the Ethiopian famine, 
the EPLF closed the Barka route, the TPLF's supply lines between Tigray and Sudan. This 
move effectively isolated Tigray from its chief source of food. According to a TPLF officer 
interviewed by Negash and Tronvoll, the "EPLF did this to kneel them down, since it did not 
116 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
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accept TPLF's analysis of the nationalities contradiction in Ethiopia" . 
121 The exchange of 
comments following this move also highlighted the importance of the definition of national 
identity. The TPLF claimed that "a truly democratic" Eritrea would have to respect "the right 
of its own nationalities up to and including secession". 122 There are thus some indicators 
showing the importance of different conceptions of identity as a factor creating conflict even 
during the war against the Derg. 
The differences between the two organisations were to become larger. Their 
relationship was officially normalised after the Khartoum meeting held in April 1988. A joint 
statement was issued, indicating that their differences had been overcome. ' 23 The TPLF now 
joined with various other organisations to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF). All these organisations were dominated if not created by the 
TPLF. 124 The year of 1991 was one of the most successful years for both the EPLF and the 
EPRDF as it saw the final demise of Mengistu Haile Mariam and his regime. Eritrea was 
promised independence and the EPRDF immediately started to prepare a new Constitution for 
Ethiopia. 125 It was finished in 1995. The Ethiopian Constitution guaranteed extensive rights of 
ethnic self-determination. Article 8,1 of the Constitution put the sovereignty with the 
Ethiopian nations, defined as a people with common culture, common language and belief in 
a shared identity within a specific geographic area. Each nation was to have their own 
representatives in the Council of the Federation. Furthermore, the Constitution's Article 39 
guaranteed education in the mother tongue of the different minorities. Article 38 of the 
Constitution contained an even larger gesture towards the ethnic minorities in Ethiopia, as 
each of the Ethiopian nationalities received the right to declare independence. A constitution 
of this kind was in itself a contradiction to the Eritrean idea of nationhood. 
The differences between constitutional events in Ethiopia and similar processes in 
Eritrea were striking. A resolution passed by the third congress of the EPLF in 1994 rejected 
the old Awraja systems of administration, a system where the country was divided into nine 
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Awrajas or districts. 126 Awrajas were designed by the Italians during the colonial period, and 
loosely drawn along ethnic lines. 127 The new territorial units, six Zobas, were deliberately 
created to criss-cross ethnicity and kinship. President Issaias Afworki's speech at the 
announcement of the reform underlined this point: 
There was a time when people thought in terms of we and they, using religion and 
regional boundaries as bases. However, such notions have been put aside during 
the 30-years long struggle, and it is because the fighters struggled as one person by 
uniting their hearts that we were able to achieve our goal of liberation. 128 
He also threatened those that wanted to create tension by playing on ethnicity: 
The government will not restrain itself from taking appropriate measures 
regarding those who misinterpret and misconstrue any administrative or 
developmental policies in order to create religious and regional conflicts. 129 
As Patrick Gilkes, Martin Plaut, Kjetil Tronvoll, and Tekeste Negash argue, there 
were huge theoretical contradictions between the Eritrean and the Ethiopian way of dealing 
with ethnic questions. 130 These writers all claim that different perceptions with regards to 
national identity created tension and became a factor that influenced the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
relationship in a malign way. Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut explore the contradicting 
definitions of identity and also describe the tension before the war. One factor influencing the 
outbreak of the war was for them the need for a preventive battle to protect an Eritrean 
concept of nationality. 131 To them, the Ethiopian version of nationhood, granting rights to all 
the ethnic groups within Ethiopia, might have been felt by Eritreans to have the effect of 
making Eritrean ethnic minorities fight for the same rights, thus destabilising Eritrea. It 
becomes a form of ideological war, a struggle between two world-views. 
126 At this congress EPLF also changed their name into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). 
127 Kjetil Tronvoll, "The Process of Nation Building in Eritrea, Created from Below or Directed from Above?, " The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 36, no. 3 (1998): 463. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. - 
130 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "War in the Horn, the Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, " Royal Institute for 
international Affairs Discussion Paper, no. 82 (1999), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000), Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "Conflict in the Horn: Why Eritrea 
and Ethiopia Are at War, " Briefing paper, New Series, no. 6 (1999), Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War 
Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 2000). 
131 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 1. 
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However, this type of argument also has its weaknesses. The scholar Allehone 
Mulugeta, for example, emphasises some of the statements of Berket Habte Selassie, who 
headed Eritrea's Constitutional Commission, in order to criticise Tronvoll and Negash's focus 
on such issues. Habte Selassie stresses the positive contribution of the new Ethiopian 
Constitution to Africa as a whole. Mulugeta continues his citation of Berket Habte Selassie: 
"... but the vitality of Eritrean nationalisms make such arrangements unnecessary for 
Eritrea". 132 Implicit in this statement lays the claim that Eritreans already have a strong and 
centralised identity, which is so strong that it can withstand the existence of an Ethiopian 
multiethnic identity. 133 
An argument focusing on the differences in policies on ethnicity/ ethnic groups 
becomes further weakened by the many accusations directed at the Ethiopian government for 
ignoring their own constitution. Siegfried Pausewang, who monitored several Ethiopian 
elections, stated that the constitution was bypassed by governmental oppression. '34 Moreover, 
an argument focusing on the differences in policies on ethnicity is weakened by the fact that 
the constitution in itself also had limitations to the power of the nationalities. The 
representatives of the nations are for example appointed by another decision level, the 
regional state, where the nation in question may be a minority. Both facts could not have 
escaped the Eritreans, even as early as in 1997, and one might question if a defunct 
constitution together with a pretty much non-functioning agenda could have created much 
hostility. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that a clash of the concept of nationhood could 
have some importance. The Ethiopian Constitution still creates debates in Africa and could 
have significant symbolic value. 135 The first statements from the Eritrean Government after 
the war had started explained that: "... the recurrent border incursions that continue to be 
perpetuated by Ethiopians forces basically emanate from the narrow perspectives of the 
administrative zones (Ethnic regions). 9, )136 This statement at least shows that the clash of the 
concept of nationhood figured in Eritrean explanations of the outbreak of war. Importantly, 
X32 Allehone Mulugeta, Review of Brothers at War Walta Information Center (Walta Information Center, 2001 [cited 3 
November 2002]); available from http: //www. waltainfo. com/Conflict/Articles/2001/June/articlel. html. 
133 Ibid. ([cited), Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: 
James Curry, 2000). 
134 Siegfried Pausewang, Interview, 10 January 1998. 
135 The main points of this discussion are best summed up by Ugo Mattei Ugo Mattei, "The New Ethiopian Constitution: 
First Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the Reception of Western Institutions, " in Transplants, Innovation, and Legal 
Tradition in the Horn of Africa, ed. Elisabetta Grande (Torino: L'Harmattan Italia, 1995). 
136 The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea, "Appendix 5, Statement of the Cabinet of Ministers of the 
Government of Eritrea on the Dispute with Ethiopia, 14 May 1998, " in Brothers at War, Making Sense of the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian War, ed. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll (Oxford: James Curry, 2000). 
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however this does not demonstrate that Ethiopian and Eritrean decision making was 
influenced by such issues, as such statements might have been a propaganda effort in order to 
show that Ethiopia was the guilty party. Indeed, explanations focusing on difference in the 
conception of nation became more important as the war progressed, with the belligerents 
using them actively as propaganda, making them prominent in public discussions. 
A second approach to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war that also focuses on the process of 
identity formation is found in the works of Ruth Iyob. Rather than focusing on different 
conceptions of nationhood and of the role of ethnic groups, Iyob sees identity as extensions of 
the way governments and People's view their collective national missions (destinies). 137 Iyob 
claims: "At the heart of the conflict remains the dynamics of the contradictory roles that the 
two states - Eritrea and Ethiopia - came to play vis-a-vis each other". 
138 Ethiopian leaders 
have historically regarded their country as the dominant power in the eastern Horn of Africa: 
it was the hegemonic leader of the area with interests within the other states, conducting 
various military operations and colonising missions. Eritreans, on the other hand, have defied 
this vision and struggled for the right to have a vision and a scope of action that differs from 
that of the region's traditional hegemonic power. When the interaction between the two 
former allied organisations became more and more formalised they also internalised the 
values of the different states. The TPLF became Ethiopia in the sense that it internalised its 
traditional hegemonic values and aspirations. The EPLF became Eritrea, a nation defined by 
its survival struggle, the pogroms conducted against it and thus also the acceptance of extreme 
tactics to protect it. Iyob names the former category of states Hegemonic states and the latter 
Diaspora states. The formerly cordial, pragmatic and informal relationships were replaced by 
a formal state-centric and rigid relationship as the TPLF and EPLF grew from mere rebel 
organisations into Ethiopia and Eritrea. The latter type of relationship contributed to this 
internalisation of values leading to conflict. Her arguments seem to reveal important 
information with regards to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, but it does not illustrate how such 
values were internalised. It is not clear if lyob claims that this was a geopolitical development, 
where the rulers of these two entities were bound by Eritrea and Ethiopia's geographical 
position, or if the two organisations were exposed to the pressure of other Ethiopian/Eritrean 
groups pushing them in such directions. 
139 
137Ruth lyob, "Re-Configuring Identities: A Clash of Vision(S) in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000" (paper presented at the 
Early warning in practice: the case of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), London, 5 
March 1999), 7. 
138 Ibid. 
139 The first explanation has similarities with classical geopolitical approaches to the study of conflict, stressing that the 
specific geographic traits of a country 
defines its national interests and the conflicts it is most likely to engage in. See Karl 
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The need to have an enemy in order to build a common identity is the central element 
in a third approach. This approach sets out to explain the Ethiopian-Eritrean war as a result of 
nation building, of the need for an enemy in order to define and consolidate a vulnerable 
Eritrean identity, a factor most often stressed by Kjetil Tronvoll. 140 Italia colonised Eritrea in 
1885. Before this some ethnic groups were part of the Ethiopian empire, others gravitated 
culturally towards the middle-east. 141 This leaves a period of 116 years to build retrospective 
myths and to forge an identity, a relatively short time span. The construction of national 
identity is seen as coinciding with the definition of and distinction from the other, which was 
all too often defined as the enemy. 
When Eritrea became, for all practical purposes, independent in 1991, the country kept 
its good connection with its former allies. However, the Eritreans also lost something: they 
lost the eternal enemy, the Derg/Imperial Ethiopia. This, according to Tronvoll: "left a void 
for contrasting the territorial Eritrean identity". They needed somebody to demarcate the 
ethnic and religious groups within Eritrea from their cousins in the neighbouring countries; 
they needed an enemy. 142 Tronvoll continues: "the Eritrean government seems to deem it 
necessary to create significant others by means of violence. " 143 
Indeed Eritrea appeared extremely warlike after its independence, and one cannot rule 
out the possibility that this has something to do with the process of nation building. It has had 
confrontations involving troops with all of its neighbours and regular, albeit small scale, wars 
with Sudan and Yemen. Sometimes these confrontations seemed quite out of proportion to the 
potential dangers of the situations they created. In 1996 Eritrea deployed troops against 
Djibouti, a country that has strong ties to France and has a strong garrison of French foreign 
legionaries. 
However, it is important to stress that the causes of many of these conflicts were 
complicated and that all of them were resolved. Moreover, Eritrea often accepted defeats in 
the mediation process without resorting to violence. For example, Eritrea occupied the Hanish 
islands, a contested island group between Yemen and Eritrea, in 1996. On the other hand, this 
was after Yemen had started to build a large hotel on one of the islands, a project that the 
Haushofer, Grenzen: In Ihrer Geographischen Und Politichen Bedeutung (Berlin: Kurt Vowincklen Verlag, 1927). This 
thesis suggest that the latter explanation is more correct. See chapter four. 
140 Kjetil Tronvoll, "The Process of Nation Building in Eritrea, Created from Below or Directed from Above?, " The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 36, no. 3 (1998), Kjetil Tronvoll, "Borders of Violence - Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the 
Eritrean Nation-State, " Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 6 (1999). 
141 Kjetil Tronvoll, "The Process of Nation Building in Eritrea, Created from Below or Directed from Above?, " The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 36, no. 3 (1998). 
142 Kjetil Tronvoll, "Borders of Violence - Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-State, " Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 22, no. 6 (1999): 105. 
143 He plays down this line of argumentation in his later works. 
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Eritreans felt should have been postponed until the final status of the islands had been 
cleared. 144 Yemen and Eritrea agreed to put the matter to the International Court of Justice. 
Yemen won; they were granted all the larger islands. Although Eritrea at the time had a 
military advantage, they withdrew and made a large effort to repair their relationship with 
Yemen. 145 
It must also be underlined that Eritrea has many other strategies to strengthen its 
national identity, such as schools and compulsory military service with members being drawn 
from all the ethnic groups. Eritrea has a strong notion of civic identity. The strength of the 
Eritrean identity was demonstrated in the landslide victory (99.805 % for independence with a 
98.24 % participation rate) in the referendum on independence, held on 23-25April 1993. The 
UN, the OAU and the Arab League monitored the referendum. It was subsequently approved 
by all of them, so the results seem quite valid. 146 It is also a paradox how the Eritreans during 
the early years of the last decade pushed strongly for a closer relationship with their Ethiopian 
counterpart, the enemy they were supposed to be employing to create a national identity. 
In sum, Eritrea seemed to have a very strong national identity, so strong that its need 
for enemies must have been little. The conflicts it had with its neighbouring countries indicate 
that the need for an enemy was less important. Eritrea usually backed off before the conflicts 
escalated into war, often stressed the traditional friendship it shared with these states and 
accepted international mediation. 147 The arguments raised by Ruth Iyob seem more plausible, 
however she leaves unanswered questions about how the values connected with Eritrea and 
Ethiopia became internalised. 
Greed and the Lust for Power 
Patrick Gilkes makes the case that an additional factor contributed to war in the case of 
Eritrea-Ethiopia, namely the self interests of the leadership in the two countries. 148 Mirroring 
144 In December 1995, Yemen granted a German company, Konzeptbau, permission to build a hotel. Martin Plaut, "Yemen 
and Eritrea: Friends Once More?, " Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 7 (1998): 660. 
145 Ibid.: 660-63. 
146 Ruth Iyob, "Re-Configuting Identities: A Clash of Vision(S) in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000" (paper presented at the 
Early warning in practice: the case of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Institute for African Alternatives (IFAA), London, 5 
March 1999). For an alternative interpretation of the referendum, see Kjetil Tronvoll, "Mai Weini, a Village in Highland 
Eritrea :A Study of the People, Their Livelihood, and Land Tenure During Times of Turbulence" (Master 
(Hovedfagsoppgave), University of Oslo, 1996). 
147 The notable exception to this was Sudan, but this conflict never escalated into full war. 
148 Patrick Gilkes, "Conference Proceedings" (paper presented at the Eritrea- Ethiopia conference, Institute of African 
Alternatives, London, 1 July 1998). 
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the so-called "rally round the flag" or "diversionary theory of war"- theory of conflict and 
peace research, a theory claiming that war may be a tool by leaders to create unity and gain 
support in their own state, Gilkes argues that the war could have been a tool to tap into 
national feeling in order to gain support. 149 
Indeed, both Issaias Afworki and Meles Zenawi had other pressing internal issues and 
mounting internal opposition. 150 The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, is for example 
half Eritrean Tigrinya, half from Tigray. His government was often viewed as Tigray- 
dominated. Many critics accused him of being pro-Eritrean and of being pro-Tigray, the 
Ethiopian oppositional papers in general trying to describe him and his staff as puppets of the 
EPLF. In a way he could have been trapped by their criticism, and had a strong motivation to 
try to counter it. According to Patrick Gilkes, Meles Zenawi was under heavy pressure "to 
prove his Ethiopian credentials". 151 One way to counter this sort of criticism was to be harsh 
and hawkish in the negotiations with Eritrea. Gilkes states that the present conflict gave Meles 
Zenawi the possibility of proving his "Ethiopianness". By being strict towards Eritrean 
demands, he was able to refute the critics that blamed him for pro-Eritrean attitudes because 
of his ethnic background. 
Another researcher, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) veteran Leenco Lata, emphasises 
the internal pressure Zenawi must have been under, making it in his own interest to be less 
lenient towards Eritrea to keep his position and keep his party united. Lata claims that an 
important group criticising Meles Zenawi for being too lenient on Eritrea had been in 
existence from 1995 and onwards. 152 This group, consisting of several of the most powerfizl 
individuals within the TPLF, was so strong that Meles Zenawi had to take them into account 
in order to survive. In 2001 the division within the TPLF became so large that this group 
walked out of a meeting in Mekele, the split became public and the group members 
themselves admit that they wanted a more hawkish policy towards the Eritreans, in a way 
confirming Lata's claim. 153 
A third version of the self-interest argumentation is identifiable in relevant literature, 
namely that the Eritrean leadership wanted war to postpone elections. In 1991, the EPLF 
149 Ibid, Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique, " in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 
1973). For a Marxist version see: Vladimir Illyich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: 
International, 1916). 
150 The names of the President of Eritrea and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. 
's1 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 
79. 
152 Leenco Lata, "Ethiopia: The Path to War, and the Consequences of Peace, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 43-51. 
153 Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
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formed a provisional government. This provisional government dealt very well with the 
difficult transition period between practical independence (1991) and formal independence 
(1993). Violence was in general avoided, and Eritrea seemed to move in a democratic 
direction. Eritrea declared its formal independence on 24th May 1993. The provisional regime 
declared that they wanted to establish a four-year transitional government pending the 
drafting of a constitution. The proto-democratic institutions and rules of interaction were in 
place by the end of 1997.154 The war made it possible to postpone the forthcoming election, 
and to this day no election has been held. Democratisation has been successfully postponed, 
and Issaias Afworki is still in power. 
Tekeste Negash also focused on the self-interest line of argumentation in an earlier 
article from 1998. Focusing on the economic failures of the Eritrean government, he argued 
"that the EPLF government's economic policy had failed and therefore the EPLF chose to 
divert the attention of the Eritrean people from economic and political issues". '55 
The war did serve as a justification for Issaias Afworki to stop some of the democratic 
processes in his country. However, it did not prevent differences with regards to policy from 
surfacing within the governments of both states. Furthermore, the EPLF government had 
managed such problems before, without conflicts escalating into war. The two leaders 
seemingly had few economic advantages of the war, the European Union and the United 
States actally threatened to block their personal assets, but nevertheless the respective leaders 
continued to fight. Nor were there any large corruption cases or scandals before the war. ' 56 
Kjetil Tronvoll argues that the war actually split Ethiopia. 157 Again, this does not directly 
contradict scholars arguing that personal interests are important. The respective leaders might 
have been unaware of this effect and believed that unity would follow when war was 
declared, or their decisions could have been attempts to please oppositional groups within 
their own organisation. As will be explored in later chapters, some of the Ethiopian leaders 
felt intimidated by popular pressure and by pressure from their rivals. Personal interests 
indeed seem to have been an important factor, amongst the many leading up to the war. The 
154 Ruth lyob, "The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic Vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000, " The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 4 (2000): 670. 
iss His attack on the Eritrean leadership becomes even stronger and he claims: "The president of Eritrea is a mentally 
unbalanced person". He subsequently claims that the presidents mental state is one of four causes of conflict, all the others 
stated earlier in this text. The last statement is in many ways extreme, and he does not, to my knowledge, repeat it in his later 
work. Such a statement seems vague and unsupported by material observations. Tekeste Negash, "How Ethiopia Could Win 
over the Crisis without Going to War" (paper presented at the Seminar on Ethiopia-Eritrea, Dutch department of foreign 
affairs (Holland), 1998), 6. 
156 The last large scandal was the arrest of Ethiopian deputy Prime Minister (former Prime Minister) Tamirat Layne in 1996 
157 Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 
(forthcoming). 
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fact that groups within the TPLF put pressure on the Ethiopian leadership in order to make 
them less lenient towards Eritrea also seem solidly established, with both members of the 
current leadership of Ethiopia, as well as members of this group confirming this publicly. '58 
Unanswered Questions, Unexplored Areas 
Some previous attempts at explaining the war, as well as some of the more general attempts to 
explain wars, seem to be misleading. The war was not a result of any Tigrayan or Eritrean 
master plan to expand. The fact that the Ethiopian (Tigrayan) leadership refused to mobilise 
their army until after the war had started, and that both belligerents failed to substantially 
increase their defence purchases contradict such claims. The war was no clash of civilisation 
and Muslims were allied with Christians and vice versa. Nor was the war a product of an arms 
race, such an arms race simply did not exist. Superficially, Eritrea's need for an enemy in 
order to consolidate national identity might seem to yield much insight, and the importance of 
this factor is seemingly validated by Eritrea's aggressive behaviour after its independence, 
instigating conflict with all of its neighbours. Yet Eritrea also accepted the international 
verdict in the conflict between themselves and Yemen, showing that Eritrea's need for an 
enemy was so weak that it was possible to seek new friendship with that enemy even though 
conflicting interests still existed. The armament purchases made by Eritrea do not indicate 
aggressiveness, at least not until the autumn of 1997. The ancient hate between the two 
belligerents, as well as the inferiority/superiority complex, was supposed to have existed for a 
long time, yet war only broke out in 1998. Moreover, research indicated that there was close 
affection between some of the groups that were supposed to hate each other, as well as 
traditional hate between groups that became allies in the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. 159 
Some approaches are very hard to evaluate. For example, the traditional relationship 
between Tigrayans and Eritreans might have had influence, but this relationship became 
propagandised by the belligerents themselves and might appear stronger in hindsight than it 
really was. Similarly, the general theoretical approaches stressing the lack of democracy as a 
cause of conflict seem to yield little information when trying to explain the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
158 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003, Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 
April 2001. 
159 Alemseged Abbay, Identiti Jilted or Re-Imagined Identity? The Divergent Path of the Eritrean and Tigrayan 
Nationalistic Struggle (Lawrenceville: Red Sea press, 1998), 204, Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of 
IVar and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 (forthcoming). 
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war. Both countries were undemocratic and had serious economic problems, yet these traits 
remained constant and the two countries were on friendly terms for most of the 1990's. 
However, several previous analyses of the war have provided a number of valuable 
insights. The border between Tigray and Eritrea was ambiguous; it left room for interpretation 
on behalf of both parties. Moreover, the border became more important as the economic 
relationship between the two countries broke down and it had to be patrolled in order to stop 
smuggling. It also seems safe to claim that the economic issues of difference between the two 
countries poisoned the atmosphere between them and that resource scarcity might have 
initiated local conflicts in Tigray. Ruth lyob's focus on how the EPLF and the TPLF 
internalised new values after they came into power also is very interesting. 160 
The personal interests of the leadership in the two countries appear to have been 
important. Eritrea's President Issaias Afworki managed to shelve the question of election. As 
suggested by Leenco Lata, there seem to have been internal conflicts within the TPLF, the 
EPRDF and the PFDJ (EPLF), with important sub-groups pressuring for a more hawkish 
policy. Moreover, on the Ethiopian side there seems to have been a considerable pressure 
from the public press in order to promote a more hawkish policy towards Eritrea, a pressure 
that could have made it seem in the leaders' self-interest to adopt a more hawkish stand, or 
could have contributed to the internalisation of the values described by Iyob. 
Nevertheless, all these approaches leave questions unanswered. Eritrea had ambiguous 
borders with other countries as well, but they did not cause war; the two governing 
organisations had previously competed over economic resources, but it had not caused war at 
that stage. Moreover, while resource scarcity created local conflicts in Tigray, it also created 
local conflicts in the border areas facing the neighbours of the two belligerents, but none of 
these conflicts developed into war. Iyob's approach does not explore how the internalisation 
of Eritrean and Ethiopian values happened, how the TPLF became influenced by the rest of 
Ethiopian population. 
Notably, several areas of research have also been neglected. Culture has been 
examined by researchers attempting to explain the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, but only culture 
defined by ethnicity, the culture of ethnic groups or culture defined by a common membership 
in a state, a homogenised Ethiopian or Eritrean culture. The constructivist theories of 
Elizabeth Kier suggest that there might be additional types of culture influencing decision- 
160 Ruth lyob, "The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic Vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991-2000, " The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 4 (2000), Ruth Iyob, "Re-Configuring Identities: A Clash of Vision(S) in the Horn 
of Africa, 1991-2000" (paper presented at the Early warning in practice: the case of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Institute for 
African Alternatives (IFAA), London, 5 March 1999). 
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making and human interaction, namely the cultures of various organisations, organisations 
that through social interaction, through standardisation and through common historical 
experiences, end up sharing traditions and customs influencing decision-making strategies. In 
this sense this thesis will examine an almost totally neglected aspect of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
war. 
Moreover, with the notable exception of the work of Leenco Lata, it has been taken for 
granted that the EPRDF and the PFDJ acted unitarily, with few inner discussions. The inter- 
group dynamics within these organisations have not been studied in detail before. 161 Even 
Lata lacks an in-depth examination on why and how these groups emerged. A focus on 
organisations and their culture will enable an in-depth study of the larger organisations 
influencing Ethiopian decision making. The employment of the theories of Elizabeth Kier, 
theories explicitly acknowledging the existence of sub-groups even within organisational 
hierarchies, and also acknowledging that sub-group interaction is important for national 
decision-making, might provide insights into how much influence the sub groups explored by 
Lata had, and why the groups were formed. 
In addition, the role of the press in the developments leading up to the war has never 
been studied before. The private Ethiopian newspapers were also organisations that can be 
studied employing Kier's constructivism that has been inspired by organisational theory. Such 
a study can be of vital importance: it might discover if the press contributed to the pressure on 
Meles Zenawi described by Gilkes and Plaut, the pressure to prove his "Ethiopian 
Credentials", and if so, why this came about. '62 
The following chapters will focus on these unexplored areas, as well as attempting to 
answer some of the questions left open by previous attempts at explanation. The role of the 
press in defining the public debate in Ethiopia will be explored, as well as the pressure the 
press placed on EPRDF politicians. Why and how the sub-groups within the EPRDF that put 
pressure on the Ethiopian leadership were formed and how they influenced Ethiopian policy- 
making will be explored. The question of why scarcity or economically driven local conflicts 
in Tigray were allowed to develop, when similar conflicts in other border areas were 
controlled, will be answered. How economic factors were allowed to have influence on the 
bilateral Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship will also be examined. 
161 Leenco Lata, "Ethiopia: The Path to War, and the Consequences of Peace, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005). 
162 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 
79. 
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Chapter 4: The Press, Organisational Culture and the War 
If the observers most surprised by the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war had conducted a 
systematic study of the Ethiopian press in the years between the Press Law of 1992 and the 
outbreak of the war in May 1998, their surprise would perhaps have been reduced., The tone 
that the private Ethiopian press used when commenting upon Eritrea before the war was 
hostile and aggressive, branding the Eritreans by using terms such as "brother murderers" or 
"Haemorrhoids". 2 Strong language is quite common in many newspapers in numerous 
countries around the world. However, the Ethiopian press was special in many ways. A 
certain theme portraying the ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), as controlled by Eritrea or other foreign powers, dominated press coverage 
and certain axioms based on this theme came to dominate the public debate. The Ethiopian 
leadership was strongly criticised for being puppets of foreign actors, and this puppet theme 
dominated most of the coverage of Ethiopian bilateral relations. Regardless of the specific 
topic examined in the articles of the newspapers, the press tended to suggest reflexively that 
the Ethiopian government was controlled by outsiders, mostly of Eritrean origins. 3 The puppet 
theme contributed to a homogenisation of the Ethiopian public debate. As suggested by 
experts such as Patrick Gilkes, Martin Plaut, Medhane Tadesse and John Young, the 
Ethiopian leaders seem to have been pressured into a more nationalistic direction by the 
massive critique from the public debate. 4 As John Young and Medhane Tadesse argue: 
"Constantly accused of lacking a patriotic commitment to Ethiopia, the TPLF leadership 
sometimes found it necessary to take extreme actions to prove the contrary. ,5 
This chapter examines the role of the Ethiopian press in the developments that led to 
war. It shows how the puppet theme dominated large segments of the oppositional press. The 
chapter demonstrates how the theme became an axiom that was used to interpret various 
events and provided ready-made explanations that could be used to describe the Ethiopian- 
Eritrean relationship. Subsequently it explores how this influenced Ethiopian decision-making 
with serious implications for the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. The newspapers created a 
1 The Press Law of 1992 opened up for the establishment of private newspapers. 
2 "Economics, " The Addis Tribune 13 May 1994, "Wolde 'Ab' and the Press, " Niqa 23 May 1995. 
3 See for example. "Bickering and Punches or Dialogue? " Tobiya 3 August 1995. 
' Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "War in the Horn, the Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, " Royal Institute for 
international Affairs Discussion Paper, no. 82 (1999), Medhane Tadesse, and John Young., "Tplf: Reform or Decline, " 
Rericiv ofAfrican Political Economy 97, no. 3 (2003). 
5 Medhane Tadesse, and John Young., "Tplf: Reform or Decline, " Review of African Political Economy 97, no. 3 (2003): 
398. 
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public debate in Ethiopia that became hostile towards Eritreans, and Ethiopian attempts to 
negotiate with them almost inevitably tended to be interpreted as showing that the government 
was controlled by Eritrea. This chapter argues that this can not be explained by referring to 
the economic interests of the newspapers, as the papers often suffered economic loss when 
they adhered to their theme. Papers like the large Tobiya were forcefully closed down by the 
government because they stressed the theme, and accordingly, economic motives cannot 
account for the repeated insistence on the government's supposed puppet behaviour. 
The main argument of the chapter is that organisational culture entrenched the puppet 
theme, a theme that deterred politicians from giving concessions towards Eritreans, scared 
Eritreans and prevented the dissemination of information. It thus indirectly created problems 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Moreover, it will argue that such an organisational culture in 
turn was created by the recruitment patterns of the various newspapers' organisations and the 
newspapers' history of interaction with the government. 
The Puppet Theme 
On 4 January 1995 a strong verbal attack on Eritrea was launched in the Wolafen, a small 
opposition paper. 6 The article, written by Ato Mersha Wodajo, claimed that the new 
Constitution, implemented later in 1995, was an attempt by the USA to split and weaken 
Ethiopia. The USA was claimed to support the general Tigray People's Liberation Front 
(TPLF) /Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) programme that aimed to use Ethiopian 
resources to build Eritrea. 7 This alliance subsequently planned to increase Tigray by taking 
land from Gondar and Wollo. A last stage in this plan was supposed to be to include Tigray in 
Eritrea. There are no indications that such a plan ever existed. Indeed, the story is strongly 
contradicted by the events of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, in which the TPLF - dominated 
government fought fiercely to prevent even minor parts (such as Badme) of Tigray from being 
included in Eritrea. However, the article illustrates a general trend within the articles of the 
Ethiopian opposition papers, focusing on foreign manipulators manipulating the Ethiopian 
government in order to destroy Ethiopia. This theme had many variations. Sometimes the 
newspapers accused the United States, sometimes even Germany, of being out to destroy 
6 Mersha Wodajo, "Complaint against America, " Wolafen 4 January 1994. 
7 Ato Mersha Wodajo was also chairman of the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (CODEF), an oppositional group 
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Ethiopia. 8 Both had through manipulation also contributed to the fall of the Derg and thus to 
the present misery: 
.. they had been involved in fragmenting a once sovereign and united Ethiopia 
through the instrumentality of the hidden agenda of the opposition groups which 
they had organised and fully supported. In doing so they had exposed Ethiopia to 
misery of hereto unprecedented magnitudes. 9 
Nevertheless, the Eritreans were most commonly named as the original source of the overt 
control of Ethiopian authorities. There were many examples of articles carrying such themes. 
Newspapers like Mogad, Wonchif, Tomar, URJI, Beza, Etiop, Kittab, Habasha, the Ethiopian 
Register and Niqa all described the rulers of Ethiopia as more or less controlled by Eritrea, or 
other external forces. 10 Most of them agreed with the Habasha's claim of 5 September 1995 
that the "TPLF is dominated by EPLF so much that it is impossible to speak of them as 
two". 11 They also seemed to agree with the Ethiopian Register's claim that the TPLF was on 
an "EPLF assigned mission of dismantling Ethiopia. " 12 
The most important newspaper that adhered to the theme was the large Addis Ababa - 
based newspaper, the Tobiya, and it was to be central to the diffusion of the theme into other 
newspapers. The Tobiya had (and has) a solid financial basis with a registered capital of birr 
90,000 (c 13,000 dollar), and is according to the Ethiopian independent scholar Shimelis 
Bonsa the richest paper in Ethiopia. 13 The Tobiya was thus able to start publishing more 
issues than other newspapers; it had (and has) one of the largest circulation numbers in 
Ethiopia. Moreover, the number of pages in each of the Tobiya's issues, a regular copy having 
16-20 pages, was so high that it had an increased resale value. Increased resale subsequently 
meant that it became more popular amongst the poor, as it could be resold for a higher price. 
Lastly, the Tobiya's articles had a high technical quality, and their journalists were usually 
good writers. The Tobiya was thus a very popular and influential paper in Ethiopia. 
Because of the Tobiya's influence, it is highly significant to examine its articles. The 
Tobiya's coverage of the new Ethiopian Constitution, formalised and put into practice in 
8 "America Failed to Act, " WALWAL 27 December 1994. "Olf, " Tobiya 22 May 1997. 
9 "We Seek a Dictatorship Rather Than Democratic Governance, " Andinet 19 September 1996. 
10 For examples see: "The Consequences of Ethnic Politics and Secession, " Tobiya 10 August 1995, "The Root of All 
Sprouted from This Land, " Tobiya 14 November 1997, Mersha Wodajo, "Complaint against America, " Wolafen 4 January 
1994. 
" "Fighting for an American Cause? " Habasha 5 September 1995. 
"Lessons for the Ethiopian Diaspora, " Ethiopian Register 1 April 1997. 
13 Shimelis Bonsa, Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia 1991-1999 (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2000), 26. 
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1995, shows the importance of the puppet theme. On 20 January 1994 the Tobiya concluded 
that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) wanted to weaken 
Ethiopia. 14 For the Tobiya this was easy to see because the newspaper meant there was an 
intentional lack of a definition of a common Ethiopian flag in the new Constitution and no 
common definition of territory. The lack of the definition of the flag was intentional, because, 
as the newspaper put it, there was "a need to divide the country". The territories were not 
defined because of the need to "decrease the Ethiopian ability to declare and fight a war". 
The combination of the two strategies would lead to "weakening the national spirit". 
Moreover, the negative effects of the Constitution were said to be products of an active policy 
to make the country vulnerable if attacked by another nation, and also a part of a foreign plot 
to weaken Ethiopia. 
The paper did not indicate what type of information and sources it had accessed that 
indicated foreign influence on the Constitution. Importantly, the Constitution was at this stage 
not finished, and the exact wording was under discussion. Indeed, the Ethiopian Constitution, 
Article 3, now reads: "1). The Ethiopian flag consists of three horizontal bands of equal size, 
the uppermost green, the middle yellow and the nethermost red". So the flag became clearly 
defined, albeit at a later stage of the process. There was no discussion of the possibility that 
the lack of a common definition of territory was a result of the increased power of the ethnic 
groups, namely because Article 38 stipulated their right to secession. To the Tobiya it seemed 
clear that the whole Constitution was a result of foreign manipulation, even at a stage when it 
was still under construction. 
Notably, the Tobiya in general failed to see the contradictions between this 
Constitution and the Constitution of the supposed manipulators, Eritrea, which allowed few 
concessions to its ethnic groups. The TPLF and the EPLF actually had massive differences 
with regards to their views on ethnic groups. The TPLF defined national identity according to 
the lus sanguinis principle, citizenship based on common bloodlines and thus based on the 
bonds of ethnicity. On the other hand, the EPLF defined citizenship according to the lus soli 
principle: citizenship based on a common geographic background disregarding ethnic 
background. 15 The EPLF felt that few concessions should be given to the various ethnic 
groups within Eritrea, as the common Eritrean identity was seen as transcending the older 
ethnic identities. The TPLF on the contrary wanted to give the full sovereignty to ethnic 
14 "A New Constitution, " Tobil, a 20 January 1994. 
15 Bertil Egero, "The Roots of the Recent Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia- an Interpretation" (paper presented at the 
Conference on Culture and Conflict at the Horn of Africa, Lund University, 5 August 2004). 
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groups that should even be allowed to secede from Ethiopia if they wanted to. Taken to the 
extreme the new Ethiopian Constitution thus could be seen as opening up for territorial 
demands on Eritrea. Some of the Eritrean highlanders were so close to Tigrayans that, if one 
accepted the principle of ethnically defined states within the Ethiopian federation, they should 
be a part of Tigray. Indeed, the EPLF had previously been very frightened by the TPLF's use 
of this principle, especially its possibilities to be employed as a justification for 
Ethiopian/Tigrayan expansion, and it had contributed to most of the serious rifts between the 
two organisations. 16 Moreover, an Ethiopian adaptation of the lus sanguinis principle could be 
used as propaganda by ethnic groups within Eritrea that wanted to secede. After all, secession 
was according to the new Ethiopian Constitution legal for ethnic groups within Ethiopia, and 
Eritrean population groups could point to this as a justification for their own actions. The 
EPLF had been negative towards the TPLF's views on ethnicity from the day the two 
organisations first established contact, and there was little reason for Eritrea to become more 
positive with regards to this principle when it became enshrined in the Ethiopian Constitution. 
Martin Plaut and Patrick Gilkes even stress that the contradiction between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia with regards to the treatment of ethnic groups, including the contradictions enshrined 
in the new Constitution, could be a cause of the war itself. 17 
Importantly, information indicating the previous conflicts between the EPLF and the 
TPLF over the ethnicity question was available to the Addis Ababa newspapers. John Young 
had commented upon this information in his book Peasant Revolutions in Ethiopia, published 
in 1997.18 Previous members of the TPLF, members who had seen the conflicts between the 
EPLF and the TPLF over this principle, were available for interviews. The important TPLF 
leader Gidey Zeratsion had for example left the country, but was still active in the Diaspora 
and could easily have been interviewed by Ethiopian newspapers. Nevertheless, the 
newspapers failed even to discuss how the Ethiopian Constitution violated important Eritrean 
principles of nationhood. It becomes almost ironic that the Ethiopian Constitution that the 
Tobiya claimed was a product of Eritrean control perhaps was the document that most clearly 
demonstrated some of the most important of the conflicting issues between the Eritrean and 
Ethiopian ruling organisations. The Ethiopian Constitution was, self-contradictingly, rather 
described as a product of Eritrean manipulations. 
16 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 1, 
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, "Publications of the Eplf: The Tplf and the Development of Its Relations with the Eplf, " in 
Research and Documentation Centre, Asmara (Asmara: 1984), 4. 
" Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 1. 
18 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
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The new Constitution also meant that government structures had to be rearranged. 
Transitional governmental organs created after the victory over the Derg in 1991 had to be 
changed into more permanent institutions. The new permanent institutions had to include 
more non-Tigrayan members in order to be theoretically more representative. Some of the 
Tigray/ TPLF members of the cabinet had to leave in order to make positions available for 
non-Tigrayans. 19 The speculations that arose when the powerful Minister of Defence Siye 
Abraha Hagos, also a veteran central committee member of the TPLF, vacated his office were 
a major issue in some of the opposition papers. The articles commenting on his removal again 
demonstrated how the theme of a foreign power controlling the Ethiopian government became 
an axiom, and how this theme was almost as a reflex invoked to interpret new events. On 30 
November 1995, just after Siye Abraha Hagos vacated his office, the Tobiya wrote "Some 
circles ascribe Siye Abraha's removal to probable differences with Meles on Eritrean 
influence over Ethiopia". Siye was said to have protested against the Eritrean control of the 
government. 20 The first reflex of the Tobiya was to interpret this event, as many other events, 
as a result of the Eritrean influence over Ethiopia. 
Superficially, it might seem as though the reflex reaction could have been justified in 
this particular case. Seven years later Siye Abraha was removed from the TPLF central 
committee because of differences with Meles over Eritrea. However, this does not validate 
their story from 1995. Siye Abraha remained powerful after he moved from Addis Ababa to 
Tigray and until 2001 remained in the TPLF central committee, an organ that, given the 
TPLF's relative power in the EPRDF, was in many ways more important than the cabinet. 
Sebhat Nega, a former leader of the TPLF, today one of the senior leaders within the 
movement, actually stresses that Siye Abraha supported a lenient policy towards Eritrea at 
least until January 1998 and voted against military mobilisation before the war. 21 Importantly, 
this claim is supported by Alemseged Gebre Almak, former head of propaganda within the 
TPLF. Almak was, together with eleven other central committee members, including Siye 
Abraha, ousted from the TPLF in 2001. Members of this group, of which Almak is one of the 
leaders, have a strategic interest in saying that Siye Abraha was ousted from the cabinet in 
1995 because of the Eritrean issue, as Ethiopian public opinion is today largely against the 
19 In practice TPLF continued to dominate The TPLF still had control over the new National Security Authority, and Kinfe 
Gebre Medhine, a TPLF veteran, got this position. Several international observers as Kjetil Tronevoll and Sigfried 
Pausewand also commented upon informal channels of overt control, which enabled the TPLF to exercise control over the 
government. Siegfried Pausewang, and Lovise Aalen, "Local Elections in Ethiopia, February/March 2001, " Nordem Report. 
WORKING PAPER 01, no. 07 (2001). 
20 "Power: In Whose Hands? " Tobiya 30 November 1995. 
21Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
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Eritreans. Such claims could thus have confirmed their credentials for the general public, the 
group itself claiming that resistance towards lenient policy towards Eritrea is one of their 
main policies. 22 Nevertheless, Amlak, in contradiction of his own interests, claims that Siye 
was very important in the TPLF even after 1995, and that he actually supported a very lenient 
policy towards Eritrea until 1998, even voting against military mobilisation in 1997.23 The 
stories of Sebhat Nega and Alemseged Gebre Almak are corroborated by other sources. 
Mesmor Fante, a former leading member of Amhara National Democratic movement 
(ANDM), the TPLF's sister party within EPRDF, supports their statements. 24 This makes the 
Tobiya's argument extremely weak. Moreover, much of the information available to them 
should have indicated this. The Tobiya, like most Ethiopians at the time, must have been 
aware of the relative dominance of the TPLF in the EPRDF, and of the importance of the 
TPLF central committee, in which Siye still sat. They pointed to the importance of the TPLF 
structures in many of their articles. 25 Nevertheless, they did not analyse why Siye kept his 
position in the central committee. The possibility that Siye Abraha relinquished his power 
because of the constitutional rearrangements, and that he kept much informal influence, was 
not discussed by the Tobiya. Instead of using the sources available to them, the Tobiya 
reflexively interpreted the event as a product of Eritrean manipulation. 
The story of the ousting of Tamirat Layne, Prime Minister of Ethiopia from 1991 to 
1995, from 1995 to 1996 Deputy Prime Minister and Siye's replacement as Minister of 
Defence, also illustrates the way the puppet theme functioned as a reflexive axiom underlying 
the interpretation of a new event. At the time when Siye Abraha moved to Tigray, the Tobiya 
claimed that Tamirat Layne was crucial in removing Siye, being indirectly "an opponent of 
Siye's attempt to prevent Eritrean influence". 26 Nevertheless, when Tamirat Layne was 
arrested for corruption one year later, the first reaction of the Tobiya was to claim that 
Tamirat had been removed because of his hostile attitude towards Eritrea. The paper also 
used this opportunity to underline once more the control they felt Eritrea had over the 
EPRDF. To them the ANDM, Tamirat's party within the EPRDF umbrella, never really was 
intended to be a representative Amharic organisation. The ANDM was intended to be TPLF's 
spearhead in Amharaland, and the TPLF was subsequently intended to be EPLF's spearhead 
in Ethiopia. 
22 See for example Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
`' Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
24 Mesmor Fante, Interview, 2 February 2003. 
25 See for example "A New Constitution, " Tobiya 20 January 1994. 
26 "Power: In Whose Hands? " Tobiya 30 November 1995. 
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We vividly recall how Ato Abraha Yayhe had once referred to the EPDM [later 
renamed ANDM] as the Amhara wing of the Weeyins [TPLF]. Shabia (EPLF) 
had used the Weeyins to penetrate into the country. In like manner the Weeyins 
had used the EPDM as a vehicle and a bridge for penetration of the central 
highlands. 27 
Tamirat was seen to have an important position in the Eritrean-Ethiopian trade negotiations. 
He was a member of the ministerial commission, but he became too sceptical of what the 
Tobiya claimed to be "the Eritrean control of the Ethiopian political life", so he had to be 
removed. 28 Admittedly, the newspaper later changed its view, and claimed that the corruption 
accusations against Tamirat were solid and probably the sole cause for his removal. 29 
Nevertheless, the initial reaction of the Tobiya again showed a tendency to interpret new 
events according to a puppet axiom. 
The Tobiya also claimed that the TPLF tried to Eritreanise the Ethiopian society: 
Many citizens have become increasingly convinced over the past four years that 
Ethiopia no longer belongs to Ethiopians. Ethiopians dismissed from work on 
various levels are replaced by Eritreans. Eritreans also hold key positions in the 
government. These are causes for widespread complaint and discontent amongst 
Ethiopians today. 30 
Other papers followed the lead of the Tobiya. On 5 September 1995 the Beza claimed that 
"Ethiopia has become an Eritrean colony" . 
31 In December the same year the Tequami 
claimed that the "EPRDF's role as an agent directly in charge of EPLF interests in Ethiopia 
has been repeatedly confirmed by a number of popular voices on various occasions". 32 The 
Tobiya followed suit claiming: "Should Ethiopians remain unemployed while Eritreans 
control every thing from petty kiosks to high positions in the government? Have you 
considered this? "33 They also warned about officials with Eritrean relatives: "Can 
government officials with Eritrean blood possibly work for the interest of the Ethiopian 
27 "Who Is Tamirat, " Tobiya 31 October 1996. 
28 "What Is the Mystery Behind Tamirats Dismissal And..... Questions Remain Open, " Tobiya 31 October 1996. 
29 "Uproot the Rotten System!, " Tobiya 7 November 1996. 
30 "Editorial: The Freedom of Information in Contemporary Ethiopia, " Tobiya 10 August 1995. 
31 "Editorial, " Bea 5 September 1995. 
32 "Eritrea Demands Ethiopians to Pay Custom Duties in Us Dollars, " Tequami 19 December 1995. 
33 "Questions Addressed to Cpr and Genuine Tigreans, " Tobiya 13 June 1996. 
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people? "34 Interestingly, the same paper later in the same article, albeit when discussing 
Oromos, contradicted itself, claiming that mixed blood is so common in Ethiopia that no one 
should be judged because of his/her ancestors. 
Admittedly, Ethiopia's citizenship laws at the time were awkward and complex and 
might have contributed to some hostility targeting the Eritreans. The EPRDF chose to be 
lenient with regard to the possibility for citizenship not only vis-a-vis Eritrea, but also with 
regards to nomads straddling the borders. Focusing on the rights of Eritreans only, many 
newspapers saw this as the clearest example of how the TPLF was controlled by the Eritreans, 
how they were forced to allow Eritreans to enter Ethiopia. 35 However, the inter-marriage 
between Eritreans and various population groups in Ethiopia, not only Tigrayans, but also 
Amharas, Afars and to a less extent Oromos and Gurages, would have made other options 
extremely impractical. As Human Rights Watch says when commenting upon the later 
expulsions of Ethiopians with Eritrean origins: 
For the forty years preceding Eritrean independence in 1991 both countries were 
part of the same internationally recognized state. Strong cultural, religious, and 
linguistic affinities existed between the two people, and intermarriages were 
common. The Ethiopian Constitution, in its Article 6, grants citizenship by birth 
to any person with one or both Ethiopian parents. 36 
In fact, the discussion of the citizenship of Eritreans was equally influenced by the puppet 
theme, and influencing it in return. The issue of citizenship became tied to the background of 
the citizen in question rather than the principle itself. For several opposition papers the 
naturalisation, even dual citizenship, of foreigners was unproblematic as long as the person in 
question, or his mother/father, had not originated in Eritrea. Thus when discussing the 
background of the largest entrepreneur in Ethiopia, the half Saudi Arabian Al-Amoudi, the 
newspaper Moresh for example remarked that: 
No Ethiopian would have reservations if Alamoudi becomes a naturalized 
Ethiopian citizen. But giving dual citizenship to Al-Amoudi would violate the 
34 Ibid. 
35 "Haven't We Had Enough, " Beza 1 January 1998, "The Nationality of Thousand Eritreans Is Put to Question", " Tobiya 29 
August 1996, "Questions of Eritrean Nationals in Ethiopia Should Be Resolved, " Tobiya 27 November 1997. 
36 Human Rights Watch, "Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 
1998 - April 2002), " (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003). (Eritrea formally gained independence in 1993, but had it de- 
facto from 1991 and onwards) 
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provision in the Ethiopian Constitution which prohibits dual citizenship. If that 
provision on dual citizenship is amended, a great number of Eritreans who have 
registered as foreign nationals and are denied dual citizenships would have the 
opportunity to make use of two citizenships. 37 
Reflexively, the interpretation was that when Eritreans gained citizenship, it would be 
negative, but non-Eritrean foreigners gaining citizenship would be positive. 
Indeed, the dominance of the puppet theme led almost reflexively to the interpretation 
of most new events in the light of the supposed puppet relationship between the EPLF and the 
TPLF. So when Ethiopia sold its navy, the newspaper Genanaw almost as a reflex action 
suggested that the money went to the Eritreans. 38 This tendency continued, not only in the 
Tobiya, but also in many other papers. On 17 July 1997, the Wonchif claimed that the 
Weyane (TPLF) and Shabia (EPLF) alliance was the root of all problems in Ethiopia. 39 The 
Wonchif made the claim that Zalambessa, one of the Ethiopian cities that saw the fiercest 
battles during the 1998-2000 war, was to be handed back to the Eritreans and claimed that this 
was partly because Eritrean domination of the TPLF. Needless to say, this never happened. 
According to the paper, Sebhat Nega, a powerful TPLF central committee member, and 
General Tsadekan "were partly of Eritrean origins", and also influenced the negotiations. 40 In 
fact, Tsadekan was at the time strongly negative towards the Eritreans, and advised military 
defensive mobilisation against them just months after. 41 Nevertheless, this story was repeated 
in other newspapers, also during the tense period between the Eritrean-Ethiopian governments 
during August 1997. The tension between the governments had at this stage even become 
clear to many of the Addis Ababa newspapers. 42 However, on 5 August 1997 the newspaper 
Zegabbi reported that Zalambessa was given to Eritrea. 43 
The Tobiya also continued to interpret events reflexively in accordance with a puppet 
theme. On 22 May 1997, a peace attempt trying to create a dialogue between the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) guerrilla organisation and Ethiopia was said to be a German-Eritrean 
(EPLF) plot to weaken Ethiopia. 44 On the 26 of May it also suggested that the OLF, as well as 
37 "Al-Amoudi, 'Yes', Eritrean Nationals, 'No', " Moresh 15 March 1998. 
38 "Naval Ships Sold, " Genanaw 19 September 1996. 
39 "Ethiopia-Eritrea Territorial Settlement, " Wonchif 17 June 1997. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
42 See for example: "Stepped up Border Vigilance, " Beza 21 October 1997. 
43 "Ethiopia/Eritrea Border Adjustment, " Zegabbi 5 August 1997. 
44 "Olf, " Tobiva 22 May 1997. 
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its enemy EPRDF, was Eritrean controlled. 45And other smaller papers followed suit. Beza 
even carried an article suggesting that "the two groups, Tigrayans and Eritreans, are so similar 
that they should be kept apart from the rest of Ethiopia. "46 
The events of 1997, the Eritrean introduction of the Nakfa and the problems in the 
border areas increased the manifestations of the puppet theme. Each new event was 
interpreted according to the theme, and complex issues were reduced to a question of Eritrean 
influence only. In late 1997- early 1998 the Tobiya for example heavily attacked Eritrea and 
its "puppets in the Ethiopian government" under headlines such as "Enough is enough". 47 
Commenting on the on-going trade negotiations, they claimed that "The hullabaloo on the birr 
and Nakfa has raised the eyebrows of the Ethiopian people. Ethiopia should not continue to 
bleed in order to satisfy the interests and the needs of Eritrea. " Meles Zenawi's adviser Fasil 
Nahom, an Eritrean Jew, was described as a traitor. The former EPLF member Yemane 
Jamaica Kidane, the Secretary of the Foreign Minister, was used as an example of how far the 
infiltration had gone. The coverage of the trade negotiations became one-sided as newspapers 
reported that the Eritreans dominated both the Ethiopian delegation and the Eritrean 
delegation. The Beza in detail explored how the Ethiopian delegation was controlled by 
Eritreans. 
Ato Aw-Alom Woldu is an Eritrean and yet has been appointed Ethiopian 
ambassador to Eritrea to [so called] look after Ethiopia's interests. During 
negotiations that were held in Assab between Ethiopia and Eritrea Ato Aw-Alom 
was negotiator on the Ethiopian side. Ato Fasil Nahom, who is an Eritrean Jew, is 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's advisor. Yemane Kidane, nicknamed Jamaica, is 
the secretary of the Ethiopian foreign minister. 48 
Nevertheless, the supposedly Eritrean controlled negotiation team was ardently resisting 
Eritrean attempts to facilitate a continuation of the trade pact which they saw as 
disadvantageous to Ethiopia. Again the EPRDF proved their ability to hold their ground 
against the supposed puppet masters, and again the puppet theme was depicting a situation 
as "And Who Are the Next Targets? Further Dismemberment in Store for Ethiopia? " Tobiya 29 May 1997. 
46 "Interview with Professor Tilahun, " Beza 22 April 1997. 
`" "Enough Is Enough, " Tobiya 1 January 1998. 
48 "Haven't We Had Enough, " Beza 1 January 1998. 
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erroneously. The Beza had seemingly reflexively interpreted the situation according to their 
puppet theme and avoided examining what was going on in the negotiations. 
Given the information available to the papers, arguments of Eritreans' ruling Ethiopia 
through high ranked Eritrean civil servants within the Ethiopian government appear odd. It 
would have been an understandable conclusion for ordinary citizens because of the close 
connection between Tigrayans (TPLF) and Eritreans, and considering the number of 
Tigrayan leaders with Eritrean relatives. However, the attitudes of some of these supposed 
Eritreans, such as for instance Gebru Asrath, the then powerful president of Tigray, were 
highly critical towards Eritrea. 49 Information about the attitudes of several critical TPLF 
officials circulated relatively widely in TPLF circles and leaked. Members of the opposition 
were indeed aware of this, so the information should have been available to the oppositional 
papers who frequently interviewed oppositional politicians. 50 
Nevertheless, the Tobiya even threatened the government directly, attempting to push 
them towards a more hawkish stand in the negotiations: "If the situation is allowed to 
continue, the present ruling party which has been criticised for being an instrument of Eritrea 
could further lose credibility. "51 In this way the Tobiya attempted to push the Ethiopian 
leaders into being stricter towards Eritrea, by claiming that the leaders would be seen as 
Eritrean instruments if failing to do so. 
Moreover, the frequency of such coverage increased. Although first starting amongst 
oppositional papers, allegations of Eritrean control of the Ethiopian government spread 
beyond them. Business papers like the Addis Tribune moderately started to claim that 
Eritreans in the Ethiopian government had a negative impact on the trade negotiations. 52 The 
theme thus spread to new segments of the press during the crucial economic negotiations of 
1997-1998. Interestingly, during this period the Ethiopian government clearly showed that 
they were no puppets, refusing the Eritrean suggestion that they should allow the Eritrean 
Nakfa to circulate at a one-to-one exchange rate with the Ethiopian currency, the birr. 
The tone developed, it became harsher and the newspapers now started to condemn 
even the critics of their puppet axiom. The newspaper Beza for example suggested that female 
critics of the interpretation that the EPRDF was a puppet of Eritrea had been the sex partners 
of the TPLF leaders. 53 
41) Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
50 Beyene Petros, Interview, 3 December 2002. 
51 "Strict Control Measures: A Timely Necessity, " Tobiya 17 December 1997. 
52 "Prime Minister Says No Change in Free Trade Agreement with Eritrea (but Reaffirms Necessity of Dollar-Based Letter of 
Credit): A Commentary, " Addis Tribune 16 January 1998. 
53 "Haven't We Had Enough, " Beza 1 January 1998. 
99 
Newspapers also started to identify Eritreans that supposedly manipulated the 
Ethiopian financial sector. This was perhaps a less surprising adaptation of the puppet theme 
than its adaptation to the Ethiopian delegations sent to renegotiate bilateral agreements. 
Eritreans had a prominent position in the Ethiopian economy, including black-marketing and 
illegal enterprises taking advantage of Ethiopia's somewhat cumbersome laws. 54 However, 
the theme again led to reflexive interpretations of events and to the discovery of non-existing 
Eritrean back men controlling the Ethiopian economy. The newspaper the Ethiopian Register 
for example claimed that Dashen Bank, the second largest bank in Ethiopia, was fully 
controlled by Eritreans, the owner being supposed to be an Eritrean. 55 This was erroneous: all 
11 owners of the bank were Ethiopians. Moreover, this information was open to the press. All 
the same, rather than do research, the Ethiopian Register reflexively applied the puppet theme 
when an article was to be produced. 56 
Another issue that became linked to the puppet theme was the issue of Assab. The city 
of Assab is located in the south of Eritrea, where Eritrea narrows and the Ethiopian border is 
closest to the sea. The region is populated by the Afar, an ethnic group that also occupies the 
north eastern part of Ethiopia and Djibouti, and that previously fought for independence from 
all these countries. Assab had been integrated into the Ethiopian economy and was second 
only to Port Djibouti when it came to the amount of cargo going back and forth from Ethiopia 
during the Derg era. 57 The Ethiopian presence was large, also after the end of the Derg. 
According to the United Nations' Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 70% of 
Assab's population were actually Ethiopian on the eve of Eritrean independence in 1993.58 
However, while there were few celebrations in Assab during the independence frenzy 
in 1993, the percentage of pro-independence votes was as high here as in the rest of the 
country. International observers, including the researcher Terrence Lyons, concluded that the 
city wanted to be a part of Eritrea. 59 Moreover, it had always been a part of the Italian colony, 
and thus had to be Eritrean according to the OAU charter that defined the former colonial 
borders as a foundation for the borders in Africa. 
sa See for example: "Counterfeiter under Police Custody, " Eritrea Profile 2 May 1998. 
ss "The Perils of Ethnic Banking, " Ethiopian Register 1 August 1997. 
56 Dashen Bank, "Press Release: Dashen Bank, " Press Digest 18 September 1997. Moreover, the article had additional 
negative effects, as Dashen bank in a press statement stated that never had any Eritrean owners. By going out and denying it 
publicly in one of the larger Ethiopian newspapers, they underlined that it was problematic to have Eritreans, in this way even 
the bank contributed to a general anti-Eritrean discourse. 
57 Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Federal Experience (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika insitutet, 1997). 
58 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Eritrea-Ethiopia. - 
Irin Focus on Assab (Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2000 [cited 25/04 2002]); available from www. irin. org. 
59 Paul Henze, Eritrea's War (Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2001). 
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As claimed by the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs and by Fisseha- 
Tsion Menghistu, Assab was extremely important in Ethiopian public discussions. 
60 Segments 
of the Ethiopian press claimed that the secession of Assab in 1991 was a result of the 
supposed Eritrean control over the EPRDF and the TPLF. The decision to let Assab go and 
the humiliation that many Ethiopians felt because of this inevitably fed the puppet theme, as 
well as being interpreted in the light of it. The Ethiopian ambassador and chief negotiator 
during the Assab negotiations, Ato Aw-Alom Woldu, was, according to both members of the 
present day TPLF leadership, the opposition and the more anti-Eritrean TPLF group that left 
the party in 2001, one of the hawks of the TPLF, pushing for full defensive mobilisation 
against Eritrea as early as in December 1997.61 The Tobiya had ample opportunity to speak 
with the politicians of the opposition, nonetheless, the Tobiya claimed that Woldu was 
influenced by his Eritrean origins. 62 
The application of the puppet theme had several negative implications for the bi- 
lateral Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. Firstly, it framed the situation for the Ethiopian 
decision makers: they were afraid of appearing as the puppets they were accused of being. It 
intimidated several of the EPRDF leaders. For example Yemane Jamaica Kidane, who in 
1976 had been a member of the EPLF but had switched to the TPLF, felt strongly pressured 
by the comments with regards to his Eritrean background. 63 Lovise Aalen's respondents also 
observed how TPLF central committee member Tewodros Hagos became pressured because 
of his half Eritrean origins. 64 Indeed several other researchers such as Patrick Gilkes, Martin 
Plaut, John Young, Medhane Tadesse and Kjetil Tronvoll point to the effect of the agitation of 
the press and the public debate it defined. 65 As suggested by John Young and Medhane 
Tadesse: "Constantly accused of lacking a patriotic commitment to Ethiopia, the TPLF 
leadership sometimes found it necessary to take extreme actions to prove the contrary. "66 On 
several occasions this was seemingly even the conscious strategy of the newspapers 
60 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Eritrea-Ethiopia. - 
Irin Focus on Assab (Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
2000 [cited 25/04 2002]); available from www. irin. org, Fissehatsion Menghistu, Let Us Have Assab and Outlet to the Sea 
and Let Eritreans Go to Hell, Attitudes of Some Extremist Ethiopians, Part 15 (Hadish-Tesfa, 2002 [cited 20/08 2004]); 
available from http: //www. hadish-tesfa. org. 
61 Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
62 "Enough Is Enough, " Tobiya 1 January 1998. 
63 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
ba Lovise Aalen, "Expressions of Control, Fear and Devotion, " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Siegfried Pausewang and 
Kjetil Tronvoll (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 2000), 85. 
65 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000), 
Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 44. 
66 Medhane Tadesse, and John Young., "Tplf: Reform or Decline, " Review of African Political Economy 97, no. 3 (2003): 
398. 
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themselves, with newspapers such as the Tobiya asserting that the TPLF now had to 
demonstrate their Ethiopianness by being strict towards Eritrea, and thus avoid being branded 
as Eritrea's puppets. 67 Interesting, the critique of the government's Eritrean connections also 
had influence on the opposition. Oppositional leaders with connections with Eritrea were 
removed, a paradox in a country with so many citizens of mixed origins. In 1995, the vice 
chairman of the Medhin party, Dr. Fisseha-Tsion, was for example removed from his position 
because of his Eritrean family roots. 68 
Secondly, the press failed to raise questions about strategies for peace and in this sense 
be critical to the government. The harsh critique of alternative voices, voices claiming that the 
relationship between the EPRDF and the Eritreans actually was tense, might have contributed 
to the silencing of such voices, voices that could have given an early warning of the conflict 
and that often also arguing for moderation. As Dominique Jacquin-Berdal puts it: "The 
legitimacy of the war was never openly questioned, even by those who subsequently voiced 
their opposition to the government in power. " 69 No pressure for peace emerged in the 
Ethiopian press, instead pressure for war dominated. Given the findings of Sarah Vaughan 
and Kjetil Tronvoll, namely that the private press had a substantial influence on small town 
intelligentsia, it seems fair to claim that its relatively homogenous coverage of Eritrean- 
Ethiopian relations must have had influence too. 70 This might in turn have contributed to the 
fact that no peace movement emerged in Ethiopia during the war. The public debate became 
dichotomised with only two different choices: to support the government and the war, or to 
support the even more hawkish opposition. 
Thirdly, the press also failed its important role as an informer vis-a-vis the Ethiopian 
opposition. Oppositional politicians were in general much more reflected than the tabloidised 
quotations that were published in the Ethiopian press. 71 The Ethiopian government failed to 
provide them with information, and thus one of the few ways they could remain up-dated on 
issues concerning Ethiopia was by reading the private press. Organisations like the All 
Amhara People's Organisation (AAPO) had to trust the speculative members of the Ethiopian 
67 "Strict Control Measures: A Timely Necessity, " Tobiya 17 December 1997, "Time for the Tplf to Take Stock of Itself, " 
Tobiya 11 December 1997. 
68 International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Ifex Alerts 3 January 1996,13, and 12 December 1995 (International 
Freedom of expression exchange, 1996 [cited 14/03 2005]); available from http: //www. ifex. org/es/content/view/full/3337/. 
69 Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, "Introduction, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin- 
Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: 2005), xii. 
70 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 73. 
71 Personal impression after interviews with: Merara Gudina, Interview, 1 April 2003, Berahnu Negga, Interview, 1 
December 2002, Beyene Petros, Interview, 3 December 2002. 
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private press. The effects of this is hard to estimate, but it might have substantially weakened 
the quality of information that the opposition based its decisions on. 
Fourthly, the negative attitude towards Eritreans must have created fear amongst the 
latter. An Ethiopian, Fisseha-Tsion Menghistu, concluded that "Such articles may be 
temporally appealing to the emotions of many Ethiopians, but they also have a great potential 
of creating fear amongst sensible Eritreans. "72 The Eritrean Foreign Ministry also remarked 
how intimidated they felt by the press coverage claiming that "the Ethiopian media is waging 
an inflammatory campaign of inciting hate and confrontation. , 73 In many ways the situation 
was ironic: the Eritrean government had their propaganda tools made ready for them by 
Ethiopian papers: the negativity of the Ethiopian press was used to illustrate the hostility of 
Ethiopians in general. In this sense papers like the Tobiya indirectly acted like the puppets 
they accused others of being, helping the propaganda effort of the Eritreans. 
In sum, between 1991 and the outbreak of war in 1998 a puppet theme was adopted by 
a majority of the private Ethiopian newspapers. This puppet theme was reflexively applied to 
interpret the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. The puppet theme put pressure on Ethiopian 
politicians to show that they were not Eritrean puppets, giving them less room for leniency 
towards Eritrea, it scared Eritreans, damaged the quality of information provided by the 
newspapers and contributed to a development where the press failed to question the war and 
rather pressed for an escalation. 
Former Cooperation and Commercial Interests 
It could be argued that the puppet theme was adopted because of the previous cooperation 
between the EPRDF, more specifically the most powerful movement within the umbrella 
organisation the TPLF, and the EPLF and its successor, the People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice (PFDJ). Admittedly, the TPLF had received initial training from the EPLF. Tigrayans 
(TPLF) and Tigrinyas (EPLF) were closely related ethnically. However, although never 
entering into open conflict with each other before 1998, the relationship between the two 
organisations had been filled with conflict, and the organisations often ended up supporting 
each others' enemies. 
72 Fisseha-Tsion Menghistu, Let Us Have Assab and Outlet to the Sea and Let Eritreans Go to Hell, Attitudes of Some 
Extremist Ethiopians, Part 15 (Hadish-Tesfa, 2002 [cited 20/08 2004]); available from http: //www. hadish-tesfa. org. 
73 "Are We Reaping What We Have Sown?, " Press Digest 21 May 1998. 
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As early as in 1975 the TPLF defined Tigrayans as anyone speaking the language 
Tigrinya, thus including large population groups within Eritrea in Tigray. The EPLF was 
frightened by this, since it in practice was a claim to what they regarded as Eritrean territory. 74 
In 1977-1978 the TPLF actively cooperated with the EPLF's enemy, the ELF. In this case the 
TPLF indirectly aided an organisation that aimed to destroy the EPLF, hardly the act of a 
puppet. While their support for the ELF ended in 1978, the disagreements between the EPLF 
and the TPLF continued. According to Gidey Zeratsion, former military leader of the TPLF 
and a frequent critic of the present day organisational leadership, the TPLF gave an ultimatum 
to the EPLF with regards to the border areas in 1984. The TPLF stated that if the EPLF failed 
to accept TPLF interim control over contested areas, the TPLF would go to war against the 
former. 75 Such harsh language is again hardly the act of a puppet. The closing of the Barka 
route, described in the previous chapter, was another incident that showed how the TPLF was 
able to resist the EPLF. From 1986 to 1988 the relationship between the two organisations 
was like a cold war. The TPLF even vocally supported the rights of the Afar population in the 
south of Eritrea to secede, creating even more animosity within the EPLF. 76 The examples 
continue after the war against the Derg ended. Until 1994 the TPLF militarily supported the 
ELF CC and Shagim, two organisations that wanted to remove the EPLF by force, again 
hardly the act of a puppet. 77 They continued to support the Eritrean Afars. The TPLF sent 
forces to Adi Murug to eject the Eritreans in 1997, forcing the Eritreans out. 78 The TPLF also 
rejected the Eritrean wish for parity between the birr and the Nakfa. The events of 1998 again 
showed that the TPLF was far from a puppet. 
Importantly, most of this information was readily available to the newspapers. Exiled 
politicians like Getachew Garredew, as well as several TPLF and EPLF leaders in exile, 
willingly described the previous conflicts between the two organisations and warned of the 
animosities between them, even about the possibility of war, but they were, with the exception 
of one Ethiopian newspaper, the Itop, ignored. 
79 Some of the information about these 
animosities was relatively openly available even in Ethiopia: any Tigrayan farmer would be 
able to tell about the closing of the Barka route in 1986, which created much suffering 
74 Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, "Publications of the Epl£ The Tplf and the Development of Its Relations with the Eplf, " 
in Research and Documentation Centre, Asmara (Asmara: 1984), 4. 
75 Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999). 
76 Richard Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, " Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 73, no. 3 (2003). 
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amongst ordinary Tigrayans. Interestingly, several of the Ethiopian newspapers even printed 
information with regards to the disagreements between the EPRDF and the Eritreans. The 
Beza for example clearly knew that the Ethiopian government supported the Afar opposition 
within Eritrea, writing articles on how the Ethiopian government had to send high level 
delegations to Asmara because of Eritrean complaints about this. 80 Nevertheless, the Beza still 
adhered to the puppet theme. Again it seems as if certain sources of information were 
overlooked, the axiom of the foreign puppet master coming to dominate the oppositional 
press. As Richard Reid says, information about the conflicts between the TPLF and the EPLF 
should: 
.. 
have been well known to the leadership circles as well as to informed observers 
of the two movements over the past twenty years. A closer examination of the 
problems themselves demonstrates the degree to which the war in 1998 should 
have been anticipated. ' 8 
Newspapers fully involved with analysing Ethiopian politics, with access to oppositional 
politicians, with the possibility of accessing ex-TPLF officers residing abroad and of 
accessing the work of scholars like John Young, should have had the possibility to abandon 
their own puppet theme. Indeed, some newspapers, such as for example the Itop and the 
Reporter, managed to discard the theme. However most of the private press failed to discard 
it. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that this failure could have been because of 
commercial interests. There are many examples from many different countries of newspapers 
that deliberately ignore information in order to sell as much as possible. This seems unlikely 
in this case, partly because the papers adhering to the puppet theme were often punished by 
the government simply because of this adherence. The Tobiya's second Editor-in-Chief, Taye 
Belachew, was in 1997 for instance detained for five days, then released on a bail of birr 
5,000. Less than one month later, he was detained at the Criminal Investigation Department 
and released on a bail of birr 10,000. All of this was because of two articles entitled "The 
Strategy for Re-unification of Mereb-Melash (Eritrea) with Ethiopia" and "The Root of All 
80 "High Level Ethiopian Team Goes to Eritrea, " Beza 27 December 1997. 
81 Richard Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and Its Relations with Tigray, from 
Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, " A/mica: Journal of the International African Institute 73, no. 3 (2003). 
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Sprouted from This Land", articles describing the Eritreans as the rulers of the TPLF. 
82 
While the Tobiya managed to survive, even to be profitable, the costs it had to pay were 
massive and the amount of human suffering it had to endure was immense. Other smaller 
papers experienced the same consequences when they adhered to the theme. 
The Siye Abraha story, where the Tobiya described how he was removed from office 
because of his anti-Eritreanness, shows how the puppet theme rather became invoked almost 
as an organisational reflex. The theme was implemented immediately when a new event broke 
and thus served as a replacement for information. The Tobiya and other papers did not wait 
for information but published weakly researched articles with the theme instead. This was not 
the result of a wish to earn more money, for the journalists that published such stories often 
suffered jail for them and their newspapers had to pay high fines. Thus the puppet theme can 
not be understood as a strategy employed by the newspapers in order to sell more newspapers, 
in fact the newspapers lost economically when they pushed the theme as the government 
closed them down. It cannot be explained by the previous cooperation between the two ruling 
organisations in Eritrea and Ethiopia, as the relationship between them was as much filled 
with conflict as with cooperation, and information about these conflicts were available to the 
Ethiopian Press. 
The theories of Elizabeth Kier focus on organisational culture and decision making, 
and offer a possibility to examine an alternative explanation of the appliance of the puppet 
theme. To Kier, elements of organisational culture influence decision making and have the 
potential to lead to decisions that contradict both the available information, and the 
organisational self interest. Organisational culture creates organisational reflexes, reflexes that 
for newspapers also can include a particular habitual way of writing. 
Inheritance, Lack of Information and Repeated Crises 
The entire Adiabo Plains (Kunama) region between Mereb and Takazie including 
the eastern parts of Badema and Sheraro woredas which are in Shire Awraja, 
Assaye and Egela in Adwa Awraja, and Zalambassa area in Agame Awraja. This 
secret Agreement completes TPLF's previous commitments, as the preceding 
82 "The Root of All Sprouted from This Land, " Tobiya 14 November 1997, "The Strategy for Re-Unification of Mereb 
Melash (Eritrea) with Ethiopia, " Tobiya 5 November 1997. 
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paragraph makes clear, to a prospective Eritrean state by carving out the Tigrai 
83 districts to be within its internal territorial boundaries at independence. 
The above quote could have been from any of the private newspapers that were established 
after 1992. Several of them had stressed how the TPLF had been forced by their puppet 
masters to give away Zalambessa, Badme and several other areas in Tigray to the Eritreans. 84 
This never happened, according to both TPLF and EPLF sources, both dissidents and insiders. 
These areas had actually been heavily contested by the parties in 1983, with none of the sides 
being willing to yield. 85 Importantly, the quote is not taken from any of the post 1992 
Ethiopian newspapers, but is taken from a newspaper published in a previous era of Ethiopian 
history, the era of the Derg (1974-1991), the regime that preceded the EPRDF's takeover. The 
article thus illustrates an important continuity between the press coverage during the Derg 
regime and the private press during EPRDF rule, namely the frequent use of the puppet 
theme. Newspapers controlled by the Derg had also often labelled their opponents as puppets 
controlled by external forces. On 8 October 1978, the Ethiopian Herald for example wrote: 
Shattering of the conspiracy of reactionary Arab regimes is not an easy task 
either. On the local scene, there has [been] strain to rebuff envoys of the 
discredited EPRP, the trio self proclaimed ELP, EPLF, Awhad secessionist 
bandits in Eritrea. 86 
Here the Arabs were the puppet masters, but the United States, Germany, China, Albania, and 
the EPLF also received the label. 87 The examples of the pre-1991 employment of the puppet 
theme are many, and some will be explored in detail later, the puppet theme thus had emerged 
during the Derg but remained in use during the EPRDF's regime. 88 
83 "The Tplf Mission, " Addis Zemen 11 November 1990. An Awarja roughly equalled a municipality, a Woreda is a lower 
administrative unit 
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When taking the theories of Elizabeth Kier into account, it becomes easier to explain 
why the puppet theme was kept by many of the newspapers even after the fall of the Derg. 
Many the private newspapers emerging in Ethiopia after 1992 were formed by former 
journalists from the newspapers of the Derg. As Shimelis Bonsa pointed out when 
commenting upon what he calls the first wave of Ethiopian newspapers, the first newspapers 
founded after the Press Law: 
The papers were in most cases founded by people who had worked as journalists 
during the previous regime but who had left their jobs under the current 
government, these people injected their experience into the periodicals which were 
consequently demonstrative of the comparatively better professional standings of 
their procedures. 89 
A substantial number of journalists working in some of the major new papers had received 
their journalistic experience from older Derg-controlled newspapers like the Addis Zemen and 
the Ethiopian Herald, or other parts of the Derg-controlled Ethiopian media. Teferra Asmare, 
an editor of one of the new papers, the Etiopis, might serve as an example: he had twelve 
years previous experience from the Ethiopian Television (ETV). 90 Many of the former Derg 
journalists were crucial in the establishment of new newspapers as they were knowledgeable 
with regards to the practicalities of a newspaper. Because of their experience they were also 
looked up to by many of the new journalists, and functioned as what Elizabeth Kier refers to 
as charismatic persons, individuals that have influence on organisational culture in an early 
phase of organisational history. 91 In this way there seems to have been a transfer of the 
puppet theme from the Derg newspapers to many of the newspapers emerging after 1992. 
In order to understand the initial adoption of the puppet theme and how it became a 
part of organisational culture of several of the post-1992 newspapers, it is essential to 
understand the relationship between the previous Ethiopian regime, the Derg, and its 
newspapers. The history of this relationship started in 1974, when there was a major 
watershed in Ethiopian history. Ethiopia's traditional administrative elite had been weakened 
through earlier coup attempts and was divided over the implementation of modernisation 
schemes. Student demonstrations, in addition to the imperial administration's inefficient 
89 Shimelis Bonsa, Sur' cv of the Private Press in Ethiopia 1991-1999 (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2000). 
90 "Teferra Will Soon Be Free, " Niqa 16 May 1995. 
91 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152. 
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handling of severe droughts, further prepared the grounds for a revolution. The Ethiopian 
Emperor, Haile Selassie, was brought down by his own junior officers in a creeping coup. A 
Coordinating Committee consisting of these junior officers, most of them Marxist, was 
organised, eventually totalling about 120 members, none above the rank of major. They came 
to be known as the Derg, a word that means committee or council in Amharic. 92 
After a short confusing period, the government took direct control over all the 
newspapers in Ethiopia. During their period in power, the Derg controlled the papers and 
often employed deliberate misinformation, including the puppet theme, in order to strengthen 
its cause. This is very different from the common sense of the subsequent period that makes 
newspapers fall back on a particular interpretation inspired by the puppet theme. However, the 
similarities between the adoption of the puppet theme during the first phase and during the 
second phase indicate that the Derg installed habits and entrenched the puppet theme amongst 
its journalists. As suggested by present day editor-in-chief of the Addis Tribune, Yohannes 
Ruphael, the puppet theme became repeated continuously amongst the state controlled papers, 
and any journalist that wished to write in a Derg newspaper had to know it, and it became a 
common strategy to put the blame on an external manipulator. 93 
It is important to note that the Derg's first use of the theme was probably not due to a 
direct wish to misinform; rather it was a result of disappointment and wishful thinking. There 
was some bewilderment amongst the new rulers as to what to do with the EPLF. In 1975 the 
TPLF came into being and caused more of the same bewilderment. 94 Both of these 
organisations in theory shared much of the Derg's ideology, Marxism. One view, originating 
early under the Derg and in the circles around Tefferi Bante, the second leader of the Derg, 
saw the EPLF movement as progressive. The TPLF was at this early stage not yet created and 
thus not commented upon. Bante's conclusion was that the EPLF had its origins in class 
resistance towards the ancien regime of Haile Selassie. 95 Bante and the Derg officers around 
him also held that the EPLF was confused: they started out as progressive but became 
controlled and manipulated by external forces, namely the Arabs and the Western countries. 
This became an explanation for the confusing fact that what they saw as a progressive Marxist 
organisation had chosen to fight their fellow Marxists in the Derg. 
92 Sometimes, written Dergue 
93 Yohannes Ruphael, "A Monumental Folly, " Addis Tribune 6 May 2004. 
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During the later phase of the 1970's, strategic interests also motivated the Derg into 
employing the puppet theme in their newspapers, and during this period there was a large 
growth in articles carrying such theme. The Derg was at the time attempting to get the support 
of other communist countries around the world. If the Derg managed to convince the Soviet 
Union that the EPLF was controlled by external forces, the troublesome pressure from the 
Soviet Union and the DDR to push the Derg to negotiate with their Marxist rivals might end. 96 
The Soviet Union's initial stand was that it would have liked to have peace between the 
Marxist EPLF, the Marxist TPLF and the Marxist Derg. They regarded all of them as 
ideological allies that could be employed in order to prevent American influence. The Derg 
understood that if the EPLF was shown to be controlled by USA, the Soviet Union's attitude 
might change. In the end the Derg were successful in getting Soviet support and benefited 
greatly from its friendship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union participated heavily in 
defending Massawa against the EPLF as early as in 1977-1978, and all in all the Derg 
received $12 billion worth of Soviet arms. 97 
The puppet line of argumentation now became repeatedly printed in various 
publications from the Derg's information service, the Ethiopian Resource and Information 
Centre (ERIC). Rebel organisations opposing the Derg were seen as part of an international 
plot to sabotage Ethiopia's progress. In the words of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam: 
Every time the broad masses of Ethiopia move a step forward, confirmed internal 
and reactionary forces, coordinated and abetted by imperialists have been 
hatching plots and openly confronted them in an attempt to block their path and 
force them to retreat two steps backwards. 98 
This line of argumentation also became a part of the Ethiopian press. The Derg's Ministry of 
Information and National Guidance published two daily newspapers: the English-language 
Ethiopian Herald, with a circulation of 6,000, and the Amharic-language Addis Zemen, with a 
circulation of 37,000. The Ministry also printed the Hibret, a Tigrinya-language newspaper 
published in Asmera that had a daily circulation of 4,000.99 The Ministry closely controlled 
96 Ibid., 43. 
97 Paul Henze, Eritrea's War (Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2001). 
98 Haile Mengistu Mariam, "The National Revolutionary War in the North, " (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information and 
National Guidance, 1978), 7. 
99 The Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) published the Serto Ader, an Amharic-language newsletter with a weekly 
circulation of about 100,000. Two other periodicals were the magazine Yekatit Quarterly and the ideological journal 
Meskerem, also in Amharic. In addition to this the Arabic Al Alem, the Berissa in Oromiffa, the Le Progres Socialiste in 
French (published on an irregular basis) and a last Amharic paper, Ye Zareyitu Ethiopia existed. 
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the contents of these publications, and the speeches of Mengistu and the views of the Derg 
were always adhered to. One example was a series of articles entitled "Eritrea then and now", 
running in the Ethiopian Herald in November 1976. The stated purpose of the series was to 
show how "progressivism" in Eritrea had become a tool in the hands of reactionary forces 
outside Eritrea, showing how the west and the Arabs controlled the rebels. 10° According to 
the Herald, the rebels "had become prisoners of those who finance their activities. " 101 The 
more hawkish amongst the Derg officers maintained that they had always been controlled by 
external forces that "from the very beginning were behind the scenes controlled and directed 
by the imperialist and reactionary Arab rulers", as Mengistu Haile Mariam concluded in his 1 
May speech, printed in the Ethiopian Herald in 1977.102 
Certain facts gave impentus to the puppet theme. Firstly, some of the organisations 
fighting the Derg had foreign support. It was common knowledge that the Ethiopian 
Democratic Union (the EDU), a rebel organisation fighting the Derg as well as both the 
TPLF and the EPLF, was backed by the United States. 103 The EPLF's predecessor, the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), had strong connections with the Arabs. The more Arab- 
supported ELF and the more independent EPLF managed to maintain an alliance for a short 
period around 1975, though usually they were enemies. Under the influence of strongly pro- 
Arab EPLF leader Uthman Sabi, there was an early period with some contacts between 
elements of the EPLF and the PLO. Later the PLO actually supported the Derg, but its 
previous support for the EPLF might nevertheless have created rumours. '04 Such facts might 
have influenced the Derg journalists, perhaps influencing them to overestimate the 
connections between the EPLF, even the TPLF and foreign powers. 
Certain events also made it more likely that the TPLF in particular should be seen as 
an organisation controlled by foreign powers or other organisations. The early TPLF lacked 
both members and equipment. Almost immediately after its establishment it made contact 
with the EPLF in order to gain support and some initial training. Two fighters, Yemane 
Jamaica Kidane and Mehari Tekle Mussie came from the EPLF to the TPLF and remained 
within the organisation. More importantly, they rose in rank and became relatively famous. '°5 
100 "Eritrea Then and Now, " The Ethiopian Herald 23,24,27 and 28 November 1976. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Mengistu Haile Mariam, "1 May Speech, " Ethiopian Herald 1977. 
103 Thomas P Ofcansky, and Berry LaVerle, Ethiopia, a Country Study (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress, 1991). 
104 Seifudein Hussein Adam, "Systemic Factors and the Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: 1961-1991, " in Ethiopia in Broader 
Perspective, Voluin 2, ed. Eisei Kurimoto Katsuyoshi Fukui, and Masayoshi Shigeta (1998), David Pool, "The Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front, " in African Guerrillas, ed. Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Curry, 1998), 24. 
105 Both of them had Tigrayan fathers, in this sense they were half Eritrean, half Tigrayan. Mussie was born in Tigray. 
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Mehari Tekle Mussie also became a link between the two organisations. 
106 Many of the 
original members had some connections with Asmara or other Eritrean cities because of the 
close trade and ethnic connections between the two regions. 
A specific event in July 1975 was a defining moment for press attitudes towards the 
TPLF: the Derg managed to capture one of the leaders of the former, Mehari Tekle Mussie, 
who had an Eritrean mother and had initially been an EPLF member. 107 The captors became 
aware of Mussie's Eritrean background and this was repeated in the press, also when other 
prisoners were taken. 108 Describing the TPLF as Eritrean bandits became a way of 
marginalising the organisation. By using the puppet line of argumentation, indicating that it 
was Eritrean not Tigrayan, the inference was that it lacked support from the locals and thus 
that it was small. As such the argument might have had a strategic value for the Derg, but it 
can not be ruled out that the coverage of the event was influenced by the lack of available 
information on the TPLF, as the Derg newspapers might have believed that the capture of 
Mussie really indicated that the TPLF was an Eritrean creation. Lack of information also 
probably continued to sustain the theme. The Derg press lacked information about the various 
conflicts between the EPLF and TPLF, how the EPLF supported the EPRP in the 1970's 
when the latter tried to destroy the TPLF. Also they lacked information on how the TPLF 
supported and cooperated with various enemies of the EPLF, such as the ELF and later 
Shagim, and the ruptures between the two organisations. 109 
However, as the Derg's problems grew, the frequency of their deliberate employment of 
the puppet theme grew. In order to explain how bandits managed to beat the Ethiopian army, 
in order to explain hunger during the reign of the Derg, one needed excuses. As a fearful 
eyewitness to this development, Yohannes Ruphael, present day editor of the Addis Tribune, 
writes: 
It was not until the emergence of the military regime in 1974 that Ethiopians were 
witnessing the esoteric art of political lying in its most sophisticated state. [so 
called] Reactionary elements and [so called] agents of imperialism were 
castigated for all the troubles that the military regime was facing - these being the 
most fearsome bogeymen bent on destabilizing the regime. 
106 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 586. 
107 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999). 
108 lbid. Mussie was eventually freed from captivity by a TPLF commando raid. 
109 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000). 
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He explains why: 
Since the new regime had chosen to tread the virtually impossible path of 
revolutionary socialism, however, it had to resort to shameless lies to legitimize 
its authority. That is precisely why it was being haunted by the specter of [so 
called] reactionaries and agents of the CIA who were disturbing its waking and 
sleeping hours. ' 10 
The employment of the puppet theme was thus a conscious strategy of the Derg in order to 
remove focus from their own mistakes, as well as a product of the lack of information on the 
various rebel organisation, and also, albeit at an early stage only, of the Derg's own need to 
explain why it had become enemies with the EPLF and the TPLF in spite of a common 
ideology. All these factors made the puppet theme a common one, repeated almost on a day- 
to-day basis in Ethiopian papers. On 14 October 1978, the Ethiopian Herald for example 
claimed that: 
Chinese complicity with conspiracies and plots by these die hard elements 
became an open secret. China has stocked the assassin EPRP group seeking to 
thwart the progress of mass movement, which is striving to rebuild the nation in 
line with scientific socialism. l l' 
And this line of argumentation continued. In an article published on 6 September 1984 the 
newspaper claimed that: 
Ethiopia's genuine desire to solve the problem of nationalities, however, had 
faced and still faces many problems. Most significantly, there is the problem 
created in the administrative region of Eritrea by the united front of separatists 
and imperialism. Eritrea itself is a home of many of Ethiopia's nationalities; in 
addition, the region has always been the core of historical Ethiopia. But since the 
region occupies a strategic place along the Red-Sea coast, the enemies of Ethiopia 
110 Yohannes Ruphael, "A Monumental Folly, " Addis Tribune 6 May 2004. 
111 Abiot Zeke, "Proletarian Internationalism or Nationalism, " The Ethiopian Herald 14 October 1978. 
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have waged struggles for centuries to bring this area under their hegemonism 
[sic]. ' 12 
The Eritrean movements were still seen as puppets controlled by external actors. The puppet 
theme also expressed itself in other types of media. Mengistu Haile Mariam spoke on Radio 
Addis of the "EPRDF as the tools of Shabiya". 113 As previously described, in 1990, while the 
Derg was on the verge of collapse the government-owned Addis Zemen even desperately 
attempted to convince its readers that the EPRDF had planned to give away large parts of 
Tigray. 114 The puppet line of argumentation had continued influence even during the last 
stages of the Ethiopian civil war. In 1991, the writer Jenny Hammond was for example asked: 
"Why do you bring Arabs? ", because the state radio had pressed the message that the TPLF 
was a puppet in Arab service. 115 
When the Derg fell, the regime's newspapers were either taken over by the EPRDF or 
were closed down. Journalists from the Derg newspapers were recycled when the Press Law 
of 1992 led to a surge of new papers, their experience being much in demand. However, the 
way the puppet theme became employed after 1991 was drastically different from its use 
before 1991. It now ceased to be used by the Derg as a propaganda tool, and indeed the Derg 
did not exist anymore. However, the theme was employed by former Derg journalists, as well 
as their new subordinates in new papers, the latter eager to learn from their more experienced 
Derg educated counterparts. Subsequently, it became adopted by newer newspapers that did 
not have any journalists from the Derg but were eager to draw on the older newspapers 
experience, and lacked alternative sources of information. 
Nevertheless, the puppet theme was thus not only a product of the inheritance from the 
Derg. Some of the developments after the takeover of power by the EPRDF also contributed 
to the entrenchment of the theme, namely the conflict between the government and the press 
and the failure of the new government to distribute information to the private press. As will be 
explored in depth, there was a malign spiralling process between the government and the 
oppositional press, driving each party to more extreme positions. One might again use the 
Tobiya as an example of such a process. The Tobiya was a part of what Bonsa called "those 
with an attitude of head-on collision with the government and, are, consequently, remote from 
112 "People's Revolution, a New Chapter, for Unity of Nationalities, " The Ethiopian Herald 6 September 1984. 
113 Mengistu Haile Mariam, "Eprdf as the Tools of Shabya, " in News (Addis Ababa: 1991). 
114 "The Tplf Mission, " Addis Zenien 11 November 1990. 
115 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999). 
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its sources of information". 116 Significantly, the government did nothing to improve their 
relationship with the paper, shunned dialogue and prevented its access to important 
information. The former editor of the Tobiya, Kiflu Mulat claims that 
The editorial office of the Tobiya newspaper which is one of the free press 
publications had over the past few years repeatedly requested more than thirty 
government officials over the telephone and by mail to provide them with 
information. Only three officials favourably responded to their requests. 117 
This interaction process seemed to have two important consequences. Firstly, as little 
information was forthcoming from the government, organisational culture, mainly inherited 
from the Derg papers, gave a large proportion of the available clues about to how to perceive 
a situation. This created habits that were invoked even when information was available, as for 
example in the earlier described case of the ousting of Tamirat Layne. Lacking information 
and influenced by the assumptions of the previously state-controlled Derg press, the first 
generation papers printed stories based on rumours, so imaginative that some oppositional 
newspapers even claimed that the EPRDF was indirectly writing the articles behind the scenes 
just in order to discredit the press. ' 18 Oppositional newspapers suggested that the Derg was 
launching major offensives as late as in 1994, and that several larger EPRDF units were 
annihilated in major campaigns in 1997.119 Many of them suggested that Ethiopia received 
substantial military support, including 50 tanks, which no other source ever confirmed. 120 
The newspapers printed stories with little connection with reality, which in turn made the 
government (over)react to curtail the newspapers, using out-of- proportion prison sentences, 
and in some cases even arson, contributing to a renewal of the malign process. 121 
Secondly, as described in chapter one, Kier and organisational theory claim that an 
organisation fighting for its survival will entrench its values. She claims that the culture of 
such organisations would be grafted into the members, that the values of the organisation and 
the individual would become more similar, as the lines between the organisation's members 
116 Shimelis Bonsa, Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia 1991-1999 (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2000), 35. 
117 Kifle Mulat, "Presentation" (paper presented at the Workshop for Journalist associations, Media Politicies and 
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118 "Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, " Tenager 8 September 1994. 
119 "General Haile Meles Encircles Debre Tabor, " Tobiya 29 December 1994:, "Government Troops Surrounded, " URJI 28 
January 1997. 
120 "General Haile Meles Encircles Debre Tabor, " Tobiya 29 December 1994:, "Us Support to Zenawi, " Siefe-Nebelbal 9 May 
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and the enemy become sharper. 122 She argues that "In short, the greater the hostility in the 
organisational environment, the greater the potential for organisational dogmatism. 99123 Many 
of the first generation newspapers were constantly in a hostile environment, constantly 
fighting for survival. 124 To depict the stories of conflicts between these papers and the 
government would take up almost an entire thesis in itself and goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, the Tobiya's organisational history might serve as an example; it was a 
history of suffering and of legal battles. To give some examples: fourteen charges were filed 
against the first Editor-in-Chief, Mulugeta Lule, during his first period in the position only. 125 
He was first fined birr 10,000 and released on a one-year suspended sentence. When 
Mulugeta Lule subsequently went into exile he was replaced by another Editor-in-Chief, Ato 
Goshu Moges. Goshu Moges did not fare any better than his predecessor; he was sentenced to 
six months in jail. 126 The replacement for the second Editor-in-Chief, Taye Belachew, was 
first detained for five days and then released on a bail of birr 5,000. Less than one month later, 
he was detained at the Criminal Investigation Department and released on a bail of birr 
10,000. The following legal battle was to entrench the puppet element even more. The 
Tobiya was fighting for its life, and the validity of the narrative of justification was 
emotionally important, being a justification for the fight itself. And the narrative was based on 
the puppet theme. Articles claiming that the EPRDF was controlled by Eritrea, such as the 
previously described "The Strategy for Re-unification of Mereb Melash (Eritrea) with 
Ethiopia" and "The Root of All Sprouted from this Land", were the cause of many of the trials 
the paper had to go through. 127 The paper had to protect the validity of the theme in order to 
sustain its self confidence. The theme had to be correct in order to convince the journalists of 
the paper that their fight was just, and that they needed to continue the fight. Some kind of 
justification was needed in order to motivate the journalists to endure. 
And their endurance was pushed to the limit. Taye Belachew spent seventy-seven days 
in the Central Investigation Department Prison. 128 Later, he was made to give a statement at 
the Criminal Investigation Department and was then released on a bail of birr 10,000. After a 
122 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War (Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
123 Ibid. 
124 "The Status of the Ethiopian Press, " Fiametta 20 October 1997. 
125 He had made statements to the police and was thrown to prison. Subsequently he was released after producing birr 10,000 
bail for each of the charges (totalling birr 140,000). 
126 He was imprisoned for two month and released on appeal. Moges was on another occasion kept in prison for two months 
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127 Published in Tobiya, Volume 4 (No's 11 and 12, respectively). 
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few months, he was again jailed at Addis Ababa Prison for seven months and, finally, 
released. 129 When the third Editor-in-Chief was in prison, he was replaced by the second, 
Goshu Moges. He was then detained for 30 days at the Criminal Investigation Department. 130 
The government and the Tobiya continued their legal struggle and the government became 
harsher and harsher towards the paper. The Tobiya did not experience an organisational crisis: 
it actually went through multiple organisational crises almost on a regular basis, it was in a 
hostile environment with many similarities to the environment facing the organisations 
analysed by Kier. The history sketched here is only a brief outline. The Tobiya was exposed 
to arson and had to change editors eight times before 1998.131 
As could be expected when taking into account the theories of Elizabeth Kier, this 
gave the editing staff of the Tobiya a highly closed social structure sharing strong beliefs, and 
often employing what Fred Halliday calls corkscrew journalism, self-referential journalism 
instead of active researching. ' 32 The locus of such self-referential stones became the puppet 
master, the Eritrean exploiter. The relationship between the Tobiya and the government was 
close to war, but the paper nevertheless managed to publish its issues regularly and to 
circulate them in relatively large numbers. The Tobiya's financial strength gave it the 
possibility to publish many issues and thus to circulate amongst a larger public. Moreover, the 
number of pages in each of the Tobiya's issues was so high that it had an increased resale 
value; this subsequently meant that it became more popular amongst the poor, as it could be 
resold for a higher price. The Tobiya was thus important: it was read by many, also by other 
journalists who subsequently quoted stories from them. Colleagues working in the papers of 
the first generation shared the same experiences and thus often held similar views. As late as 
in 1997, three out of the ten major adherents to the puppet theme, the Tomar, the Urji and the 
Tobiya, all had journalists in prison, indicating that the government had ongoing conflicts 
with a large segment of Ethiopian newspapers, that were exposed to similar organisational 
crises as the Tobiya was. 133 
129 He was fined birr 12,000 after having been found guilty of a previous charge 
130 He was then released when Tobiya presented 10.000 birr as bail. 
131 Goshu Moges was in 1995 again sentenced to a six-month prison term. The Tobiya then hired another editor. However, 
the new fifth editor-in-chief, Anthene Merid, was detained for fifty five days and was released on bin 5,000 bail. The Tobiya 
was also put under surveillance and exposed to illegal actions The sixth Editor-in-Chief, Taye Belatchew, was on July 5 
1995 detained without charge by civilian agents of the Central Criminal Investigation Department. The seventh Editor-in- 
chief, again Goshu Moges, who took up the post for a third time, was charged with committing two offences and was 
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Wolde Qirqos. 
132 Fred Halliday, Two Hours That Shook the World, September 11: Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi Books, 2002). 
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Illustration 4-1: The Prime Minister of Ethiopia attacking the press134 
Illustration 4-1, taken from the Ethiopian Register newspaper excellently illustrates their 
perception. Meles Zenawi is here seen attacking the press with an axe, he is wearing a t-shirt 
with the text "I Love EPLF", indicating his affiliation with the Eritreans. As shown through 
the quotes earlier, all of the above-mentioned newspapers came up with relatively similar 
explanations of new events, often based on the axiom of a malign puppet master controlling 
the governing party in Ethiopia in order to hurt the country. They also interpret their own 
suffering in a similar way, as a fight against the Eritrean dominated Ethiopian government. 
The recruiting patterns of the first generation of newspapers, the role previous Derg 
journalists had in their establishment, their lack of information, and their conflicts with the 
government entrenched the puppet theme as an element in their organisational culture. 
1 34 "Caricature, " Ethiopian Register 1 March 1997. 
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Organisational Culture and Its Influence 
The puppet theme, and an axiomatic way of interpreting new events based on this theme, 
dominated a large number of the Ethiopian newspapers. These newspapers had three things in 
common. The first was that they had recruited many journalists from old Derg papers; the 
second was that they had a troublesome relationship with the government. Thirdly, they were 
repeatedly denied information by the government. In this way they were exposed to an 
influence on their organisational culture from the organisations many of their journalists were 
recruited from, namely the Derg media, and, as suggested by Kier's theories, recruitment 
patterns influenced organisational culture. This organisational culture was also influenced by 
all the organisational crises that the conflict with the government created, entrenching it even 
further. In addition, the failure of the Ethiopian government to provide information made the 
organisational culture stronger: it was never challenged by information from the government. 
The recruitment pattern of the newspapers made them accept arguments that had been 
prominent in the Derg press and use them in their new papers. After all, many of their most 
experienced journalists had previously worked with Derg newspapers. The conflict with the 
government made them adhere to the axiom that the government was controlled by foreign 
elements, and this in a way justified the struggle of the various newspapers. The struggle 
against the government in many ways came to equal the struggle for justice and for Ethiopia. 
These factors entrenched the puppet theme and it became an element in the organisational 
culture of several newspapers. While there were differences between the newspapers, these 
factors contributed to the entrenchment of similar elements of organisational culture. 
The puppet element had a negative impact on the Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship as it 
put pressure on Ethiopian politicians negotiating with Eritreans and scared the Eritreans and 
thus ironically gave arguments to the more hawkish elements on the Eritrean side, which 
could point to intimidating articles in the Ethiopian press. Moreover it created doubt with 
regards to the various agreements that resulted from Ethiopian-Eritrean negotiations, as many 
Ethiopian newspapers argued that Eritrea de-facto had been negotiating with their own 
puppets. The Ethiopian press also failed to question the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, but rather 
indirectly pressured for an escalation. 
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The puppet theme did not cause the war. However it did contribute to the negative 
process leading up to the war. In this way the chapter provides clues to why the pressure on 
the Ethiopian leaders to "show their Ethiopianness", as expressed by Gilkes, grew so 
immense, with the private press arguing daily that these leaders were controlled by 
Eritreans. 135 
135 For the Ethiopianness quote seePatrick Gilkes, "Conference Proceedings" (paper presented at the Eritrea- Ethiopia 
conference, Institute of African Alternatives, London, 1 July 1998), 3. 
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Chapter 5: EPRDF, Haunted by Old Ideology 
This chapter focuses on what Ann Swindler defines as a special form of organisational 
culture, namely ideology. ' It explores how the old ideological assumptions from the Marxist 
era of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) were kept even after Marxist 
ideology had officially been rejected. The main argument of the chapter is that such 
ideological assumptions created a tendency to link the issues raised in negotiations with the 
former ideological enemies of the EPRDF with the issues raised in the negotiations with 
Eritrea, subsequently hampering negotiations with the latter and thus contributing to an 
increase in tension. 
Two key incidents will be identified. Firstly, in 1998 concessions to Eritrea were 
linked with concessions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both being perceived as 
bourgeois by several EPRDF members. 2 As a consequence, concessions to the IMF prevented 
concessions to Eritrea. This chapter will show how this happened, and how the rhetoric used 
when discussing the IMF Agreement/the border issue with Eritrea, two seemingly unrelated 
issues, was strongly reminiscent of earlier ideological discussions from the Marxist period of 
the EPRDF. 
A peace plan designed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1998, serves 
as a second example. The Ethiopian authorities hesitated about accepting the technical 
framework of the plan. Arguments not only circled around the practicalities of the plan, they 
also focused on a third party country that supported the plan, namely the United States. The 
rhetoric employed in the discussion around the Technical Agreement again echoed the 
rhetoric employed in the EPRDF's ideological discussions more than ten years earlier, again 
illustrating a linkage between old ideology and the Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiation process. 
Ideology, IMF and the Ethiopian Eritrean Negotiations 1997-1998 
The period from the summer of 1997 to May 1998 was critical for the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
relationship. The new Eritrean currency, the Nakfa, was at that time a hot topic in the 
' Ann Swindler, "Culture in Action, Symbols and Strategies, " American Sociological Review 5 1, no. 2 (1986): 279. 
2 Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
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Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiations. In the spring of 1997, the Eritreans asked to have both the 
Nakfa and the birr circulate in Ethiopia as well as Eritrea, and to have a one-to-one exchange 
rate between the two, but the Ethiopians refused. 3 As a consequence of the disagreement, the 
old free trade pact between the two countries, the Asmara pact, collapsed. 4 A new letter of 
credit arrangement was implemented by the Ethiopians, and trade between the two countries 
now had to be settled in hard currency (dollars). 5 Petty trade, allowed to circumvent the letter 
of credit pre-requisite, was allowed, but had to be under a certain threshold amount of birr 
2,000.6 
The Nakfa negotiations seemed to focus on Ethiopian-Eritrean relations only, they do 
not seem to be connected to the old ideology of the EPRDF. However, this chapter will argue 
that old ideology facilitated the creation of an issue linkage between the Nakfa process and an 
additional parallel negotiation process, the IMF/ Ethiopian negotiations. The chapter will 
show that this linkage was so strong that concessions to the IMF prevented concessions to 
Eritrea. Ethiopia's strict capital control, heavy restrictions on foreign investment and limited 
rights for farmers to own their properties were far from the ideals of the IMF, and the IMF- 
Ethiopian negotiations were troublesome. 7 As Joseph Stiglitz, at the time Chief Economist at 
the World Bank, observed: 
Meles [The Ethiopian Prime Minister] was having problems with the IMF. What 
was at stake was not just $127 million of IMF money provided through its so- 
called Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program (a lending 
program at highly subsidized rates to help very poor countries); but World Bank 
money as well. 8 
The IMF suspended the whole ESAF program on the 11 October 1997.9 There were 
hard internal discussions within the EPRDF, concerning both the IMF Agreement and the 
economic relationship with Eritrea. Alemseged Gebre Almak was at the time an active TPLF 
central committee member and heavily involved both in the discussions with Eritrea and with 
3 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 35. 
' Kinfe Abraham, Ethio-Eritrean History, Liberation Struggle, Statehood and Bilateral Political Economic Social and 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean War (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
Development, 2004), 99-117. 
5 "Effects of the Decision to Conduct Trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Us Dollars, " Addis Tribune 2 January 1998. 
6 Patrick Gilkes, and Martin Plaut, "The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, " Foreign Policy, INFOCUS 5, no. 25 (2000): 14. 
7 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: The Penguin books, 2002), 25-32. 
8 Ibid., 27. 
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the IMF. Amlak had a negative attitude towards the Eritreans, as he felt that previous 
agreements between the two countries had been to Eritrea's advantage. Nonetheless, he also 
felt that the discussions were influenced by other, more subjective, factors. He claimed that 
several of the high ranking EPRDF members discussing the two issues saw the IMF and 
Eritrea negotiations as connected, and that a concession to the Eritreans was indirectly seen as 
"a concession to the IMF, the global forces of capitalism and imperialism. "10 Alemseged 
Gebre Amlak's claim is supported by Sebhat Nega, former leader of the TPLF and today an 
important member of the TPLF central committee. Nega remembers the same linkages: "The 
struggle against the IMF was perceived to be connected with the struggle against Eritrea, and 
its bourgeoisie. " 11 The results were according to both Alemseged Gebre Almak and Sebhat 
Nega that the IMF's successes in pressuring Ethiopia made top-ranking EPRDF officials 
demand a harsher line towards Eritrea, constraining negotiation attempts, even when 
discussing the border. 12 
Admittedly, there were certain factors that could have made observers believe that the 
relationship between Eritrea and the IMF was very friendly and that a linkage between the two 
negotiations could be justified. Both the IMF and Eritrea promoted the economic system of 
Singapore as an ideal; they wanted an open economy in which foreign investment supposedly 
was to create growth. However, Eritrea was highly antagonistic towards the IMF. It saw the 
latter's programmes as a form of neo-imperialism and rejected any major deals with them. ' 3 
Eritrea was eligible for large-scale balance of payments support from IMF but did not apply for 
it. Eritrea's loans in the IMF sister organisation, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), also known as the World Bank, were small, Eritrea preferring Arabic 
banks. One of the reasons for the Eritrean politics was the wish to avoid donor conditionality, 
which was regarded as a form of interference and in addition as a sovereignty problem. Eritrea 
for example borrowed $ 125.4 million from the World Bank before 1999. In comparison 
Ethiopia had borrowed $ 3036.3 million. In many ways it was Ethiopia that was the IMF's 
most important local partner, even before the discussions in 1997.14 
A counter argument could be that if Eritrea and Ethiopia had remained in an economic 
pact and the free trade agreements between the two countries had remained valid, the open 
economy of Eritrea would have forced Ethiopia to adapt to the capitalist system. However, 
10 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
11 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
12 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
13 "Interview with Isayas Afeworki, " LA Times 9 March 1998. 
14 Grate Hansson, "Building New States, Lessons from Eritrea, " World Institute for Economic Research discussion paper 
(2001). 
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according to Sebhat Nega and Alemseged Gebre Amlak, the link between the IMF issue and 
the Eritrean issue continued even after the Asmara pact had collapsed and the former goal of a 
comprehensive free trade pact had been abolished. 15 Moreover, the link was even invoked 
when discussing pure border issues. '6 
Both Sebhat Nega and Alemseged Gebre Amlak were aware of the strange linkages 
between the two seemingly unrelated issues; they both stressed the old ideology, kept as an 
organisational reflex rather than a conscious element, as a possible explanation of the 
linkage. ' 7 As will be explored in depth later in this chapter, EPRDF internal ideological 
discussions had previously deemed Eritreans as a part of the global capitalist alliance. The 
TPLF, and some of its older sister organisations such as the ANDM/ EPDM had seen 
themselves as participating in a global struggle against capitalism, of which the Eritrean 
bourgeoisie had been considered a part. ' 8 The words used by the two respondents when 
describing the discussions are also interesting, resembling the old ideological phrases used by 
the two oldest EPRDF organisations, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) during their period as Maoist Marxist 
organisations. As will be illustrated later, words such as bourgeoisie and world capitalism had 
been used to describe the ideological struggle of the TPLF and its nearest ally, Albania, 
against the rest of the world. 19 Old ideological ghosts seemingly haunted the negotiation 
processes. 
The Technical Agreement and Old Ideology 
The linkage between the economic negotiations with the IMF and the negotiations with 
Eritrea could have been an isolated episode. However, a pattern is indicated by occurrences of 
similar linkages in the later peace negotiations, more specifically during the discussions 
surrounding the second major attempt to solve the war after it had broken out, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) plan. Again traces of old ideology influenced the 
discussion. 
15 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
16 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
17 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
18 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 16. 
19 Wondmu Yigzaw, "The Search for Ideology, Legesse Zenawi's Dilemma, " The Reporter 18 July 2001. 
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An exploration of the influence of old ideology vindicates a short exploration of the 
various negotiation attempts implemented by third party governments and organisations. In 
order to explain why the other peace attempts before the Technical Agreement failed to be 
influenced by old ideology, and why/how the Technical Agreement became influenced, the 
causes for the rejection of the previous attempts have to be established. 
The first peace plan, the so-called US-Rwandese Peace Plan of 3 June 1998, failed 
because Eritrea rejected it. 20 Eritrea claimed that temporary administration in the belligerent 
areas stipulated as Ethiopian in the peace proposal, needed to be handled with "flexibility". In 
addition, Eritrea also claimed that more details had to be worked out with regards to the 
composition of the suggested technical team that according to the proposal was to demarcate 
the border. 21 An Ethiopian air attack against Asmara airport, Eritrean distrust towards the 
United States and reactions to harsh Ethiopian statements also influenced their decision. 22 
Ethiopia, however, accepted the plan just one day after it was made public, allowing little 
time for an in-depth discussion within the EPRDF. The central organs of the organisation 
were involved only to a limited degree, allowing few possibilities for organisational culture of 
sub-groups within the EPRDF to have influence, because the main discussions of the 
Agreement took place amongst the leadership. 23 
The Eritrean rejection stopped the peace process, and it also stopped further 
deliberations over it within the EPRDF. The stage was then set for a new initiative, at the 68th 
ordinary session of the OAU in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. From 1 to 10 June 1998 the 
organisation decided to send a high level delegation. The high level delegation contained the 
heads of state from Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. The OAU's leader Salim 
Salim also participated. On 8 November 1998 the OAU came up with a clear peace 
framework. Both parties were supposed to withdraw from the contested areas, and the United 
Nations cartographic unit, together with experts appointed by the two parties, was to 
24 demarcate the borders. 
Nevertheless, the legal consequences of the third party demarcation and its exact 
conditions were not dealt with, nor were the events in Adi Murug included in the suggested 
examination of the events leading up to the war. 25 Eritrea first asked for elaboration. 26 After 
20 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 57. 
21 Ibid., 58. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 58-59. 
24 High Level Delegation The Organisation of African Unity, "Proposals for a Framework Agreement for a Peaceful 
Settlement of the Dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, " (The Organisation of African Unity, 7-8 November 1998). 
25 See appendix 1 
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the elaboration was received, the Eritreans hesitated. The Eritreans rejected the re- 
establishment of an Ethiopian administration in the contested areas. They wanted to drop the 
question altogether and put focus, as the Eritrean President put it, "on an expedient 
demarcation of the border, which will automatically solve the question of administration. " 27 
Ethiopia endorsed the plan on the 9th, while also asking for and receiving some clarifications 
with regard to the meaning of the text. 28 Ethiopia again accepted a peace plan just one day 
after it was made public, allowing little time for its discussion within the EPRDF party 
organisation. 29 Again, the involvement of the central organs of the organisation was limited, 
allowing few possibilities for the organisational culture of the rank and file officials of the 
organisation, including their former ideological tenets, to have influence. 30 
Since Eritrean acceptance of the plan failed to emerge, the Ethiopians now started to 
plan a major military campaign against Eritrea. On 23 February 1999, the Ethiopians 
launched operation "Sunset". 40,000 troops were deployed in the Badme area and 
participated in the attack. Eritrea was forcefully evicted from Badme. One of the most 
important Ethiopian demands had indirectly been fulfilled: Ethiopia controlled the area and 
could now re-create administrative institutions regardless of the Eritreans. The Eritrean 
negotiation position now became drastically weakened and the Eritreans now backed down. A 
letter from Issaias Afworki, dated 27 February 1999 and addressed to the president of the 
Security Council, was hailed by the United Nations as an informal acceptance of the 
framework agreement. 31 A vague modality agreement, based on the previous framework, was 
at this time designed by the OAU. On 14 July 1999 the Eritreans accepted this agreement, 
adding only a small point about economic compensation to Eritreans deported by Ethiopia. 32 
The Ethiopians accused the Eritreans of trying to change the initial framework agreement, 
hesitated, but on 21 July they also accepted the one page modalities agreement. 33 On 7 and 8 
26 Issaias Afworki, "Document 14, Annex Viii: Letter from Eritrean President Issaias Afeworki to H. E Blaise Campaore, 
President of Burkina Faso, Sent December 15,1998, " in Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents, ed. 
Walta Information Center (Walta Information Center, 1998). 
27 Issaias Afworki, "Speech to the OAU Central Organ Meeting, Ougadougou, " (Embassy of Eritrea to Sweden, 17 December 
1998). 
28 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 62. 
29 Walta Information Center, Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information Center, 2001). 
30 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 58-59. 
31 Walta Information Center, Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information Center, 2001). 
32 Issaias Afworki, "Document 26: President Issaias Afwerki's Remarks Regarding the Oau Modalities of 14 July 1999, " in 
Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents, ed. Walta Information Center (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information center, 2001). 
33 Walta Information Center, Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information Center, 2001). 
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August a technical arrangements' proposal, made in order to implement the modalities' 
agreement, was submitted by the OAU. It seemed that the war was getting closer to a 
peaceful solution. External actors such as the USA and the European Union now put heavy 
pressure on both parties to sign. The USA even sent a delegation, led by their special envoy 
Anthony Lake, to convince the belligerents. 34 
The Eritreans accepted, while the Ethiopian authorities again hesitated. This time, and 
for the first time ever, the peace proposal was discussed in-depth by the party organisation, 
including all the five major central committees. 35 In this way the discussion of the peace 
negotiations with Eritrea reached the depths of the EPRDF, it was exposed to all the central 
organs of the organisation, not only the core leadership; and, as will be shown, it became 
exposed to the organisational culture of various sub-groups within the EPRDF. The proposal 
was first debated by members of the EPRDF politburo, then by the Central Committee of each 
of the EPRDF member parties and finally by the council of the EPRDF. It led to splits in all 
the institutions, as anonymous former central committee members claim: 
The prime minister tried to turn every stone to convince the politburo of EPRDF 
and the central committee of TPLF into accepting the Technical Arrangement 
when his argument for the benefit of the arrangement was met by serious 
challenges. Then he advanced a rebuttal argument that not accepting the 
arrangement would annoy America and tough measures would be taken against 
36 
us. 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's argumentation would have made perfect sense if it 
had not been for the remaining tenets of old ideology within the EPRDF; he failed to grasp 
the mode of his own argumentation. The argument he used in the debate was centred on the 
pressure that the USA could put on Ethiopia if Ethiopia refused to follow the OAU plan. The 
Ethiopian Prime Minister's strategy seriously backfired. 37 The USA came up repeatedly in the 
discussions. The then president of Tigray, Gebru Asrat, stated that the USA's 
34 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 80. 
`s Walta Information Center, Chronology of the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and Basic Documents (Addis Ababa: Walta 
Information Center, 2001). 
36 Suspended central committee members, "The Sovereignty Agenda Is Not yet Closed, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
37 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
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recommendations of decreasing the defence budgets before the war had forced Ethiopia to 
become vulnerable. 38 Anonymous central committee members claimed that: 
It was not surprising America argued that we were fighting for a rugged plateau 
because our sovereignty was less important to them according to their global 
strategy. 39 
Rather than focusing on Eritrea, the debate became focused on the USA and its status in 
the global system. Negasso Gidada, at the time president of Ethiopia and also a central 
committee member of the EPRDF, claimed that the rejection of the Peace Plan "was a vote 
against USA, against world imperialism. " 40 Prominent EPRDF members like Dr Abdulmejid 
Hussein, the Ethiopian representative to the UN, even officially had to stress the prominent 
role of the OAU, and that the USA was not very involved after all. 41 United States and the 
struggle against global capitalism became the prevalent topic in a debate on a pure border 
issue. 
Importantly, the Peace Agreement was largely irrelevant for any plans on behalf of the 
United States to increase its power. Firstly, the OAU Technical Agreement contained no 
references to economic issues and could have been implemented with few implications for 
Ethiopian trade policies. If central committee members wanted to prevent the economic 
influence of United States they could have done so regardless of this Agreement. Secondly, it 
did not contain any paragraph that mentioned the USA by name, so in this sense it did not 
empower the United States. 42 The peace effort of the United States could have been motivated 
by the wish to encircle Sudan with regional allies of United States, both Eritrea and Ethiopia 
being viewed as such allies. 43 Nevertheless, the Technical Agreement contained no reference 
to the relationship with Sudan. If the American wish to encircle Sudan was the worry of the 
various EPRDF central committee members, it could also have been thwarted regardless of the 
status of the Technical Agreement. Moreover, the United States actually supported Ethiopia 
38 GebrLs Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
39 Suspended central committee members, "The Sovereignty Agenda Is Not yet Closed, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
40 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
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militarily during the conflict, according to Martin Plaut: the Ethiopians for instance had access 
to vital information from American spy satellites. 44 
Nevertheless many EPRDF members saw the plan as a plot by the United States. 
45 The 
Technical Agreement of the peace proposal was rejected by most of the organisations under the 
EPRDF umbrella. The central committee of the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation 
(OPDO) voted completely against the proposal. The central committee of the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) voted 100% against the OAU proposal. The Southern 
Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (SEPDF) central committee also overwhelmingly voted 
against the agreement, while the TPLF was split, with seventeen voting against, and fourteen 
for. 46 The rejection meant that the war had to continue until an interim cease fire agreement 
was signed on 18 June 2000. 
The linkage between the United States and the implementation of the Peace Plan 
seemed to make little sense. However if one examined the EPRDF's pre-1991 history, when 
the United States was viewed as the EPRDF's ideological enemy, the linkage becomes 
explainable. The discussion emphasising words like bourgeoisie and imperialism actually 
summoned echoes of the EPRDF's organisational past. Older TPLF publications for instance 
tended to label the USA bourgeois. 47 On several occasions this label was used for Eritrean 
traders and even the EPLF, creating an indirect linkage between Eritrea and the United 
States. 48 The perceived division between Ethiopia and the capitalists, including the United 
States, remained important for many EPRDF members. As claimed by ex-president Gidada: 
"Western powers can never be real friends, we cooperate as long as it's to our advantage, but 
their capitalist systems prevent friendship. "49 For many of the strongest opponents to the 
involvement of the United States, such as Negasso Gidada, Marxist-Leninism was still 
important, and they admitted that ideology played a role in their scepticism towards the 
United States, as well as the Technical Agreement. 50 Interestingly, many of the members who 
rejected the peace agreement, such as e. g. former Defence Minister Siye Abraha and 
Alemseged Gebre Amlak, later left the EPRDF en masse. One of the reasons given for 
leaving the organisation was its failure to guard its ideological heritage and that it was 
as Martin Plaut, "The Conflict and Its Aftermath, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. Dominique 
Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 102. 
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47 Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), "The Differences between Eplf and Tplf, " People's Voice 1986. 
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"becoming capitalist". Although they rejected Marxism, some of its tenets still were 
important to them. 51 
Marxism had been rejected as an official ideology as early as in 1991. Nonetheless, 
the factors described above indicate that the ideology from the EPRDF's organisational past 
merits a closer attention if one wants to explain important elements influencing the 
interaction between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
An Unsettled Period of Organisational History 
This chapter argues that, although rejected, previously held ideology influenced the 
negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As described in chapter two, Ann Swindler argues 
that ideological influence might continue even after the original ideology has been abolished. 
Ideology might become transformed into a culture based on institutionalised traditions and a 
shared definition of common sense. When the ideology is changed from a clearly articulated 
agenda into institutionalised rites and subconscious assumptions, the organisation goes from 
an unsettled to a settled phase. While the ideologically unsettled phase becomes a culturally 
offensive stage where culture influences new action instead of preserving old reaction 
patterns, the settled phase is reactionary and ideology is transformed into a culture based on 
institutionalised traditions and a shared definition of common sense. Such a shared definition 
of common sense, of enemies and of appropriate linkages becomes important in order to 
understand the results of the previously explored negotiations. 
Given the extreme importance of ideology in the early history of the EPRDF 
organisations, the importance of old ideology even after its official rejection is unsurprising. 
Marxism, more specifically the EPRDF's Maoist/Hoxaist version of it, had been a part of the 
TPLF, the oldest and the most prominent of the EPRDF organisations, even before that 
organisation had been created. The students who had formed the TPLF were educated in 
colleges and universities during the high tide of the international student movement, during 
the years from 1967 to 1974. Inspired by outside events such as for example the Paris and 
Berkeley student rebellions, the mass of students in Ethiopian universities became politically 
active; they were to change Ethiopia for ever. In Ethiopia politically active was synonymous 
51 Ibid 
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with Marxist. As Kiflu Tadesse, a member of the Ethiopian student movement in the 1960's, 
writes in his book called The Generation: 
In the years to come the militant group acquired a distinctly radical ideological 
orientation, which many of them felt and understood in Marxist terms. The 
activists had immersed themselves in the study of Marxist theory, driven by an 
intense desire to understand their own society as a prelude to changing it. 52 
Moreover, impulses from abroad were important: 
Students returning from abroad, where the student movement was in an upsurge, 
brought additional reading materials and ideas, all from the radical left of the 
politico- ideological spectrum. 53 
Randi Running Balsvik's research indicates the strength of the Marxist student movement; by 
1970 all the candidates for student elections were Marxist. 54 The men and women who later 
became the leaders of the EPRDF were a part of this movement. They participated actively in 
student politics, engaging in frequent theoretical discussions. Even Tigrayan secondary 
schools became arenas for politicised debate. The Agassey Comprehensive High School in 
Mekele was perhaps most important and became a fertile recruiting area for the TPLF. ss 
Nevertheless, it was the Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa, today named the Addis 
Ababa University, which was to be the political cradle of the future leaders of the TPLF, and, 
as will be shown later, also for a majority of the leaders of the TPLF's sister organisations 
within the EPRDF. 
There are several indications of continuity of the ideological assumptions carried by 
these students and the later assumptions held within the TPLF. The similarities between the 
discussions amongst the students that later became the leaders of the TPLF and the 
discussions taking place with regards to the Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiations taking place 
twenty to thirty years later is surprising. One such similarity was for example a focus on the 
52 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation (New Jersey: Red sea press, 1993), 45. 
53 Ibid. 
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negative role of the United States. The student movement in Addis Ababa had grown 
increasingly sceptical towards the United States. At the Haile Selassie University, the 
Americans ran the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Business and Administration; this was 
deeply felt by the students. As Kiflu Tadesse puts it: 
The American presence was now becoming dominant in teaching and 
administration, including the post of dean and vice president of the university. 
The Americanisation of the curriculum had done little to enhance the indigenous 
content of the subject matter, and little, if anything, of relevance to Ethiopia was 
taught. By then, an incipient hostility towards the American dominance began to 
surface. 56 
The American support for the Emperor and his conservative regime in Ethiopia was another 
reason for the hostility against them. The students saw the American support as hindering the 
modernisation of Ethiopia. 57 Moreover, the USA's war in Vietnam was a hot topic on the 
campus. 
58 
In the spring of 1968, a fashion show organised by a female Peace Corps volunteer, 
trying to show new western fashion design, led to the so-called miniskirt riot. Kiflu Tadesse 
claimed that: 
A hostile campaign orchestrated by the radicals drew a connection between a 
seemingly innocent affair like the fashion show and the underlying themes of 
cultural alienation and moral degradation, evils they attributed to western 
imperialism. 59 
The American vice president, the United States Information Service and the American 
Library became the targets of the rioters, and the two buildings were stoned. Moreover, 
Ethiopian students who had taken secondary education in the United States were named Jolly 
Jacks, and the politically active students claimed that they had been indoctrinated and could 
not be trusted. 60 The American flag was burned during riots. 61 
56 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation (New Jersey: Red sea press, 1993), 38. 
57 Ibid., 47. 
58 Ibid., 38. 
59 Ibid., 46. 
60 Ibid., 38. 
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132 
The support given to the Haile Selassie regime by the USA all reconfirmed the 
negative image the United States had on campus. The perceived negative role of the United 
States and the frequent use of terms like "world bourgeoisie" were to resurface thirty years 
after the incidents at Haile Selassie University. The words of Negasso Gidada in 1999, a claim 
for the need to vote "against USA, against world imperialism", would have been an entirely 
regular comment in the student elections of the late 1960's or early 1970's. 62 Similarly, the 
need for Dr Abdulmejid Hussein to stress publicly the unimportance of the United States in 
the peace process, resembles the need for any believable student candidate in the early sixties 
to stress that he/she detested the United States and had no connection with them, that they 
were no Jolly Jacks. 63 
Many of the future leaders of the TPLF experienced the politicised atmosphere of the 
Haile Selassie University during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Tigrayan students formed 
the Tigrayan University Students Association (TUSA), an organisation which was to supply 
the TPLF with its early organisational mythology. Future TPLF cadres got their first 
Ethiopian idols when the government, sometimes supported by the United States, tried to 
constrain the TUSA. Individuals like Tillahun Gizzaw, killed in 1969, and more importantly 
Meles Teckle, who was executed by the Derg in 1974, became important icons for the future 
leaders of the TPLF. Meles Teckle was elevated to legendary status amongst the students and 
later became regarded as a martyr by the TPLF. Ethiopia's present Prime Minister, who was 
originally called Legesse Zenawi, even took the name "Meles" in honour of the student 
leader. 64 During these years, the first organisational values were grafted into the TPLF 
structure which was a child of the student movements and was to share many values with 
them. 
The lives of the students were to change drastically. In 1974, a creeping coup ended 
the reign of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. A Coordinating Committee consisting of 
junior officers, the initiators of the coup, was organised, eventually totalling about 120 
members, none above the rank of major, electing Major Mengistu Haile Mariam chairman and 
Major Atnafu Abate vice chairman. They came to be known as the Derg, meaning committee 
or council in Amharic. Initially, the teachers and students, by now experienced in protesting 
against the previous regime, expected the end of the government's reprisals and freedom of 
speech and organisation to follow. However, the result was quite the opposite; they were not 
62 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
63 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation (New Jersey: Red sea press, 1993), Abdulmejid Hussein, "The Current Political Situation 
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allowed to demonstrate anymore. Moreover, student activists did not gain any influence over 
the Derg's decisions, although the Derg claimed to have the same ideology as them. 
The Derg implemented the Zemacha, a government scheme to promote primary school 
attendance, in which university students were sent back to their regions as teachers. Many 
students also left the university because of their general disappointment with the new regime. 
While taking up work as teachers, these former university students often tried to engage local 
pupils in political activities promoting the values of the university student movement. Such 
Tigrayan student-teachers became the nucleus of the future TPLF, and many of their local 
pupils became their first soldiers. 65 
The first stage on the path to rebellion was the creation of the Tigray National 
Organisation (TNO), which consisted of a combination of high school pupils and university 
students. 66 The TNO was created to function as a link between university students building up 
a military organisation and their supporters in the city. The military organisation in question 
was the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and was formed on 18 February 1975 in 
Dedebit. The early TPLF cadres had strong ideals influenced by their background from the 
student movement. As present day Prime Minister Meles Zenawi claims: "Their ideas were 
influenced by Maoism, and the idea that individuals like Che Guevara could transform 
society, that they could change everything through intensive political work as in China. , 67 
The strong theoretical focus of the TPLF was actually watched in amusement by the local 
Tigrayan farmers. Meles Asgede, then Tigrayan farmer, later TPLF soldier, told Jenny 
Hammond: "They had big sacks of books"; "they would spend twenty four hours reading, 
discussing and debating what the political differences between us and the junta were. " 68 Not 
surprisingly, the TPLF became organised according to its ideological foundation. The 
organisational structure of the TPLF was partly established during the fighter congress on its 
first anniversary on 18 February 1976, attended by all its 170 members. Aregawi Berhe was 
elected chairman of the organisation. The TPLF's organisation was then, as it still is today, 
structured fully according to a Marxist/Maoist model. The early recruiting pattern of the 
TPLF, mostly amongst students with Marxist leanings, its early organisational structure and 
the ideological motivation of its members meant that Marxism became the main ideology of 
65 Young estimates that 50% of Tigrayan teachers joined the TPLF between 1975 and 1978. John Young, Peasant Revolution 
in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 80. 
66 Ironically Young claims that the TNO became especially active in the summer months when the university was closed 
Ibid., 82. 
67 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 382. 
68 Ibid., 57. 
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the organisation. Moreover, this ideology was very strong, defining global capitalism, and the 
United States, as its enemy. 
Marxism was to become even more entrenched in the organisation through the years 
of armed struggle against the Derg and its various other rivals. During the TPLF's early years, 
the life and death struggle with the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and its predecessor 
Teranafit formed the culture of the organisation. These organisations were royalist rebel 
movements supported by the USA. This conflict was seen as a showdown between two 
different ways of viewing the world, and subsequently entrenched the TPLF's early form of 
Maoist/ Hoxaist Marxism. The TPLF's 100 fighters were unable to fight efficiently the 
estimated 10,000 men from Teranafit, so according to Young the only battle the TPLF could 
wage initially was an ideological one. Through emphasising the EDU/ Teranafit's 
conservative origins and its own Marxist identity TPLF justified the struggle, Marxism 
indirectly becoming the truth that justified the existence of the organisation, the reason for its 
existence and the reason not to defect. 69 The United States, the patron of the EDU, became 
viewed with even more hostility. In this way the arguments of the 1999-2000 discussions of 
the Technical Agreement would also have been very familiar to the rank and file TPLF soldier 
of 1978. The United States, supporting the EDU, was to them an easily identifiable and 
deadly foe. The EDU was seen as a part of the global imperialist strategy of the United States. 
As shown previously, to many TPLF members the United States remained an ideological 
enemy as late as during the Technical Agreement negotiations in 1999.70 In the 1970's the 
United States supported the TPLF's enemies; in 1998-1999 they provided the TPLF with 
valuable intelligence, they had by then also provided them both with financial as well as, 
albeit limited, military support .'1 
The tense phase of the late 1970's strengthened the ideological assumptions of the 
TPLF. Given the staggering military odds the TPLF faced in the struggle against these 
organisations, ideological motivation became important to keep the struggling TPLF together. 
Ideology became the motivator for individuals facing immense hardships. As Tesfay Atsbeha 
and Kahsay Berhe put it: 
I 
69 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
70 Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
71 Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 102, "Fighting for an American Cause?, " 
Habasha 5 September 1995. 
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The actual and feared losses caused mass desertions in the TPLF. Since the 
overwhelming majority of the TPLF fighters were either peasants or students with 
only rudimentary training and no experience of fighting, it was not surprising that 
they ran for their life, when many of their comrades fell in combat. Some TPLF 
Militiamen went over to the EDU and many fighters went to areas held by the 
Dergue. 72 
Soldiers with doubts had the tempting possibility of deserting the struggle and thus avoid 
these hardships. The TPLF fighters that stayed in the organisation were highly motivated and 
believed strongly in its ideology. Furthermore, when other differences arose, Marxism, or 
more specific the TPLF's Maoist-Hoxaist version of it, became the reference point for 
cohesion, becoming the principle that was referred to in order to decide right or wrong. Even 
in the serious hinfishfish [meaning chaos in Tigrinya] crisis in 1977-1979, the conflicting 
parties cited the works of Karl Marx as the standard of truth, the standard of justification. 73 
Other internal conflicts of the TPLF also became defined by its ideological origins. 
One of the themes in the conflict between the TPLF's first leader Sebhat Nega and the 
military leader Gidey Zeratsion, a conflict that led to the ousting of the latter, was the status of 
the Tigrayan trading class. The question was: were they allies or were they enemies? Their 
discussion closely mirrored the discussion between Kamenev and Lenin in 1918 and was to 
have great significance for the events that led to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. The result was 
that the comprador bourgeoisie were defined as enemies, as were the feudalists, though 
neither of the classes was clearly defined. 74 Interestingly, the discussion was indirectly tied to 
discussions of the Eritrean issues, and Zeratsion also argued for support for the EPLF. 
Zeratsion's opponents contradicted his views by defining many Eritreans as members of the 
comprador bourgeoisie. 75 The Eritreans, including the EPLF, were also branded bourgeoisie 
because of the military strategies they employed against the Derg. 76 Because of the EPLF 
tendency to operate with larger units instead of employing purely Maoist guerrilla tactics, the 
TPLF accused the EPLF of fighting a conventional, `bourgeois' military campaign, divorced 
72Tesfay Atsbeha, and Kahsay Berhe, Two Groups of the Tplf and Two Issues of Ethiopia Power Struggle and the Mllt from 
1979 to 1985 (2001 [cited 1 November 2002]); available from http: //www. geocities. com/haweltina/kahsay-u-tesfay. htm. 
73 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
74John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 115. 
75Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 1999). 
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from `the people' in its struggle. The TPLF members contesting the claim that the EPLF was 
bourgeoisie, including Zeratsion, lost the struggle and had to flee in order to survive, and the 
EPLF ended up defined as comprador bourgeoisie. The issue of the Eritreans as bourgeois 
was to surface again fourteen years later in relations to the parallel negotiations between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and the IMF. According to the witnesses Sebhat Nega and 
Alemseged Gebre Amlak, the two issues became linked through rhetoric claiming that 
Eritreans, like the IMF, were bourgeois, and thus had common interests. " The capitalist 
nature of Eritreans as such was seen as making them pawns for the international capitalist 
forces. 78 Again the rhetoric of the pre-1991 Marxist TPLF was surprisingly similar to the 
supposedly non-Marxist TPLF of the late 1990's. 
The ideology of the TPLF of the mid-eighties was to be reinforced by the day-to-day 
discussions at the front. In her book Fire from the Ashes, Jenny Hammond writes about one of 
these discussions: "Outside, sitting on a rock, two women fighters and three male fighters are 
in a heated discussion about the problem of petty bourgeois elements in fighters themselves". 
Jenny Hammond's TPLF guide commented "by wanting private things, by selfishness, and by 
working for personal advantages you show petty bourgeois element. , 79 In addition, during the 
early period of the TPLF's struggle, the organisation actively tried to control trade and 
merchandising, set prices and apply taxes. However, this developed into commodity shortages 
and such measures were reduced to a tax on luxuries and exports to Eritrea. 80 This trade 
involved taxing and controlling the Eritrean petty bourgeoisie in Tigray. 
The TPLF's own propaganda also entrenched specific views with regards to Eritrea 
and international politics. Together with other rival fractions, as well as foreign powers, the 
EPLF was placed in the bourgeois category. The rival rebel organisation the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) was described as Feudo-Bourgeois. Moreover, the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF) was again described as liberal bourgeois and the Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) as chauvinist and anti-revolutionary. 8' In this way the 
discussions of Eritreans within TPLF propaganda resembled the arguments described by 
Amlak when he participated in the negotiations with the IMF in 1997-1998. In both instances 
the bourgeois nature of the Eritreans were emphasised, again indicating a connection between 
previous ideological discussions and pre war decision-making. 
77 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Berhanu Nega, Interview, 1 March 2003. 
78 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
79 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 130. 
80 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 191. 
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The TPLF's propaganda also entrenched the Marxist ideology by connecting it with its 
own identity as the only correct Marxist alternative. The TPLF's anti-government propaganda 
stressed that the Derg was not really Marxist, but only opportunist. To them, the real 
alternative became the TPLF's Maoist/Hoxaist version. The founding of Malalite, or the 
Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT), showed the importance of Marxism as a 
reference point used to define the truth. The MLLT was an inner circle of the TPLF. It 
originated in "the Organisation of the Vanguards" from 1983, but was first initiated on 25 
July 1985.82 The MLLT was less nationalistic than the rest of the organisation, putting more 
stress on Maoist/Hoxaist Marxism. As John Young points out, and in contrast to the TPLF's 
own charters, nationalism was not mentioned amongst its stated objectives. 83 This inner circle 
was created to spread Marxism-Leninism through the world and "to engage in the bitter 
struggle against all brands of revisionism (Krutchevism, Titoism, Trotskyism, Euro- 
Communism, Maoism... )", engaging the TPLF in a global struggle, also with the United 
States. 84 
Ideology also became a powerful tool for internal rivalries between the TPLF leaders, 
a tool to exclude unwanted individuals. When a member of the TPLF was ousted, as for 
example in the case of Zeratsion, the justification was that he/she failed to adhere to Marxist 
principles. 85 While showing that opportunism could be important in the TPLF, such struggles 
also show the importance of ideology. Ideolgy remained the standard of justice; it was used as 
justification for imflikting punishment on members, it was so important that it had to be 
centrally controlled. 86 
All in all, until 1991 the TPLF was what Swindler refers to as an unsettled 
organisation. Its animosity against the USA was founded on ideology as well as the members' 
own experiences from their student days, and the organisation was fully aware of its 
ideological tenets. It was also an organisation that defined its enemies as bourgeois and that 
used the term to label segments of Eritrean society. 
82 Gidey Zeratsion claims that the planning started already in 1982. Gidey Zeratsion, "The Ideological and Political Causes of 
the Ethio-Eritrean War" (paper presented at the International Conference on the Ethio-Eritrean Crises, Amsterdam, 24 July 
1999), 3. 
83 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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84 Rich farmers were however regarded as allies; Ibid., 85. 
85 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
86 Tesfay Atsbeha and Kahsay Berhe, Two Groups of the Tplf and Two Issues of Ethiopia Power Struggle and the Mllt from 
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Ideology and the Organisational Allies of TPLF 
While the TPLF clearly is the most important organisation within the EPRDF, the EPRDF 
also consists of several other organisations. TPLF's major allies within the EPRDF, the 
Amhara National Democratic movement (ANDM), The Oromo People's Democratic 
Organisation (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopian Democratic Front (SEPDF) supplied 
prominent personalities such as Negasso Gidada, the former President of Ethiopia, the now 
imprisoned former Prime Minister, Tamirat Layne, and the present Minister of Information, 
Bereket Simon. It is therefore important to examine the influence of former ideology on these 
organisations. Arguably, all of them had real importance and influenced decision-making in 
the EPRDF, although in different ways. 87 
There were similarities between the background of the TPLF's leaders and the leaders 
of the OPDO and the ANDM when it came to ideology. The leaders of the OPDO and the 
ANDM had also been members of the so-called Generation, a term used about the Ethiopian 
student movement of the late 1960's/ early 1970's. Several of the leaders in both 
organisations had earlier been members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP). 88 The EPRP was officially founded in 1975, but was based on the older Ethiopian 
People's Liberation Organisation (EPLO). 89 This organisation in turn had its roots back to 
anti-monarchy Marxist cells organised in the sixties. There were many similarities between 
the EPRP and the TPLF, partly since both originated in the student movement. Future leaders 
of the EPRP participated heavily in the campus discussions that the future leaders of the TPLF 
had taken part in, they participated in the discussion surrounding the previously explored 
fashion show incident, voicing their opinion against American influence. They participated in 
the criticism against the Peace Corps, which was viewed as a pawn of American influence, 
and they rhetorically attacked students that had studied in the United States for being Jolly 
Jacks. 90 The words of president Negasso Gidada in 1999, commenting upon the Technical 
Agreement, his claim for the need to vote "against USA, against world imperialism", would 
indeed have been familiar rhetoric to the future EPRP members engaged in the campus 
discussions in the late 1960's, early 1970's. 91 The United States was at that time viewed with 
87 Mesmor Fante, Interview, 2 February 2003. 
88 Ethiopia Hizbawi Abyotawi Party in Amharic 
89 Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation (New Jersey: Red sea press, 1993), 201-39. 
90 Ibid., 46. 
91 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
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hostility. 92 The need to stress that the United States was not supporting a political project 
would have been similarly important for an EPLO cadre that wanted to be elected in 1973 as 
it was for Dr Abdulmejid Hussein during the peace process in 1999.93 As indicated earlier, 
there was a rhetorical continuity between the campus debates and Ethiopia's bilateral 
decision-making. 
Like the other organisations based on student recruits, the organisation chose Marxist- 
Leninism as their ideology of choice in its unsettled period. Their charter stated that: 
"The EPRP is the party of the working class. It is guided by the working class 
ideology of Marxist-Leninism. Its aim is to strengthen the unity and alliance of 
the workers and the Peasants so as to ultimately establish Proletarian Dictatorship 
in the era of Socialism. " 94 
From 1975 and onwards the EPRP entered into its most dramatic period when the 
organisation fell out with the Derg. In September 1976 the party had to take up arms after the 
Ethiopian military in practice declared war against it. 95 The EPRP now had to engage in a 
life and death struggle with the Derg and the TPLF. Like the TPLF, the EPRP needed to 
indoctrinate its members, to convince them about the merits of the EPRP's version of 
Marxism. 
However, the EPRP failed to recruit local farmers and slowly lost ground to the 
TPLF. The TPLF's major ally in the EPRDF, the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM), previously known as the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), 
originated in a splinter group from the EPRP. In 1981 this group rebelled against the EPRP 
leadership initiating a period that later became known as "The Bitana". 96 The EPDM took up 
many of the original rites of the TPLF, later even changing its name and becoming a purely 
Amharic party after the model of the TPLF, which was a purely Tigrayan party. 
97 The EPRP 
background ensured that EPDM leaders had many similarities with TPLF leaders: they were 
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educated, former students, often graduates from the Haile Selassie University in Addis 
Ababa. This, in combination with organisational Marxist propaganda employed to ensure the 
loyalty of the EPDM's soldiers in the harsh civil war, meant that Marxism also became 
entrenched in the EPDM organisational culture. 98 
The EPRP and its organisational values also influenced the Oromo People's 
Democratic Organisation (OPDO), a second large organisation under the EPRDF umbrella. 
This organisation is commonly said to have been based upon turncoats, prisoners of war, 
pointing to people like Defence Minister Abadula Gemeda and Kuma Demekesa who chose to 
join the rebellion against the Derg in exchange for their freedom. 99 However, through the 
Forum 84 organisation, which consisted of former members of the EPRP choosing to support 
the government, former Oromo EPRP members joined the OPDO from 1991 and onwards. 
Important leaders such as Ali Abdo, the former president of Addis Ababa city council, had a 
background from the EPRP. 10° Other OPDO leaders came from the EPDM. When this was 
turned into an Amhara organisation in 1991, the Oromo EPDM members had to leave the 
organisation and entered the OPDO instead. 
Organisational connections between the EPRP, the ANDM/ EPDM and the OPDO 
were thus strong. The three organisations had leaders that shared organisational backgrounds. 
Many of them shared common organisational experience through their EPRP background. 
Common organisational shocks, such as the government's prosecutions during the Red Terror 
in the seventies when the opposition was heavily prosecuted by the Derg, had a lasting impact 
on them. Nevertheless, their interpretations of the world were, with the notable exception of 
the nationalities' question treated in a later chapter, convergent with those of the TPLF. In 
short, this was a world view where traders were viewed with hostility and the United States 
viewed with suspicion. Arguments focusing on the fight against the bourgeoisie, against the 
world capitalism of the United States, against Imperialism, surfaced during the early years of 
these organisations, as well as the later stages of their organisational life, most crucially 
during the period 1997-1999. However, by then, all the EPRDF organisations had officially 
rejected Marxist ideology. 
98 For an exploration of the EPDM's relationship with Marxism, see Messay Kebede, "Marxism- Leninism as the Two 
Stages of Ethiopian Elitism-Part 2, " Addis Tribune 19 October 2001. 
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The EPRDF Becomes a Settled Organisation 
In 1990, the EPRDF rejected Marxism. This ideological transformation was far from a linear 
process. As late as in 1989 Meles Zenawi expressed admiration for Albania, but when he 
visited Washington in May 1990 he had renounced Marxism. '°' As late as January 1991, 
Ethiopian Workers Parties were established within the OPDO, the EPDM and the SEPDF. 
These were similar to the MLLT of the TPLF. The fact that these organisations seem to have 
been abandoned just a couple of months after their initiation illustrates the ideological 
confusion. 102 Nonetheless, during 1990 year the word Marxism was removed from the 
EPRDF party programme. 103 Observers like Sarah Vaughan noticed how the rhetoric changed, 
the new buzzword becoming "democracy". 104 
It is possible to see the rejection of the EPRDF's Maoist/Hoxaist Marxism as a purely 
tactical one. The researcher Paulos Milkias claims that Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister, had: 
taken a bold step of appearing to follow two lines at the same time - one 
capitalist, the other Marxist-Leninist. The first one is for the West which is 
important for its pecuniary values, whereas the second one is for his Stalinist 
hard core cadres, still loyal to MALELIT [Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, 
(MLLT)] that are crucial in keeping his base in Tigray. 105 
Indeed, within some sub-groups, as amongst the upper echelons of the OPDO, and within sub- 
groups of the TPLF, the move was seen as purely tactical. Former President Negasso Gidada 
never saw Marxism as a past phase of the EPRDF, viewing the capitalist phase as a 
transitional one that was bound to end in communism. In a comment to "Revolutionary 
Democracy", he characterised the EPRDF mix between capitalism and Marxism as: 
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.. a revolutionary democratic system may last a while or be short-lived, but it is 
not the same thing as bringing about a socialistic order. It is just preparing the 
conditions for a socialist system. ' 06 
However, within other parts of the organisation, such as the top leadership of the EPDM/ 
ANDM, the move was seen as a genuine one. To EPRDF members like the present day 
Minister of Information, Bereket Simon, or the now ousted (from EPRDF) Mesmor Fante, the 
latter clearly with no present interest in pleasing donors, the failure of Eastern Europe was 
seen as proof that Marxism had failed. 107 Bereket Simon claims: "Some were motivated by a 
perception that a third way, between capitalism and Socialism, based on Scandinavian 
models, was possible. "los 
The drastic economic changes implemented in Ethiopia, pushing it in the direction of a 
free market, indicate that the last group was powerful. According to the United Nations 
Development Program the political system in Ethiopia took a drastic turn and "moved towards 
market-oriented economy. "109 The private sector was accepted, and the regime also tried to 
mend fences with former enemies abroad, also drastic changes given their previous 
ideological stance. The EPRDF developed their highly complicated new ideology, 
revolutionary democracy, based on amongst others John Maynard Keynes. This ideology, as 
mentioned above, had parts clearly aligned with Marxist views, but was in part clearly also 
new, allowing more circulation of capital. The ideology of revolutionary democracy could. 
have been developed to please all the sub-groups within the EPRDF, but it was not developed 
to please donors. In fact the main book describing the new ideology, "Revolutionary 
Democracy", was never translated into English, so many donors lack in-depth information 
about the book until this day. ' 10 
The EPRDF seemed to consist of several sub-groups after the 1990 ideological 
change: a clear Marxist group, as well as a reformer group. Indeed later events confirmed the 
existence of at least two sub-groups with contradictory views on ideology. This manifested 
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itself in 2001, when several TPLF members left the organisation, partly because they felt the 
ideological heritage of the TPLF had been rejected. ' I1 
However, the rhetoric of the negotiations of 1997-98 and 1999 shows that Marxist 
assumptions were important outside the circles of pure Marxists surrounding Negasso Gidada. 
Criticism of the supposedly American plot against Ethiopia was launched by TPLF members 
who according to several respondents had abandoned Marxism, as for example the then 
president of Tigray, Gebru Asrat. 112 Many of the old ideological assumptions actually 
remained in the EPRDF, even within the sub-groups that rejected Marxism. In "Revolutionary 
Democracy", published first in 1999, typical Marxist argumentation remains in use with the 
present day Prime Minister Meles Zenawi talking about the indoctrination of cadres and of 
cadre schools and using many other terms taken from dialectic materialism. "3 "Revolutionary 
Democracy" and the TPLF's earlier Marxist-Leninism had other similarities. As in the early 
Soviet system, the elite, the bolshevists, was to rule Ethiopia. Therefore the good leaders 
should be taken care of and the elite had to be in charge. The next generation elite, the cadres, 
were to be indoctrinated in Marxist/ Revolutionary Democratic ideology. 114 Similarly, other 
Marxist assumptions were kept within the organisation, one of them being scepticism to 
property rights. In 2001, when the disagreement within the TPLF and the EPRDF broke out, 
and twelve top ranking members left the TPLF central committee meeting in protest, the 
resulting discussion also showed the importance of old Marxist rhetoric and assumptions 
when Prime Minister Meles Zenawi used the term "Bonapartism" borrowed from Marx to 
label his opponents. 115 As Messay Kebede remarks, his choice of words, when he only wanted 
to denounce corruption and autocracy, becomes strange if not seen in the light of the TPLF's 
old ideology. ' 16 
There were thus massive signs that old ideological assumptions still had influence 
even beyond the EPRDF groups still adhering to Marxism, and that even reformists such as 
Meles Zenawi and Gebru Asrat were influenced. Parts of the organisation were settled in the 
sense that it kept the old ideological phrases and assumptions unconsciously, parts of the 
organisation even kept them consciously. Given this, it was hardly surprising that old 
111 Elisabeth Verdier, Who Is Who, Ethiopias 100 Most Important Persons (Paris: Eastern Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2002), 1- 
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ideological assumptions had influence on decision making, even when it came to bilateral 
relations such as the relationship with Eritrea. The in-depth discussion of the Technical 
Agreement in 1999 opened up possibilities for the influence of several sub-groups within the 
EPRDF, sub-groups that still adhered to the old Marxist Maoist ideological tenets that the 
organisation officially had rejected, both settled sub-groups, as the group around Gebru Asrat, 
and unsettled groups, as the group around president Gidada. 
Moreover, sub-groups, both unsettled and settled, kept scepticism towards the western 
democracies, which were defined as the Enemy. They could be temporary partners when it 
was deemed necessary, but to many members of the TPLF they were eternal enemies because 
of their ideological system. 117 A large group of EPRDF mid -level cadres viewed the United 
States as an enemy even after the latter in theory became Ethiopia's main ally and partner. 118 
Furthermore, some classes still had to be controlled or quelled. One such class was the 
bourgeoisie, of which the Eritreans were to become a symbol. The Eritreans as a trading class 
were highly visible in Tigray. This was partly a result of the Italian investment in Eritrea, as 
Kjetil Tronvoll states: "The (Eritrean) economy was monetised; a small working class was 
established; law and order was established; and there was a marked distinction in material 
well-being between the Tigrinya in Eritrea and the Tigrinya in Ethiopia. " 119 Eritrean traders 
functioned as exporters for Ethiopian goods, a fact that created many conflicts and 
disagreements with accusations of misbehaviour as early as in 1992. The terms comprador 
bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were central in the discussions on the subject. TPLF 
officers were framed by their own organisational background: the two categories were seen as 
enemies of the system and the Eritrean traders were defined as members of these classes. 120 
In 1997-1998, the IMF agreement was viewed as giving in to the capitalists and the Eritrea- 
Ethiopian negotiations became defined by a wish to avoid another ideological defeat, namely 
giving in to the Eritrean petty bourgeoisie, suffering an additional defeat against capitalism. 121 
The hostility towards Eritrea was thus not necessarily directed against Eritreans, it was also a 
product of the existence of an important Eritrean petty bourgeoisie that the old organisational 
assumptions defined as the enemy. This created the issue linkages described by Amlak and 
Nega: one had to avoid an additional defeat by the global bourgeoisie. 122 The IMF and Eritrea 
1 17 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Tekeste Negash and Kjetdl Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 8. 
120 Ibid. 
'2' Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
122 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
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were linked, although the latter was actually highly sceptical to the former. Geographical 
concessions to Eritrea were linked to the concessions to the IMF, and the concessions to the 
IMF were seen as too large to allow additional sacrifices to a global bourgeoisie, of which the 
Eritrean petty bourgeoisie was a part. 
Correspondingly, although the United States was officially an ally of Ethiopia, it was 
perceived as a hostile state. 123 Even though the USA had little practical influence on the details 
of the OAU plan itself, a plan that focused on the border issue and avoided ideological or 
economical issues, major segments within the EPRDF reflexively viewed the USA's attempt 
negatively. American efforts to facilitate peace became counterproductive, hindering peace 
instead. The continuity between the arguments used by later EPRDF members in their 
ideological discussion in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's and the discussions around the 
Technical Agreement indicate that former ideological assumptions still played a role. 
A Ghost from the Past influenced Decision-making 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's the campus of Haile Selassie University as well as the 
secondary schools of Tigray vibrated with political activity, and the future leaders of the most 
important political organisations got their baptism of fire in student politics. Themes like the 
United States' negative role in Ethiopian Politics as well as the status of the bourgeois were 
important in the student discussion. As in the European universities, Marxism and Marxist 
themes formed the discussions. However, surprisingly these themes surfaced again during the 
IMF negotiations as well as during the discussion surrounding the Technical Agreement. The 
rhetoric was employed regardless of the role change of United States from an enemy 
supporting the old regime to an ally supporting the EPRDF regime. 
Similarly, the discussions taking place within TPLF during the eighties carried the 
same themes. The big political showdown within the TPLF, the struggle between Sebhat Nega 
and Gidhey Zeratsion, had many similarities with the discussion surrounding the IMF 
negotiations in 1997-1998. The latter became linked with the Eritrean issue because of 
Eritrea's supposedly bourgeoisie status; in the former discussion, the issue of the EPLF's 
status as bourgeoisie was also an issue. The participants maintaining that Eritreans were 
comprador bourgeoisie won the day in this discussion, creating a linkage to the discussions in 
'23 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
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1997-1998, in which the IMF and Eritrea were seen as allies because of their presumed 
bourgeois status. 124 
Marxist assumptions were clearly a part of the discussions amongst the Ethiopian 
students of the late 1960's and the early 1970's. They were also clearly a part of the 
discussions within TPLF of the 1980's. These Marxist assumptions were officially rejected in 
1990. However, as indicated by Swindler's concepts of settled and unsettled periods, ideology 
might influence decision-making even after it has been rejected: it could become 
organisational culture. Marxist rhetoric remained important, so important that it influenced the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiations. The Eritreans were seen as bourgeois and indirectly allied to 
the IMF, even though the former viewed the latter with large scepticism. Concessions to the 
IMF made it harder to give concessions to Eritrea, even when such concessions were related 
to the demarcation of the border rather than financial issues. Likewise, the old ideological foe 
of many of the EPRDF members, the United States, was still regarded as a foe, although it 
now supplied Ethiopia with intelligence and, albeit to a less extent, arms. Their initiative to 
push the Technical Agreement thus proved counterproductive, leading to a re-emergence of 
the old pre-1991 rhetoric and strong hostile attitudes towards the Agreement. 
Organisational culture, in the form of the remains of an old ideology, had a dramatic 
impact on the negotiation processes, leading to two failed negotiation rounds, rounds that, if 
they had been successful, could have saved tens of thousands of lives. Again a focus on 
organisational culture highlights vital processes leading to the war, and even prolonging it. 
The EPRDF was haunted by a ghost from its past, a ghost from its unsettled phase. 
12' John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 115. 
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Chapter 6: ANDM and TPLF, from Guerrilla Movements to Political 
Parties 
Two of the organisations within the EPRDF, namely the Tigray People's Liberation Front 
(TPLF) and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), were originally guerrilla 
movements fighting in a civil war. As within other guerrilla organisations, the extreme 
conditions of a civil war meant that certain standard operational procedures focusing on 
secrecy and security had to be developed for self-protection. However, this chapter will argue 
that such procedures influenced EPRDF decision-making long after the EPDM and the TPLF 
had transformed themselves from guerrilla organisations into political parties. 
As will be shown later in this chapter, the EPRDF manifested a behavioural pattern of 
secrecy and a pattern of acting reflexively in a heavy-handed way towards perceived threats. 
Firstly, an old tradition of secrecy seemed to have been transferred from the guerrilla 
organisations to the political parties. This tradition manifested itself in a systematic failure to 
provide information, both to its own members and to the Ethiopian public. Subsequently, the 
EPRDF's traditions of secrecy allowed rumours damaging to Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship 
to circulate. Secondly, the tradition of putting emphasis on security was kept, even after the 
organisations turned from military fractions into political parties, manifesting itself in a 
marked tendency to act swiftly in order to maintain security. In doing this, the government 
had an inclination to impose sentences seemingly out of proportion with the offences 
committed. ' The chapter argues that this also influenced Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiations; 
when the EPRDF discussed Eritrean-Ethiopian affairs, it tended to focus on security measures 
rather than mediation strategies. 
1 In 1996, Garoma Bekele, the publisher of the newspaper Urji, for example, had to pay bin 10,000 (USS 1,600), a substantial 
amount in a country where a good monthly wage is around birr 800, after being accused of disseminating false information. 
The stoºy that he was prosecuted for seemed to be trivial, describing new taxation imposed on peasants in Oromiya Regional 
State. International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Ifex Alerts 3 Januar} 1996,13, and 12 December 1995 (International 
Freedom of expression exchange, 1996 [cited 14/03 2005]); available from http: //www. ifex. org/es/content/view/full/3337/. 
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The Cult of Secrecy 
The government has nonetheless preferred to remain silent; this silence has led 
many to suspect that government officials holding key positions have a hidden 
agenda which they do not want to be made public. Many believe the issue must be 
a leading public agenda. 2 
This quotation, taken from an article in the newspaper the Tobiya, excellently illustrates one 
of the main points of this chapter, namely how the Ethiopian government in several instances 
chose to remain silent, even when such a silence hurt their own interests, and subsequently 
how this silence created rumours, also rumours with the potential to spark conflict with 
Eritrea. 
The EPRDF showed a marked tendency to fail to disperse information and to keep 
even trivial information secret, often leading to speculations about hidden agendas. As 
explored in chapter four, oppositional papers like the Tobiya had problems getting 
information from the government. 3 However, even more moderate papers experienced these 
problems. The Reporter, one of Ethiopia's largest papers, should have had excellent channels 
to the inner circles of the TPLF. Its editor-in-chief, Amare Aregawi, had previously been a 
high-ranking TPLF official, responsible for the TPLF propaganda bureau. 4 After the fall of 
the Derg, Amare Aregawi became an Ethiopian TV general manager. Amare was then made a 
head of the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) in 1994. He became regarded as a top EPRDF 
official among the diplomatic circles in Addis Ababa, but also as an enemy of the new 
oppositional papers. After a demotion Aregawi subsequently resigned and then started to 
work in the private press. 5 Aregawi still kept his connections from the ENA and from his 
guerrilla days in Tigray, and this gave him access to the inner circles of the EPRDF. 
Moreover, even though the paper later became oppositional, during the period of 1995 to 
1997 the paper remained an ardent supporter of the government and retained the sympathy of 
the EPRDF. Even the Reporter experienced problems when it wanted information. The 
Reporter was worried about this, fearing the impact of rumours created by the lack of 
information, also with regards to the Eritrean-Ethiopian relations. 6 When Ethiopian Prime 
2 "The Nationality of Thousand Eritreans Is Put to Question", " Tobiya 29 August 1996. 
3 See for example "Editorial: The Freedom of Information in Contemporary Ethiopia, " Tobiya 10 August 1995. 
Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 24. 
s "Veteran Quits Ena, " The Indian Ocean Newsletter 17 December 1994. 
6 Amare Aregawi, Interview 2002. 
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Minister Zenawi visited Asmara, the Reporter for instance claimed that: "It would however be 
much better if the outcomes of the Prime Minister's visits were announced openly instead of 
leaving the public to keep on assuming and speculating in the dark. "7 When rumours about 
the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea with regards to trade started to emerge, the 
Reporter complained that: 
Only recently, his [Meles Zenawi] explanations of the post currency-change 
Ethio-Eritrean relations were not clear either. All he said was that there are 
differences which would be solved through discussion as usual. And so it seems 
we are left at the mercy of rumours and hearsay to learn about an issue that 
concerns us deeply. 8 
The Reporter clearly felt that the government had a tendency for secrecy, creating rumours 
that could generate conflicts. 9 Other moderate papers, as for example the Addis Tribune, were 
equally worried. The Addis Tribune was usually on very friendly terms with the 
government. 10 Nevertheless, the Tribune had great problems getting information, even when 
they wanted to explore relatively trivial issues: 
The GDP is kept secret, arable land not occupied by peasants is kept secret, [the 
number of] farmers with only one ox is kept secret, government subsidies for 
fertilizer and other commodities, population characteristics, actual current and 
capital expenditures by purpose, including national defence, government budget 
deficit, external debt and arrears by creditor, money supply, inflation, foreign 
reserves and their composition by currency, IMF and world-bank loans, bilateral 
loans and grants, franco valuta imports, details on foreign exchange auctions, the 
amount of birr issued in Eritrea, exports to and imports from Eritrea, actual 
government expenditure by region, bank credit by borrower and type of activity, 
etc... They are all kept secret. ' 1 
7 "No Need for Secrecy, " The Reporter 13 November 1995. 
8 "A Trend of Non-Transparency, " The Reporter 14 January 1997. 
9 Amare Aregawi, Interview 2002. 
10 The Addis Tribune had a clash with the EPRDF. On 24 January 1994 the Tribune's founding father and first editor Tamrat 
Bekele, was detained for questioning. However, this remained an isolated incident. The government was usually on exceiler. t 
terms with the Tribune. When Tamrat Bekele died in 2000, the Ministry of Information for example wrote a very positive 
obituary for him. When the Tribune celebrated its ten years anniversary in 2002 they got flattering comments from the 
government. "Celebrating Addis Tribune's Tenth Anniversary, " Addis Tribune 30 August 2002, "Tamrat Bekele (Chairman 
Ceo of Tambek International Ltd) April 24/1944 - June 02/2000, " Addis Tribune 2 June 2000. 
11 "The Stranglehold on the Flow of Information in Ethiopia, " Addis Tribune 2 July 1995. 
150 
It seems fair to say that the number of farmers with one ox has little relevance to national 
security, so the focus on secrecy went far beyond what was demanded by national interest, 
inviting ironic comments from the press. In fact, the Tribune found the situation tragic-comic; 
they clearly saw that the culture of silence manifested itself even within the government, and 
that it damaged the EPRDF itself. The paper claimed that "Information exchange does not 
function, the Ministry of Finance must wait for days in order to get information from the 
Ethiopian Privatization Agency. " 12 As expressed by another weekly, The Ethiopian Press 
Digest: 
The first thing a government employee does when asked for some information 
these days is to check as best he could on the ethnic origin of the enquirer, the 
second thing he would try to find out is whether the guy looks like somebody who 
may have connections with any political group whatsoever. If the employee 
begins to have some rather anxious hunches about these attributes, the snap reply 
would be: we have no such information. If he somehow feels that the enquirer is 
somebody that could be brought into his confidence, then the reply might be: We 
do have information, but it is confidential. So you've got to get me a green light 
from my boss who's next door. Invariably the boss's answer is: It's absolutely 
confidential. 13 
The claims from these four different papers, with different backgrounds and political stands, 
The Reporter, The Tribune and The Press Digest even on relatively friendly terms with the 
government, clearly indicates the existence of a cult of secrecy in the EPRDF and within the 
state structures controlled by them. 14 The EPRDF kept even trivial information secret. 
It can be argued that this cult of secrecy was intended as a strategy to decrease public 
respect for the press, as the press became less and less accurate because of the lack of 
information. However, as suggested by the above newspapers, the cult hurt the EPRDF itself, 
as it hindered an effective dissemination of information within the organisation. Moreover, 
12 "Information Generation and Exchange at Low Ebb in Ethiopia, " Addis Tribune 17 April 1998. 
13 Gote Hansson, The Ethiopian Economy 1974-94: Ethiopia Tikdem and After (London: Routledge, 1995). 
14 For more examples of the private press and their encounter with the cult of secrecy se for example: "Secrecy Must Make 
Way for Transparency, " Zeggabi 8 April 1998. 
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the negative effects of the cult was even felt and feared by many of the EPRDF members 
themselves, indicating that it was far more than just a strategy in order to deal with the press. 
'5 
Ethiopian actions to support Eritrea defensively against Yemen serve as an excellent example 
of the effects of the cult of secrecy even within the EPRDF organisation. In 1995, Eritrea and 
Yemen clashed over a group of islands in the Red Sea. Yemen approved the construction of a 
hotel on the contested islands. When the construction started Eritrea deployed troops and a 
minor clash followed. 16 This conflict was solved peacefully, with Eritrea accepting an 
international verdict that granted most of the Islands to Yemen. At the time Ethiopia sent an 
anti-aircraft brigade in support of Eritrea. 17 It is worth noting that information about the 
Ethiopian move was not dispersed within the ruling party of Ethiopia; large segments of the 
EPRDF leadership were not informed about it. Negasso Gidada, who after all was President 
of Ethiopia at the time, was not informed. 18 The EPRDF also failed to inform Zeray 
Askedom, the EPRDF leader of the foreign relations committee in the Shengo, the Ethiopian 
Parliament. 19 It can be argued that Negasso Gidada and Zeray Askedom were left out of the 
information chain because they lacked access to the inner circles of the TPLF, the most 
politically important of the EPRDF's various organisations. 20 Both Negasso Gidada and Zeray 
Askedom were non-Tigrayans, and thus not members of the TPLF, and this could also have 
prevented them from getting information. However, even members of the inner circles of the 
TPLF were left in the dark. Sebhat Nega, the former leader of the TPLF, and an important 
central committee member, clearly a member of the core group of the EPRDF, was not 
informed. 21 The ambassador to Eritrea, and relatively powerful central committee member of 
the TPLF, Aw-Alom Woldu was even kept in the dark when Ethiopia decided to lend Eritrea 
birr 1.2 million. 22 Thus the cult of secrecy manifested itself even within the top echelons of 
the TPLF. Low-level party officials got even less information and had to trust the oppositional 
press or locally circulated rumours if they wanted information about relatively important 
events. 
The lack of information had serious implications for the Eritrean-Ethiopian Relations. 
15 Mesmor Fante, Interview, 2 February 2003, Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003. 
16 Martin Plaut, "Yemen and Eritrea: Friends Once More?, " Review of African Political Economy 25, no. 7 (1998). 
17 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
18 Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
19 Zeray Askedom, Interview, 3 December 2002. 
20 Leenco Lata, "Ethiopia: The Path to War, and the Consequences of Peace, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 38. 
21 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
22 "Tplf, Eplf and Why Peace Eludes Them, " The Reporter 16 April 2005. 
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Firstly, low level civil servants failed to give adequate information to the civilian population, 
sometimes sparking negative rumours about Eritrea, rumours again leading to tension 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. There were many incidents demonstrating this, amongst them 
the Adigrat incident of 1997, in which 700 prostitutes and beggars were forcefully removed 
from Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, as well as from Assab, one of the largest Eritrean ports. 23 
Some of them were moved to Adigrat, one of the larger cities in Tigray. According to 
Muluwork Kidanemariam, then college lecturer in Tigray and consultant for the TPLF, 
residents of Adigrat were informed about the event by the prostitutes and beggars themselves, 
giving the locals a rather skewed picture of the situation. The local Kebele (municipality 
leaders) of the TPLF became furious over the presumed Eritrean deportation of what they 
believed to be Tigrayan waitresses and cleaning maids. The TPLF centrally failed to provide 
information and counter arguments. The issue was raised in various meetings between the 
lower TPLF leaders and the President of Tigray, Gebru Asrat, and led to harsh criticism of 
him and a demand for a straighter line of policy towards Eritrea. 24 Moreover, several popular 
actions against Eritrean merchants took place just after the incident; all of them were reported 
to the Eritrean President, souring the already tense relations between the two countries. 25 The 
EPRDF's failure to provide information thus directly contributed to the bilateral tension 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 26 Important information was kept secret, and although the 
secrecy clearly hurt the TPLF, a cult of secrecy manifested itself. 
Secondly, it was also to have an indirect effect on the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship 
through its effect on Ethiopian newspapers. As suggested by all of the above-mentioned 
Ethiopian newspapers, the EPRDF tradition for silence allowed rumours to circulate amongst 
the Ethiopian elite. 27 This could have paved the ways for the influence of the organisational 
culture of the newspapers described in chapter four. Newspapers like the Tobiya became 
more important when they became the only source of information, commenting upon events 
that the cult of secrecy prevented the government from informing about. As suggested by the 
Reporter's editor, Amare Aregawi, this actually empowered the oppositional newspapers, as 
23 Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003, "Abduction of Ethiopians at Assab, " Tomar 5 November 1997. 
24 Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
25 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com'Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
26 Several EPRDF leaders dealing with border questions such as Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, a powerful central 
committee member, and Yemane Jamaica Kidane, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, claim that popular pressure for tough 
measures against Eritreans put a heavy pressure on Gebru Asrat, the regional president of Tigray, and the other top TPLF 
leaders stationed in Tigray. See the next chapter 
2' "Editorial: The Freedom of Information in Contemporary Ethiopia, " Tobiya 10 August 1995, "No Need for Secrecy, " The 
Reporter 13 November 1995. 
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the only way to get any information about critical events was to buy oppositional papers . 
28 in 
this way the cult of secrecy contributed to a form of monopoly of information services on 
behalf of the relatively speculative press. Again the EPRDF's cult of secrecy worked to their 
own disadvantage, aiding the enemies it had in the private press by indirectly providing the 
newspapers with readers. In many cases the government's silence created a fertile ground for 
rumours and speculations with anti-Eritrean content, arguing that Eritrea for example intended 
to incorporate the northern Ethiopian city of Zalambessa into their territory with the help of 
the TPLF. 29 This in turn was noticed by the Eritreans and, according to Eritrean observers as 
well as Ethiopian observers, created fear in Eritrea. 30 
Thirdly, it had a direct impact on the Eritrean-Ethiopian negotiations, creating 
increased tension. Kinfe Abraham, a well-known Ethiopian scholar but also a special advisor 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus directly informed on the details of the 
negotiations, for instance claims that "The lack of transparency in the dialogue between the 
two parties had also resulted in false rumours that were to poison their relationship .,, 
31 The 
cult of secrecy apparently also had influence after the war broke out. In several instances 
Ethiopia failed to inform both Eritrea and third party international mediators about their 
demands thus creating trouble for the Ethiopians themselves. Eritrea for example officially 
requested information about Ethiopian territorial claims for many months after the start of the 
conflict, without receiving any. 32 A border incident of 15 March 2001 illustrates how the cult 
of secrecy was directly involved in creating such tension even after the war had ended. 
Ethiopia failed to provide the necessary information to the United Nations. On 15 March 
2001, the UNMEE discovered three companies of Ethiopian soldiers in the Irob area six 
kilometres north of the Southern boundary of the proposed Zone. The UNMEE protested. 
Ethiopia maintained that it had administered the area before 6 May 1998 but had failed to 
28 Amare Aregawi, Interview 2002. 
29 See for example "Fighting for an American Cause?, " Habasha 5 September 1995, "An Interview with Ato Mersha 
Wodajo, " Wolafen 5 Januar 1995, "The Strategy for Re-Unification of Mereb Melash (Eritrea) with Ethiopia, " Tobiya 5 
November 1997. 
30 Fisseha-Tsion Menghistu, Let Us Have Assab and Outlet to the Sea and Let Eritreans Go to Hell, Attitudes of Some 
Extremist Ethiopians, Part 15 (Hadish-Tesfa, 2002 [cited 20/08 2004]); available from http: //www. hadish-tesfa. org, Yonas 
Manna Bairu, Interview, 1 September 2004. 
31 Kinfe Abraham, Ethio-Eritrean History, Liberation Struggle, Statehood and Bilateral Political Economic Social and 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean War (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
Development, 2004), 77. 
32Eritrea, "Appendix 8: Points of Clarification Raised by Eritrea on the Oau Framework Agreement, (Handed over to the 
Secretary General of Oau During the Meeting with the President of Eritrea in Asmara on 12 December 1998 as a Follow-up 
to the Ouagadougou Meeting, 6-7 November 1998), " in Brothers at War, Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, ed. 
Tekeste Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll (Oxford: James Curry, 2000), 126, The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of 
Eritrea, "Appendix 5, Statement of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea on the Dispute with Ethiopia, 14 
May 1998, " in Brothers at IVar, Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, ed. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll 
(Oxford: James Curry, 2000), 118-19. 
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inform the UNMEE about it, it rather chose, in a typical EPRDF manner, to keep the 
information secret. The UNMEE examined the claim and verified it. As Ian Martin argues: 
But by twice failing to make clear to UNMEE the full extent of the areas it 
claimed to have been administering, yet compelling UNMEE to adjust its map of 
the Zone, it had undermined UNMEE's ability to adjust its map of the Zone, it 
had undermined UNMEE's ability to convince Eritrea of its objectivity, even 
though in fine-tuning the southern boundary UNMEE attempted as far as possible 
to restore Eritrean villages to its administration. 33 
Again the inability of the EPRDF to disperse information hampered relations with Eritrea. 
The incident created a tense stand-off between Eritrea, Ethiopia and the UNMEE. A tense 
situation was made even tenser. 34 
While the various examples explored above indicate the existence of a cult of secrecy 
within the EPRDF and show its effect on the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship, it does not 
explain where this cult originated. Kjetil Tronvoll and Sarah Vaughan argue for the existence 
of a culture of power within the Ethiopian culture, more specifically the Amharic culture 
within Ethiopia, which prevents the general dispersion of information. 35 The EPRDF is seen 
as formed by this, hampering the dissemination of information, creating something similar tc 
a cult of secrecy: 
The government and opposition do not enter into public dialogue on issues and 
ideology, but tend each to be entrenched in their own inwardly-informed political 
positions, from which they communicate against each other rather than with each 
other. 36 
The existence of an Ethiopian culture of power might have influenced the EPRDF, as it 
might have enhanced the cult of silence. However, it is important to avoid making an 
Ethiopian/Amharic culture more important than it really was. Firstly, the EPRDF was, 
dominated by non-Amharas, Tigrayans, originating outside the pure Amharic culture, 
33 Ian Martin, "Keeping the Peace: The Un Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 140. 
34 Ibid., 140-41. 
35 Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003). 
36 Ibid., 35. 
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although influenced by the latter. Secondly, the EPRDF also had traits that failed to conform 
to Ethiopian culture as described by Tronvoll and Vaughan. De Waal for example sees the 
TPLF as having a socio-contractual relationship with the Tigrayan population, far from the 
top-down hierarchic culture of the traditional Ethiopian state. 37 The EPRDF principle of 
Gimgemma, where civil servants and party members are submitted to an oral review by their 
peers, or even individuals lower than them in the organisational hierarchy, also indicates 
willingness for evaluation that diverges from the traditional patterns of the Ethiopian state as 
described by Tronvoll and Vaughan. It thus seems like EPRDF in many ways diverged from 
the Ethiopian traditional cultural pattern. 
Thirdly, it is important to pay attention to opinions within the EPRDF; after all, they 
have a high level of knowledge about their own organisation. According to Techa Uqa, an 
EPRDF member of the foreign relations committee in the parliament, there was a hate-love 
relationship within the EPRDF, between the newer SEPDF and OPDO and the two former 
guerrilla organisations, the TPLF and the EPDM (ANDM). The SEPDF and OPDO members 
acknowledged that the TPLF and the EPDM had far more experience and know-how, 
however they criticised TPLF and the EPDM overemphasis on secrecy, claiming that this 
was a relic from their guerrilla days. 38 Nevertheless, the OPDO and SEPDF members looked 
up to the freedom fighters of the TPLF and EPDM, leading to a dispersion of organisational 
culture, including the cult of secrecy, from the TPLF and the EPDM to the OPDO and the 
SEPDF. 39 To Uqa, the cult of secrecy was not a product of an Ethiopian culture; it was rather 
a product of organisational culture originating in the experiences of the guerrilla period. 
Even the TPLF itself was aware of the cult of secrecy, they saw it as a problem and 
tried to address it through Gimgemma, a criticism routine where peers in theory are able to 
criticise each other in order to improve the organisation, and they introduced -active 
programmes to change their organisational culture. 40 The TPLF member Mulugeta Gebre 
Chaltu Hywat, a powerful central committee member, even identified its origin, claiming that 
the culture of secrecy as originated in the experiences of TPLF when it functioned as a 
guerrilla organisation. Moreover, Hywat claimed that the change from guerrilla organisation 
to political party had failed to change parts of the organisational culture: "It was like having a 
football team, a really good football team, suddenly transform into a basketball team, it did 
37 Alex De Waal, Famine Crimes (Oxford: James Curry, 1998). This will be described more in depth in chapter 7 
38 Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003. 
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not go smoothly. "41Foreign observers concurred with these statements. The BBC journalist 
Martin Plaut for example concluded that organisational culture could have been a factor 
because: "Secrecy, always a necessity for a guerrilla movement, was almost turned into a cult 
during the long years of fighting against the Ethiopian government. , 
42 The origins of the cult 
of secrecy must be sought in the guerrilla days some of the EPRDF organisations. 
A Cult of Security 
The EPRDF also manifested other behavioural tendencies. It acted swiftly and reflexively in 
order to deal with what it regarded as enemies, and it overemphasised security. There were 
several incidents that demonstrated such overemphasis. Many newspapers were punished 
heavily for relatively small offences. The Tobiya for example once published a secret United 
Nations' memorandum recommending security precautions to its staff in its Addis Ababa 
headquarters. 43 Although this clearly was illegal according to Ethiopian law, it must have 
been of little practical importance to the Ethiopian authorities, and the memorandum did not 
concern Ethiopian civil servants and was therefore largely irrelevant to the security of the 
Ethiopian government. Although it could have hurt the prestige of EPRDF, the response 
against the Tobiya, swift, harsh and seemingly out of proportions with the Tobiya's offence, 
hurt this prestige even more. The government arrested the editor-in-chief and three of its 
former editors. At the same time the newspaper's offices were burned to the ground, its 
equipment, archive and database totally destroyed. 44 The incident was a manifestation of a 
frequently repeated pattern of actions, illustrating a tendency to overreact and focus on the use 
of violent sanctions against even relatively trivial threats, and illustrating the existence of a 
cult of security. Another incident two years earlier can be used to give an additional example 
of this tendency. Garoma Bekele, publisher of the newspaper Urji, had been detained because 
the Urji published an article containing false information with regards to new taxation of 
peasants in Oromiya Regional State. The publisher was released on bail of birr 10,000, around 
41Ibid. 
42 Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 18. 
-43 Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia, Human Rights Developments (Human Rights Watch, 1999 [cited 15 March 2005]); 
available from http: //www. hrw. org/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia. html. 
44 Ibid. ([cited). 
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a year's wage for an Ethiopian upper middle class worker. 45 Again, the same pattern of 
behaviour manifested itself: reflexive actions in order to protect the EPRDF's security, 
seemingly out of proportion with the offences committed. There are many examples of such 
incidents, too many to be listed in this thesis; however all of them point to the existence of a 
cult of security. 46 
This cult of security also manifested itself in the Ethiopian-Eritrean relations, for 
example under the Adi Murug incident. Adi Murug is a small place in eastern Tigray, long 
occupied by Ougugume rebels. The Ougugumes sided with the Derg during its war against 
both the EPLF and the TPLF. However, the Ougugumes continued to fight both the TPLF and 
the EPLF after the end of the war against the Derg, thus creating confusion with regards to 
who actually controlled the area. In addition, the local river had changed its course and this 
made old maps harder to interpret. In July 1997 Eritrean forces moved into what they 
probably believed to be Eritrean territory. 47 The Ethiopians reacted severely and threatened 
with the use of force if the Eritreans did not withdraw. 48 After one week Ethiopian officials 
noted a victory. 49 Again, the Ethiopian resorted to a response focusing on security, using the 
threat of violent sanctions. 
The losers, Eritrea and Issaias Afworki's regime, wanted to avoid similar incidents in 
the future so Afworki pressed for a border commission; the nucleus of a previously formed 
joint commission was to deal with the practical sides. 50 There was a notable difference in the 
perception of the two involved parties. The Entreans pushed for the commission, but the 
Ethiopians regarded the incident as unimportant and agreed to the commission just because of 
the wish of the Eritreans. 51 The Ethiopian side of the commission consisted of four persons: 
Tewolde Wolde Mariam, Hassan Shiffa, Gebru Asrat and Kinfe Gebre Medhin. Others 
attended the meetings of the commission on an ad hoc basis. 52 The Eritrean delegation was 
'u International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Ifex Alerts 3 January 1996,13 and 12 December 1995 (International 
Freedom of expression exchange, 1996 [cited 14/03 2005]); available from http: //www. ifex. org/es/content/view/full/3337/. 
46 For more examples, see: Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia, Human Rights Developments (Human Rights Watch, 1999 [cited 
15 March 2005]); available from http: //www. hrw. org/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia. html, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: 
Human Rights Developments 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1992 [cited 1 March 2005]); available from 
http: //www. hrw. org/reports/1992/WR92/AFW-02. htm#PI11_34316, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia (Human Right Watch, 
1999 [cited 1 December 2004]); available from http: //www. hrw. org/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia. html, Human Rights 
Watch, "Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Horn of Africa War: Mass Expulsions and the Nationality Issue (June 1998 - April 2002), " 
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), Human Rights Watch, "The Ethiopian Government Is Trying to Muffle the 
Independent Press, " (London: Human Rights Watch, 2004). 
" Alexander Last, "A Very Personal War: Eritrea Ethiopia, 1998-2000, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005). 
48 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Interestingly, the various EPRDF central committees were not even informed of the incident, again showing the poor 
dissemination of information and propensity to secrecy within the organisation 
51 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
52 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
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headed by Defence Minister Sebhat Ephrem, Head of Political Affairs, Yemane Gebreab; and 
National Security Adviser, Abraha Kassa. 53 A majority on both sides had a background from 
security and/or defence related parts of the administrative apparatus of their respective states. 
Instead of professional diplomats, the parties, both Eritrea and Ethiopia, chose to elect former 
and present security officers to the committee. The Ethiopian focus on security personnel 
again serves to illustrate a more general focus on security, the cult of security. 54 
Another and more important incident more clearly illustrates the importance of this 
cult, in this instance with direct implications for the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. During 
the autumn of 1997 economic issues influenced Eritrean-Ethiopian relations negatively, 
making the border more important as the end of free trade between the two countries meant 
that the militia had to control the borders in order to stop smugglers. 55 The issue of 
preparations for a forthcoming war was then raised for the first time in the TPLF politburo. In 
one way the TPLF's inclination was towards peace: they did not discuss whether Ethiopia 
should attack Eritrea, as this was out of the question for all members of the politburo. 56 The 
question was instead whether Eritrea would attack or not, and how to prepare for such a 
situation. The option of partial or full mobilisation was put on the table. Alemseged Gebre 
Amlak, former Marxist philosopher of the TPLF, Gebru Asrat, President of the Federal state 
of Tigray, and Tewolde Wolde Mariam, former second secretary of the TPLF and special 
advisor for Zenawi, voted for mobilisation. 57 Meles Zenawi and Siye Abraha, head of the 
governmental development agency EFFORT, were against. 58 The Ethiopian ambassador to 
Eritrea, Aw-Alom Woldu, was present and argued for mobilisation, as did the Chief of Staff 
Tsadkan Gebre Tensay. However the two did not have voting power in the Central 
Committee, they only had the right to voice their opinions. The discussions focused on the 
issue of mobilisation, namely whether the standing forces of Ethiopia could deter the 
59 Eritreans, or if additional units needed to be mobilised. 
53 Issaias Afworki, "Appendix 3: Letters Exchanged between Afwerki & Zenawi, July-August 1997, Second Letter from 
President Issaias Afworki to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Dated 25/08/1997, " in Brothers at War, Making Sense of the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian War, ed. Tekeste Negash, and Kjetil Tronvoll (Oxford: James Currey, 1997). 
54 In addition to this commission, a joint party commission, a joint (local) committee for border incidents and a joint 
ministerial commission for economic problems existed; the two first institutions also discussed border related issues. The 
third, the joint ministerial commission, focused on economic issues, issues that nevertheless also had an impact on border 
regulations, as customs rules had to be enforced by patrolling borders. 
ss "Stepped up Border Vigilance, " Beza 21 October 1997. 
56 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
57Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
58 Ibid. 
59 The discussion actually centred on the question of whether Eritrean President Afworki was a rational actor. If he could 
understand that Ethiopia was stronger than Eritrea, or if one needed to show this through mobilisation. Ibid. 
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There were several other options, such as for example to increase the activities of the 
commissions dealing with the problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but this did not happen, 
and was not really discussed. In fact, according to Yemane Gebreab (Eritrean member of the 
border commission), the Eritreans asked for more frequent meetings, but the Ethiopians 
postponed all the suggested dates. 60 Indeed, the pre-war frequency of the border commission 
meetings, twice in six months, is embarrassing given the amount of suffering the war was to 
cause. The focus of the EPRDF was rather, as it had been with regards to its relation to the 
oppositional press, on security measures. The EPRDF seemed focused on security and self- 
protection: they focused on strategies of self-protection rather than strategies of negotiations 
and dialogue. 
Although the above examples indicate the existence of the cult of security and its 
implication for the Eritrean-Ethiopian bilateral relationship, the factors creating the cult are 
left unexplained. As they did with regards to the EPRDF emphasis on secrecy, Kjetil 
Tronvoll and Sarah Vaughan argue that the focus on security related measures could have 
been an effect of the culture of power within the Ethiopian culture, more specifically the 
Amharic culture within Ethiopia. 61 The culture is seen as leading to a "Let us talk with the 
barrel of a gun" mentality in Ethiopian society. 62 While this sort of mentality might have 
influenced the cult of security within the EPRDF, several factors indicate that other elements 
must have intervened as well. As described previously, the EPRDF had many traits that 
deviated from the traits one should have expected if it was a pure derivate of Ethiopian/ 
Amharic culture, as it was also dominated by non- Amharic Tigrayans. 63 
As with the cult of secrecy, EPRDF members were aware of the cult of security. They 
blamed it on previous organisational experience from the guerrilla years. Again TPLF 
members such as Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat saw the problem as an organisational 
cultural problem, a problem of mental frames inherited from the civil war phase of the 
history of the TPLF and the EPDM. 64 Techa Uqa of the EPRDF claims that this mentality 
became transferred to the OPDO and the SEPDF. 65 To Uqa, the cult of security was not a 
product of an Ethiopian culture, rather a product of organisational culture originating in the 
60 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 28. 
61 Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003). 
62 Ibid. 
63 Alex De Waal, Famine Crimes (Oxford: James Curry, 1998). This will be described more in depth in chapter 7 
64 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003. 
65 Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
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experiences of the guerrilla period. The origins of both the cult of secrecy and the cult of 
security must be sought during the guerrilla days of some of the EPRDF organisations. 
Institutionalisation 
As illustrated previously the EPRDF had a tendency to keep even the most trivial information 
secret, even when it hurt the organisation. Moreover it had a tendency to act out of proportion 
when it felt that its security was threatened. To a political party, too much focus on secrecy 
and security becomes damaging; it leads to overreaction, to confrontations with potential 
allies and to the creation of unnecessary conflict. However, a strong focus on secrecy and 
security is important if you are a guerrilla organisation, fighting for survival in a harsh 
environment, as it aids your survival. 
The TPLF started out as a guerrilla organisation. Their early doctrines put emphasis on 
secrecy and security. Their battles were guided by the military doctrines of Mao, with some 
leanings towards the teachings of Che Guevara. 66 Mao's perhaps most important principle 
was that of self-preservation and the structure of the TPLF had to be protected by all means. 
Losses had to be minimised in order to achieve revolution. 67 One way to do this was to 
withdraw units after combat occurred and to reject holding land. This was a basic part of 
early TPLF strategy, institutionalised into its formal drills. Early TPLF publications 
highlighted Mao's teachings and their strategy closely followed his principles of self- 
protection, of which a focus on secrecy and security was an integral part. 68 
Mao formulated three stages of guerrilla war, namely strategic defensive, strategic 
stalemate and strategic offensive. 69 The TPLF largely chose to remain on the strategic 
defensive. During its first ten years the organisation was always weaker than the Derg. With 
some notable exceptions it evacuated its personnel when the Derg took an offensive, leaving 
their supporters under enemy rule, tentatively evacuating them. 70 This practice in turn meant 
66 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 389. 
67 Bruno Shaw, "Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, " in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. James Sarkesian (Chicago: 
Precedent Publishing, 1975). 
68 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 33. 
69 Bruno Shaw, "Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, " in Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, ed. James Sarkesian (Chicago: 
Precedent Publishing, 1975), 205. 
70 When the Derg opened its Red Star offensive in 1982.3,000 TPLF fighters spent nine months in the Sahel Region where 
they defended EPLF, contributing almost 50% of EPLF's non-militia force, in a bloody trench war, probably saving the latter 
from defeat. However, this was an exception, and until 1987 the general TPLF strategy was to hit and run. John Young, 
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that secrecy had to be maintained to protect supporters in Derg controlled territories. It also 
meant that security and secrecy had to be given priority, as a breach of security in enemy 
controlled territory would mean annihilation and a leak of information would have similar 
consequences. Institutionalisation of guerrilla strategy also meant institutionalisation of 
secrecy and security. 
Moreover, a focus on security and secrecy became institutionalised by the TPLF's 
standard tactical operational procedures for tactical attack and defence operations. A guerrilla 
warrior attacks when the enemy is unprepared or weak, under cover of darkness and taking 
advantage of the enemy's lack of readiness. Stealth and secrecy is actively employed in this 
strategy. Young illustrates such priorities when describing the TPLF campaign against the 
royalist Ethiopian Democratic Front (EDU): 
As their military skills and numbers increased the TPLF typically sent out 
squads of 60-100 fighters who travelled at night and slept during the day while 
in search of the EDU. Upon finding an enemy encampment, a reconnaissance 
team would observe them and decide where to attack. Ambushes were usually at 
night and the TPLF attempted to surround the enemy, enter into their midst, and, 
in the fashion of their forefathers, concentrated on attacking the core of the 
7 enemy camp where the leaders were most likely located .l 
The initiatives that are taken in a guerrilla campaign are usually just relatively small scale hit- 
and-run attacks. Tactical security and stealth become of immense importance, swift action can 
ensure success, a wait-and-see policy exposes the attacker to danger as the enemy becomes 
able to draw in reinforcements or to detect the enemy and implement preparations. Security 
again becomes of vital importance. 
In 1987 the TPLF reorganised into fronts, the units became bigger and the TPLF 
became an army, but even as late as 1989 mobility was the key word. If the pressure became 
too high the TPLF would withdraw. The TPLF main base was in the Sheraro area of western 
Tigray, but according to Young, even this base was evacuated on three or four occasions. 72 
Even at this late stage of the TPLF's struggle secrecy and security were of vital importance. 
Secrecy had to be maintained in order to safeguard the safety of those left behind during the 
Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 125. 
71 Ibid., 105. 
72 Ibid., 124. 
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evacuation and it had to be maintained in order to protect the mobile force. Leaks of 
information, internal conflicts and traitors: all these could have serious implications, and thus 
still had to be dealt with at an early stage. 
The institutionalisation of a cult of secrecy and security was also reinforced by the 
dramatic day-to-day experiences of the front, constantly exposed to a hostile environment, 
constantly exposed to organisational shocks, entrenching organisational values. Fears of the 
potentially dire consequences of leaks frightened the organisation into using harsh 
punishments. One of the stories told to Jenny Hammond by former TPLF fighter lassu Berhe 
Ruba Lemin illustrates this point. A new recruit had been suspected of spying: 
Ahferom and Sebhat challenged him and he started to admit he was a spy, but he 
also accused Marta [a female TPLF fighter] of being a spy... 'I came with a 
mission and now I am against you' he said. This started a real suspicion because 
she came from Asmara too. Two days later; another comrade was accused [by 
the boy first accused of being a spy]. Finally he accused Father Shifare of being 
against us and to prove it, he alleged that he had poison in his house. At night his 
house was checked. The spy found the medicine and the old man was taken to 
prison. We had no experience at interrogating people. Physical pressure was 
absolutely forbidden, only democratic methods, but in fact we beat them and 
Martha and the peasant. They all denied it saying `We are not afraid, we support 
you. You know there is something not right in our organisation, if you realize 
this, it is a victory'. Then the strong words of prisoners like Marta gave us 
doubts. Especially impressive was father Shifare. 'We are being tortured', he 
said, but we accept it, because it is rectifying our organisation. Even the old 
man was beaten. He told the truth about the spy coming for just one night. In the 
end, we turned on the spy and he was the one who broke and the others did not, 
in front of all of them, he was killed. The biggest lesson was the strength of 
those fighters. TPLF was very near to dissolution, without morale, without 
strength. From then on, the organisation began to be alert against spies. From 
then on we began to appreciate the nature of a fighter. 73 
73 Jenny Hammond, Fire frone the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 261. 
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This was the harsh reality of the TPLF's struggle, fighting against the Shemek, the 
counter-guerrillas of the Derg, exposed to infiltration attempts and always suspicious of each 
other. Secrecy, and security, became values that you needed to hold in order to survive, and 
these values thus became a part of the TPLF culture from an early stage of its organisational 
history. Such values also became formally institutionalised as the organisation evolved. The 
hunt for traitors, spies and even soldiers who failed to keep secrets became institutionalised. A 
central organisational tool was the Bado Shewate (a Tigrinya expression meaning: the seventh 
unit), the security unit of the TPLF. 74 The Bado Shewate struck quickly against suspected 
`traitors', but also against internal groups that were perceived to be potential defectors. They 
thus emphasised military action and deterrence rather than in-depth investigation of 
accusations. Organisational experience and institutions based on these experiences meant that 
a highly necessary culture of silence was developed, as well as a culture of security. 
The events in the early 80's and the events taking place before the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
war show organisational continuity. The actions of Ahferom and Sebhat (leaders in the TPLF) 
in the lassu Berhe Ruba Lemin story from the civil war years and the actions of EPRDF 
before the war broke out in 1997-1998 are strikingly analogous. In both instances the TPLF 
leaders focused on the use of violent sanctions and deterrence. However, while the TPLF 
during the guerrilla years in many ways had to focus on such strategies in order to survive, 
Ethiopia had a larger army in 1997-1998 and could have afforded to be lenient and to focus on 
more peaceful ways to stop perceived threats from emerging. They did not. As suggested by 
Mulugeta Gebre Hywat and Techa Uqa, the mentality of the guerrilla organisation had stayed 
on, even though the TPLF had attempted to change it. 75 
Given the threats that the TPLF members were exposed to, an institutionalisation of 
such mentality is understandable. Even the top leadership was exposed to danger. In 1978 
Meles Zenawi, today Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and Abay Tsehay, after the war a central 
member in the TPLF politburo and Minister of Federal Affairs, contracted malaria near the 
Mereb River. 76 Meles Zenawi's paternal grandfather lived nearby and alerted his son, Meles' 
father, who gave them medicine and then hid them for a month. 
77 Any form of treason, or 
failure to keep secrets, could have killed both Abay Tsehay and Meles Zenawi during this 
incident. Secrecy also had to be maintained in order to protect relatives living within the reach 
74 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 103. 
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of the Derg, as the latter actively used reprisals against family members. Prominent TPLF 
members such as Sebhat Nega lost relatives because of indiscretion: in the case of Sebhat, his 
brother was killed. 78 Organisational theory claims that organisational shocks, dramatic events, 
entrench organisational culture and the members of the TPLF were exposed to such shocks on 
a day-to-day basis exposed as they were to danger and losing relatives because of Derg 
reprisals, all of which contributing to the entrenchment of the secrecy and security cult. The 
tension amongst the guerrilla fighters was high, and the value of security and secrecy had to 
be learned in order to keep alive. Indeed, the reaction pattern of the TPLF during the guerrilla 
years was strikingly similar to its reaction pattern ten years later, indicating organisational 
continuity. EPRDF choose to focus on military precautions, discussing mobilisation rather 
than an increase in the frequency of peace negotiations in 1997-1998, just as they had focused 
on military precautions during their attacks against the EDU in 1979. 
It is not surprising that the EPDM, TPLF's sister organisation within the EPRDF, 
shared these values. The EPDM had a very similar background. It started its history as a wing 
of the older Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which in turn was based on the 
Ethiopian People's Liberation Organisation. 79 The founding conference of the EPRP, held in 
August 1975, had been highly secretive because of fear of Derg reprisals: 
In the official statement, the date the conference was held was put three months 
back, a piece of disinformation designed to protect the delegates to the conference 
whose absence from their work place might have been noticed. The party 
branches throughout the country were alerted to prepare for the task of 
distribution. The intention was to publicise the event throughout the country on 
the same day. It had to be done in the uttermost secrecy to prevent any 
interference from the regime. For the sake of absolute secrecy, the central 
committee and the Addis Ababa inter-zone committee shouldered the major 
80 burden, including conveying bundles of printed material from place to place. 
The EPRP's fear of the Derg thus meant that the cult of secrecy was there the moment the 
organisation was born. Even in the first meeting ever in the organisations history high 
emphasis was put on secrecy. 
78 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 263. 
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In September 1976, the Derg acted against the EPRP, trying to kill or capture all its 
members. 81 The EPRP's organisational history then became as dramatic as that of the TPLF, 
fighting a life and death struggle against the TPLF as well as the Derg. The perils of a 
guerrilla organisation now faced the EPRP: it was weaker than the Derg and had to withdraw 
if facing superior forces. It also had to focus on the security of the organisation and secrecy in 
order to protect members living in cities controlled by the Derg. 82 As with the TPLF, the 
EPRP was exposed to organisational shocks on a day-to-day basis, exposed to heavy attacks 
from the Derg and the TPLF and experiencing practically an annihilation of its military wing 
at the end of the seventies. Values such as secrecy and security were the values needed to 
survive. Moreover, some of its members paid a heavy price when security was neglected. The 
present day Minister of Information in Ethiopia, Bereket Simon, for instance, lost his brother 
in action against the TPLF. 83 
The EPDM was a product of a conspiracy within the EPRP. In 1981 tactical 
commanders and commissars of the EPRP met and decided to form a new and independent 
organisation, partly as a reaction to purges and inflexibility within the EPRP organisation. 84 
The defection might also partly have been motivated by the wish to survive, as the EPRP was 
in the process of losing out militarily at the time. Secrecy must have been essential when 
planning their action, with the defectors operating within an organisation that had harsh 
penalties for such defection. 85 Although the new organisation found itself an efficient ally in 
the TPLF, it nevertheless became exposed to the same dangers as the latter, and used the same 
guerrilla strategies, guerrilla strategies which emphasised secrecy and security. 
Similarly, the new organisation experienced several organisational shocks inflicted on 
it by its enemies. Ato Addisu Legesse, General Secretary of the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), the successor of the EPDM, describes the early years: 
as the gigantic Derg army was bent on destroying the various liberation struggles, 
most of these movements either opted to safeguard their existence by retreating 
until the tempest passed or were obliged to strengthen their struggle by drawing 
up suitable guerrilla strategies. On the whole this was without doubt a period of 
unprecedented suffering and despair in our country. This was a period when any 
81 Michael Chege, "The Revolution Betrayed, Ethiopia 1974-79, " Journal of Modern Africa Studies 17, no. 3 (1979): 372. 
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form of popular struggle was extremely difficult, much more so for nascent 
organizations that had not acquired any experience yet. 86 
The Derg had used spies and informants in order to purge the EPRP and also its splinter group 
the EPDM, and it learned to keep secrets quite early in its organisational history. The need 
for secrecy and the need for security became equally, if not more, enshrined in the EPDM 
than in the TPLF. 
Perhaps it was not a coincidence that the head of the Ethiopian Ministry of 
Information, the institution behind the EPRDF extreme strategy for punishing the offences of 
press, was Bereket Simon, one of the EPDM leaders who had lost most relatives during the 
civil war, but also one of the EPDM leaders that just through the increase of security and 
secrecy measures managed to turn the EPDM into a very successful guerrilla movement. The 
actions by the Ethiopian Ministry of Information towards the press in the 90's become more 
comprehensible when viewing them in the light of what the leaders of the Ministry had 
experienced during the EPDM's guerrilla days. 
Although the fight of the TPLF and EPDM organisations was crowned with victory in 
1991, with the Derg crushed and only small fragments of the EPRP and the EDU remaining, 
still the guerrilla mentality remained. While there had been some differences between the 
EPDM and the TPLF, such as for example views on the nationality question, their experiences 
with regards to the fight against the Derg had been very similar. 87 An emphasis on secrecy 
and on security had contributed to the survival of the two organisations. After 1992-1994 the 
security situation stabilised and the need for drastic measures in order to protect security 
decreased and the need to keep secrets became less pressing. Nevertheless, the EPRDF still 
chose to keep secret "the amount of farmers with one ox". 88 As Vaughan and Tronvoll 
remarked: the view that "if you are not with us, you are against us, " remained an important 
assumption for the EPRDF in general. 89 Secrecy and security became important elements in 
the organisational culture of the EPRDF. The secret names of the TPLF leaders, created in 
order to confuse the Derg intelligence with regards to the identity of the TPLF's leaders, 
remained in use. Central committee member Aw-Alom Woldu for example remained Aw- 
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Aw-Alom, even though his original name had been Tiku Woldu, and Abay Tsehay, later 
Minister of Federal Affairs, remained Abay, even though his original name had been Ahma 
Tsehay. The present day foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, choose to keep Seyoum instead of 
the original Ambay. 90 The emotional attachment to the guerrilla era was still strong. 
In 1997-98 Ethiopia had the time and resources to avoid the emphasis on security and 
secrecy, as it had a large army, more resources than its rival Eritrea and far more than its 
internal opposition. 91 The EPRDF was no longer guerrilla movement that needed its previous 
focus on secrecy and security, it nevertheless kept it. As claimed by many of the TPLF leaders 
themselves, the mentality stayed on. 92 
Organisational History, Secrecy and Security, 
A guerrilla organisation is exposed to perils and threats that make an emphasis on security and 
extensive secrecy necessary. For the TPLF and the EPDM such values were required in order 
to stay alive as guerrilla organisations. Organisational theory argues that such values will be 
carried on long after the functional needs of the organisation are gone. Respondents within the 
EPRDF suggest that this happened in the case of their own organisation. 93 Moreover, they 
suggest that such values spread from the original two organisations to other members of the 
EPRDF umbrella. 
Indeed, viewed in the light of the old guerrilla history of the EPDM and the TPLF the 
actions of the EPRDF before the war become more understandable. Heavy handed sanctions 
against perceived enemies (newspapers) leading to hostility, the tendency to keep even trivial 
information secret, leading to rumours hurting the EPRDF itself, the tendency to focus on 
maximising security through military means rather than through negotiations, would all have 
made sense for organisations engaged in a life and death guerrilla struggle with ruthless and 
superior opponents. The EPDM and the TPLF had been such guerrilla organisation just seven 
years before the Eritrean-Ethiopian war broke out. 
Such actions had implications for the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship: it allowed anti- 
Eritrean rumours to circulate freely, it left both Eritrea and the international community in the 
90 Aregawi Bereh, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 579. 
91 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998). 
92 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
93 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
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dark with regards to Ethiopian claims and intentions and it prevented the employment of more 
peaceful negotiation strategies before the conflict broke out. Again organisational culture, this 
time in the form of a cultural inheritance from the organisations' guerrilla period, influenced 
the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. 
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Chapter 7: The TPLF, Tigray and the War 
The ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), consists of several smaller parties, but the influence and power of these smaller 
parties vary. 1 The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the oldest of these organisations, 
had an extremely important role in the decision-making process before the war, supplying all 
Ethiopia's members of the border commission as well as most of the important inner circle of 
advisers around Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Given the relative significance of the TPLF, 
its organisational culture becomes of vital importance, and the focus of this chapter will be on 
this organisation. 
As will be shown later in the chapter, the organisational culture of the TPLF was 
different from the other EPRDF organisations. The TPLF's propaganda as well as internal 
discussions put positive emphasis on the culture of the peasants of Tigray (Map 7.1), the 
home province of the organisation. A broad organisational acceptance of popular initiatives 
by such peasants, at least when the peasants raised their voices to influence local issues, also 
developed. Such acceptance allowed informal forms of local political participation to develop, 
as well as permitting locals to act without consulting the central authorities. Eritrean and 
Ethiopian sources confirm several episodes in which local peasants, customs officials and 
local Tigrayan militia put pressure on local officials, failed to uphold centrally given 
regulations and/or acted in an offensive way against Eritreans. 2 Similar incidents were heavily 
punished in other parts of Ethiopia, but in Tigray they were more or less accepted. 
The main argument of this chapter is that actions targeting Eritreans, initiated by 
ordinary Tigrayans, were allowed to influence the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship because of 
special traits in the TPLF's organisational culture. In addition, the chapter argues that popular 
pressure from Tigray, again allowed influence because of the TPLF's organisational culture, 
contributed to the consolidation of a group of hardliners within the TPLF, a group that later 
actively blocked most peace attempts. 
Firstly, the chapter establishes that local peasants and low level TPLF on their own 
initiative acted against the Eritreans. Subsequently, the chapter examines how such incidents 
contributed to the formation of a hard line group within the TPLF. The chapter then proceeds 
Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 116. 
2 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
\\, ww. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html, Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
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to explore how the TPLF developed the elements of its culture that enabled local popular 
initiatives to play a role, and the interaction between these elements and other factors that 
damaged the bilateral Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. 
Map 7.1 Tigray National State of Ethiopia 
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A Series of Small but Important Incidents 
There are many examples of incidents where local Tigrayan Peasants on their own initiative, 
neglecting Ethiopian law, acted against Eritreans without suffering any form of punishment 
from the central Ethiopian government. 
The different incidents can be divided into two categories; the first was conflicts over 
resources, the second concerned trade. Several of the pre-war resource conflicts in the border 
zone between Tigray and Eritrea actually originated before World War II. After the 1991 
EPRDF/EPLF takeover of power in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the local authorities on both sides of 
the border managed to negotiate settlements, even to these older conflicts. However, the 
implementation of such agreements repeatedly failed because of a lack of will by the 
Ethiopian side to punish locals breaking the agreement. Numerous examples can be given. In 
for instance Aromo (Eritrea), where the problem was illegal Aromo (Eritrean) taxation of 
Ethiopian Erob after the latter had cut down eucalyptus trees, an agreement between the 
parties had been reached. 3 According to Professor Tekie Fezzehasion, the Tigray regional 
authority failed to uphold this agreement and the locals continued to break it. 4 Some border 
incidents were of larger proportions. In Upper Indali (close to Erob), Eritreans reported the 
large scale incursion by Tigrayan militia soldiers as early as in 1992, probably because of a 
quarrel about resources. 5 The Eritreans acknowledged that they believed that the action had 
been initiated by the local TPLF commander and had no linkage with central TPLF policy. 6 A 
joint (local) border committee, ad hoc in its composition, held a meeting on 10 August 1992 
in order to solve this tense situation. It was then agreed that the local authority of Erob, 
Ethiopia, should pay compensation. Only 1/13 of the agreed compensation was ever paid. 
Again the local authorities neglected the implementation of an agreement. 7 These incidents, as 
well as many others, indicate a pattern where locals or local authorities were allowed to break 
regionally or centrally negotiated treaties, without any repercussions from either the regional 
government or Addis Ababa. Interestingly, the Eritrean side was usually, albeit not always, 
very satisfied with the decision reached during local negotiations, but not with the 
3 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. htn-d. 
4 Ibid. ([cited). 
s Alemseged Tesfai, The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict Part 3 (Final Part) (The Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict 
Page, 1998 [cited 15 January 2005]); available from http: //www. dehai. org/conflict/home. htm? analysis. htm. 
Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
7 lbid. ([cited). 
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implementation by the local authorities. 8 Local violations were seldom punished, indicating a 
lack of will to curtail the actions of ordinary Tigrayan peasants and the local TPLF 
organisation that often consisted of such peasants. 
There are many similar cases illustrating this point. Alemseged Tesfai claims that 
there were eighteen in the rainy and cultivation season of 1996 alone. 9 The frequency of such 
incidents is corroborated by Ethiopian sources. They were even described by newspapers as 
far away as in remote Addis Ababa. 1° Even when issues were being negotiated higher up in 
the system, the local Tigrayan administration failed to curtail actions by their own militia and 
by ordinary citizens, actions that provoked the Eritrean side. " The Eritreans were also 
dissatisfied with several parallel actions by the local Tigrayan militia, who acted with what 
they claimed to be unnecessary brutality. 12 
Moreover, the lower level TPLF officials in Tigray often became empowered by the 
central TPLF leadership, awarded responsibility beyond their local area of responsibility. The 
Eritreans complained that several TPLF high level delegations themselves delegated 
responsibility down the command chain within the TPLF. One of the first high-level 
meetings, on 20-21 July 1994, led by Secretary Alamin Mohammed Said from the Eritrean 
side and politburo member and vice-chairman of the TPLF, Tewolde Woldemariam from the 
Tigrayans/Ethiopians, resulted in another meeting where the Tigrayan/Ethiopian side sent low 
level officials only. 13 This indicated a will to delegate responsibility that was rare for the 
EPRDF, demonstrating an unusual will to empower local Tigrayan actors. 
Ethiopian newspapers also reported several similar incidents belonging to the second 
category of incidents, all trade related. 14 According to Professor Tekie Fessehazion, local 
Tigrayan police repeatedly harassed Eritrean traders, often under the pretext that the latter had 
made derogatory remarks about Tigrayans, or that they had been members of the EPLF's 
8 Ibid. ([cited). 
9 Alemseged Tesfai, The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict Part 3 (Final Part) (The Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict 
Page, 1998 [cited 15 January 2005]); available from http: //www. dehai. org/conflict/home. htm? analysis. htm. 
10 "Anti Shabiya Activities on the Rise, " Tonrar 7 November 1996. 
11 Tekie Fessehazion, First Things First: Demarcate before Dialogue: (Part 2) (Shaebia, People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice, 2003 [cited 10 March 2005]); available from www. Shaebia. org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view. cgi? archive=6&num=2061, 
Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
12 Tekie Fessehazion, First Things First: Demarcate before Dialogue: (Part 2) (Shaebia, People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice, 2003 [cited 10 March 2005]); available from www. Shaebia. org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view. cgi? archive=6&num=2061. 
13 Alemseged Tesfai, The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict Part 3 (Final Part) (The Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict 
Page, 1998 [cited 15 January 2005]); available from http: //www. dehai. org/confl1ct/home. htm? analysis. htm. 
" Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html, "Sugar Destined for Eritrea Held in Tigray, " Tobiya 14 March 1996. 
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rival, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 15 Again, the Eritreans felt that their complaints 
were neglected and that the Tigrayan central authorities failed to deal with the problem. ' 6 
The frequency of border incidents increased in 1997. As Ethiopian Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi claims: "Bad feelings between the two of us were building up, as I said earlier, 
following the currency changes in particular. Misunderstandings along the border also started 
assuming greater visibility after that. "17 The border now had to be intensively patrolled in 
order to keep the new customs regulations, and the customs control had to be expanded, often 
by recruiting new personnel with little, if any, previous experience with such tasks. New and 
complex tasks were assigned to the Tigrayan militia. Militia patrols were intensified in order 
to deal with breaches of the new trade regime. 18 With new rules, new and/or untrained 
personnel, it was hardly surprising that the implementation of the new arrangements became 
disorganised. In the words of TPLF central committee member Mulugeta Gebre Hywat, also 
known as "Chaltu", his code name from the civil war: 
Our bus was passing through the border post, I travelled incognito and few of the 
customs officials knew who I was. The bus was stopped, and a female customs 
official entered, she claimed that the 2000 birr limit [for individuals] for petty 
trade was for the whole coach and started to confiscate from all the passengers. 
This might have happened in other areas as well. 19 
Other EPRDF leaders also claim that local Tigrayan officials/ civilians took the law into their 
own hands, in the words of Yemane "Jamaica" Kidane, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
"Yes, they stopped trucks, the population themselves stopped trucks going to Eritrea, they 
stopped them at the border. , 20 Their statements clearly underline that the locals in Tigray 
acted against Eritrean traders. Moreover, none of them mentioned any steps beyond pure 
communication taken to stop such actions, indicating a similarity with the Ethiopian 
government's response to the previous actions targeting Eritreans initiated by the Tigrayan 
border population. 
15 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
16 Tekie Fessehazion, First Things First: Demarcate before Dialogue: (Part 2) (Shaebia, People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice, 2003 [cited 10 March 2005]); available from www. Shaebia. org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view. cgi? archive=6&num=2061. 
17 Meles Zenawi, "Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's May 21 Press Conference, 29 May 1998" (Addis Ababa, 1998). 
18 "Stepped up Border Vigilance, " Beza 21 October 1997. 
19 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003. 
20 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
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Outside Tigray, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) had a different 
record when facing angry peasants acting illegally, both when it came to resource conflicts 
and trade related conflicts. Although more lenient than all of its predecessors, the Ethiopian 
government did not hesitate to use strong methods to strike down on peasants that they 
believed to be acting outside Ethiopian law. 21 The Ethiopian newspapers contained story after 
story about how the government harshly curtailed demonstrations and riots by both Amhara 
and Oromo peasants. 22 Compared with incidents taking place under somewhat similar 
circumstances on the borders with Kenya, the contrasts with EPRDF actions become striking. 
On 9 May, the Addis based newspaper Seife Nebelbal for example reported on how Ethiopian 
and Kenyan authorities had used their armies jointly in order to stop border incidents. 23 
Admittedly, there was some action to address the problems. From 20 to 22 April 1997 
representatives of Barka region and Western Tigray met in Shire, Tigray, in order to deal with 
the Eritrean complaints about the activities of Tigray militia in the border areas. 24 This 
meeting was followed up by the so-called Shambuko meeting, 8 May 1997. The previously 
ad-hoc joint (local) border committee was now formalised in order to review complaints. 25 A 
special committee of three Tigrayans and four Eritreans was formed to study the disputed 
areas in Gasha Barka and Western Tigray. Regional committees at city and municipality level 
were to be formed in order to deal with the complaints locally. Nevertheless, the situation 
again escalated and a third meeting, this time in Mekele, the capital of Tigray, had to be held. 
The meeting was scheduled for 23 July 1997.26 It was then agreed that the problems should be 
examined at a higher level in the TPLF/ PFDJ organisation. Moreover, it was agreed that the 
contested areas should remain under the temporary administrations that had been determined 
in an agreement made between the parties in 1987. In addition, it was decided that an eight- 
man committee was to meet again in Mekele, Tigray (Ethiopia) on 30 July. 27 
21 See for example Kjell Solberg, "Political Apathy and Class/Caste Conflict: The Election in Sidama, Southern Ethiopia 
(Snnpr), " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Kjetil Tronvoll and Siegfried Pausewang (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of 
Human rights, 2000). Siegfried Pausewang, "A Population Resisting Local Control and Intimidation? The Elections in Gedo 
Southern Ethiopia (Snnpr), " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Siegfried Pausewang and Kjetil Tronvoll (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of Human rights, 2000). 
22 See for example "Mass Arrest of Peasants, " Tomar 24 September 1997, "North Gondar: Hot Bed of Tension, " Wonchif 19 
August 1997, "North Shoa, Land of Misery, " Tobiya 18 September 1997, "Peasants Attack Ndfs, " Wonchif 26 August 1997. 
23 "Kenya Attacks, " Seife Nebelbal 9 May 1997. 
24 The meeting was chaired by Ato Tsegay Berhe , Vice-Chairman of the Tigray administrative region and the Deputy Administrator of the Gash-Barka Region of Eritrea, Ato Tesfamichael G. Medhim. It lasted for two days, 20-21 April 1997, 
and included all the major officials of the of the corresponding border districts. 
25 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
26 The participants from the Tigrayan side were Haleka Tsegay Berhe , the Vice Chairman of the Tigray administrative 
region; Kiros Bitew, the Chair for Western Tigray, and Beyene Mukuru, Assistant chief of Propaganda, TPLF 
27 Tekie Fessehazion, First Things First. Demarcate before Dialogue: (Part 2) (Shaebia, People's Front for Democracy and 
Justice, 2003 [cited 10 March 2005]); available from www. Shaebia. org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view. cgi? archive=6&num=2061. 
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At the same time, according to Eritrean sources, arms were distributed to Tigrayans 
living close to Geza Sherif and the Tigrayan militia actively rounded up Eritreans close to the 
border, creating irritation on the Eritrean side. 28 Both Ethiopian Vice-Minister Yemane 
Kidane and Sebhat Nega, former leader of the TPLF and at the time an important central 
committee member, claim that Gebru Asrat tried to moderate similar local actions and that he 
scored many successes. 29 They also claim that Gebru Asrat felt pressured by such actions, 
and their claim is supported by one of Gebru Asrat's political allies, Alemseged Gebre 
Amlak. 30 Their claims are puzzling for, as previously illustrated, the EPRDF failed to be 
pressured by local action outside Tigray, preferring to use force to curtail it. However in 
Tigray the TPLF politicians nevertheless paid attention to informal pressure from peasants 
and traders living in the border areas. 31 
It could be argued that the regional authorities could have tried to use popular pressure 
and local actions against Eritreans in order to justify their own policy. Nevertheless, the 
Eritrean President at the time clearly believed that the various actions had local origins. 32 This 
view is shared by some of the most prominent members of the TPLF central committee. 33 It is 
also stressed by Tigrayans observing the events close to the border. 34 It is also unlikely that 
the central leadership of the TPLF and the EPRDF had a policy of actively provoking Eritrea 
in order to start a war. The Ethiopian reluctance to mobilise even after Eritrea called in 
reserves and their downscaling of the Ethiopian army, thus putting themselves at risk by 
making themselves more vulnerable to attacks, contradict such a view, indicating that 
Ethiopia failed to prepare for war. 35 Rather than being a result of a central strategy of Ethiopia 
to intimidate Eritrea, the actions must have been a result of local initiatives. 
This nevertheless leaves an important question open: in Tigray locals were allowed to 
take initiatives with bilateral implication whereas outside Tigray locals were heavily punished 
for such attempts. The difference between the policies towards the actions of non- Tigrayan 
28 Tekie Fessehazion, Genesis of the Border War (Denden, 1998 [cited 17 March 2005]); available from 
www. denden. com/Conflict/newscom/com-062898. html. 
29 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
30Alemsegged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003, Sebhat Nega, 
Interview, 21 January 2003. 
31 For examples of how popular pressure outside Tigray was curtailed, see "Mass Arrest of Peasants, " Tomar 24 September 
1997, "North Gondar: Hot Bed of Tension, " Wonchif 19 August 1997, "North Shoa, Land of Misery, " Tobiya 18 September 
1997, "Peasants Attack Ndfs, " Wonchif 26 August 1997. 
32 "Interview with Isaias Afwerki, " Eritrea Profile I May 1998. 
33 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Sebhat 
Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003, Hassan Shiffa, Interview, 21 December 2003. Kidusan Nega did not want to talk about the 
subject. 
'a Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
35 For the trends in Ethiopian military expenditure see: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
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peasants and the actions of Tigrayan peasants is not explained. This question became more 
and more important during 1997 to 1998, when even the more central authorities in Tigray 
now took initiatives apparently going beyond their mandate without being reprimanded by the 
central TPLF leaders in Addis Ababa. On 30 July 1997 the eight-man local negotiation 
committee met. The Tigrayans now wanted to make the interim border permanent and argued 
that this had to be a pre-condition for further negotiations. Such a demand had potential 
implications for all Ethiopian-Eritrean border negotiations, and was never a pre-requisite for 
the Ethiopians negotiating at state level. Although led by Haleka Tsegay Berhe, then Vice 
President of Tigray, the committee lacked the mandate to make such statement, a statement 
with bilateral implications that according to the Ethiopian Constitution should have been 
decided by the Ethiopian Cabinet and Parliament. " It seems as though the Tigrayan officials 
went far beyond their mandate when making the claim. Local negotiations then stalled, with 
much animosity being created between the regional administrations. Moreover, the anger of 
the local Eritrean commander, General Gerzgiher Tesfamariam, over the actions of the local 
Tigrayan militia was cited as one of the causes of the aggressive Eritrean actions in May 
1998, by several well situated international observers such as for example the journalists of Le 
Monde diplomatique. 37 Eritrea now requested the formation of the joint border commission. 
While this commission formally was created after the Adi Murug incidents, the Eritreans 
emphasised that it was the sum of all the incidents that worried them. 38 Thus the small border 
incidents and the TPLF's failure to curtail local initiatives clearly created tension between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
In sum, the various border incidents from 1993 to the outbreak of the war formed a 
pattern: local negotiations were successful, but collapsed during the implementation phase, 
often because of the actions or inactions of the Tigrayan militia/local party officials. Local 
TPLF cadres and customs officials often took initiatives against Eritrean traders and the 
Eritreans in the border area, and Tigrayan officials made decisions that seemingly went 
beyond their mandate. All in all low-level TPLF cadres and ordinary Tigrayans were allowed 
to make decisions influencing the bilateral relationship with Eritrea. To many Addis Ababa 
newspapers this was puzzling, partly because of the contrasts with the harsh reprisals 
36 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 8 December 
1994 (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1994 [cited 1 May 2005]); available from 
http: //www. civicwebs. com/cwvlib/constitutions/ethiopia/constitution_I 994. htm. 
37 "Escalation of Voilence in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Eritrea, an Absurd War, " Le Monde diplomatique, I June 1998. 
38 "Interview with Isaias Afwerki, " Eritrea Profile 1 May 1998. 
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implemented on informal attempts from locals to protest against even Eritreans. 
39 As 
expressed by the newspaper Wonchif in 1997: "Over the past six years, Tigray Region has 
more or less transformed into a state within a state. Tigray National Region does not seem to 
be totally under the control of the central government. , 40 Indeed, given the harsh reprisals 
peasants in other parts of Ethiopia received when attempting similar actions, it was puzzling. 
The popular pressure from Tigray was even to have significant consequences for the top 
leadership of the TPLF. 
A Hard Line Fraction within the TPLF 
The TPLF's surprising leniency towards the actions of local TPLF officials and Tigrayan 
peasants was to have implications even within the higher decision making levels of the 
organisation. As will be shown, it contributed to the consolidation of a group of hardliners 
within the organisation. 
A quest to understand the influence of popular pressure and why this pressure came 
about also directs attention to an event taking place after the end of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
war. The hard line group within the TPLF became well known only after its showdown with 
the rest of the TPLF in a central committee meeting in Mekele, March 2001. At this meeting 
twelve out of twenty-eight central committee members of the TPLF walked out in protest at 
what they regarded as erroneous procedures and violations of the TPLF charter. However, 
both witnesses and investigative journalists indicate that the group consolidated much earlier 
and had effects on the Eritrean-Ethiopian Relationship even from an early stage. 41 According 
to Africa Confidential: 
the Central Committee did set up a war council headed by Siye [Abraha], 
Seyoum [Mesfin] and Gebru [Asrat], which distance Meles from the military 
decision-making process. Meles held support among more ideological 
Committee members, including head of Organisation Tewolde Woldemariam, 
39 See for example "Mass Arrest of Peasants, " Tonrar 24 September 1997, "North Gondar: Hot Bed of Tension, " Wonchif 19 
August 1997, "North Shoa, Land of Misery, " Tobiya 18 September 1997, "Peasants Attack Ndfs, " Wonchif 26 August 1997. 
40 "Secret Undertaking, " Wonciff 9 July 1997. 
41 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, "Ethiopia: Eritrea-Brothers at War, " Africa Confidential I1 
September 1998. 
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Alemseged Gebre Amlak of the Ideological Department and senior Politburo 
member Sebhat Nega, but the former MLLT Chairman, Abay Tsehay, swung 
the undecided by robust responses and swift agreement to act against Eritrea. At 
the price of accepting the expulsion of Eritreans and a continuing military build- 
up, Meles kept control, if only just. 42 
At the time, in 1998, the fronts were not clearly defined, Siye Abraha had just (in February) 
voted no to Ethiopian mobilisation, but he regretted it and so now ended up supporting Gebru 
Asrat. 43 Alemseged Gebre Amlak still supported Zenawi on many issues. 44 However, when 
Siye Abraha fell in line with Gebru Asrat and Abay Tsehay (who later turned on the group), 
there arose a consolidated sub-group within the TPLF, a sub-group that from the early stage 
also controlled the war council. 45 The dissenter group, together with Abay Tsehay, who 
remained a part the group until 2001, held a majority in the TPLF politburo, and must have 
been a major influence on Ethiopian decision-making. The main point is that this hardliner 
group both was consolidated before the war and that it had influence over the bilateral 
relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
The connections between the process leading to the consolidation of this group and 
the previously analyses of the actions of peasants and low level TPLF officials in Tigray 
become clearer if the geographical and cultural affiliations of the members of the hardliner 
group are examined. Most of the hardliners had closer connections to Tigrayan peasants than 
was common within the TPLF central committee. Moreover, the hardliners lacking such a 
connection were often engaged in cultural work emphasising the importance of the culture of 
the Tigrayan Peasant. An examination of the background of the members of the hardliner 
group confirms this. The informal leaders of the opposition were Tewolde Wolde Mariam, 
then Vice Chairman of the TPLF, flanked by Siye Abraha, at the time head of EFFORT 
(Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray), Gebru Asrat, the president of Tigray, and 
Alemseged Gebre Amlak, former head of the propaganda section of the party. 46 Of the four, 
42 "Ethiopia: Eritrea-Brothers at War, " Africa Confidential 11 September 1998. 
4; Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
as "Ethiopia: Eritrea-Brothers at War, " Africa Confidential 11 September 1998. 
45 Researchers like Leenco Lata claim that this group had been consolidated earlier, as early as in 1995. He is supported by 
notable figures in the Ethiopian opposition, such as Beyene Petros. However, none of the TPLF insiders interviewed for this 
thesis, some 25% of the central committee all in all, including members of the opposition group, support their claim. See for 
example Leenco Lata, "Ethiopia: The Path to War, and the Consequences of Peace, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), Alemseged Gebre Amlak, 
Interview, 26 March 2003, Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003, Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003, Beyene 
Petros, Interview, 3 December 2002. 
46 Kinfe Abraham, Ethio-Eritrean History, Liberation Struggle, Statehood and Bilateral Political Economic Social and 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean War (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
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two resided in Tigray. In addition, Aregash Adane, former regional secretary of Tigray and 
Deputy for Gebru Asrat (at the time Head of Social Affairs with the Office of the Prime 
Minister), played a prominent role. Gebremeskel Hailu, leader of the Dimitse Weyane Bitew 
(the Voice of Weyane), the TPLF radio station, and a leader of the TPLF's propaganda 
committee was also important. Both Aregash Adane and Gebremeskel Hailu were close to the 
events taking place in Tigray. 
The other core members were Abraha Kahsay, long-time veteran of the TPLF central 
committee, Bitew Belay, then Head of Regional Affairs with the PM's office, Aw-Alom 
Woldu, then ambassador to Eritrea, and Solomon Tesfaye "Timmo" Gebreigzi, Head of 
Propaganda, but also the founder of the Cultural Association of Tigray. Abraha Kahsay 
resided in Tigray, while the three others lived outside of the province. 
Abay Tsehay, advisor to Prime Minister Zenawi and secretary general of the TPLF, as 
well as head of the Commission for Sustainable Agriculture and Environmental Rehabilitation 
of Tigray (SAERT), and resident in Tigray since 1995, supported the group, but later changed 
his opinion. Hassan Shiffa, himself a veteran TPLF central committee member, also changed 
his mind later. 47 A majority of the members of the group of twelve were based in Tigray 
and/or had been resident there within the five last years before the Mekele meeting. 
Moreover, several of the members were actively engaged in voluntary work to maintain and 
strengthen Tigrayan popular culture, a culture that was based on the dances and songs of 
Tigrayan Peasants. Together with low-level officials from farming families, such peasants 
were the main implementers of the previously described events taking place in Tigray. 
An examination of the sixteen TPLF members opposing the group of twelve, the 
supporters of the line of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, is also illuminating, illustrating how 
this group indeed had weaker connections with Tigray and Tigrayan peasants. Two members, 
Kidusan Nega and her husband Haleka Tsegay Berhe nearly voted with the group of twelve, 
changing sides very late in the process. The couple resided in Tigray at the time and Haleka 
Tsegay Berhe had in his role as Vice President of Tigray participated in several of the 
meetings trying to solve local border issues. The two Meles Zenawi supporters with the 
closest connection to Tigray were thus also the most hesitant Meles Zenawi supporters. 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi himself, his Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin and the 
former leader of the TPLF Sebhat Nega were the dominating personalities amongst the 
Development, 2004), 370. The group is sometimes given the name the Tewolde-Siye group after two of its leaders. The 
followers of the group also used the name "Guardian twelve" in the early phase of the conflict. 
47 Ibid. 
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sixteen. Importantly, none of the three leaders of the group resided in Tigray. Other members 
included Berhane Gebre-Christos, then ambassador to United States, and Addisalem Balema, 
ambassador to China, again, none of whom resided in Tigray. Two other members, Mulugeta 
Alemseged, the Head of the PM's Office, and Getachew Assefa, then head of the Federal 
Police, also resided in Addis Ababa, as did a third member, Arkebe Oqubay Mitiku. Abadi 
Zemo, the powerful head of several state owned business companies, and also a member of 
the coalition supporting Meles Zenawi, resided mostly in Addis. Zemo's colleague Tewodros 
Hagos had a house in Tigray but lived in Addis Ababa. 
Only three core members of Meles' alliance resided in Tigray, namely veteran TPLF 
central committee member Tirfou Kidanemariam, Gobezay Woldearegay, the Head of 
Southern Zone of Tigray, and Abay Woldu, then chairman of the Central Zone of Tigray. 48 
The list shows that only five out of the sixteen members of the coalition supporting the Prime 
Minister resided in Tigray; two of whom actually supported the dissidents at the start of the 
processes. Not a single leader of the group resided in Tigray. 
Indeed, the dissidents claimed to be closer to Tigray and Tigrayan culture and 
maintained that the group supporting the Prime Minister had betrayed "the people of 
Tigray". 49 Meles Zenawi and his allies were seen as the "Lounge Lizards" or "Palace Group", 
travelling to "high places", talking with "important people" and drinking fine "French wines" 
having abandoned both the culture of Tigray and the TPLF. 50 Researchers such as John 
Young and Medhane Tadesse also argue that the hardliner group became remote from the 
original values of the TPLF, including the values of the simple lifestyle in Tigray: 
The move of many TPLF leaders, who had lived with the peasants and shared 
their deprivations in the Tigrayan countryside, to Addis Ababa, exposed them to 
an alien material world divorced from the realities of peasant existence. 
Inevitably, some cadres were corrupted, yet many remained dedicated to the 
cause. In order to take effective control of the state apparatus, the front had to 
appoint many of its cadres to positions of power and responsibility for which they 
were ill prepared. Power attracted careerists to join the ruling party. Attitudes to 
48 Kinfe Gebre Medhin and Mulogeta Gebre"Chaltu" Hywat were not present, they were busy with other tasks and could not 
attend the meeting in Mekele, but joined the group later. 
a' Kinfe Abraham, Ethio-Eritrean History, Liberation Struggle, Statehood and Bilateral Political Economic Social and 
Diplomatic Relations, and the Ethio-Eritrean War (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
Development, 2004), 381. 
50 EthiopiaFirst, Interviewt' with Ambassador Abdulmejid Hussein (Walta, 2001 [cited 1 March 2005]); available from 
http: //www. waltainfo. com/, Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
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women, comradeship, communal living, religion and the value of a simple 
lifestyle were increasingly challenged. 51 
In opposition to the "Palace Group", the group of dissenters saw themselves as still paying 
attention to the traditional networks, talking with ordinary peasants, travelling in Tigray and 
according to themselves keeping the traditions of old Tigray. 52 The group stresses its 
connection with Tigray, and for example mentions "the people of Tigray" twenty times in 
Gebru Asrat's main statement on the conflict, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray", 
alone. 53 Indeed, the title of this document indicates the emphasis put on the connection with 
ordinary Tigrayans. Several of the members, like Gebremeskel Hailu and Solomon Tesfaye 
"Timmo" Gebreigzi, also worked actively to promote Tigrayan culture in their day-to-day 
work, emphasising, and thus giving value to, the deeds and songs of the Tigrayan peasants. 
Tigrayan peasants, or low level governmental/ TPLF officials, often the sons of such peasants, 
were behind the actions targeting Eritreans in Tigray. 
Admittedly, not all dissenters were from Tigray, but the dissenters from Tigray acted 
as a group towards the remaining members of the group. 54 It is also notable that two out of 
five Tigray-based Meles supporters only supported him at the end of the showdown. 
Additionally, many officials who became members of the dissenters, such as for example 
Gebru Asrat and Aregash Adane, were just the leaders who failed to curtail popular activities 
like riots against Eritrean traders and violations against negotiated agreements in Tigray. 
Indeed, they must have been influenced by such activities, as well as by popular pressure from 
the groups behind them. Muluwork Kidanemariam, then resident in Mekele, was a close 
observer of the events taking place in Tigray: "Popular pressure had immense effect, on 
several Kebele and TPLF meetings the leadership of TPLF in Tigray was pressured, there 
were popular discontents, and the leaders were influenced. "55 Gebru Asrat refers to such 
popular pressure in order to explain his own views. 56 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, another 
prominent member of the dissenters, agrees with Asrat's claims. 57 Sebhat Nega, long-time 
TPLF central committee member and ally to Prime Minister Zenawi, admits that several 
dissenter leaders had been put under pressure by pressure from locals and their actions 
51 Medhane Tadesse and John Young., "Tplf: Reform or Decline, " Review of African Political Economy 97, no. 3 (2003): 
401. 
S1 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
53 Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
sa "Ethiopia: Eritrea-Brothers at War, " Africa Confidential 11 September 1998. 
ss Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
56 Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
57 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
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targeting Eritreans. 58 Sebhat Nega says this even though it could be advantageous for him to 
deny it, for such statements could increase the public perception that the dissenters were 
closer to the common Tigrayans than the EPRDF of today. The actions of the local peasants 
of Tigray, as well as a fascination with and closeness to the Tigrayan culture, influenced the 
processes that lead to the consolidation of the hardliner group. Even the Addis Ababa 
newspapers observed the effect of such pressure, as the Beza wrote in their 8 January 1998 
issue: 
The people of Tigray have exerted great pressure on the government to formulate 
and pursue a clear cut policy regarding Ethio-Eritrean relations. In consequence, 
political leaders have been forced to change their course of action, the pressure 
has taken deep roots so much so that differences of opinion have emerged from 
within the TPLF leadership. This indicates that the trend could open the way for a 
new political direction. 59 
Given the frequency of actions targeting Eritreans and popular pressure, and the number of 
witnesses claiming it had effect, its seems quite certain that the TPLF's Tigrayan leadership 
was influenced by the local initiatives of peasants and low-level officials in Tigray, as well as 
a large respect of the culture of these peasants. 
The formation of the hardliner group had far reaching consequences for the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian Relationship. The group was consistently negative to all of the peace agreements, 
regardless of variations in contents. 60 Siye Abraha, Tewolde Wolde Mariam, Gebru Asrat and 
Alemseged Gebre Amlak, the leaders of the dissenters, for example all voted against the 
Technical Agreement, as did most of the other members. 61 Moreover, the group even resisted 
and continues to resist the current peace agreement. Gebru Asrat, now widely regarded as the 
leader of the group for example claims: 
And who stopped him [Meles Zenawi] when he in contravention of international 
laws confiscated our properties in Massawa and Assab? What I'm saying is not 
that we should flout each and every international law but that these issues are very 
58 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
59 "Is the Journey Uphill Well and Safe?, " Beza 8 January 1998. 
60 Elisabeth Verdier, Who Is Who, Ethiopias 100 Most Important Persons (Paris: Eastern Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2002). 
61 Ibid., 1-90. 
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much at the core of the conflict and they need to redressed. And this redress 
would have start with scrapping the Algiers Agreement. 62 
Ironically, the fissure within the TPLF at one stage probably also had a positive impact on 
peacemaking. Gebru Asrat argues that one of the reasons for the Ethiopian acceptance of the 
Algiers Peace Agreement was that the TPLF was concerned with its internal divisions. 63 
Nevertheless, the group itself stressed its dissatisfaction with what they perceived as lenient 
policies towards Eritrea and wanted a less submissive line. 64 The existence of a group 
consistently negative to the international peace attempts must in general have hindered peace 
making. 
The analysis of the formation of the hardliner group within the TPLF also gives clues 
with regards to why local peasants were allowed to act so freely in Tigray compared to the 
rest of Ethiopia. Amongst the hardliners, Gebremeskel Hailu and Solomon Tesfaye "Timmo" 
Gebreigzi, worked actively to promote Tigrayan culture. Moreover, the reference to the 
Tigrayan culture was common in the publications of the group stressing the virtues of the 
Tigrayan peasant lives, and their closeness to the original Tigrayan values. In many ways, as 
will be shown in the next section, these arguments strongly reminded of previous TPLF 
propaganda that had paid heed, if not outright worshipped the values of Tigrayan peasants and 
their culture. 65 The explanation of the previously explored incidents might be the special 
relationship that had traditionally existed between the people of Tigray and the TPLF, and the 
extreme respect TPLF had for the peasants' culture. 
The TPLF as Wedibna of the Tigrayans 
The TPLF and the Tigrayan Peasants often viewed themselves as one single organic unit, an 
observation that has been made by several external observers. Lovise Aalen for example 
observed how people in Tigray made statements claiming that there was no distinction 
between the people of Tigray and the TPLF, "claiming that the Tigrayan People have watered 
62International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Ifex Alerts 3 January 1996,13, and 12 December 1995 (International 
Freedom of expression exchange, 1996 [cited 14/03 2005]); available from http: //www. ifex. org/es/content/view/full/3337/. 
63 lbid. ([cited). 
64 Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The Reporter 25 April 2001. 
65 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 222. 
184 
the TPLF as a Plant". 66 She also recorded how a Tigrayan academic claimed that "The TPLF 
is flowing as blood in their [people's] veins". 67 The peasants of Tigray had a tradition of 
close affiliation with the TPLF, and many spoke of the TPLF as "Wedibna", meaning "our 
organisation" in Tigrinya. 68 The close relationship between the organisation, the peasants in 
Tigray and Tigrayan culture was rooted in the origins of the organisation. Merara Gudina, 
formerly a member of the Ethiopian student movement during the early seventies, explains: 
There are two major issues we have to consider when we analyse the Ethiopian 
Student Movement (ESM) holistically: these are the questions of class and the 
question of national equality. Even at that time, at least towards what we take to 
be the end of the ESM, the political forces which used to say class struggle first 
and those saying national struggle first were clearly marked out. The first of 
them were then defeated - the EPRP, MEISON and so on. Forces which said 
national struggle first, like the TPLF, won the political battle. 69 
Nationalist sentiments were important amongst the Generation during the regime of Emperor 
Haile Selassie. Nationalism was to gain special importance amongst the TPLF cadres. 70 
The perception that the regime was "a prison house of nations" was strong amongst 
most Ethiopian students of the time. 7' As early as in 1967, there was a riot at the Faculty of 
Education that pitted Tigrinya speakers against Amhara students. On this occasion the riots 
went on for several days. 72 The activities of future Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles 
Zenawi, might again serve as an illuminating example of the more nationalistic stands held in 
the student movement. As a student, Zenawi got into problems with his university when he 
wrote a paper on the legendary battle of Adwa in 1896. This was a battle of great significance 
within Ethiopian, if not African, nationalist discourse. Ethiopia won over Italy, and was the 
first non-western power to win a war over a western power for many centuries. Zenawi 
argued that most of the Ethiopian/Abyssinian soldiers participating in the battle were from 
66Lovise Aalen, "Expressions of Control, Fear and Devotion, " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Siegfried Pausewang and 
Kjetil Tronvoll (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 2000), 90. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 122. 
69 Merara Gudina, "There Is a Serious Tension between the Original Agenda (of the Tplf/Eprdf) and the Project of Liberal 
Democracy, " The Reporter 21 May 2003. 
70 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 83. 
7' Kiflu Tadesse, The Generation (New Jersey: Red sea press, 1993), 52. 
72 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Tigray and he thus indirectly claimed that Tigrayans both suffered most losses and 
contributed most to the victory. 73 Aregawi Berhe, one of the founders of the TPLF claims: 
The university at Addis Ababa became the venue where politically minded 
teachers and students from all districts of Tigray converged and discussed issues 
concerning the whole of Tigray. Land degradation, recurring famines, massive 
unemployment, political marginalization, cultural domination and different 
aspects of social problems were some of the issues that arose, and their solutions 
were debated by students. They compared the level of the problems with those in 
other regions of Ethiopia, believing that conditions in Tigray were by far the 
worst. This assessment was often expressed sentimentally, in relation to the past 
glory of Tigray and its standing in the history of the Ethiopian nation. 74 
The case of Meles Zenawi's hero, Meles Teckle, illustrates how popular nationalist rhetoric 
could be. In 1972 Meles Teckle won over the then ardent Marxist and present day Speaker of 
the lower house of Parliament, Dawit Yohannis, in a nomination contest for the position of 
representative of the Law Faculty. Dawit Yohannis was successfully challenged on the 
question of whether he put the class struggle before the right of Ethiopia's oppressed nations, 
and Teckle won a clear victory over him. 75 Meles Teckle, together with notables such as Abay 
Tsehay, later a member of the dissenter group before turning on his former allies in order to 
support Meles Zenawi, became prominent members in the Tigrayan University Student 
Organisation (TUSA), in which the situation in Tigray was discussed. 76 
There were many problems in Tigray that fed Tigrayan nationalism amongst the 
students. The province had endured several droughts. The Tigrayan language had been 
banned, this in a province with perhaps as little as 12.7 % Amharic speakers. " Moreover, as 
Otto Klineberg and Marisa Zavalloni suggest, Tigrayans had a separate and powerful national 
tradition, from Emperor Yohannes IV, an Ethiopian emperor of Tigrayan origins, to the 
Weyane Rebellion in 1943.78 As Randi Ronning Balsvik points out, many Tigrayan students 
73 Ibid. 
74 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004). 
75 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 86. 
76 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 577. 
77 Ibid. 
7$ The Weyane rebellion was relatively brief, lasting from May 22 to October 14,1943. After the fall of Mekele, capital of 
Tigray, on October 14,1943, practically all organised resistance collapsed. The government exiled or imprisoned the leaders 
of the revolt. The Emperor implemented harsh reprisals against peasants suspected of supporting the Weyane. 
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were aware of the power struggle between Amhara and Tigrayan dynasties in the 20th century 
and that this created distrust between Amharas and Tigrayans. 79 A connection between the 
students and the older elite of Tigray existed, as many of the Tigrayan students were of noble 
families, and senior Tigrayan parliamentarians and leaders actively supported organisations 
like the TUSA. 8° 
Within the TUSA, a politically conscious group by the name of Mahber Gesgesti 
Bihere Tigray (MAGEBT), combining Marxism and nationalist ideology, evolved in 1974. 
Literally translated, the name means the Association of Progressives from the Tigray Nation, 
but for convenience it was called the Tigrayan National Organisation (TNO). 81 The 
organisation symbolised the fusion between Marxism and nationalism that was to become the 
basis for the TPLF. This fusion in many ways meant something new in Tigray, as Donald 
Donham claims: "Before, Tigrayan peasants' sense of difference had related primarily to their 
identification with Tigrayan elites who had competed with other lords in Ethiopia for the 
office of `King of Kings'. "82 The emphasis on class justice meant that the ordinary peasant 
became elevated, with the TPLF's teaching claiming that they should be treated better, 
allowed influence and that old injustice towards peasants should be corrected. The principles 
outlined in the rhetoric of the TNO could in many ways serve as a blueprint for the TPLF 
strategies directed towards the Tigrayan peasants targeting Eritreans in 1997-1998. In 1997- 
1998, the peasants were allowed to continue to violate treaties without any sanctions, they 
were allowed to have influence on central TPLF politics, TNO suggesting that peasants must 
be able to influence central politics, as well as inciting peasants to act outside the law against 
oppressors. Moreover, the emphasis put on the peasant culture of Tigray also had its parallel 
in the developments from 1992 to 1998, the emphasis on their culture in a way elevated the 
peasants status. In 1992 to 1998, the Tigrayan peasants were, rather than being punished as 
non-Tigrayan peasants would have been, elevated to a higher status when they were allowed 
to influence central Tigrayan policies. Importantly, this elevation contradicted the traditional 
very hierarchal traditions of Tigray, as Tigrayan culture had traditionally suppressed, not 
elevated peasants. 83 It did however follow the rhetoric of the Tigrayan student movement, 
stressing the value of Tigrayan peasants and their right to influence. The parallels between the 
79 Randi Running Balsvik, Haile Seliasse's Students: The Intellectuals and Social Background to a Revolution (East Lansing: 
ASC/Michgan state University, 1985). 
80 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 577. 
81 The TNO was established at a meeting held on 14 September 1974, in a Meeting in Piazza in the centre of Addis Ababa. 
82Wendy James, Donald Donham, Eisei Kurimoto, and Alessandro Triulzi, Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism & After 
(Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 4. 
83 Ibid. 
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rhetoric and actions of the Tigrayan students in the TNO and the leaders of the TPLF in 
Tigray from 1992 to 1998 indicate an organisational continuity. 
TNO was to become even more attached to the peasants of Tigray. The TNO became 
active in Tigray: 
Students used to write, demonstrate, organize in study groups and sing songs of a 
revolutionary nature that were more straightforward and programmatic. 
University students took the lead in these revolutionary activities, confining their 
Marxist rhetoric to the company of their peers and expounding the national self, 
determination of Tigray within the conservative peasant society. The ethno- 
nationalist cry was stretched so far as to invoke the martyred patriots of the 1943 
Weyane while hailing their own movement as the second Weyane. 84 
Nationalism became a tool to mobilise Tigrayan masses. The contents of nationalism were 
much simpler in form than the TPLF's Marxism and thus easier to understand for the potential 
local recruits. They invoked the 1943 Weyane rising, in which Tigrayans had risen against the 
regime of Haile Selassie, indirectly celebrating the many Tigrayans, mostly peasants, who had 
participated in this rising. The TPLF claimed that their rebellion was the second Weyane 
Sebhat Nega's sister Kidusan Nega, a very prominent TPLF leader in her own right, for 
instance remarked that "the first Weyane in 1943 becomes the first revolution". 85 One of the 
larger newspapers of the movement was even named the Weyane and the TPLF later also 
institutionalised a celebration of the 1943 Weyane. 
The TPLF symbolically married nationalism through the participation of the Tigrayan 
icon Gesessew Ayele Sihule. 86 Sihule's father was a grazmach (Ethiopian nobleman) and a 
living legend due to his resistance towards the Italians during the 1930's. Sihule had held 
important positions in the imperial regime. He was also famous in Tigray for his fight against 
Ras Mengesha's Gum Arabic cooperation (a state development company) when the latter 
established a factory in Tigray but nevertheless refused to hire workers locally. 
In the words of TPLF founding father Aregawi Berhe: 
84 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 584. 
85 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 87. 
86 Sihule is a nickname. Gesessew Ayele acquired his nickname `Sihule' at the beginning of the armed struggle in February 
1975, in reference to the eighteenth-century Tigrayan warrior and kingmaker Ras Mikael Sihule, whose power was felt as far 
as Gondar and Wollo. Ras Mikael Sihule was known for his decisive action in getting rid of emperors he thought illegitimate 
and replacing them with those of his own choice. He overthrew King loas in 1769 and was responsible for placing the next 
two Emperors on the throne. 
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He [Sihule] had the respect of the people living in the villages adjacent to this 
terrain. Otherwise, the people in these villages would definitely have been hostile 
to the unknown students whose activities had previously been only in the towns. 
When representatives of the people in Shimelba, Tselimoye and Adi-Mohamedai, 
three villages surrounding Dedebit, were approached by the TPLF to render their 
support, they did not hesitate. This compliance was granted not because they 
understood the objectives of the emerging front, nor because of the young 
revolutionary students, but simply because Sihule, whom they knew very well, 
was involved. Thus, it was not surprising that, for some months, the TPLF was 
referred to not by its proper name, but as a group that belonged to Gesessew 
Ayele. 87 
His popular status was immense and he drew many supporters to the TPLF, he gained a 
function similar to the charismatic personalities that Elizabeth Kier describes in her works. 
Sihule was in himself a fusion between the old Tigray and the new movement, embodying 
centuries of traditions, both in his actions, and by his nickname. Gesessew Ayele "Sihule" 
was killed in June 1976, in some ways giving the TPLF more symbolic strength as they now 
had a martyr, an additional icon, connected to Tigray. 
In 1976 the TPLF created the famous "Manifesto of the TPLF" which argued that "the 
first task of this national struggle will be the establishment of an independent democratic 
republic of Tigray. "88 Again this was a compromise between Marxism and traditional 
nationalism; secession was, just like in Stalinism, seen as a step and only a step to "socialism 
and communism rather than being demands or ends in the struggle. "89 Even given this 
comment, the claims of the manifesto were too strong for a Marxist organisation and the 
manifesto was soon after renounced by the organisation. 90 It nevertheless showed that 
amongst many top leaders of the TPLF the issue of Tigray was important and aroused 
emotions. 
87 Aregawi Berhe, "The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front, " African Affairs 103, no. 413 (2004): 590. 
88 Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), "Manifesto of the Tplf, " (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), 1976), 24. 
89lbid., 14. 
90John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 99. 
189 
The close connection with the peasants also provided tactical advantages for the 
TPLF. The present day Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yemane Kidane, explains: 
We used to say: We had to work with the masses, and organise them for war. So 
we saw our army as a spear and the stick was the people. The stick was 
important, all had to participate. If somebody is wounded, somebody will pick 
him up. Women will bring food. Men will give ammunition. When we fight an 
enemy of 5,000, we had an army of 1,000 and 10,000 civilians support us. If an 
enemy has a wounded, the soldiers will have to carry him, if he needs 
ammunition he needs to fetch it. We have others to do that for us. In the end of 
the day the odds are evened out! 91 
This strategy was as old as the TPLF itself: even the TNO tried to send students back 
to their native Awraj as and build up a basis for support, and the TPLF was to take great care 
to avoid committing crimes against the locals and to help them as much as possible. The 
TPLF actively started to recruit amongst peasants, and nationalism and references to the old 
history of Tigray were fertile strategies in order to recruit amongst them. Young rightly claims 
that: "In its battles with Teranafit/the EDU the TPLF concluded that nationalist appeals were 
not enough and that if the Front was to win the support of the peasants it had to address their 
social problems and needs. , 92 As remarked by Meles Zenawi, the urban Marxists had to 
convince the locals to join them in the fight and to adopt some of the tenets of Marxism: "If 
you try to instil a new theory, you don't proceed far. You must start and widen and deeper 
what they already have and in the process the two things get fused and changed at the same 
time. , 93 
At the same time their respect for ordinary Tigrayans increased, as they became 
dependent on advice on how to gather food provided by ordinary peasants. As Meles Asgede, 
TPLF fighter and former peasant put it: "In the forest it was the peasant who had the wisdom 
of life and experience. " Moreover Asgede claims "that wisdom is perhaps more important 
than some far-fetched theory you might have had. "94 
91Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
92 John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 114. 
93 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 389. 
94 Ibid., 56-57. 
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The TPLF showed much care for locals during their struggle. The TPLF soldiers 
discovered treating locals in an impolite manner were heavily punished, even for voluntary 
sexual relationships with locals. In the struggle to defeat the EDU the TPLF popularised itself, 
focusing on land reform, honesty, moderation and local democracy in order to convince 
potential recruits that their organisation was superior. Respect for the Tigrayan peasant 
became grafted into the new recruits; the peasant had the values the recruit was supposed to 
strive to defend. As more and more Tigrayan peasants were recruited, the more important this 
factor became. A part of this strategy was to involve the Tigrayan peasants. Mebratu 
Adhanom told Jenny Hammond how the TPLF first came to their village, Sobeya: "The whole 
village was in church. Afterwards, they gathered us around the church and told us their aims 
and what they wanted to do. Then they asked everybody what were their immediate and 
burning problems. "95 The problems were often banditry and lack of land, and the TPLF took 
strong measures to deal with both of them. 96 The Front's position on land issue, wanting to 
give all Tigrayans equal access to land and taking immediate steps in order to implement it as 
soon as they had gained control over an area, made them more popular amongst the peasants. 
However, by making land communal property, and subsequently by allowing the peasants 
themselves to distribute the land, they built up a system of grass-root participation. 97 Again 
the TPLF empowered the Tigrayan peasant. 
According to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, from the 1980s this also led to a 
formalised policy, in which responsibility was delegated down to hamlet level, so as to 
involve the peasant in every area of the struggle. 98 Peasants and local officials were used 
actively to try to discuss local issues with the low level cadres that also to a certain degree 
were open to their arguments. 99 The TPLF had through their organisational culture become 
used to allowing peasants influence at a neighbourhood level. '00 The pattern of allowing 
peasants informal political influence and giving them influence in local matters was thus 
developed long before the events taking place at the Eritrean-Tigrayan border from 1992 to 
1998. In the eighties the peasants were allowed to influence the local policies of the front, 
and in the nineties they continued to influence such policy, this time using their influence to 
95 Ibid., 267. 
96 Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 
(forthcoming), 142. 
97 Ibid., 143. 
98 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 391. 
99John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 205. 
100 Ibid. 
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thwart the local settlements with Eritrea. Indeed, it must have been hard for a central or a 
more local level TPLF official to challenge such an old organisational tradition. 
This must have been made even harder by the tendency TPLF had to worship the life 
and culture of the peasant. The actions and habits of the Tigrayan peasants were upheld as the 
standard the TPLF soldier was to strive for. The TPLF was engaged in a Tigray cult, cultural 
troupes entertained troops with traditional plays and songs in Tigray and with more modern 
plays that nevertheless frequently referred to ancient Tigrayan history and local culture. Jenny 
Hammond describes how such events took place: 
We arrived in the evening as hundreds of young fighters, organised in their units 
and singing songs, were making their way through the trees and across open 
ground to take their places on hillside, which soared like an immense amphitheatre 
above the performance area. At our last meeting, lassu had confided his idea of a 
musical drama. It will be like an opera, he said. It will be based on the ancient 
songs of the people. It will move the heart. For the last few years, the cultural 
troupe had been researching and collecting traditional songs from the remote 
countryside. They were really sung poems, which had been passed on orally from 
one generation to another and ranged from odes of praise to powerful feudals to 
bitter laments at the injustice and poverty of peasant life. 
Moreover, she emphasises the value such events put on the day-to-day activities of the 
peasant family: 
The simple story of a mother at her grindstone, the father at the plough, and the 
son (who eventually becomes a fighter) wielding his sling against the birds who 
threaten the crop, certainly moved the heart. There must have been several 
thousand fighters on that hillside, but there was not a rustle to be heard and when I 
turned to scrutinise the ones sitting beside and behind me I saw their faces filled 
with tears. 101 
The ideal was the simple peasant and the values they held. The result of this cult of 
Tigray and the TPLF's quest for recruits was a form of contract, in which peasants gained 
101 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 222. 
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influence. Indeed the TPLF was, as Alex De Waal suggests, basing its relationship with the 
Tigrayans on a form of social contract. 102 Such politics had positive effects on the TPLF's 
military efforts. The results of the TPLF politics were a rapid mobilisation of peasants in 
1980-82 and the gain of support from the whole of Tigray. Furthermore, as Young claims, the 
TPLF's care for Tigrayan peasants kept them in Tigray during the droughts. The TPLF's aid 
organisation, Relief for Tigray (REST), managed to provide them with food, and thus 
managed to uphold the TPLF's militia system. 103 
Contact between the TPLF and the local population was always given high priority. 
Political meetings were arranged to indoctrinate the local population. These meetings 
developed and became more of a two-way channel than an arena of pure indoctrination, as the 
worries of the locals were aired. Indeed, this was the way it had to be, for if the TPLF lost the 
loyalty of the people, they might lose the battle itself. Even when it came to religion, the 
TPLF went to great lengths to accommodate ordinary Tigrayans, who were very religious. 
TPLF cadres read the Bible to try to link their causes with religion and to persuade the lower 
clergy and ordinary Tigrayans to join their struggle. 104 Jenny Hammond described how "The 
fighters stayed with us for the whole day carrying stones to the new church. 99105 
The image of the TPLF fighter was also central in the peasants' perception of the 
organisation. The TPLF fighter was seen as shunning luxuries, as sacrificing himself for the 
peasants. In this way the connections between people and leadership within Tigray became 
very close during the struggle, and individuals living in small hamlets would often know 
surprisingly much about the TPLF's dealings. 106 Indeed the foot soldiers of the TPLF were 
recruited from these hamlets. By the end of the war, an almost mythical bond between the 
TPLF and Tigray had been created. The martyrs of Tigray, 30,000 sons and daughters of 
Tigrayan peasant families, were worshipped and a gigantic monument was raised in Mekele, 
Tigray, to celebrate their sacrifices. An Ethiopian holiday, the Martyrs' Day, was reintroduced 
on 22 June, commemorating a Derg attack on the small village of Hauzen in Tigray in 
1988.107 The expression "in the name of the martyrs" became almost a magic spell and was 
invoked in the major conferences of the TPLF. 108 Tigrayans also repaid the post-war 
102 Alex De Waal, Famine Crimes (Oxford: James Curry, 1998). 
103John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, the Tigray People's Liberation Front 1975-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 131. 
104 Because of the Dergs' religious prosecution, the TPLF and the church also had common enemies. Ibid. 
105 Jenny Hammond, Fire from the Ashes (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, 1999), 267. 
106 Kjetil Tronvoll, Personal communication, 12 March 2002. 
107 Kjetil Tronvoll, Identities in Conflict, an Ethnography of War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia 1998-2000 
(forthcoming), 254. 
108 As in the Mekele meeting in 2001. 
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courtship from the TPLF, by referring to the organisation as "Wedibna", which means our 
organisation in Tigrinya. 109 It became "the plant that they watered". ' lo 
The TPLF's sister organisations were different. Organisations like the EPDM and the 
OPDO achieved military supremacy over their home areas relatively late in the conflict with 
the Derg, if not after the latter's collapse. It was almost impossible for them to build up a 
relation with peasants they lacked contact with. The TPLF's sister organisations were also 
recruited from a variety of backgrounds, many from what could be deemed to be the remains 
of other organisations lacking the TPLF's link with their respective population. In the case of 
former EPRP members in the ANDM and the OPDO, they came from an organisation that 
focused more on class than on nationality. ' 11 In this sense, the EPRDF was a schizophrenic 
organisation. In Tigray popularly instigated actions targeting Eritreans were allowed and even 
had influence on the TPLF, outside Tigray the punishment for popular small scale action 
would be severe. This enabled the effects described by Muluwork Kidanemariam, where 
angry Tigrayan Peasants dared to face high ranking TPLF officials and even influence their 
decisions. 112 It also explains Lovise Aalen's description of how TPLF officials were shouted 
at in some popular meetings. ' 13 Moreover, the respect and emphasis on the Tigrayan peasants 
and their culture remained an important element of the TPLF even after its war against the 
Derg had ended. It remained important even when no more soldiers were needed from the 
hamlets in Tigray. It was regularly invoked in propaganda, in speeches; it had become an 
unconscious element in the TPLF's organisational life: it was a part of organisational culture. 
It is symptomatic to read some of the TPLF publications. Its newspaper the Weyyin 
often focused on the peasants, their culture and the need for students and intellectuals to make 
sacrifices in order to help them. In 1996, they for instance wanted the students to go into the 
Tigrayan countryside to teach peasants: 
"As such one way the people can use their time, energy and knowledge during the 
coming long vacation is to go into the countryside, serve the people and learn 
109 Sarah Vaughan, and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, Sida Reports 
(Stockholm: SIDA, 2003), 122. 
110 Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), Tplf Begins 6th Congress (Walta, 2001 [cited 1 April 2005]); available from 
www. waltainfo. com. 
11 Merara Gudina, "There Is a Serious Tension between the Original Agenda (of the Tplf/Eprdf) and the Project of Liberal 
Democracy, " The Reporter 21 May 2003. 
112 Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
113 Aalen also claims that fear played a part in the relationship between Tigrayans and the TPLF but fails to give any 
examples of intimidation. She does however give several examples of statements confirming the devotion between the TPLF 
and Tigray, of how Eritrean issues created loud and severe criticism against TPLF. Lovise Aalen, "Expressions of Control, 
Fear and Devotion, " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Siegfried Pausewang and Kjetil Tronvoll (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of Human Rights, 2000), 81-96. 
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from the people and in so doing contribute significantly to the development 
process currently underway. "114 
The sacrifices of the peasants in arms, the common soldiers of the TPLF, were stressed in 
both TPLF and EPRDF newspapers. 115 
This was the organisational culture that surrounded the TPLF officials in Tigray who 
were supposed to curtail illegal local behaviour. This was the organisational culture that 
influenced Gebru Asrat when he faced such behaviour in Tigray. It was also the 
organisational culture surrounding Meles Zenawi. However, he was far away from the 
pressure from the peasants, he did not meet them in his day to day work, and the reaction of 
his Palace Group indeed became different. 
Interaction with other factors 
Elements of TPLF organisational culture unconsciously defined respect for peasants and their 
opinion as correct. Importantly, there was much anti-Eritrean animosity amongst peasants in 
Tigray. The Eritrean deportation of Ethiopians in 1991-1992 was remembered. According to 
Human Rights watch, most of the deported were members of the Derg's army, intelligence 
and the Derg's Ethiopian Workers Party. 116 However, rapid implementation meant that 
decisions were taken in a rush and many mistakes were committed. In October 1991 the EPLF 
for example deported 424 non-Eritrean orphans, residents of church- and government-run 
orphanages in Asmara. ' 17 The TPLF also estimated that many Ethiopians left in panic when 
they observed the Eritrean will to use force against the deported. 118 The deported Ethiopians 
had few means to take care of themselves and became a burden for the place they were 
deported to, namely Tigray. As Meles Zenawi claims: "In Tigray, there was not enough food 
even for the resident let alone for 100,000 more. There was not enough shelter. " 119 When 
114 "What We Expect from Our Students, " Weyyin 6 June 1996. 
115 See for example : "Lest Our Martyrs Should Have Died in Vain, " Abyotawi Demokrasi 27 June 1996, "What We Expect 
from Our Students, " Weyyin 6 June 1996. 
116Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Human Rights Developments 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1992 [cited 1 March 2005]); 
available from http: //www. hrw. org/reports/1992/WR92/AFW-02. htm#Pl 1134316. 
"' Ibid. ([cited). 
118 "Interview [Transcribed] with Meles Zenawi from Etv, " Addis Zemen 22 August 1991. It is important to underline that a 
large number of Ethiopians, 70,000 in Assab alone, choose to remain in Eritrea. 
119 Ibid. 
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dealing with the incident, the TPLF maintained their tradition of secrecy, failing to inform 
about the event, so rumours were allowed to circulate locally. 120 
Conflicts concerning land distribution and the rights to use natural resources were 
common, and also created animosity inciting farmers against Eritreans, symptomatically the 
frequency of conflict increased in the ploughing season. 121 Indeed according to the Eritrean 
researcher Tekie Fezzehasion most of the incidents where Tigrayan peasants violated existing 
bilateral agreements directly involved conflicts over resources. 122 
Moreover, the trade laws created animosity. The laws regulating trade were confusing 
and hard to understand even for Ethiopians. 123 Loopholes within Eritrean and Ethiopian trade 
laws made it tempting for Eritrean traders to take advantage of them. Ethiopia refused to use 
currency that was earned through exports for imports, creating incentives for hiding exports to 
avoid reporting the earned currency. In 1994 approximately 40% of all exports were illegal, 
and many of these illegal export activities were conducted by Eritreans, since the more 
developed Eritrean economy provided more capital for investments. 124 In addition, Eritreans 
were banned from importing Ethiopia's exportable goods, and they were not allowed to re- 
export to Ethiopia goods from a third country; the same did not apply to Ethiopians in 
Eritrea. 125 Additionally, the lower birr: dollar exchange rate in Asmara meant that foreigners 
got products cheaper there than if they bought them from the source in Ethiopia, creating 
incentives for the Eritreans to cheat. 126 Finally, an illegal scheme that involved many Eritreans 
was the production of fake birr notes. According to Ethiopian sources, the trade related 
episodes of actions targeting Eritrean were most common, being according to Eritrean sources 
only second to the resource related incidents. 127 
The new trade regulations that were implemented in 1997, after the Eritrean 
introduction of their currency, the Nakfa, made things even worse. Firstly, these new 
regulations, allowing border trade only if the total amount was less than birr 2,000, 
120 Several similar incidents occurred later, following the same patterns. Eritrea dumped unwanted people, some of Sudanese 
origins, in Tigray. The TPLF still often failed to inform about the causes for the deportation, so strong sentiments against 
Eritrea, rumours and actions targeting Eritreans followed. Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
121 Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. 
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005), 15. 
122 Tekie Fessehazion, "Explaining the Unexplainable: The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border War, " The Eritrean Studies Review 3, no. 
2 (1999). 
123 "For Clarity of Directives, " The Reporter 12 August 1996. 
'2' Gote Hansson, The Ethiopian Economy 1974-94: Ethiopia Tikdem and After (London: Routledge, 1995), 110. 
125 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War Making Sense of the Eritrean Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Curry, 
2000), 33. 
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approximately 285 dollars, gave many new incentives for smuggling. Almost all of the trade 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea became illegal overnight. Secondly, the new trade arrangements 
were implemented in a confusing way. 
However, the above explored factors do not explain why the TPLF, a very successful 
military organisation with very efficient strategies to deal with its enemies and unwanted 
internal elements, failed to discipline its own cadres. Local party officials, customs officers 
and militia were allowed to operate the laws in a confused and non-transparent way since they 
had local support. The TPLF centrally failed to punish or constrain the local initiatives of 
militia leaders or seemed afraid when facing hot tempers in Kebele (municipality) 
meetings. ' 28 The President of Tigray, Gebru Asrat, a tough veteran guerrilla fighter, used to 
acting harshly in order to purge potential traitors from his organisation, had a hard time 
controlling the sentiments and had to face popular opinion in the meetings with Tigrayans. 129 
Lovise Aalen describes how Tewodros Hagos, top level TPLF central committee member, 
was severely criticised in many popular and even municipal meetings, partly because of his 
position on Eritrea. ' 30 As earlier indicated, similar actions committed by peasants in other 
Ethiopian provinces were at best neglected by the EPRDF, at worst curtailed with power. ' 31 
The emphasis on the value of the Tigrayan peasant, the organisational tradition for allowing 
them influence in local matters, allowed the factors that angered Tigrayan peasants to have 
influenced the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. The TPLF was simply not willing to use force 
to curtail the peasants that its organisational culture had elevated into icons and idols. This 
means that organisational culture had a clear effect: without an organisational culture that 
prevented the TPLF from punishing peasants for their actions, even trying to stop them, these 
peasants would have had little influence on the bilateral Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. 
Instead they would have been imprisoned or curtailed, as their colleagues were in other border 
zones. 
128 Muluwork Kidanemariam, Interview, 13 March 2003. 
129 Sebhat Nega, Interview, 21 January 2003. 
130 Lovise Aalen, "Expressions of Control, Fear and Devotion, " in The Ethiopian 2000 Elections, ed. Siegfried Pausewang 
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131 See for example "Mass Arrest of Peasants, " Tonrar 24 September 1997, "North Gondar: Hot Bed of Tension, " Wonchif 19 
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The Effect of Organisational Culture 
The case of the TPLF and its traditional relationship with Tigray and Tigrayan peasants 
illustrates how a founding ideology, namely nationalism, combined with a selective 
recruitment pattern (peasants) and recruitment strategies created a strong element in 
organisational culture. It also illuminates the fruitfulness of analytically accepting the 
differences within the EPRDF: it was only the TPLF amongst the EPRDF organisations that 
had the traits in question. Moreover, as indicated by organisational theory, the physical 
location of sub-groups even within that organisation influenced the strength of these traits. 
The closer the TPLF members were to Tigray and the more local actions targeting Eritreans 
they saw, the more they became influenced by them. 
This chapter again clearly illustrates the fruitfulness of applying Kier's theories in 
addition to other approaches. Organisational culture explains why resource scarcity as well as 
peasant protests contributed to developments leading to war only in Tigray, and not in other 
border zones. The close relationship between the TPLF and the peasants and low level civil 
servants of Tigray, entrenched in TPLF organisational culture, enabled the latter groups to act 
outside the control of the government and outside both Ethiopian-Eritrean treaties as well as 
the Ethiopian law, angering Eritreans and creating more tension in the border areas. 
The pressure from locals and the respect TPLF gave them also led to a formation of a 
hardliner group within the TPLF. This group was led by individuals both geographically and 
culturally closer to the Tigrayan peasants, and is a group that was negative towards all the 
peace plans that were launched to end the war, and that remains negative to the current Peace 
Agreement. 
Organisational culture played a crucial role. Without the culturally entrenched 
respect for the Tigrayan peasants, less hostility towards Eritreans would have ensued and 
peace would have been easier to maintain. 
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Chapter 8: From Analytic to Problem-Solving Peace Research 
In this chapter implications for the study of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, as well as theoretical 
implications, are presented. The findings of the previous chapters are then used in order to 
explore strategies to address the Eritrean-Ethiopian war and potentially in other wars. Firstly, 
the chapter argues that a focus on organisational culture reveals new information because it 
avoids treating ethnic groups as more homogeneous than they really are and broadens the 
focus of examination of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war to include organisational interaction, as 
well as the culture of important sub-groups within these organisations. Secondly, basing it- 
self on the first argument, the chapter argues that the application of several standard peace 
research policy guidelines in order to prevent or stop war, such as press support, increasing 
multilateral trade and employing a powerful third party broker, could, if not implemented in a 
way that corresponds with local organisational cultural factors, contribute to increased tension 
in the Eritrean Ethiopian case. General principles are subsequently deduced to address some 
similar problems and to promote peace. 
This last undertaking is grimly topical. Although the Algiers Agreement was supposed 
to solve the border issue, the verdict of the Border Commission created as a consequence of 
the Agreement has failed to be respected. ' On 28 March 2003, the Commission clarified that 
the area known as the Badme Plains was largely Ethiopian. However, the commission also 
stated that the village of Badme, the area where the first clash of the war took place and an 
area that had a prominent role in the war propaganda of both of the belligerents, was inside 
Eritrea. 2 Ethiopia raised serious questions about the process and failed to accept the status of 
Badme, claiming that this issue needed to be readdressed during the demarcation on the 
ground phase, de-facto rejecting the verdict of the commission. Although the border is 
patrolled by United Nations soldiers, the situation remains tense. 
' Eritrea and Ethiopia, Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia (US Institute of Peace, 2000 [cited 20 April 2003]); available 
from www. usip. org/library/index. html. 
2 International Crisis Group, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace, " (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 6. 
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Implications for the Study of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war 
As illustrated in chapter three, most researchers studying the Eritrean-Ethiopian war either 
treat the two states as homogenous entities, treat the various ethnic groups in the countries as 
culturally homogeneous or focus on the interest of individuals. 3 The war is seen as a product 
of a problematic border between two states, contradicting interests of two countries or ethnic 
groups and cultural and historical animosity between ethnic groups, or self interest. This 
thesis challenges this focus. The war was not only about the relationship between Ethiopians 
and Eritreans, nor was it only about the relationship between Eritreans and Tigrayans or about 
the personal interests of the leaders. The Ethiopian society consists of a multitude of 
organisations with a multitude of often overlapping sub-group cultures. The process that leads 
to war is an interaction process between all these groups, as well as their Eritrean 
counterparts, interacting with both the culture of ethnic groups, with the effects of economic 
factors and with the interests of individuals. However, so far the analysis of such sub-groups 
and their culture have been neglected, and an important aspect of the development that led to 
the 1998-2000 war has been lost. 
The chapter thus shows how a more traditional approach focusing on ethnic culture 
fails to explain events easily explained when organisational culture is considered in the 
analysis. Importantly, it was organisational culture, neither the ethnic culture of Tigrayans nor 
a more general Ethiopian culture, which enabled the empowerment of the Tigrayan peasants 
explored in chapter seven. Contradicting TPLF organisational culture, Tigrayan culture 
traditionally held local peasants in low esteem and mass action had previously been 
mercilessly put down. 4 The focus of the study of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war has to be 
expanded in order to include organisational cultural factors. 
Secondly, the findings of the thesis indicate that the dynamics of EPRDF subgroup 
interaction is an equally important, but equally neglected factor directly influencing the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian bilateral relationship. A small number of researchers have already 
emphasised the interaction between the various sub-groups within the TPLF and the effect 
this had on the outbreak of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the most notable being Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) veteran, Leenco Lata. 5 As Lata suggests, sub-group interaction had 
3 See chapter three 
' Wendy James, Donald Donham, Eisei Kurimoto, and Alessandro Triulzi, Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism & After (Oxford: 
James Currey, 2002), 4. 
5 Leenco Lata, "Ethiopia: The Path to War, and the Consequences of Peace, " in Unfinished Business, Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
11'ar, ed. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 2005). 
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an impact on the duration of the war and the various peace negotiations. 
6 However, the 
theories employed in this thesis also explain how some of the most important sub-groups 
came into existence. As suggested by the organisational theories presented in chapter one, 
location within an organisation matters, because geographical location may limit social 
interaction. This thesis claims, as do many of the members in the dissenter group, that the 
formation was a consequence of their closeness to Tigray and the popular actions taking place 
there. 7 Importantly, the analyses of EPRDF subgroups in this thesis show that explorations of 
the Eritrean-Ethiopian war have to acknowledge the existence of even sub-groups within 
organisations, sub-groups with different cultures. 
Thirdly, the findings of the thesis indicate that organisations have to be studied over 
time in order to understand fully their decision making, and that the EPRDF's history 
similarly has to be explored in order to understand decision making. As explored in chapters 
five, six and seven, old cultural elements, such as rejected ideology, cultural remains from a 
guerrilla period and a focus on Tigrayan peasant culture, influenced decision making. The 
consequence becomes that the organisational history of the most important organisations 
within a belligerent party has to be understood in order to understand why this belligerent 
made decisions that prevented peace and damaged the relationship with other belligerents. 
In addition, the thesis suggests that other organisations than the organisations in power 
in Eritrea and Ethiopia have to be studied in order to adequately understand the factors that 
created the war, namely the press that put pressure on Ethiopian politicians, not for peace, but 
to act more hawkishly towards their Eritrean counterparts. The organisational theories 
employed by Elizabeth Kier suggest that the initial recruitment pattern of organisations will 
influence the culture of organisations. Moreover, it is suggested that a hostile environment 
will entrench the parts of the organisational culture providing justification for the struggle. 
This happened in the case of the first generation newspapers in Ethiopia, creating a prevailing 
pressure for more hawkish actions towards Eritrea and Eritreans. 8 The theoretical approach 
employed in this thesis thus reveals new insights: insights, controversially exploring the 
negative effects of an oppositional press, and insights also explaining why this came about. 9 
Elements of organisational culture within several important organisations had a crucial impact 
on the developments that led to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Moreover, organisational theory 
6 Ibid. 
7 Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003, Gebru Asrat, "Letter to the People and Council of Tigray, " The 
Reporter 25 April 2001. 
8 See chapter four 
9 See chapter four 
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illuminates aspects of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict that never have been explored before. 
The organisational history is seen as a whole, and decision-making is seen as connected with 
the organisational past. 
The main contribution of this thesis to the research into the causes of the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian war is its demonstration of the importance of organisational culture and also of a 
broadened research focus, a focus that includes such organisational culture, organisational 
history and also an examination of seemingly minor actors as the Ethiopian press. In this 
sense the thesis contains a warning, addressed to the analyst studying this war as well as 
researchers studying other wars: it warns against examining belligerents as more 
homogeneous than they really are and against a belief that ethnic or national groups are the 
only form of groups that can have a distinct culture. 
Theoretical Implications 
There are several additional theoretical insights offered by this analysis. Firstly, one insight 
concerns Kier and Swindler's analytic division in settled and unsettled periods of 
organisational life, the former an organisation that keeps ideological assumptions as 
unconscious assumptions, the latter keeping it as a conscious belief. It seems as though an 
organisation can be both settled and unsettled: parts of the EPRDF were still consciously 
Marxist, while parts kept Marxism as unconscious assumptions. The EPRDF did not totally 
reject Marxism, nor did it keep it as a hidden agenda. The situation was much more complex. 
The EPRDF was far from homogenous, while there was a circle within ANDM, around its 
leader Bereket Simon, pushing for market reform, as well as a circle around Meles Zenawi 
holding similar opinions. A group around President Gidada saw revolutionary democracy 
only as a stepping stone in order to achieve more wealth, before communism could be 
implemented, a New Economic Policy (NEP) of Ethiopia. 10 Importantly, members of 
Zenawi's group tended to pay lip service to Marxism at party meetings in order to keep the 
loyalty of the latter group. In this way the findings in the thesis indicates that one has to take 
the possibilities for several sub-groups into account when employing Kier and Swindler's 
terms. The EPRDF was both settled and unsettled at the same time, some parts of the 
10 Bereket Simon, Interview, 25 December 2002, Negasso Gidada, interview, 31 December 2002. 
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organisation unconsciously keeping the former ideological assumptions, some parts still 
adhering to Marxist ideology and some adhering to it for tactical reasons, attempting to 
maintain the unity of the organisation. 
Nevertheless, the concept of settled and unsettled organisations is still fertile. The 
respondents dealing with the IMF Agreement and the border negotiation in 1997-1998 
acknowledged that the connection between two was subconscious. The discussions of the 
Technical Agreement went on within the whole organisation, involving members both within 
and outside the Marxists surrounding President Gidada. Both incidents show that Marxist 
assumptions were still carried by sub-groups outside President Gidada's group within the 
EPRDF. Parts of the organisation acted as an unsettled organisation, parts of it acted as a 
settled organisation. Thus the concept of an organisation going from the status of being settled 
to being unsettled illustrates vital processes within important sub-groups of the EPRDF. 
Secondly, the analysis suggests that categories of organisations may share many 
historical experiences and thus also share traits of organisational culture. One such category 
of organisations is the first generation of Ethiopian newspapers, the papers starting up within 
two years after the new Press Law. These newspapers shared their recruitment patterns and 
experiences with the government. As explored in chapter four, many of the first generation 
newspapers recruited from the old Derg papers; the expertise of these old journalists was 
invaluable to the new newspapers, providing them with journalistic competence. As explored 
in chapter six, the Ethiopian government tended to overreact towards what it perceived as 
threats, and to fail to disperse information. 11 The latter did not concern only the Tobiya; some 
very moderate papers were affected, the legendary editor in chief of the moderate Addis 
Tribune, Tamrat Bekele was for example arrested by the government in 1994, but released 
shortly afterwards. 12 Even the newspapers of category four, all with relatively good 
relationships with the government, had such problems. More surprisingly, even newspapers 
from category five, owned by the state or the party, had problems in getting information. '3 
Three different factors were thus influencing the organisational culture of most of the early 
first generation papers. The first factor was a common recruitment pattern; the second factor 
was lack of information and the third factor a continuous hostile relationship with the 
government, which it is important to point out did not influence the papers from the segments 
11 "A Trend of Non-Transparency, " The Reporter 14 January 1997. 
12 "Tamrat Bekele (Chairman Ceo of Tambek International Ltd) April 24/1944 - June 02/2000, " Addis Tribune 2 June 2000. 
13 Sekuture Getachew, Interview, 5 February 2003. 
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of the press on more friendly terms with the government or the government papers themselves 
(category four and five),. 
These similarities between different organisational cultures indicate that similar 
external settings and recruitment patterns might homogenise culture across organisational 
boundaries. On the other hand, such findings do not contradict the need for in-depth research 
on the various organisations. Moreover, it does not indicate an existence of a homogeneous 
press culture, or that the papers had been marked by a homogeneous Ethiopian culture. The 
newspapers of the first wave became different from other Ethiopian newspapers that did not 
share their experiences. Other newspapers, as the Reporter, with good sources within the 
government, a less tense relationship with the government, a different recruiting pattern and 
an editor who was a former TPLF member developed very different organisational culture. 
The Reporter did not accuse the government of being controlled by Eritrea. Similarly, the 
Addis Tribune, although amongst the private papers started up in the period 1992 to 1994, 
showed a very different recruiting pattern, recruiting from the private business sector as well 
as amongst the old journalists, and also having a businessman as its first editor-in-chief The 
Addis Tribune focused on business related stories and invoked the theme of Eritrean control 
over the EPRDF in a different way from for example the Tobiya. 14 All papers did not have a 
similar organisational culture, only a segment of them shared similar experiences and 
recruitment traits. However, this segment was very important, commenting upon events that 
other papers failed to comment upon. 
A Foundation for Policy Guidelines 
In sum: this thesis initially asked if organisational culture had an influence on Ethiopian 
decision-making before and during the war in ways that prevented peace. It also asked how 
such organisational culture originated. The four previous chapters show how such 
organisational culture influenced, and how culture had originated in previous ideology, 
recruitment patterns, organisational propaganda, standard organisational procedures and 
organisational crises. The examination of various Ethiopian organisations influencing the 
bilateral relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia provides several new insights never before 
" "Celebrating Addis Tribune's Tenth Anniversary, " Addis Tribune 30 August 2002. 
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revealed in studies of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Firstly, the organisational culture of 
independent Ethiopian newspapers prevented them from having a positive role in promoting 
peace. Elements of organisational culture rather made these newspapers attempt to push the 
Ethiopian government into being more aggressive. Secondly, former ideology entrenched in 
the organisational culture of the Ethiopian ruling party had a negative effect on peace 
negotiations, mainly because the mediator, the United States, a former ideological enemy that 
had become an ally, was regarded with suspicion. Thirdly, the thesis reveals that values 
entrenched in organisational culture during the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front's 
(EPRDF) guerrilla years, namely an emphasis on security and secrecy, had a malign influence 
on the Eritrean-Ethiopian relationship. Lastly, the thesis discloses that the prominent role of 
the Tigrayan peasants within the organisational culture of the strongest organisation within 
the EPRDF, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), allowed local border incidents to 
escalate in the Tigrayan region of Ethiopia. Certain strategies employed to deal with specific 
elements of organisational culture could have slowed or even stopped the process that led to 
war or enhanced negotiation attempts. The deduction of such strategies is the task of the 
following sections. 
It is important to point out that the analysis conducted in the previous chapters does 
not disclose the single most important cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war; however, this was 
never intended. The analysis rather reveals factors that intervened on different stages of the 
process leading to the conflict, and factors that prevented peace after the war had started. 
Nevertheless, these elements created tension and contributed to the carnage of the war. Such 
a process-centred rather than event-centred approach, offers several possibilities for the 
deduction of policy guidelines. Rather than focusing on one or two major factors that should 
be changed, it focuses on many small factors, factors that can perhaps be changed without the 
loss of prestige needed to change the more prominent factors like for example the border. The 
identification of such factors creates a foundation for the deduction of policy guidelines in the 
next part of the thesis. The war was not only about the relationship between Ethiopians and 
Eritreans, nor was it only about the relationship between Eritreans and Tigrayans, nor about 
the personal interests of the leaders. The war was rather about the interaction between a 
multitude of organisations with a multitude of often overlapping sub-group cultures, 
interacting with both the culture of ethnic groups and with the interests of individuals. 
Several of these sub-groups within the Ethiopian society, such as the media, the Tigrayan 
locals and the sub-groups within the EPRDF need to be addressed when designing policy 
advice. In order to prevent the potential negative influence of these groups, their members 
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either need to be accommodated in ways that prevent their negative influence on decision - 
making, or the subculture of these groups has to be changed, sometimes in ways that 
seemingly contradict traditional policy advice dealing with conflict. 
Media and the Prevention of Conflict 
This thesis has analysed the elements of organisational culture that influenced the Eritrean- 
Ethiopian relationship negatively so as to push the countries towards war, and also so as to 
prevent a successful negotiation outcome after the war had started. Chapter four focused on 
the role organisational culture had in the Ethiopian oppositional press. The main conclusion 
was that inheritance from the Derg made several newspapers adopt a puppet theme, 
describing the EPRDF as puppets of the Eritreans. EPRDF leaders had to adopt a more and 
more hawkish stand against Eritrea in order to show how invalid the puppet theme was. 
It is a common view within liberal and democratic thought that a free press is 
important to prevent conflict. Political philosophers from John Stuart Mill to Amartya Sen 
argue for the importance of the press. 15 Mill for example argues that a public press and the 
resulting free debate together create an arena where arguments can be met with 
counterarguments and new views in order to prevent individual and societal self-deception. ' 6 
Such philosophical arguments are reflected in the various agendas for good governance, ways 
to improve the governance in third world countries, bringing them up to the supposedly higher 
standards of western countries. The General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, for 
instance claimed that a free press was an essential part of good governance, which in turn 
would lead to peace. ' 7 Moreover, in policy defining reports, Kofi Annan actively encouraged 
and encourages support for the free press in third world countries. 
' 8 
This belief has to a certain extent been challenged by media researchers. Ross Howard 
for example claims that: 
15 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal 
Value, " Journal of Democracvv 10, no. 3 (1999): 7. 
16 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 19-56. 
17 Kofi Annan, "Report of the Secretary-General on Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organization, " (New York:: United Nations, 1999), 10-14. 
18 Ibid., 1-27. 
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The news media is also capable of causing considerable damage when no-one is 
intentionally wielding it at all. Under ideal conditions the news media is supposed 
to have a mind of its own and operate according to professional codes of conduct. 
But its culture of professional and financial instincts can drive the media to 
practices which obsess with violence and influence opinion in socially 
destabilizing ways. Under less than ideal conditions, media bias, inaccuracy and 
sensationalism can generate xenophobia and violent conflict. ' 9 
Howard argues that there are two factors that under some circumstances can lead to a 
negative impact even from a free press, namely sensationalism and partisanship. The findings 
of this thesis show the existence of a third one, namely organisational culture. A majority of 
the Ethiopian oppositional papers failed utterly in the task given to them by Mill: they did not 
open up a public debate, their opinions were static and few counterarguments were included 
in their articles. Importantly, this does not mean that the lack of a free press would fully have 
prevented the war, nor is it to say that a free press can never contribute to peace. However, in 
the Ethiopian case, the free press pressed their agenda of hostility towards Eritrea, 
contributing to a generally negative public discourse about Eritrea, and put pressure on 
several politicians. 20 
Contrary to some of the advice within the good governance agenda, press support 
actually seems to have had the potential to make a situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
tenser. Moreover, it seems as though financial support for independent newspapers, like the 
Tobiya during the years 1994 to 1998, could have led to an increase in the distribution of 
articles depicting Eritreans as evil, and the number of articles depicting the government as 
their puppets. As argued in chapter four, the frequency of such articles scared Eritreans, 
intimidating politicians of Eritrean origins as well as possibly pushing the government in a 
hawkish direction. 21 Such developments made the relationship between the two belligerents 
even more hostile. 
Based on these findings, this thesis thus suggests that general advice to support a free 
press in order to prevent war has to be treated with caution, and that each separate case merits 
19 Ross Howard, "The Media's Role in War and Peace Building" (paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Media in 
Public Scrutiny and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector, Budapest, 6-9 February 2003), 1. 
20 Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003. 
21 Medhane Tadesse, and John Young., "Tplf: Reform or Decline, " Review of African Political Economy 97, no. 3 (2003), 
Yemane Kidane, Interview, 28 January 2003, International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Ifex Alerts 3 January 1996,13, 
and 12 December 1995 (International Freedom of expression exchange, 1996 [cited 14/03 2005]); available from 
http: //www. ifex. org/es/content/view/full/3337,. 
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detailed examination. Painstaking attention has to be paid to the details of press support 
programmes in order to promote reflection rather than habitual thinking and hawkish 
newspapers. In this way it follows Ross Howard, when he argues for a more holistic 
approach to press support schemes, but also going beyond him when arguing for also taking 
the organisational culture of the newspapers into account when constructing press support 
schemes and aid programmes. 22 Simplistic press support can make a situation tenser, as large 
papers with cultural traits inherited from previous regimes are supported. 
Nonetheless, thoroughly planned press support might have a positive effect. 
Importantly, not all newspapers shared the organisational culture that facilitated the spread of 
the puppet theme. Several of the first generation newspapers had journalists that had worked 
for the Derg, while newer papers, what Shimelis Bonsa called "the second generation of 
Ethiopian newspapers", had a different recruitment pattern. 23 However, the second generation 
newspapers were weak, with few educated journalists and little organisational experience. 24 
The newcomers' lack of access to information and little experience in investigative journalism 
made it easier to adopt the editorial stance of larger and more experienced papers. Support for 
the second generation papers and providing them with financial resources, information and 
training, might have created an alternative to the first generation papers. 
Importantly, the large first generation papers, such as the Tobiya, cannot be blamed for 
the negative development. There is little doubt that they displayed appalling journalism, but 
the government also exposed them to violence that in turn made their journalism even worse, 
becoming more confrontational and also less based on external sources. In addition, the 
government had an extreme tendency for secrecy, which to a certain extent opened up for the 
circulation of rumours. Pressure should have been put on both parties in this conflict; this 
could have been done by both third party governments as well as by international 
organisations. The government should have been pressured to abide by its own laws and to 
provide information to the press. Some of the large first generation private papers could have 
been pressured to ensure the quality of their sources, or tentatively ensure that they actually 
had sources. Donors could have supported smaller and newer newspapers, more open to new 
impulses, and they could have trained journalists in critical journalism. By doing this, they 
could have contributed to ending the dispersion of elements of organisational culture with 
negative effects, through enforcing rigorous quality standards. 
I` Ross Howard, "The Media's Role in War and Peace Building" (paper presented at the Conference on the Role of Media in 
Public Scrutiny and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector, Budapest, 6-9 February 2003), 12. 
23Shimelis Bonsa, Survey of the Private Press in Ethiopia 1991-1999 (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2000), 57. 
21 Ibid. 
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Moreover, donors could have created arenas where Ethiopian journalists could meet 
Eritrean journalists and/or journalists from the entire Horn of Africa (including Djibouti, 
Somalia and Kenya), thus making the organisational culture of both parties open to scrutiny. 
Such gatherings could create opportunities for fruitful discussions that could introduce 
alternative perspectives in a much cheaper way than flying in journalists and editors from 
Europe and USA. It could give the smaller Ethiopian newspapers new role models, replacing 
some of the larger newspapers adhering to the puppet theme. Indeed, many of the Somali and 
Kenyan papers, such as the Hatuf, the Jamhurya and the East African Standard are of high 
quality. 25 Targeted donor support actively using regional actors might prevent malign 
elements of organisational culture from spreading, thereby also facilitating a true discussion 
between papers holding different views. Some existing programmes like the cooperation 
project between the Centre for Human Rights in Oslo, Gimlekollen Journalist College in 
Norway and several Ethiopian newspapers can be expanded in such a direction emphasising a 
regional rather than a solely Ethiopian profile. 
The international peace movement could play a part in improving Ethiopian 
journalism. Parts of the peace movement arranged various courses promoting press ethics and 
peace journalism. 26 These courses have themes like "War Journalism - the dominant 
narratives of conflict reporting and how to recognise them", or "Getting beyond the sport and 
court paradigm of winner takes it all. " Indeed, some of the workshops of the peace movement 
encourage journalists to answer questions like: "What is this article not telling us? " They 
contain exercises that encourage journalists to "identify the important facts of A and how they 
are perceived by B and vice versa". 27 These courses could indeed have been good tools to 
create an awareness of organisational culture amongst Ethiopian journalists. Academics also 
have a large potential to contribute to peace. Firstly, they might counter the lack of 
information facing the Ethiopian papers, by establishing media-academic links, and 
academics might provide the media with alternative sources of information. This can be 
achieved by creating joint seminars initiated by Somali, Kenyan and Djiboutian academicians, 
rather than by Europeans. There have been some achievements on this front already. One 
25 Somali papers are in general vibrat, innovative and good despite the conditions in the country, however their circulation 
numbers are small. Hatuf will e. g. publish around 1,400 issues a day. 
26 Trandscend Peace University, Peace Journalism (Transcend Peace University, 5 October 2004 [cited 5 October 2004]); 
available from www. transcend. org/tpu/jl-course. htm. 
27 lbid. ([cited). 
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example was the Horn of Africa Conference III: Transforming the Horn of Africa - Culture of 
War Vs War Culture" arranged by the Somali International Rehabilitation Centre. 28 
The conflict between the oppositional newspapers and the government also hurt 
oppositional political organisations, which got little, if any, information from the government, 
and often misinformation from the private papers, information confirming negative images of 
Eritrea. One way to counter a potential lack of information is to institutionalise questioning, 
creating arenas where the government and the opposition can meet regularly for public 
discussions. First, institutionalised questioning will allow both the opposition and the 
government to get direct information about each others' views. Secondly, the two parties will 
become used to discussing with each other, and will get to know each other directly instead of 
through articles in papers heavily influenced by their own organisational culture. Thirdly, the 
press might become used to such interactive discussions instead of one side presenting their 
arguments and this might influence editorial style. Again, this is a development that has 
already started. The Inter Africa Group initiated high level public meetings between the 
opposition and the government in 2003, and similar discussions were also held before the 
2005 elections. Such arrangements could be expanded and their frequency increased. 
The conclusion must be that all press support is not necessary good press support, and 
that a free press does not always promote peace. As the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Aid, 
Hilde Frafjord-Johnson, claims, "badly trained journalists are like badly trained poodles: more 
good as simple amusements than real watchdogs against the government. , 29 The same can be 
said about journalists influenced by a too strong organisational culture. Press support is not 
necessarily a good thing; a private press does not necessarily have a positive role in a society 
but it can be of immense value if supported in a proper way. The issue of press support is a 
very important issue in Ethiopia today. The opposition and the private press in Ethiopia 
remain hostile towards the peace with Eritrea and the Algiers Agreement. 
30 There are several 
international support schemes envisaged to support just the newspapers arguing against the 
Peace Agreement. Paradoxically such support could lead to increased agitation for war, and 
malign consequences of foreign press support schemes have to be addressed. 
28 Somali International Rehabilitation Centre, "Programme Workshops" (paper presented at the Horn of Africa Conference 
III: Transforming Horn of Africa- Culture of War Vs War Culture, Lund, 28 August 2004). 
29 Hilde Frafjord-Johnson, "Utdanning Av Journalister" (paper presented at the Jubilee for the cooperation agreement 
between the Journalism college of Gimlekollen and Addis Ababa University, Gimlekollen, 17 February 2004), 2. 
30 See for example articles as: "Robust Democracy: Sentinel of Peace!, " The Reporter 15 January 2005. 
211 
Trade and Neutrality 
Theorists such as Richard Cobden and Norman Angell argue for trade liberalisation as a 
measure to stop war. 31 When trade is liberated several mechanisms arise which are supposed 
to create peace. Trade can enhance peace between former belligerents by capturing the impact 
of trade on the states' welfare with respect to consumers, producers, exporters and 
importers. 32 The gain trading partners get from trade, in theory creating cheaper commodities 
for all parties, is seen as deterring the parties from engaging in warfare. Moreover, investment 
and trade might serve as media for communicating interests, preferences and needs on a broad 
range of matters among trading partners. Trade is seen as getting people involved with 
individuals from other countries thus creating social bonds that prevent hostile feelings and 
animosity. 33 
As John O'Neal, Bruce Russett and Michael Berbaum claim, these theoretical 
arguments are today supported by many peace researchers and policy makers alike. 34 The 
promotion of peace through free-trade is indeed one of the explicit targets of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 35 However, the findings in this thesis indicate that 
such policy advice might have counterproductive effects, especially when it is a result of 
foreign pressure and not properly adjusted to local factors as for example organisational 
culture. During the period just before the war, from 1997 until 1998, the IMF engaged 
Ethiopia in a structural adjustment programme. It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss 
the advantages and failures of structural adjustment programmes. 36 Nevertheless, concessions 
towards the IMF were linked with concessions towards Eritrea, allowing fewer concessions to 
be made towards the latter. The implementation of the structural adjustment programme 
enabled an issue linkage between the negotiations on the structural adjustment programme 
31 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York:: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1933), Richard Cobden, The Political Writings of 
Richard Cobden (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903). 
32 Ruth and Seev Hirsch Arad, "Peacemaking and Vested Interests: International Economic Transactions, " International 
Studies Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1981). 
33 Solomon W. Polachek, "Why Do Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship between International 
Trade and Cooperation, " Review of International Economics 5, no. 3 (1997), Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade: An 
Economics Approach to Political International Interactions, " in Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process, ed. 
Walter Isard and Charles H. Anderton (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1992). 
31 John Oneal, Bruce Russett and Michael Berbaum,, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International 
Organizations, 1885-1992" (paper presented at the Annual meeting of American Political Science Society, California, 31 
August 2001). 
35 Horst Köhler, "Welcome Address: Peace Pole Dedication with the Goi Peace Foundation, " (Washington: 2002), 1. 
36 For analyses of the Ethiopian-IMF relationship see: Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: The 
Penguin books, 2002), The International Monetary Fund, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Imf (The 
International Monetary Fund, 2005 [cited 1 July 2005]); available from www. imf. org/external/country/ETH/. 
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and the negotiations with Eritrea to have influence. The linkage happened because members 
of the TPLF felt that the IMF and Eritrea were allies, both representing the global bourgeoisie. 
Although officially rejected, old Marxist ideological assumptions about the global bourgeoisie 
still had influence, even as much as seven years after they were officially abandoned. The 
result was that concessions to the IMF were seen as equalling concessions to Eritrea. Through 
subjective issue linkage the IMF was seen as Eritrea's ally. The IMF was actually a 
participant in the conflict without knowing it. Such beliefs worsened the relations with 
Eritrea, which was quite ironic since the Eritreans actually held similar beliefs about the 
IMF. 37 
The findings in this thesis suggest that international organisations promoting certain 
agendas of good governance must examine properly the previous ideology of the most 
important organisations in the countries with whom they are cooperating. If international 
partners fail to conduct such an examination, the result could be increased tension. In the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian case the IMF's agenda to promote free trade indirectly contributed to 
conflict, probably without the IMF understanding it themselves. 
It might be argued that the Eritrean-Ethiopian case actually supports the advice that 
free trade creates peace, as the end of the free trade area between the two countries led to 
conflicts as the borders were closed down. This is a complex issue, beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The point here is that pressure for free trade can, if applied without knowing the local 
setting, be counterproductive if the aim is to create peace. 
Organisational Culture and Mediation 
The role of organisational culture in the negotiation process also merits closer attention, as 
does the interaction between organisational culture and the mediators trying to create peace. 
Peace and conflict researchers like Marieke Kleiboer and Ronald Fisher have previously 
discussed how the characteristics of a mediator affect the process in terms of mediator 
impartiality, leverage and the like. 38 Ronald Fisher claims that: 
37 Gote Hansson, "Building New States, Lessons from Eritrea, " World Institute for Economic Research discussion paper 
(2001): 92. 
38 Ronald J. Fisher, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management, 2001), Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure in International Mediation, " Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996). 
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The received view on third-party bias is that the third-party should be impartial, 
without favouring one party over the other, neutral, and not determining outcomes 
one way or the other. Impartiality is seen as one of the main requirements of 
acceptability by the parties, and as a prerequisite to establishing a relationship of 
trust. It serves as the basis for effectively carrying out the role of intervener. 39 
Impartiality is thus stressed as important. 40 
The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict also shows that the perceived position of the mediator 
in the international system is not neutral for the results of the negotiation process; the point in 
this case was ideological. The USA was seen as the defender of capitalist ideology, and this 
was seen as having a direct implication on their mediation, they were seen as biased towards 
Eritrea. The intervention of the United States during the vote over the Technical Agreements 
failed. The issue linkage between the war and a perceived global struggle against the USA 
influenced the USA's efficiency as an arbitrator between the parties. Parts of the EPRDF did 
not see the USA as neutral because of the EPRDF's organisational culture. 41 
As the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested: "Many mediators make 
serious mistakes. However, they believe that their authority and mandate derive from their 
personal stature, or the body which appointed them, rather than from the disputant parties. " 42 
The authority and legitimacy thus derives from the belligerents. In this way the perception of 
the belligerents also becomes important for the legitimacy of the mediator, a perception that 
might be formed by organisational culture. 
Conflict researchers Kevin Avruch and Peter Black have proposed that the first step in 
a successful intervention should be to carry out a cultural analysis of the conflict. They 
suggest an in-depth analysis, going beyond one's own cultural identity, seeking instead to 
ascertain the particular cultural dimensions of the conflict and to assess their relevance to its 
expression and potential resolution. 43 The findings of this thesis indicate that organisational 
culture, including former ideological assumptions and their strength within the implicated 
39 Ronald J. Fisher, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management, 2001), 19-20. 
40 For an alternative view see: Saadia and William Zartman Touval, "Mediation in International Conflicts, " in Mediation 
Research. The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention, ed. D. Pruitt and Associates K. Kressel (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1989). 
41Negasso Gidada, Interview, 31 December 2002. 
42 Laurie Nathan, "A South African Policy Framework on Peace Initiatives in Africa" (paper presented at the Second 
Workshop with Civil Society: Draft paper on Peace Support, Pretoria, 1997), 5. 
43 Kevin Avruch, and Peter Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects, " in Conflict 
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, ed. D. Sandole and H. van der Merwe Dennis J. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993). 
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organisation, has to be a part of such cultural analysis. Moreover, it indicates that such 
cultural analysis might be necessary if one wants to identify which mediators are perceived as 
biased by important sub-segments of the various involved belligerents. An ideal facilitator/ 
mediator should not be a country or organisation that is perceived as hostile by parts of the 
elite of an involved country. 
Although power might be important on occasion, as one might need military or 
economic power in order to enforce settlements, it is also important that the mediator is seen 
as neutral. Parts of the EPRDF did not see the USA as neutral, and this created problems 
regardless of Meles Zenawi's threat that the United States would use its relatively large power 
if Ethiopia did not comply, in fact this threat proved counterproductive to a settlement. 
If a mediator with a controversial ideological background is chosen, perhaps because 
of its power in the international system, the rhetoric of the mediator has to be adapted to the 
situation. It was very unfortunate that the United States, the old enemy of the TPLF, was seen 
as the main instigator of the pressure applied on Ethiopia to implement the Technical 
Agreement. If other actors, such as for example the European Union or China, had taken the 
lead or even acted as equal partners to the United States, perhaps less hostility would have 
followed, as they had been less prominent in the TPLF's pre-1991 discourse. 44 
The global peace movement has an advantage when dealing with the belligerents if 
they are willing to use it, as it is generally viewed as being critical to western interventions in 
the third world, and it includes many former Marxists. These two factors make it more likely 
that their advice would be listened to, as organisational culture within the EPRDF enhanced 
these values. It will also be less likely to perceive them as agents of foreign powers; after all, 
the peace movement is usually critical towards their own governments. This gives the 
movement an additional advantage and a momentum if they want to engage themselves 
actively. Certain views about conflict can be promoted and alternative strategies can be 
envisaged more freely. 45 The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict could perhaps also be more 
efficiently dealt with by a country sharing the same ideological foundations: a former Marxist 
regime in transition or a country run by former Marxists, such as for example South Africa, or 
Algeria, who later actually successfully took a more active part in the negotiations. In this 
way a form of subsidiarity could have been applied. 
4' The EU successfully took the lead in the troublesome negotiations between the EPRDF and the opposition after the 
elections in 2005, thus indicating that they could engage themselves successfully as mediators. 
45 However, this demands a will on behalf of the peace movement to engage themselves in other conflicts than Afgnanistari, 
Iraq and the Palestine-Israeli conflict. 
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The European Union defines subsidiarity as "deciding an issue at a decision level as 
close as possible to the persons it concerns. "46 Perhaps a form of ideational subsidiarity, to 
have a mediator that is as close as possible to both of the parties with regards to ideology and 
ideological past, would be an advantageous way to deal with the Eritrean-Ethiopian case. 
Perhaps such a principle of ideational subsidiarity could be advantageous, if adapted to local 
conditions, in other cases. 
The Events in Tigray 
Local initiatives by the border population in Tigray, actions that influenced the TPLF's 
politicians, also seem to provide valuable insights for some of the more general approaches to 
policy guidelines, especially approaches focusing on democratisation as a way to achieve 
peace. This tradition can be traced back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who claimed that: 
"If the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be a 
war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky 
a game. " 47 Kant's discussion is complicated, and he has strong reservations with regards to 
the positive effects of popular influence. Nevertheless, the argument that this mechanism 
prevents wars has been presented by notable peace researchers as Rudolph J. Rummel. For 
Rummel, the population has to sacrifice its sons and daughters in a war, so this will lead to 
them to use their influence to prevent it from happening. If such popular influence is allowed, 
if their influence is efficient, if there is a democratic society, the likelihood for war will 
decrease. 48 This line of argumentation also became a part of the good governance rhetoric of 
institutions actively involved in peacemaking, now also including informal process of 
political participation as tools to promote peace. Former General Secretary of the United 
Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali for example claimed that "Promoting formal and informal 
processes of political participation" was a form of peace building, preventing war. 
49 
46 The European Union, Glossary: Subsidiarity (The European Union, 2005 [cited 19 April 2005]); available from 
www. europa. eu. int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/q4OOs. html. 
47 Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, " in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, ed. Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 113. 
48 Rudolph J. Rummel, "Political Systems, Violence and War" (paper presented at the United States Institute of Peace 
Conference, Arlie House, Arlie Virginia, 1 June 1988). 
49 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the 
Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on the 31 January 
1992, " (New York: The United Nations, 1992), 55. 
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However, far from constraining the Ethiopian government, through locally instigated 
actions in Tigray, informal political participation ended up pressurising the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
relationship in a negative direction. The way locals were allowed to instigate such actions was 
a serious problem in the Eritrean-Ethiopian case, creating distrust on the Eritrean side. 
Importantly, the events in Tigray were driven by locally instigated actions: they were not a 
part of a plot by the central Ethiopian leadership to provoke war. If that was the case, then 
Ethiopia would not have refused to mobilise, nor have downsized their army. 5° 
Several peace researchers warn that popular participation can have damaging effects. 
Although arguing for popular influence, even Rummel warns that the population 
"superheated" with hate and revenge can "drive democratic nations to war" under the 
"irresistible" influence of "ambitious politicians". 51 Researchers such as for example Hävard 
Hegre warn that democratisation actually increases the likelihood of armed conflict, until the 
process has gone beyond a certain threshold, only then it will promote peace. 52 The findings 
of this thesis indicate that critics of policy advice based on a belief that democratisation and 
popular participation inevitably lead to peace, have a point. It supports the conclusions of 
conflict researcher Alexander Kozhemiakin that popular influence does not necessarily 
neutralise a negative [in the sense that it promotes conflict] cultural legacy but may make 
government leaders more susceptible to popular hawkish appeals and nationalist pressures 
working against international cooperation. 53 
Incidents in Tigray remain a serious problem today: As present day General Secretary 
of the United Nations Kofi Annan writes in his 2003 progress report to the Security Council: 
"Since my last report, the number of Ethiopian herdsmen and livestock entering the [the 
demilitarized] Zone on a daily basis in some areas in Sector Centre has increased even more. " 
54 As late as on 21 June 2005, the United Nations warned that such "small-scale events, if left 
unchecked, had the potential to spiral out of control and evolve into a larger crisis", warning 
of a rise in the number of incidents. 55 The greatest concern of senior Ethiopian officials is 
50 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-98 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1998), Alemseged Gebre Amlak, Interview, 26 March 2003. 
51 Rudolph J. Rummel, Power Kills. Democracy as a Method of Non-violence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 105. 
52 Hävard Hegre, "The Limits of the Liberal Peace" (PhD Thesis, University of Oslo, 2004), 131. 
53 Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, Expanding the Zone of Peace? Democratization and International Security (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
sa Kofi Annan, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, " (New York: The United Nations, 2003), 
1. 
ss Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Unmee Warns of 
Continuing Border Incidents (Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)/ UN office for coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2005 [cited 27 July 2005]); available from 
http: //www. irinnews. org/report. asp? ReportID=48222&SelectRegion=Horn_of Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA- 
ERITREA. 
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often that "The Tigrayans would instigate skirmishes, and this could erupt into full scale 
war. "56 The warnings from Tigrayans are ominous: leaders of the Tigray Regional 
Administration have stated unambiguously that people along the border cannot accept the 
ruling. There are several signs that popular pressure is being applied to the TPLF. The TPLF, 
previously immensely popular in Tigray, almost lost out to a more hawkish candidate in the 
border province Irob during the 2005 elections, probably because of distrust of the TPLF's 
supposed leniency towards Eritrea. TPLF officials increasingly need to please their 
constituency. The split within the TPLF now means that the Ethiopian leaders have rivals 
contesting over the support of Tigrayans, and the emphasis on the Tigrayan culture remains 
important within the organisation. Tsegay Berhe, President of the Administration, warns that 
accepting the decision to concede traditionally Ethiopian-administered areas would weaken 
the TPLF, the leading party within the ruling EPRDF, in the eyes of the Tigrayan people. 57 
The interaction between various factors described in chapter eight still remains, the natural 
resources in the area are scarce and new clashes, like the ones before 1997, might happen 
again. Several organisations activitie in Tigray with a vested interest in the conflict, such as 
for example the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, add more tension to the current situation. 
It becomes important that mediators and peace makers recognise the existence of the 
pressure from the Tigrayan constituency of the TPLF. The element of the organisational 
culture of the TPLF which enables local informal channels of influence is one of the core 
elements in the culture of the organisation and will be almost impossible to change. This 
places responsibility on the already overburdened United Nations Mission in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia (UNMEE). Through civil affairs programmes tension can be eased and information 
can be gathered, making it possible for the UNMEE to prevent local clashes in the 
demilitarised zone. As the International Crisis Group claims, it is important to: "Create a 
rapid response verification capability to troubleshoot border difficulties and deter those who 
may want to manufacture a problem, including to embarrass a national government intent on 
fulfilling its obligations. "58 
The resource situation in the border area remains a source of local conflict, resources are 
scarce and poor Ethiopian and Eritrean locals have many incentives to fight over them. That is 
why the international society needs to address several of the root economic problems in 
Tigray. Generous foreign aid might prevent resource conflicts from emerging during a future 
56 International Crisis Group, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace, " (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 8. 
57 Ibid., 10. 
58 Ibid., ii. 
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demarcation, while local development projects might make resources less scarce. This thesis 
can only concur with the advice promoted by the International Crisis Group and its advice to 
the governments of the United States, the African Union and the European Union to provide: 
"Generous compensation and development aid to affected local populations, including support 
for relocation, reconstruction of infrastructure, and restoration of livelihoods. "59 In the longer 
term, arranging contact between villages on both sides of the border might be a good strategy, 
creating an arena for discussing problems and dissolving tension. However, given the closed 
border, this is not yet feasible. 
How to Deal With Secrecy 
Although the EPRDF won the war, the analysis in chapter five demonstrates that the EPRDF 
failed to engage successfully in dialogue elements within their own organisation. Previous 
analysis demonstrated that the slow flow of information created large problems and that the 
organisation often acted sluggishly and clumsily. It could be in the interests of the EPRDF to 
improve their information dissemination abilities; indeed this is recognised by members of the 
party. 60 
There are several ways to approach this problem. Third party mediators, both 
governments and organisations, may create institutions where individuals with a relatively 
independent background, and/or with a different ideological background, can screen the 
government. A good alternative is to involve traditional elders or technocrats, groups that 
might be less threatening to the government. Many such arenas ought to be created. The 
EPRDF has partly institutionalised somewhat similar procedures through their earlier 
mentioned principle of Gimgemma, where civil servants and party members are submitted to 
an oral review by their peers. However, the aim of Gimgemma is to discuss the performance 
of civil services and does not examine in depth the hidden cultural assumptions underlying 
decisions. Furthermore, the Gimgemma is not performed by outsiders or technocrats, but by 
party officials, with a similar background to that of the person questioned, sharing the same 
organisational culture. Shared organisational culture could hinder an exploration of this same 
organisational culture. In additional, the Gimgemma is not an interaction; often it functions 
59 Ibid. 
6o Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
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rather like an interrogation. An opening of the Gimgemma, allowing trusted externals to 
participate and making the process into an interaction rather than a one-sided questioning 
process, is advised. This might sound naive: the EPRDF may be seen as a closed 
organisation that would refuse to implement such policies, partly because of their own 
organisational culture. However, members of the EPRDF have themselves acknowledged how 
many problems their cult of secrecy has created for them. 61 For third parties to the conflict, it 
could be fruitful to ask the EPRDF if it could be possible to implement such routines; for the 
EPRDF it could be useful to implements such routines itself. 
Another way to address the problem is to consider legislation. As explored in chapter 
four, the Ethiopian Press Law was, although revolutionary in the Ethiopian setting because it, 
for the first time in Ethiopia allowed independent newspapers, confusing and allowed the 
government many opportunities for punishing newspapers and keeping information secret. In 
2003 the Ethiopian government issued a draft of a new Press Law. While this Press Law 
acknowledged the right of the press to have information (Article 3.1. ), it included restrictions 
on who could lead and start newspapers (Article 5. ), various paragraphs dealing with how to 
stop legally the information flow (Articles 14 to 20) and a relatively vague right to appeal 
(Article 31). 62 Moreover, the draft uses several relatively vague terms to define newspapers 
that can be censured, such as for example "immoral". As the international press institute 
claims: "The term carries with it certain religious connotations and is so wide and subjective 
that it might once again be abused by the Ethiopian government. "63 A way to challenge th. 
cult of secrecy could be to challenge some of the legislative problems in the Act. Clearly the 
vague right to appeal and the many articles dealing with how to prevent the disclosure of 
information give civil servants and EPRDF officials excuses to follow their old organisational 
culture and chose secrecy rather than openness. 
Too much secrecy creates rumours, as it clearly did in the Ethiopian case. Refraining 
from giving information will lead to, and indeed did lead to, serious rumours. Rumours might 
influence popular opinion and for this reason even decrease the options available to a 
government. 
61 Mulugeta Gebre Chaltu Hywat, Interview, 5 March 2003, Techa Uqa, Interview, 16 December 2002. 
62 The Ethiopian Ministry of Information, A Proclamation to Provide for the Freedom of the Press (The Reporter, 2003 [cited 
I April 2005]); available from www. ethiopianreporter com/drpress. php. 
63 International Press Institute, Comments on the Ethiopian Press Law (International Press Institute, 2003 [cited 1 April 
2005]); available from www. freemedia. at/R_EthiopiaLawl7.12.03. htm. 
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General Principles 
This chapter concludes that an independent press might in some cases damage the possibilities 
for peace, and that trade agreements could damage the prospects for peace through issue 
linkages. 
Moreover, it suggests that popular informal participation might promote rather than 
prevent conflict and that the ideological background of a belligerent can make mediation by 
third parties much harder, that is if the third party have previously been defined as an 
ideological enemy. Lastly, it suggests that information is important in order to avoid rumours 
damaging both parties in the negotiation process. These findings will form the foundation of a 
set of general principles. 
The above analysis is based on information from the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict only. 
It may be argued that this limits the value of the deduced principles. However, as Robert K 
Yin claims, one might generalise analytically, suggesting that policy generalisations may be 
important for cases with large similarities. Nevertheless, deduced principles have to be 
examined specifically in relation to case specific information from these other cases. 64 
The deduced general principles below, based on the previous analysis, might give 
clues for dealing with factors that can ruin peace processes and make a tense situation even 
tenser. Such principles can be used by governments, organisations and academics alike, as 
long as they are interested in addressing violent conflicts, or conflicts believed to be on the 
way to becoming violent. All in all, seven principles are deduced: 
-A principle of examining elements of organisational culture and remains of old 
ideology before implementing policies directed against belligerents. It seems to be 
negative to create tension in an already tense phase by imposing policy that is 
controversial because of issue linkages created by organisational culture. In this case, 
an agenda that was supposed to create growth but also, according to the IMF, 
supposed to create peace, free trade, was linked to other issues and thus created 
tension. 
-A principle of ideational subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity 
is usually defined 
as deciding an issue at a decision level as close as possible to the persons it concerns. 
64 Robert K. Yin, "Case Study Research: Design and Methods, " (Thousand oaks: Sage, 2003). 
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The principle of ideational subsidiarity is to have a mediator that is as close as possible 
to both of the parties with regards to ideology and ideological past. 
-A principle of examining elements of organisational culture before designing 
programmes of press support, and to acknowledge that a free press is not necessarily 
good free press. Supporting the private press in an erroneous way might facilitate 
aggression. Sometimes the support has to be planned in order to hinder malign 
elements of organisational culture from spreading. 
- The principle of open journalistic and academic channels. Discussion will expose 
journalists and researchers to assumptions beyond their own organisational and 
national culture. Regional academics and journalists should handle such tasks if 
possible. 
- The principle of creating arenas of contact between the opposition and the 
government. The principle is most important in a phase just before conflict and just 
after. It will make the organisational culture of larger newspapers less important. 
- The principle of minimising secrecy. As admitted by EPRDF officials, this should be 
in the interests of the Ethiopian government, as it gives them more freedom of choice 
in the long run. 
- The principle of institutionalised questioning by externals. Individuals lacking the 
organisational culture of most of the organisational members might see culturally 
based assumptions more clearly. 
Conclusions 
The thesis contains many warnings to future peace makers. It asks them to remember that 
small elements like the action of local herdsmen, vanished ideologies or old standard 
operational procedures might have influence. Such factors are harder to discover and to 
understand as they do not figure in the argumentation of the belligerents, indeed the 
belligerents are often not aware of them. These factors are not the large factors discussed in 
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the newspapers, they are not big economic issues or contesting views on the demarcation of a 
border. Nevertheless, they might create uncertainty and might have a crucial impact on both 
the process leading to war and the negotiations attempting to end it. 
It warns against taking a homogenous state or ethnic-wide culture for granted, as sub- 
groups often have different and non-ethnically defined cultures. The Tigrayan culture did for 
example not explain why peasants were empowered by the TPLF, organisational culture did. 
Secondly, it warns potential peace makers about applying existing policy guidelines 
for peace, especially the ones stipulated in the good governance agenda, for example support 
for the private press, liberalisation of trade, popular participation, in a simplistic manner. It 
suggests that if such strategies had been applied in the Ethiopian case without taking the 
special circumstances of this case into account, they would actually have had the potential to 
make things worse. 
The thesis contains a third warning. The Eritrean-Ethiopian war is not cold yet and the 
international community cannot afford to look away and hope for the best. Accordingly, both 
academics, journalists, international organisations, states and peace activists still need to focus 
on solving the current situation. 
However, the findings also suggest that there are ways of dealing with the problems. 
This chapter suggest that regional organisations and journalistic and academic networks might 
have a potentially large role in creating arenas that can make organisations aware of their own 
organisational culture and the constraints it creates and it suggests principles guiding how to 
achieve this. These findings suggest that there is hope. Elements of organisational culture 
may have negative effects that might be changed or accommodated - the most important thing 
is that one is aware of them. 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide 1 
(The contents of the two pages were combined into one page and used when interviewing) 
Page 1: Main Subjects: 
1) Respondent's background, story of his/her life. (This is a good way of getting a 
respondent to relax; besides it may contain important information). 
2) Respondent's organisational background, organisational heroes and rituals. 
3) How his organisational background has formed him/her, in the respondent's own 
words. 
4) Organisational rites, taboos, managerial styles, heroes. 
5) Critical events for his/her organisation, his/ her perceived estimate of the 
psychological effects. (Cognitive interview standards applied) 
6) Spirit of the organisation. 
7) How he/ she felt if they changed organisation. (Cognitive interview standards 
applied). 
8) Which groups of society he/ she admires. 
9) When he/she changed his opinion on different events. (Cognitive interview standards 
applied) 
10) When he/she changed his/her opinion on Eritrea. (Cognitive interview standards 
applied) 
11) What he/ she felt when speaking in the decision making group. (Cognitive interview 
standards applied) 
12) When he/ she felt that the mode changed in the group. (Cognitive interview standards 
applied) 
13) If he/ she felt that the group was isolated. 
14) Respondent's comments to the interview, additional information that the respondent 
wants to add. 
The interview guide is based on suggestions and a tentative structure made 
by lb Andersen in his: "Valg of organisations- 
sociologisk metoder" (How to Choose organization-sociological research 
methodology). Samfundliteratur, Kobenhavn. 
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Page 2: Key words 
Events Agreements Ideas Non-state Governmental Themes 
organisations and Organisations 
ethnic groups. 
The The Asmara Eritrean Tigray and EPRDF Zobas system 
occupation pact of leaders dream Tigrinya 
of Adi 1993. of Singapore 
Murug as an 
economic 
ideal 
Italian The Eritrean vs The Tigray The Joint Disputed 
Occupation agreement Ethiopian Peoples Border territorial zone 
of Ethiopia made idea of Liberation Front Commission on the Badme 
in 1936 between nationhood (TPLF). plains 
Italy and 
Ethiopia, 
signed on 
10th July 
1900 
The Refusal The The The Eritrean The House of The public 
of Nafka, Khartoum organisational Peoples the Federation and 
November meeting, ideas Liberation Front organisational 
1997 held in (EPLF) discussion 
April 1988 might have 
(connected hardened the 
to the attitudes 
closing of 
the Berka 
rout) 
Mediations Eritrea The Kunama Committee for The GTZ 
preceding States' Affairs Tigray map 
the war 
The Badme Ethiopia The political The House of Eritrean vs 
incident parties with Peoples' Ethiopian idea 
important Representatives of nationhood 
positions in the 
decision-making 
process. 2 
2 This could be: Amhara Nation Democratic Movement, 
Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic From, Tigray People 
Libration Front, Afar National Democratic Party, Benshangul Gumuz Peoples' Democratic 
United Party, Gambela Peoples' 
Democratic Front, Council of Alternative Forces for peace and 
democracy in Ethiopia, Southern Ethiopia Peoples' 
Democratic Coalition, Hadiya National Democratic Organization, Oromo Liberation 
United front. Ethiopian Democratic 
Party, All Amhara People Organization, Oromo National Congress, Sidama 
Hadicho People's Democratic Organization, 
Siltie People's Democratic United Party, Hareri National Legue. But the question 
has to be explored during studies in 
Ethiopia. 
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